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When one recalls the queer characters and landscapes of Truman Capote, what images does the memory offer? In all likelihood, one envisions prepubescent protagonists traversing pastoral atmospheres rich with gothic inspiration, unearthing their proto-sexual otherness somewhere among the cattails with a sense of astonishment that, at its most generous, could be described as *dubious*. And while the characters of works such as *The Grass Harp*, "A Christmas Memory," and *Other Voices, Other Rooms* may offer themselves to readings of sexual queerness in the tradition Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick emphatically rejects for positing "gender and sexuality as continuous and collapsible categories" (157), I am motivated by more contemporary maneuvers in queer theory to instead dwell on queerness as a more thorough resistance to broader "regimes of the normal," wherein—as Michael Warner asserts—queerness "has the effect of pointing out a wide field of normalization" (xxvi). It would appear obliquely in this spirit that Kenneth T. Reed contends that to read Capote's 1958 novella *Breakfast at Tiffany's* is to "become aware that the novelette itself is in part a deliberate affront to…the whole cluster of values that form the Protestant Ethic" (21). Bearing this evaluation of Capote's novella being synonymous with the troubling of hegemonic ethical norms—which Gayle Rubin observes as being overwhelmingly fixated on sex (148)—in mind, how might we reconsider *Breakfast at Tiffany*'s primary fixation, Holly Golightly, in the context of this oppositional-related sexual ethic? Although, as I will later examine, Holly's aptitude to exemplify such sexual antinormativity is conditional on more intricacies of her subjectivity than merely her sexuality. Often rendered nominal by relevant scholarship, Holly's regional migration

to New York City appears to authorize an exploration of erotic personhood previously unnoticed as though obscured by the pre-migratory space itself. Interrogating these concurrent accounts of sexual queerness and regional exodus within the novella, one perceives a scheme wherein the erotic lives of subjects of specific regional spatialities are influenced by idyllic, ontologized narratives of sexual liberation emerges. In response, then, the following developments move to conceptualize the possible organizations of erotic attachments preemptively foreclosed by such influence, introducing an approach of de-essentializing current identitarian configurations wherein identifications are situated along distinctive, discursive axes.

Queer Is as Queer Does

From the onset of the novella, Capote depicts Holly as deploying her sexuality in order to actualize material desires. Paying the rent on her modest apartment with money gleaned with her "particular talents" (103), Holly confides to the narrator that she makes money during her late-night rendezvous with various men: "[A]ny gent with the slightest chic will give you fifty for the girl's john, and I always ask for cab fare too, that's another fifty" (26). Though not a requisite for Holly's yield, these encounters are additionally displayed to occasionally end in sex (73). This ambiguity in which Holly makes her livelihood has attributed to an ongoing discussion surrounding whether or not Holly is a sex worker, a point Capote attempts to clarify in a 1968 interview with *Playboy*: "[Holly] had no job, but accompanied expense-account men… with the understanding that her escort was obligated to give her some sort of gift, perhaps jewelry or a check…but there was no emotional involvement on either side; the girl expected nothing but a present…although if she felt like it, she might take her escort home for the night" (41). If one is to side with Capote, then Holly's sexual characterization seems to be reliant on the pursuit of material stability rather than the accumulation of relational objects. For instance, Holly claims that because older men typically give her the most money, "I simply *trained* myself to like older men, and it was the smartest thing I ever did" (19). While material gain would then appear to direct her sexuality, that is not to say that Holly has no interest in erotic indulgence for indulgence's sake. Rather, Holly's interplay with sexuality is arguably best observed in her interactions with the Arkansan heiress Mag Wildwood. When discussing the details of the sexual relationship between Mag and the Brazilian politician José Ybarra-Jaeger, Mag claims that she has trouble conjuring the specifics of her sexual encounters: "[I]t isn't that I don't want to tell you. But it's so difficult to remember. I don't d-d-dwell on these things. The way you seem to. They go out of my head like a dream. I'm sure that's

the n-n-normal attitude" (50). Holly counters that "[i]t may be normal, darling, but I'd rather be *natural*…If you can't remember, *try leaving the lights on*" (50, emphasis added). I imagine that the anti-essentialist's pupils have just dilated upon reading Holly's invocation of the "natural" as justification for her self-directed sexual behavior, as though gesturing toward a singular erotic truth. Indeed, as Warner notes, variant sexual practices vying to be socially legitimized must appear "unlearned, prereflective, present before history, isolated from the public circulation of culture" (9). I ask that these scholars wait before pouncing, however, and consider if Holly's deployment of "natural" in this instance should be taken as merely an appeal to sexual essentialism? In the same conversation with Mag, Holly teases: "You've got a warm heart. But if I were a man on my way to bed, I'd rather take along a hot-water bottle. It's more tangible" (51). One could disregard this as simply Holly jesting at Mag's expense, and yet it may also act to rearticulate Holly's "natural" sexuality as more concerned with embodied pleasure than erotic truth. Appealing to Michel Foucault's challenge to strive for considerations of sexuality as "a great surface network" wherein the stimulating of bodies and intensifications of their pleasures are limited to the discursive structures they occupy (105-06), one might reappraise Holly's solicitation of "naturalness" as primarily concerning haptic sensation, to what feels "naturally" pleasurable when enacted by/on the body rather than the body's expression of pleasure being contingent on the interaction with an essential, "natural" object. Additionally, Holly's suggestion to "try leaving the lights on," offers not only a capability to "dwell on" or "remember" the details of a sexual encounter—as Mag and Holly both implicate—but to engage with one's own pleasure as well, to get "a decent look at a guy you like…Men are beautiful, a lot of them are" (50). This insistence on subjective pleasure functions to produce Holly's larger characterization as fixated on sexual independence, acting as an archetypical proxy for what Thomas Fahy deems "the growing number of young women seeking social and sexual autonomy" (98). Although "autonomy" here is perhaps overambitious, as theorists such as Warner have argued that "sexual autonomy requires more than freedom of choice, tolerance, and the liberalization of sex laws. It requires access to pleasures and possibilities" (7), I find it useful to observe Holly as a character pursuing sexual agency. Similar to Warner, however, I will later elaborate on what "sexual possibilities" I see as being foreclosed, thus complicating Holly's pursual of sexual sovereignty.

Recalling the novella as an affront to normative paradigms, aspects of Holly's sexual behavior facilitated by that pursual of autonomy appear to outright oppose repressive sexual ethics. Moreover, John D'Emilio characterizes the 1940s of the novella's setting as systematically devaluing sexual

minorities through "the matrix of religious beliefs, laws, medical theories, and popular attitudes" (40), a matrix similar to that which Foucault observes as "spread[ing] through the entire social body" at the close of the nineteenth century (122). Rubin offers the ideological imperatives of this matrix via her "charmed circle," which illustrates a discursive predisposition toward "sexuality that is 'good,' 'normal,' and 'natural'[that] should ideally be heterosexual, marital, monogamous, reproductive, and noncommercial…Bad sex may be homosexual, unmarried, promiscuous, nonprocreative, or commercial. It may be masturbatory or take place at orgies, may be casual, may cross generational lines" (151). From Rubin's perspective, Holly's sexuality transgresses a number of these axes of moral erotic ideology, locating that sexuality well within the bounds of queerness, expressed by David Halperin as more of an oppositional relation to normalcy rather than a positivist demarcation (66). More explicitly, Holly simultaneously displays a queer ethos toward sexual object choice. Recalling a lesbian she previously shared an apartment with, Holly gestures to her own erotic flexibility: "Of course [living with a lesbian] people couldn't help but think I must be a bit of a dyke myself. And of course I am. Everyone is: a bit. So what?" (22). Such instances dispersed throughout the novella reiterate Holly's emphasis on erotic autonomy and subjective pleasure, even to almost hyperbolic margins: "A person ought to be able to marry men or women or—listen, if you came to me and said you wanted to hitch up with Man o' War [a racehorse], I'd respect your feeling. No, I'm serious. Love should be allowed. I'm all for it" (83). Contrary to Holly's apparent lack of sexual conservatism, however, Mag's sexual austereness is so potent that, when Holly deceives Mag into believing she's a lesbian in order to dispel accusations of Holly sleeping with José, Mag buys a separate cot so the two no longer will share a bed (58). While Holly has no fear of homosexuals (21), Mag fears them so fervently that, although she has nowhere else to go, she refuses to sleep in the same bed as a lesbian. By juxtaposing a seemingly sexually liberated symbol with staunch erotic conformity, Capote exalts Holly to be a proxy for the natural, the liberated, the queer, whereas Mag is conversely postured to signify the normal, the repressed, and the conventional. "[B]y pairing [Mag and Holly] off," Robert Emmet Long argues, "Capote merely emphasizes all that Holly *is* and Mag *is not*" (75, emphasis added).

Normative Spaces, Normative Exits

Running parallel to *Breakfast at Tiffany's*' narrative of sexual queerness is an equally significant appraisal of regional expatriatism. Although Holly's departure from rural East Texas before the novella's opening is not due to

a sexual or gendered queerness per se—that is, not in the typical sense to which we are accustomed, wherein a departure facilitates a "coming out"—it nevertheless details an escape from a sexual/gendered traditionalism in the form of her marriage to the rancher Doc Golightly at thirteen (64). Yet, the novella largely neglects a portrayal of Holly's experiencing of that conservatism, opting to instead concentrate primarily on her movement *from* that conservatism. This migration away from sexual conformity is not only constituted by a geographical repositioning, but a broader dereliction of regional identity as well. Leaving Texas, Holly attempts to functionally sever any superficial trace of rurality and Southernness. Changing her name from Lulamae, she keeps her time in the South attentively shrouded in a spurious childhood the narrator deems "elusive, nameless, placeless, an impressionistic recital, though the impression received was contrary to what one expected, for she gave an almost voluptuous account of swimming and summer, Christmas trees, pretty cousins and parties: in short, happy in a way that she was not" (54). With regards to her portrayal as the apex of sexual liberation, Holly's exodus to New York City *does* appear to mitigate those aspects of sexual conservatism and gender traditionalism the novella associates with her life pre-migration. Yet, Capote's reliance on this migration to enable her endearment to that liberation has largely been overlooked. Importantly, however, Holly's exodus from rural Texas to New York functions to sanction an indulgence of erotic desire, producing a sexual characterization orbiting her abandonment of the rural Southern space.

Elsewhere I have posited that, adjacent to Jack Halberstam's discerning a spatial predisposition for migration to urban centers in order to cultivate "queer" identities via "metronormativity" (36), there is a requisite need to acknowledge a parallel bias of American regionality within "queer" identitarian groups: an "anti-southern normativity." In this way, the (ironically normativized) repudiation of spatial attachments perceived as synonymous with the normativity Robyn Wiegman and Elizabeth Wilson observe as queerness's "axiomatic foe" could be rearticulated as the motivating impetus behind queer southern expatriatism (2). Returning to the dichotomy of Mag and Holly, how might an acknowledgment of anti-Southern normativity's capacity to compel one to uproot themselves from the perceptual South in order to adhere to dominant "queer" identitarian models complicate our view of the relationship between these characters of sexual conservatism and liberation respectively? Along with her name and childhood, Holly sanitizes her regional accent through the performative construction of anti-Southernness. Holly's previous Hollywood agent confides to the narrator that "it took us a year to smooth out that accent. How we did it finally, we gave her French lessons: after she could imitate French, it wasn't so long [until] she could im-

itate English" (32). This line in particular reveals the extent to which Holly's outward Southernness has been annulled by a regionally antithetical identity, as she is not meant to explicitly imitate a specific regional dialect, but rather "smooth out" her Southern accent, which is then differentiated from Mag's exaggerated stutter and catalog of euphuistically Southern vernacular (43-4). This contrast between outward anti-Southernness and Southernness is introduced even in Mag's first appearance in the novella, wherein she crashes a gathering of Holly's would-be sexual suitors, all concealing their "dismay at seeing others there" (35). As Mag begins to distract the partygoers' erotic attention from Holly, Holly lashes out at Mag by insinuating to the men that Mag has an STI: "'You'd think it would show more. But heaven knows, she *looks* healthy. So, well, *clean.* That's the extraordinary part. Wouldn't you,' she asked with concern, but of no one in particular, 'wouldn't you say she *looked* clean?...But then…I hear so many of these Southern girls have the same trouble'" (45). While it's clear that Holly deliberately attacks Mag's ability to garner the romantic and sexual cathexes of the men in attendance, what might immediately alarm a reader is that the manner in which Holly does so runs remarkedly against the grain of her characterization as we have previously surveyed it. Rather than compromise Mag's sexual capacity through any other means, Holly—who otherwise might be deemed a potential antithesis to sexual conservatism—deploys a repressive ethic through her conflation of prudishness and virtue. Perhaps more significantly, by affixing Mag's sexual "uncleanliness" to "Southern girls" more broadly, Holly consciously correlates her sexual invalidation of Mag with Mag's position as a Southerner. Though, if one is to accept this, then the location of Holly's own sense of erotic validation is then exposed: a stylizing of a sexuality *opposed* to Southernness. Capote himself appears to be sympathetic to this synthesizing of sexual liberation and spatial anti-Southernness as well, as Mag's appearance in the novella eventually ends with her marriage and subsequent divorce to Rusty Trawler, whom Holly is conversely able to intuit as gay, seemingly due to her own sexual nonconformity (42).

However, whereas Mag's ostensibly Southern sexual conventionality eventually produces her own undoing, Holly's adoption of anti-Southernness fails to render a conclusion befitting the aforementioned metronormative and anti-Southern narratives—wherein a queer subject would ostensibly experience a life unbridled positive affect once entering New York or San Francisco. Rather, Holly's primary conflict arises from her inability to find a place where "me and things belong together. I'm not quite sure where that is just yet. But I know what it's like" (39). This lack of belonging is potentially first signified before the narrator has even met Holly via her mailbox card: "Printed, rather Cartier-formal, it read: *Miss Holly Golightly*; and, underneath, in the corner,

Traveling. It nagged me like a tune: *Miss Holly Golightly, Traveling*" (11). In itself, the card attaches traveling's implications of movement to Holly as a permanent state of being, as a character migrating in perpetuity, a point which Holly later justifies: "After all, how do I know where I'll be living tomorrow?" (42). And, moreover, the narrator's comparison of the pairing of Holly and "traveling" to a badgering melody suggest that the pair exist in a certain consonance with one another. Reinforcing this constant migration, Holly describes herself as a "wild thing," warning that "[i]f you let yourself love a wild thing. You'll end up looking at the sky…[but] it's better to look at the sky than live there. Such an empty place; so vague" (74). Holly's self-proclaimed occupation of a site of emptiness and vagueness here further urges us to contemplate her apparent displacement from spatial belonging in the context of an anti-Southern and metronormative migration. Holly's former agent, O. J. Berman, alludes to how this correlation might function by proclaiming that "it's impossible to know if she's a hillbilly or an Okie [Oklahoman] or what. I still don't. My guess, nobody'll ever know where she came from. She's such a goddamn liar, *maybe she don't know herself any more*" (32, emphasis added). O. J.'s suggestion that Holly's regionally antithetical identity has obfuscated a particular self-knowledge functions to more generally implicate Holly's lack of spatial belonging as a direct consequence of that identity's construction. Later in the novella, Holly also implies that in spite of her life in New York being constituted by her identity as "Holly," she might still retain aspects of regional Southernness: "I'm not fourteen [anymore], and I'm not Lulamae. But the terrible part is…I am. I'm still stealing turkey eggs and running through a [briar] patch" (73). Helen Garson similarly associates Holly's inability to "belong" with her absence of spatial attachment, asserting that although she is "always surrounded by people, Holly gives the impression of being alone, still the little girl, Lulamae Barnes, still running, still searching for a home never to be hers" (98). I deploy these two quotes in tandem to assert that the reason Holly cannot belong, both to herself and to a place, is due to her constant "running" via her identitarian expression of anti-Southernness. Yet, it is not entirely apt to say that Holly is "searching" for a site of belonging as Garson does, suggesting that Holly is looking *for* something. Rather, Holly's search appears motivated by her fleeing *from* the perceptually Southern.

Toward an Identity Compositionism

Although this manner of analysis may appear to suggest otherwise, I am not particularly interested in the insinuation that Holly prior to her migration is inherently "authentic" or that all features of her life in New York

should be deemed mere facades when juxtaposed with her "real" existence in the rural South. Nor do I wish to advocate that the belonging Holly so desires is exclusive to life in the South, reading all other avenues of spatial ontology outside the rural South as fundamentally non-validating. Rather, I find it helpful to proceed from an impetus similar to Michael Bibler in his claim that Capote "establishes regional identity as a nonessential component of identity, as no longer a totalizing marker of identity that one must try to escape completely" (228). Yet, even while regional identities are nonessential, I am nevertheless interested in how regionalism plays out in the overarching constructions of sexuality as such and to that end I remain invested in interrogating how aspects of an understood rurality and regionalism might be more integral to a larger erotic personhood. This is not, I hasten to add, to re-essentialize regional identity in the way Bibler compellingly challenges, but to observe how spatial attachments might become imbued with erotic meaning and consequently consider how a reconciliation between sexual queerness and spatial belonging might have been possible if not for the intrusion of more dominant myths of queer spatiality; of which metronormativity and anti-Southern normativity are assuredly included. This is to ask, then: is it possible that Holly—or perhaps more precisely, Lulamae—could have found the same sexual deliverance if she had migrated east rather than north?

Acknowledging metronormativity and anti-Southern normativity, the subject of Holly's inability to reconcile spatial belonging with sexuality would then appear to be an issue of intersectionality. In her seminal essay, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex," Kimberlé Crenshaw describes discrimination akin to "traffic through an intersection, [it] may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them" (149). From this genesis of organizing social identities in the context of discrimination, however, intersectionality has been developed into an all-encompassing metanarrative of social identification (Davis 69). Arising from Crenshaw's "need to account for multiple grounds of identity when considering how the social world is constructed" ("Mapping the Margins" 1245), intersectionality has received recent critique by scholars such as Rekia Jibrin and Sara Salem for propagating an "open-endedness" of identity, ultimately "study[ing] the ways in which social categories intersect without looking at how these categories are themselves constituted…thus reproducing the strength of identity politics" (8).

Though we certainly disagree on the implications of this "open-endedness" of identities being exclusive to a discounting of their constitution, Jibrin, Salem, and I *do* share a common suspicion around the manner in which intersectionality has evolved from its judicial origins to categorize individual

ontologies more broadly. Although the recapitulation of identities as distinct avenues of discrimination overlapping at various times in various spaces has indeed served a generative function in reflections of identity by political coalitions, I am skeptical of this model being the sole mode of regarding identity even when outside the legislative considerations of discrimination. Indeed, one could interpret the motivating force behind the compulsory deracination that normative discourses of queer spatiality enforce as a tactic of gatekeeping the dominant queer identity from subjects of perceptual Southernness/rurality—which would be to acknowledge those intersections of identity in a mode similar to Crenshaw. Yet, it is perhaps reductive to consider the bounds of these discourses so finitely. Instead, might we regard one's spatial and sexual attachments as less disparate objects of identification to begin with? In Crenshaw's metaphor, each street involved in the identitarian intersection remains its own respective roadway, with a distinct name and directional movement. I would like to briefly problematize this as the primary understanding of identity configuration. Instead, examining instances wherein identities which are typically separated into discursive categories (sexuality, gender, race, class, etc.) are more marbled into one another codependently, might we view such identities as a type of *composition*? In this respect, the viewing of Holly's relationship to sexuality as regionally transactional is potentially eclipsed by a mode of analysis emphasizing the preclusion of a different, "erospatial" identification entirely. Consider, for instance, one of the examples of socially mediated sex acts from Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner's "Sex in Public":

> This time we were in a bar that on most nights is a garden-variety leather bar, but that, on Wednesday nights, hosts a sex performance event called "Pork"…This night, word was circulating that the performance was to be erotic vomiting…A boy, twentyish, very skateboard, comes on the low stage at one end of the bar, wearing lycra shorts and a dog collar…His partner comes out and tilts the bottom's head up to the ceiling, stretching out his throat. Behind them is an array of foods. The top begins pouring milk down the boy's throat, then food, then more milk…they carefully keep at the threshold of gagging…The crowd is transfixed by the scene of intimacy and display, control and abandon, ferocity and abjection. People are moaning softly with admiration, then whistling, stomping, screaming encouragements. They have pressed forward in a compact and intimate group. Finally, as the top inserts two, then three fingers in the bottom's throat, insistently offering

> his own stomach for the repeated climaxes, we realize that we have never seen such a display of trust and violation. We are breathless…Word has gone around that the boy is straight… What does that mean in this context…How did you come to do it in a leather bar? Where else do you do this? How do you feel about your new partners, this audience? (564-65)

Although I do not wish to diminish the (well earned) transcendent reception of this display, I too have questions to pose. Chiefly: how *is* our subject identifying? Superficially, it may seem his sexuality is wholly encircled by heterosexuality, with occasionally "flexes" in specific contexts under specific circumstances (Ward 9). However, I want to instead consider this an instance of composite identity formation. Assuming the erotic vomiting is exclusive to a performance in this particular space, I am speculating that this boy is identifying with the "garden-variety leather bar" and the community of patrons who are present each Wednesday for the show. Would this "sociospatial" identification be elided in its entirety if the sexual acts were omitted? And, conversely, would this specific sexual identity disintegrate without the space and its occupants? If we can presume both, this identity, which cannot be reduced to explicit discursive spheres of identification (in this case sexual and sociospatial) unscathed, could be regarded as a form of identity compositionism. Compositionism in this way may present a method of approaching the horizon of Jasbir Puar's conceptualization of the subject as a Deleuze-Guattarian "assemblage" of identities, which is "more attuned to interwoven forces that merge and dissipate time, space, and body against linearity, coherency, and permanency," rather than "demand[ing] the knowing, naming, and thus stabilizing of identity across space and time" (212). However, this is not to say that to adopt identity compositionism would be to go—as some strands of recent queer scholarship has (*pace* Puar)—"post-intersectional" (Ehrenreich 256-57). Although post-intersectional critiques such as Puar's assemblagist perspective reaffirms queer theory's commitment to anti-identitarian politics in ways I maintain as generative, it has done relatively little to generate a *politics* of assemblage. Indeed, critiques of scholarship like Puar's have opted to emphasize the inability thus far for post-intersectional organizations of identity to "prescribe or imagine points of intervention" (Chang and Culp 490), and thereby make the harrowing leap from theory to praxis. This urges us to reflect on what kinds of interventions identity compositionism would hope to make, what politics it seeks to generate. Although I am asserting here that identity compositionism is not intrinsically antagonistic to intersectionality akin to Puar's assemblage, its implications very well might motivate us to think about intersectionality in

different ways vis-à-vis the organizing of identity and the political deployments it might occasion.

Those of us with anti-essentialist commitments might fear, not unfoundedly I admit, that identity compositionism might incite a new regime of hyper-identity politics. And indeed, one can only warily imagine composite identitarian groups emerging from within preexisting ones—in the case of this analysis, spatial-specific "queer" clusters splintering from the dominant "queer" identity conglomerate—and the vexing consequences of an identity politics in that infinite regress. Those with foregrounded investments in identity may conversely worry about the precarity identity compositionism might signal by critiquing the rigidity of what I see as discursively constructed "spheres" of identity, seemingly foreclosing the "roles of identity and community as paths to survival" Cathy Cohen warned queer theory against more than two decades ago (460). But perhaps by noticing the ways in which our idiosyncratic understandings and experiences of identity—whether formulated through "reverse discourses" of hegemonically imposed categories or by individual cultivation (Foucault 101)—are bespoke to each individual, we might attempt to open up possibilities for the identity "destabilization" projects Cohen concomitantly insists (459). In my preceding analysis of Holly, it would appear that we could confidently consider spatial identity and sexuality as mutually-inflected. Insofar as the sexual identities of subjects—akin to Holly—occupying spaces discursively positioned as recalcitrant to the antinormativity those identities necessitate are thrust into scrutiny, there remains no potential for those identities to be contingent on distinct sociospatial attachments. These are the types of analyses compositionist scholars might undertake, attentive to moments when, much like intersectionality, the contemplation of one's identity is entangled with another to such an extent that the attachments orbiting those categories dictate a mutual regarding of both (or more). Though, while intersectional critiques pay attention to more explicit occurrences of overlap between social categories as they are experienced by individual social actors—namely, in instances of discrimination or acts of violence—compositionist critiques consider the discursive underpinnings of these categories and how their stability is inevitably called into question through recognizing the ways in which identities are eccentrically internalized, adorned, cultivated, and lived through. Identity compositionism may in this way offer us a way of producing an anti-identitarian politics *through* identity, acknowledging, as intersectionality does, that social categories are at once varied and weaponized against subjects to whom those identities are precariously inscribed, while concurrently inciting the recognition of methodologies by which identities themselves are discursive engendered and positioned—and as I hope to have shown here, occasionally coalesced—in

relation to one another. This line of inquiry undertakes an analysis similar to E. Patrick Johnson's conception of "quare" as not "not only speak[ing] across" identities but also "articulat[ing]" them (3). Such an approach would hopefully function to preserve the potency of anti-identitarian politics while simultaneously assuring that the influence of identity as a system of solidarity and communal assemblage is not rendered derelict. Although Judith Butler has cautioned against the influence of identity for the "internal exclusions" that "rendering [an identity] visible" enacts (127), I hope to be introducing here a means by which to reflect on how individualized interiorities, shaped by their own experiences and aggregate of desires, articulate identities in ways diverging from the collective's exclusionary principality.

Both intersectionality and compositionism work to expose the numerous ways in which a subject may accumulate any number of socially constructed identities and anyone who would claim these formations, and undoubtedly more, falter foundationally if not recognizing the potential for configurations as varied as the identities we seek to express; rather than merely swapping one metanarrative out for another. While the uniform conceptualization of identities as intersectional has undoubtedly served as a "*strategic* use of positivist essentialism" (Spivak 281), in the same motion it has disavowed ontologies which resist the sole consideration of social identifications as incongruent territories. Though Holly's production in *Breakfast at Tiffany's* indicts the repudiation of certain sociospatial attachments when acquiescing to queered sexual identities, the implications of similar repudiations in the larger construction of uniform identitarian representations of queerness open up various termini of compositionist critiques. It is along these specific lines that a consideration of identity compositionism could expand the deliberation surrounding Holly. Acknowledging the modes in which sexuality and spatial identifications are discursively constructed through one another—as anti-Southern normativity and metronormativity elucidate—one could read Holly's pursuit of spatial belonging and sexual queerness as intrinsically consolidated. Divorcing the erotic from the sociospatial, discourses of anti-Southern normativity and metronormativity have in effect barred access to the belonging Holly so desires, concurrently authorizing sexual queerness while banning spatial identifications perceived as contrarian. In considering the "erospatial" as a composite identity, we might begin to contemplate narratives similar to Holly's more holistically, the full consequences of the dilapidating of particular spatialities such myths necessitate being a complete foreclosing of identificatory potential, stranding Holly in a void of spatial belonging, left to perpetually remain a "wild thing."

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