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Why War? – Psychoanalysis, Politics, and the Return to Melanie Klein

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BLACKWELL
Oxford UK & Cambridge USA

1993

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1975), p. 61). Discussing this passage, David Armstrong suggests that the theory of the mind alluded to is Bion's own ('Bion's Later Writing', *Free Associations*, 3, 2, no. 26 (1992), p. 267).

126 Felman, 'Psychoanalysis and Education', in *Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight*, p. 78.

127 In his Inaugural Lecture to the University of Cambridge, Hawking states that a quantum theory of gravity (as central to the not yet attained complete unified theory of physics) is essential if the early universe is to be described and its initial conditions explained without 'merely appealing to the anthropic principle' (Hawking, 'Is the End in Sight for Theoretical Physics?', Appendix to John Boslough, *Stephen Hawking's Universe* (Glasgow; Collins, 1984), p. 120). For a critique of Hawking in relation to the anthropic principle, see Feliz Pirani, 'The Crisis in Cosmology', *New Left Review*, 191 (January/February 1992), pp. 69–89.

128 Felman, 'Psychoanalysis and Education', p. 78.

129 Cf. Bion on the question of reduction: 'Why should a psycho-analyst invent a theory to explain a mental phenomenon and, independently, the astronomers elaborate a similar theory about what they think is a black hole in astronomical space? Which is causing which? Is this some particularity of the human mind which projects it up into space, or is this something real in space from which derives this idea of space in the mind itself? . . . I have used this idea of modern cosmology as a model for psycho-analysis, but I would also use psycho-analysis as the starting point of an investigation of the human mind' (Brazilian Lectures, pp. 61–2).

6 War in the Nursery¹

When Anna Freud first published her 1926–27 technical lectures on child analysis in England in 1945, she prefaced them with this explanation for the delay:

It is not the author's fault that the early material contained in this publication is presented to the English reader at such a late date. An English version of the *Introduction to the Technique of Child-Analysis* was published in America. Attempts at publication in England were not successful. For the general publisher the subject matter was still too remote and controversial. Professional psycho-analytic circles in England, on the other hand, were at that time concentrating their interest on Mrs. Melanie Klein's new theory and technique of the analysis of children. The British Psycho-Analytical Society devoted a *Symposium on Child-Analysis* to a severe criticism of the author's efforts, which ran counter to Mrs. Klein's outlook. The *Introduction to the Technique of the Analysis of Children* was rejected when offered to the International Psycho-Analytical Library for publication, and the matter lapsed, so far as England was concerned.²

The correspondence between Ernest Jones and Freud at the time suggests that this is, predictably, a one-sided account. When Freud accused Jones of arranging a

campaign against his daughter, Jones replied that Melanie Klein's written response to Anna Freud's paper to the Berlin Society had been suppressed. It was because the *Zeitschrift (Die Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse)* was barred to Klein that she had turned to the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* to publish her critique.³ In this dispute across national boundaries and languages, Melanie Klein seems to occupy the same position for Jones as Anna Freud does in relation to Freud. It is a strange scenario in which two men already in a father-son relation battle it out over who in turn is the true daughter – as if the intensity of the dispute over *which* daughter is warding off the greater anxiety, their shared recognition that the legacy is passing to the female child.

It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the question of child analysis immediately finds itself caught up in a set of conflicts over the relationship of psychoanalysis to pedagogy, over the issue not only of whether one can, but equally if not more centrally, whether one should analyse a child. At one level, the move to child analysis can be seen as the logical next step after Freud (although as Juliet Mitchell has pointed out with reference to Klein, it can be seen as reversing the true order of analytic time).⁴ But that idea of a logical next step conceals a more important factor, which is that this turn to child analysis was also coincident with – might even be seen as a form of acting out of – a crucial moment or difficulty in the transmission of psychoanalysis itself. It seems that, for the psychoanalytic community, child psychoanalysis has not fulfilled its promise. In 1945, Berta Bornstein was to comment that the expectation that every training analysis should include child analysis 'was disappointed'.⁵ In 1962 Esther Bick wrote of the 'neglect' of child analysis, of the few adult analysts who go on to train in the field, of the 'specific difficulties interfering with the development of child analysis' (the

developmental model is noteworthy in itself).⁶ The question then arises as to what this 'symptomatic blockage' is expressive of – it is apparently still present, since Bick's essay was reprinted in a 1988 anthology *Melanie Klein Today*. How, from this historical distance, might its moment of emergence be read?

What does analysis *do* to children? What is the accountability, or otherwise, of psychoanalysis to social law? What is the social law, the binding and bonding, of the psychoanalytic world? If the psychoanalysis of children can be reconciled with pedagogy (adjunct, enabler, accomplice), then the risk is that it will drive the unconscious to the wall. But if it retains its separate identity, recalcitrant to what is most coercive and invidious about social norms, then it is not clear how psychoanalysis, or the children it analyses, can avoid the status of eternal outlaw, nor indeed how it can legitimate – how it can transmit – itself. There will be no transmission if the second generation refuses the legacy of the ancestors; a rebellious daughter will not obey or perpetuate her father's law. But if that law is the law of the unconscious, then a subservient one paradoxically disobeys and undoes his heritage no less at the very point of her surrender. Nor is it only the order of fathers and daughters which is at play. For Melanie Klein also found herself involved in an impossible drama of legacy when her daughter became, before the most absolute of repudiations, a Kleinian analyst in turn. So what happens when the problem of transmission plays itself out between mother and daughter – that relationship in which Klein herself was the first to locate a violence no less than that which Freud had identified between fathers and sons? In this dispute over child analysis between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud – the quarrel over pedagogy, transference, and the superego – we can uncover some of the most intractable knots of our psychoanalytic inheritance. Rather than reading it as a war of invective,

proof of the self-infantilizing – in the bad sense – of the analytic scene, we might use it instead to identify something about the limits or boundaries of psychoanalysis, as procedure, as discipline, as history; we might ask what the difficulty of analysing children tells us about the transmissibility of psychoanalytic (of any) law.

When, in the course of their correspondence, Jones suggested that Anna Freud had been insufficiently analysed, Freud replied: 'I must point out to you that such a criticism is as dangerous as it is impermissible. Who, then, has been sufficiently well analysed? I can assure you that Anna has been more deeply and thoroughly analysed than yourself.'⁷ Not untypically, Freud's mutually exclusive propositions (true logic of the unconscious as he defines it elsewhere) capture the central dilemma in which the two men are caught: are some analyses more sufficient than others, or is psychoanalysis interminable (to use Freud's later expression), something – like the subjectivity it addresses – necessarily insufficient and incomplete? Since Freud analysed his own daughter, we might see both these propositions as the most blatant self-defence (she was adequately analysed; if she wasn't, then nor is anyone else). But Anna Freud will inherit the knot of these intertwining and self-cancelling propositions when she turns to the question of how, or whether, to analyse a child. Let's start by stating the obvious, that in so far as Anna Freud will argue that there can be no child analysis in the full sense of the term, she is issuing the most thinly veiled of reproaches against Sigmund Freud (she was twenty-three when he analysed her, but she was also, and would always remain, his child). It has become customary to criticize her, especially in the early stages of her work, for forcing psychoanalysis into an educational mould. But when she argues for a psychoanalysis in tandem with pedagogic ideals, her apparent social compliance, her plea for a measure of normality, may also be her way of

warding off a more ferocious legislator, the too intrusive and pressing reality of the paternal word. Maybe, as we will see, the issue is not whether you are for or against the law, but *where* you want to situate it, how – the question may be unanswerable – to negotiate between the law inside and the law outside the mind. Maybe – but this is to anticipate – there is not, finally, such a total opposition between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein.

It is generally accepted that Anna Freud's 1922 paper 'Beating Fantasies and Daydreams' is an account of her own analysis with her father. In it she expands on Freud's paper 'A Child is being Beaten', picking up his reference to two female patients who overlaid their beating fantasies with an 'elaborate superstructure of daydreams', offering as her own illustration the fantasy life of a fifteen-year-old girl (it is because Anna Freud was not qualified in 1922 that it is assumed that the patient is herself).⁸ The paper starts with the contrast between the fantasy of beating, with its barely concealed sexual encounter with the father, and the 'nice stories' produced in compensation, inspired by a boy's story-book of medieval heroism: a medieval knight is engaged in a long feud with nobles leagued against him; a youth imprisoned by the knight's henchman is first tortured but finally released. Although the daydreams end with reconciliation, the beating fantasies with an act of violence, it is clear that they are thinly disguised versions of the same theme. The identity between them, which transcends the apparent distinction between pleasurable and painful outcome, is made clear when Anna Freud recounts the version of the story which, several years later, the patient wrote down: 'It began with the prisoner's torture and ended with his refusal to escape' (p. 154). In this compacted summary, there is no mention of the reconciliation which might be expected to explain the youth's desire to stay (elaborating, Anna Freud comments: 'Its aim – harmonious union between the former

antagonists – is only anticipated but not really described': p. 154.) Strikingly, then, it appears that it is not reconciliation – the alleviation of torture – which produces the bond between the youth and his captor, but the process of torture itself.

That Anna Freud should become the theorist of 'altruistic surrender' or 'overgoodness' has often been seen as the logical theoretical accompaniment of, and way of protesting, her life time's devotion to her father.⁹ Somewhere between '*gutseins*' ('being good') and '*etwashabenwollen*' ('wanting something of her own'), it is almost too easy to track the partially sublimated expression of her own interminably repeated surrender and escape.¹⁰ In her biography, Elizabeth Young-Bruehl presents this more in terms of a narrative of self-discovery and emancipation; from her father to Lou Andreas-Salomé, to Max Eitingen, Anna Freud painfully constructs a path to analytic and personal autonomy. That narrative of progress looks less assured, however, when we remember that Anna Freud sent Dorothy Burlingham, centre of the family which she finally made her own, into analysis with Sigmund Freud.

At the end of 'Beating Fantasies and Daydreams' Anna Freud charts the emergence of the writer: 'the private fantasy is turned into a communication addressed to others . . . regard for the personal needs of the daydreamer is replaced by regard for the prospective reader' (p. 156). But if this is an account of the emergence of sublimation (a self-created representational space), it is none the less worth noting that it is the version of the story in which the prisoner's father appears for the first time: 'the story being presented in the frame of a conversation between the knight and the prisoner's father' (p. 154). In the very activity of writing, the father 'frames' the scene. The youth may be the hero of the story, but it is not to him that we look for the symbolic capacity to narrate. Anna Freud thus trans-

poses herself in fantasy into a boy only to come straight up against paternal law. It is therefore a symbolic as well as a sexual trajectory which the different stages of the story describe. If this paper draws on fantasy material from Anna Freud's analysis, could we not read it as referring, as much as to the sexual contents of her unconscious (beating as the expression of forbidden desire) to the process – tortuous, pleasurable – of the analysis itself?

At the end of this paper, Anna Freud describes the developmental gain of writing: 'renouncing her private pleasure in favour of making an impression on others, the author has accomplished an important developmental step: the transformation of an autistic activity into a social activity' (p. 155). Narcissism, as Freud himself theorized, is the key social affect ('the satisfaction which the ideal offers to the participants in the culture is of a narcissistic nature'¹¹). By 1926, when Anna Freud delivered the first of her lectures on the technique of child analysis ('An Introductory Phase in the Analysis of Children'), an author's ability to hold on to her audience has become the model of the analytic scene: 'My way was rather like that of a film or a novel which has no other intention than to attract the audience or reader to itself' (p. 10). Manipulating her audience – in 1926 her patient – Anna Freud passes from the pleasures of torture into her analytic role: 'My first aim was in fact nothing else but to make myself interesting to the boy' (p. 10). With the unerring clarity of symptomatic logic, what then surfaces in the lecture, as the rite of passage into analysis, is a drama of mastery whose ultimate objective is the child's total surrender to her will: 'he got the habit of relying on analysis as a protection from punishment and claiming my help for repairing the consequences of his rash acts; he let me restore stolen money in his place and got me to make all necessary and disagreeable confessions to his parents . . . I had

however only waited for this moment to require of him in turn . . . the surrender, so necessary for analysis, of all his previously guarded secrets' (pp. 10–11).

Thus Anna Freud seems to carry over into her procedure something which looks like a parody of an earlier parental-cum-analytic scene. We can criticize her, as the Kleinians did at the time, for the crudest manipulation of her patient; or we can note what this bizarre process of transmission reveals about the perverse components – punishment as torture and pleasure – of analytic and social norms. What seems clear is that the question of the child's criminality and the question of subjection and mastery are intimately related to each other. Acknowledge my criminality for me, take me under your wing. In a move which strangely anticipates Melanie Klein's famous papers on crime,¹² Anna Freud seems inadvertently to be suggesting here that crime is not, at the deepest level, antisocial behaviour, but the means through which the subject tortuously affirms her or his social being, surrenders her or himself.

In terms of the most immediate opposition between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, Anna Freud is on the side of convention. Although this dispute has been well documented, it might be worth laying out the basic argument again here.¹³ Anna Freud believed, at this stage in her work, that there could be no full analysis of children.¹⁴ For her, the still vivid presence of the parental figures meant that the transposition from person into imago from which transference proceeds could not take place. Unlike the adult, the child is not ready to produce 'a new edition of its love-relationships' because the 'old edition is not yet exhausted' (p. 34). Reluctant to make the transition (to leave, psychically, the family home), the child must be won. It is because the child is still in a state of total psychic dependence on the parents that the analyst has to woo and manipulate her or his way into the child's mind. The more positive the attachment

of the child to the parents, the harder this will be, the more essential it becomes for the analyst to take up a positive role. Idealization of the parent-child relation thus leads straight into the production of a parallel idealization of the analyst on the part of the child.

It follows from this first point – the still present reality of the parents – that the analyst becomes no less real. In the analysis of adults 'we remain impersonal and shadowy, a blank page on which the patient can transcribe his transference-fantasies, somewhat after the way in which at the cinema a picture is thrown upon an empty screen' (the image of the cinema again) (p. 35). But the child's analyst must be 'anything but a shadow' because of the way she must seek the collaboration of the child and because of the 'educational influences' involved in the analysis of children, which mean that the child knows full well what it is that the analyst desires, what he sanctions, of what he disapproves (p. 35). The argument thus seems to move in two directions at once: there must be pedagogy because there is no transference; there can be no transference because pedagogy is the final aim. At the end of this lecture, Anna Freud argues that, even were it possible to generate a full transference by removing the child from the parents, the outcome on the child's return would be either renewal of the neurosis or open rebellion, something which may therapeutically appear as an advantage, but which in terms of social adjustment, which 'in the child's case most matters in the end, is certainly none' (p. 37). For Anna Freud, the child's superego, undetached from the parents, is weak; there is always the risk, therefore, that this childish superego will not withstand the lifting of repression in analysis and that the outcome will be direct, and unmanageable, gratification of libidinous and aggressive impulses on the part of the child. The analyst must, therefore, 'succeed in putting himself in the place of the child's Ego-ideal' (p. 45); (emphasis original).

Once again, it is hard not to read this as a veiled account of the dangers, the seduction, that Anna Freud felt herself courting in analysis with Freud, hard not to see it as her way of commenting on the extraordinary tension, if not tease, behind the analytic injunction to speak but not act. And from where – if not from an analysis with one's own father – would the conviction that parent and analyst are indistinguishable, the belief in their joint and indissoluble reality, be more likely to arise?

It is customary to read the emphasis by Anna Freud on the pedagogic function of analysis as betraying true analytic goals (in a 1931 paper entitled 'Some Contrasted Aspects of Psycho-Analysis and Education', Nina Searl insists on their 'irreconcilable' nature¹⁵). Freud himself, on more than one occasion, has been described as an 'anti-pedagogue'.¹⁶ It may be, however, that Anna Freud is revealing something about the analytic contract which a mere insistence on the incommensurability between analysis and education cannot quite resolve. In her essay on psychoanalysis and pedagogy, Shoshana Felman discusses the links between transference and the function of authority.¹⁷ Since transference bestows authority, there is a sense in which the analyst is always already a pedagogue. Conversely, since education always contains a transference component, it could be argued that the analytic scenario is present, *in potentia*, wherever a relationship to knowledge is at play. (Lacan wrote: 'As soon as there is somewhere a subject presumed to know, there is transference.'¹⁸) In a famous comment, Freud described analysis, teaching, and government as the three impossible professions, but he did not elaborate on the transferability, so to speak, of their authority and/or pedagogic aims.¹⁹ Felman cites this passage from Freud's essay on schoolboy psychology to illustrate the link between teaching and transference in the analytic sense of the term: 'These men [the teachers] became our substitute fathers. That was why, even

though they were still quite young, they struck us as so mature and so unattainably adult. We transferred to them the respect and expectations attaching to the omniscient father of our childhood.'²⁰

From fathers to teachers to analysts, Anna Freud seems to be doing no more than uncovering something about authority, something startlingly focused by her own experience, but unavoidable in the analytic scene (something which her own insistence on the absence of full transference in child analysis cannot finally remove). If the debate over child analysis is so fierce, it might be because it forces on to the agenda, over and above the differences between the protagonists, an insoluble problem of analytic authorization and how it transmits itself. How can you pass on knowledge from generation to generation – how can you secure the child's passage into the adult world – without precisely generating, indeed relying on, the transference and its latent pedagogic imperative which psychoanalysis is meant ultimately to dissolve? The question of psychoanalytic inheritance and the question of pedagogy are in fact one and the same thing.

In a passage from the paper on schoolboy psychology not cited by Felman, Freud says some more about those earlier teachers: 'We courted them or turned our backs on them, we imagined sympathies and antipathies in them which probably had no existence, we studied their characters and on theirs we formed and misformed our own. They called up our fiercest opposition and forced us to complete submission.'²¹ The passage graphically fills out what is psychically at play – courting and rejection, projection, identifications which form and malform what the child comes to be (compare from the other passage: 'we transferred to them the respect and expectations attaching to the omniscient fathers of our childhood'). From deference to projection, the difference almost anticipates one conceptual shift from Freud to

Melanie Klein. Even more striking in this context is that acknowledged relation between rebellion and the utmost defeat, as if it were not only the authority professionally accruing to the teacher which engineers the final submission, but also the pleasures and dangers internal to the relation, not to say the process of resistance itself. In a way which anticipates the daydreams of his daughter – youths tortured by henchman in service to their beleaguered knight – Freud offers us an account here not just of the pedagogic relation, but of what we might call fealty, its perversions and its discontents.

Melanie Klein's main disagreement with Anna Freud turned on the question of the superego. For Klein, far from the childish superego being weak, it was fierce and inexorable, the product of the internal rage attendant on the extravagance of the child's impulses and its thwarted being in the world. The task of analysis, child analysis included, was not to align with or reinforce the superego, but to reduce and assuage the inexorability of its law: 'what is needed is not to reinforce this superego, but to tone it down.'²² No less than for Anna Freud, the child was, for Klein, a potential criminal; but in her account this is because the child is warding off, through socially unacceptable behaviour, the edicts of an internal persecutor compared with which the chastisement of an external authority is a positive relief. Crime does not engender guilt; it is the consequence of a guilt that is already there. As Klein puts it in her paper 'On Criminality' of 1934: 'it is not lack of conscience, but the overpowering strictness of the superego, which is responsible for the characteristics of asocial and criminal persons'.²³ (The row between her and Melitta Schmideberg over this paper is put at the centre of the play *Mrs Klein*.) For Anna Freud, on the other hand, it is the collapse of the superego precipitated by mental illness or criminality in the parent that is responsible for asocial tendencies in the child. If the child is guilty, it is because

the parent was guilty before it, guilty of a failure at the site of the superego – whereas for Klein the problem is precisely that the superego *never* fails.

It follows for Klein that the aim of the analysis must be to attract on to the analyst everything that is most negative in the child's inner world so as to dissipate, finally, its unbearable force: 'My method presupposes that I have from the beginning been willing to attract to myself the negative as well as the positive transference' (p. 145). That negativity will be necessarily, if relatively, autonomous from the reality of the parental figures in the outside world. For Klein, the child is a phantasy-spinner from the start – hence the possibility, and painful nature, of the psychoanalysis of children. What we see here are the repercussions of Klein's emphasis on the destructive impulses for the activity of analysis. Precisely because of that irreducible negativity, we could say, transference – phantasy driven by its own inner process – is something assumed in the analysis of children by Melanie Klein.

Is it surprising that the one who holds on to the image of the analyst as essentially benevolent is none other than the daughter of Freud? At the same time it is important to acknowledge that Klein's stress on negativity could also be seen – was seen by her critics – as playing a defensive role.²⁴ The attraction of hostile impulses on to the person of the analyst, far from endangering the child's relation to the parents, protected them from the worse ravages of their effects. At the same time, an emphasis on the negative inner imago of the parents – the insistence that this was *only* an imago – could paradoxically serve their idealization, an acceptance at face value of the way they see themselves (for Melitta Schmideberg this will be the fundamental reproach).

It is usually assumed that on the issue of the superego Anna Freud was in agreement with her father. Indeed, he intervened on her behalf over this specific issue in the

course of the debate. In his correspondence with Jones, Freud argued that Klein's belief in a superego belonging in the early years, prior to Oedipus and autonomous from the parents, was simply wrong: 'I would like to challenge Frau Klein's statement that the superego of the child is as independent as that of the adult. It seems rather to me that Anna is right in emphasizing the point that the superego of the child is still the direct parental influence.'²⁵ So much, so clear. But is it? Anna Freud may talk of the 'prestige' of the superego, whose authority rises and falls with the benevolence with which the parents are viewed, while Melanie Klein charts its fierce and manic oppression; yet each of their accounts of psychic and social regulation appears to contain something which, in the very name of the control it promises, is completely beyond their (anyone's) sway. Internal persecutor or henchman, the images are remarkably close; in fact, they can both be seen as sketching out, for children and for the psychoanalytic institution, the 'unpsychological proceedings of the cultural superego', to cite a famous definition of Freud's.²⁶ In doing so, they confront us with an impasse at the heart of social identity, one which, one could argue, was dislodged or displaced on to the dispute about how or whether to analyse a child. Before lining up Anna Freud and Melanie Klein on either side of the law – indeed, before asking whether psychoanalysis supports or undermines social regulation – we should perhaps first ask what exactly, for psychoanalysis, the law *is*. For if the law is a henchman, the question is not whether to obey it, but what exactly obedience, no less than disobedience, might involve.

More than one commentator has read *Civilisation and its Discontents* as an account of the perverse nature – tortuous and self-defeating – of social law.²⁷ Indeed, it is hard not to see this text as the Urtext for many of the fantasies and narratives which we have been tracking so far. For it is central to the Freudian account of the

superego that it draws its force from the violence it controls and, in the form of its terrifying injunctions, repeats it. (This is why if we turn our attention to the question of the superego, we at once make psychoanalysis more directly socially accountable and remove the possibility of using it for a simply liberationist goal.) The superego inherits the aggression of the drives it curtails; in fact, it appears as nothing other than their deflection. Subjects introject their own aggressiveness, sending it back, so to speak, to where it originally belonged: 'There it is taken over by a portion of the ego, which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as super-ego, and which now, in the form of "conscience", is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals.'²⁸ The superego even incorporates the subject's resistance to the superego itself, entering into possession of 'all the aggressiveness which a child would have liked to exercise against it'.²⁹ Inside the child is a degraded relic of the father's authority: 'Here as so often the [real] situation is reversed: "If I were the father and you were the child, I should treat you badly".'³⁰ The model for the superego is therefore a drama of torture which takes place between father and child. If we refer back to Freud's essay on schoolboy psychology, what he seems to be providing here is the ferocious underside of transference to the pedagogue.

This superego sounds uncannily like the master who tortures at whim: 'the new authority, the superego has no motive that we know of for ill-treating the ego', which it none the less 'torments'.³¹ Strictly without reason, this instructor offers to the subject its first model of social control. Relentless, it pronounces an ethical imperative which is self-defeating and impossible to obey. Conscience torments the saint far more than the sinner: 'virtue forfeits some part of its promised reward; the docile and continent ego does not enjoy the trust of its

mentor and strives in vain, it would seem, to achieve it.³² The less we offend, or rather the more we obey this law, the crueller it becomes. As Lacan points out in his seminar on ethics, this logic does not work the other way round. If the saint is troubled by his conscience in proportion to his virtue, it is not the case that the sinner, in proportion to his pleasure, finds himself liberated from his debt to the law.³³ It is, we could say, the superego which is the prime culprit – the purveyor, not the assuager, of guilt.

When the Kleinians insist, *contra* Anna Freud, that a rebellious child is in fact testing or appealing to the law which she appears, wildly, to be free of, I would suggest that they are repeating in the frame of child psychology this impasse or impossible dictate which psychoanalysis exposes at the heart of socialization. In fact, Lacan is nowhere closer to Klein than on this very issue: 'It is a capricious, arbitrary, oracular law, a law of signs where the subject is guaranteed by nothing, in regard to which he has no security or safeguard [*Sicherung*], to use another Kantian term. Which is why, this *Gute* [the Good], at the level of the unconscious, is also, and fundamentally, the bad object, which Kleinian articulation still speaks of.'³⁴ As Rivière put it during the symposium of 1927, the child's sense of goodness, its superego, is derived from the bitterness of its experience in frustration.³⁵ In this context, reparation, as theorized by Klein, can be seen as an attempt to keep the ethical instance (the good) separate from the bad object – despite the fact (or because) it is from the bad object that it so clearly and unavoidably derives.

If we turn back to the dispute between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, we can now see how the ethical question and the question of negativity, as discussed in the last chapter, might be linked. What Klein allows us to do is to delve one step deeper into what it is that this punishing ethical imperative is trying to control, what it

is that, every time it voices its injunction, it draws on and repeats. One of Anna Freud's own examples can be used to suggest what might be involved – the case of a six-year-old girl which runs through the lectures, who, as soon as the analysis relaxed her inhibitions, turned from obsessional to pervert, cheerful, and overbold, whose pleasure in recounting her anal fantasies at the dinner table destroyed the appetites of all the grown-ups. Faced with which, Anna Freud decided that she had made a serious blunder, and admonished the child, thereby making her once again inhibited and apathetic. Compare Isaacs: 'It is all right if it comes out of my anus, but it mustn't come out of my mouth as words.'³⁶ If this little foulmouth transgresses, it is because she is more than happy – indeed, finds her happiness – in the effluence which pours out of her mouth – one kind of oral production (the child's verbage) which makes it impossible for everyone else to eat.

The issue would thus seem to be not just the child's social manageability, but what that same manageability is designed to ward off: an unspeakable orality and anality where the drive, as theorized by Klein and her supporters, transmutes itself in an uncomfortable and dangerous proximity into the fact of speech. Which is not to say, as we have already seen, that language is the untranslated or direct expression of the drives, but something about the inextricability of the two. The aggression of the drive does not seem here to precede language, but rather to be its effect, as it is speech which makes of it a projectile, seizing it in that logic of expulsion which is the basis of judgement as such. After all, instinctual gratification in this instance (the feared outcome of child analysis for many critics who objected to it as early as the case of 'Little Hans') means talking about it.

What does it mean to ask that this process be managed? What – equally if not more to the point – would

it mean to ask that it not be? What is Anna Freud being asked, or trying, to put back in place? As we watch her describe her attempt to calm the child's guardian who presumably, along with the whole household, was on the verge of starvation (they had lost 'all appetite'), it seems as if something is being expressed not just about the child, but about the whole family scene. In a comment remarkably resonant for this case, Rivière commented on the way that a real, objectifiable situation can take on the weight of what is unmanageable within: 'the destructive condition (starvation) becomes equated with the destructive impulses', giving the impulses an object and turning them into less of an internal threat.³⁷ Like Dora, this little girl seems to be refusing to be the 'prop for the common infirmity' of those around her (the expression is Lacan's), by speaking in her symptoms what the family cannot bear.³⁸ In Dora's case, we know that Freud was only partially able to recognize the reality she was refusing (her exchange for her father's lover), that he first acknowledged Dora's protest but then demanded that she once again comply.³⁹ I see Anna Freud as caught in an equivalent dilemma, only this time it is not a question of an oedipal triangle, but precisely of what that narrative – as Freud later recognized – repressed: a primitive orality which it is impossible to extricate from the very fact of judgement and speech. Is this the horror which underlies the injunctions which issue from the voice of the law? The scandal of the Kleinians would then be that they force us to look inside the mouth of God.

For Freud, as we know, the law was always the law of the father. He never – a point made by Julia Kristeva⁴⁰ – retheorized his account of social bonding subsequent to his later writings on femininity; he never asked whether his narrative of inter-male rivalry and truce-making might need to be altered in view of the 'discovery' of pre-oedipality and of the crucially important early relation between the mother and the girl-child (the

fact that he assumed that women were never quite 'in' culture is a related but separate point). The dispute between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud can be seen as enacting for the participants this unwritten version of social lineage: in the content of the dispute – in the negativity, orality, and incorporation which appear as the underside of that finally more civilized, or socially familiar and acceptable, war of identification between men; in its frame – what this group of women succeed and fail in transmitting among themselves. A logical, or perhaps even inevitable, outcome once you add to the image of knights and henchmen as arbiters of the law what Melanie Klein uncovered in the unconscious of the child.

In the course of her lectures, Anna Freud acknowledged that hostility towards the mother was something she was unable analytically and, one can speculate, personally to approach. In the case of the six-year-old girl it appears as the 'climax' of the analysis, as well as a type of vanishing-point of the whole dispute: 'At the climax of her analysis it was a matter of elucidating for her her hatred of her mother, against the knowledge of which she had previously defended herself by the creation of her "devil" as the impersonal deputy for all her hate impulses. Although up to now she had co-operated readily, she began at this stage to shrink from further progress' (p. 25). Alongside, or behind, the struggle with the (paternal) master, hostility towards the mother, and even more the struggle over its resistance to knowledge and articulation, appears to propel and set the limits to the analytic scene: 'Finally she surrendered outwardly before these constantly recurring proofs, but demanded to know from me also the reason for such a hostile feeling towards her apparently well-loved mother' (ibid.). But at the very point where she gets the child to surrender, it is her own knowledge which comes abruptly to an end: 'Here I declined to give further information, for I too was at the end of my knowledge' (ibid.).

For Melanie Klein this moment is crucial. In her intervention during the 'Symposium on Child Analysis', she seizes on it as the moment when the 'substitution' of analysis by pedagogy takes place (pp. 161–2). It signals for her that Anna Freud's refusal to negotiate the negative transference has resistance – resistance to knowledge of hostility towards the mother – as its base. Today, what is equally striking is the way in which Anna Freud's language reiterates in the field of child analysis that tension between forcing ('finally she surrendered') and the failure of knowledge ('I too was at the end of my knowledge') which readers of the Dora case have commented on in relation to Freud: his oppressive assertiveness in tandem with his inability to recognize the presence of transference and the homosexual factor in the case.⁴¹ This is a strange irony for a feminism which has wanted to read behind Freud's own resistance to knowledge a positive orality for women, the founder – potentially – of another femininity to be located in the earliest relation between the mother and the girl-child. As Anna Freud puts it, hostility to the mother is the hardest thing to incorporate (it was the little girl's only 'serious resistance' in the 'progressive reincorporation' of all her impulses (p. 61); just as death, in Paula Heimann's formulation, is the one thing which cannot be expelled.⁴²

How then do Melanie Klein and her supporters get round this seeming 'impasse' (how do they incorporate it, we might say)? One way is clearly through the figure of Melanie Klein herself. In the symposium, Nina Searl describes how her hesitance to use direct interpretation with a pre-latency boy was traced, after conversations with Klein, to fears about the stability of her early superego, fears which her analysis subsequently resolved.⁴³ Her remarks give a sense of that always present overlap between theory and institution in what is unmistakably here the founding of a school (the creation of the Klein-

ian group will follow the 'Controversial Discussions' of 1941–5); or rather, between theory, institution, and founder, since Klein so clearly occupies the place of knowing subject, site of interminable transference, as François Roustang put it in relation to Freud. If Freud held off the more negative or psychotic instance by binding filiation to his person, Melanie Klein effects no less of a binding when she chases up that instance and forces it in turn to speak. We should hardly be surprised that if it works, as it seems to – at least at this moment – for Nina Searl, it was unlikely to work for her own daughter.⁴⁴

It is the case reported by Ella Sharpe during the symposium, however, which gives the most dramatic illustration of the way this difficulty inscribes itself in the framework of analytic space – a case which reads like a cross between that of Dora and Henry James's *The Turn of the Screw*.⁴⁵ Not quite child analysis, it involves a fifteen-year-old girl brought to analysis by her horrified parents when she is sent home from school after she is discovered writing what was described as an obscene letter to a boy (in fact, she was brought by her mother because the father promptly retired to his bed). In her preliminary meeting with the analyst, the mother immediately made clear that, for her, the aim of the analysis was to ensure that the daughter does not begin to think that mothers do not understand their daughters, that she remain dutiful and obedient, and that she get these things, which she had learnt from the boy and were not her own thoughts, 'out of her mind in a month so that she could go back to school' (p. 381). Until a year ago, the mother insisted, she had known all her daughter's thoughts, and she could not see what good it could do to talk to the analyst (true self-cancelling logic, this, where the analysis is deemed pointless at the same time as it is ordered to have instant effects). What is perhaps most chilling is that the girl's head is clearly to be emptied so that the mother can get back in.

Ella Sharpe immediately lays out the ramifications of this situation for the analytic process, whose aim must be, she states, to make the girl 'mistress of her own sexual thoughts':

not only is the mother negative to the suspect analyst, but the analyst is in immediate opposition to the wishes of the mother. The analyst is aware that not only does the parent here represent in reality the deepest layers of the infantile superego in the analyst, but that the conscious purposes of the analyst are in accord with the deepest levels of that hostile negative attitude to the parent who forbade sexual activity and knowledge. (p. 381)

What is this other than analysis as a declaration of war, against a mother who concretely attempts to repress the sexual thoughts of her daughter, but – and this is more difficult – against the dictates of the infantile superego, a superego by definition in excess of the mother, but which the mother cannot fail, for both patient and analyst, to represent? Repeating a primitive childhood conflict, the analyst's conscious (her *analytic*) purpose re-enacts the battle once raged against the unreasonable dictates of the superego by the child: 'I detected here reverberations never stirred by an adult analysis' (p. 382). Thus Ella Sharpe anticipates Esther Bick's observation of 1962 that unconscious conflict in relation to the child's parents is a key factor in explaining why counter-transference stresses are so much greater in the analysis of a child.⁴⁶

When the patient sides with the mother against the analyst, recognizing, not unreasonably, that in so far as the analysis requires her to talk about sexuality, it is asking her to repeat the original offence, Sharpe catches herself thinking: '“It isn't *my* fault you have had to come, you should not have written that letter, then you wouldn't be coming to me!!!”' (p. 382); that is, she catches herself in an identification with the parent, 'at the mercy of the infantile superego condemnation of

myself' (ibid.). The only way out of this impasse is, as she sees it, to dissolve the severity of the superego, by recognizing its autonomy and detaching it from the mother who seems to embody it with such force: 'The freedom to speak plainly to the mother corresponded to a release in myself from the deeper levels of the unconscious negative to the condemning parent in my own mind' (p. 383). Only when this detachment has been effected can the analyst proceed to analytic interpretation, hampered up to then by unconscious guilt. It is therefore the severity of the infantile superego which stops interpretation, stops the analytic engagement with the word. For Sharpe, only this concept of interpretation can bring about a transference in the full analytic meaning of the term: 'I proved in the last analysis that transference occurred through interpretation alone' (p. 384). Another way of putting this would be to say that negativity must, finally, be seen to be its own master if the analytic process is to proceed.

Not that this ensures a successful outcome of the analysis. By making herself the ally of the girl's unconscious wishes, Sharpe provokes her conscious hostility; she sides with the mother, and the analysis is brought to an abrupt end (this in itself should serve as a caution against seeing women patients who walk out of analysis – a point often made in relation to Dora – as casting a type of proto-feminist vote). In this context, however, what matters is the effects of this scenario for child analysis itself: 'The problem of child analysis seems more subtly implicated with the analyst's own deepest unexplored repressions than adult analysis' (p. 384). Sharpe's final comments are clearly directed against Anna Freud: 'Rationalisations that the child is too young, that the weakness of the superego makes an admixture of pedagogy with analysis indispensable, and so on, are built upon the alarms of that very same infantile superego in the analyst that he has to deal with in the child before

him. That infantile “supergo” in the last resort becomes the dictator between analyst, child and parent’ (ibid.).

All of which leaves a further question: how can analysis proceed, how can it institutionalize itself, when it has so clearly identified as persecutory (as dictator) nothing other than the bearer or instance of the social institution as such? Thus, not for the first time will women have the privilege of identifying the violence – not to say perversity – of the social tie (the point is made by Julia Kristeva in her essay ‘Women’s Time’⁴⁷). But what Ella Sharpe’s example shows is that it is not easy for this insight to pass from one woman to another, even less from mother to daughter, since their interaction is bound to be a site – if not *the* site – where that problem or conflict is played out. Since Freud could not, any more than his daughter, talk about the mother, it was his blindness that he passed as legacy to his (psychoanalytic) child. In different ways it was a legacy which could not help but be enacted by both Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. Note that this has nothing to do with ‘mothering’ psychoanalysis,⁴⁸ but everything to do with the difficulty for psychoanalysis, as practice and institution, of what the mother represents.

So what, then, of Melanie Klein’s daughter? It is tempting, although also too easy, to see her as the element which, for the Kleinians to constitute themselves as Kleinians, had to be expelled. (When I asked Hanna Segal, the best-known commentator on Klein’s work, about Melitta Schmideberg during the course of an interview in 1990, it was the one topic on which she was unwilling to reply.⁴⁹) Melitta Schmideberg was analysed by Melanie Klein; it is generally assumed that she is the girl referred to in the 1921 paper ‘The Development of a Child’ and named as Lisa in the 1923 paper ‘The Role of School in the Libidinal Development of the Child’. (In the play *Mrs Klein*, Melitta reproaches her mother for having analysed her, as well as for describing her in

the first paper as of ‘only average intellect’.⁵⁰) Commentary on the dispute that developed between Klein and her daughter has tended to pathologize Melitta (in one letter Klein herself referred to her ‘illness’⁵¹), although not consistently. Paula Heimann, for example, suggests that she was driven from England; Phyllis Grosskurth, Klein’s recent biographer, discusses the ethical and psychic issues raised by Klein’s analysis of her own children, as one among a number of grounds for potential reproach, including Melanie Klein’s mourning of her brother during her pregnancy with Melitta and her frequent absences when Melitta was a child.⁵²

What seems to me important in this context, however, is not the question of legitimate or illegitimate recrimination by either party (how, from this distance, or even at the time, could one decide?), but the way that Melitta Schmideberg’s writings resonate with the problems of psychoanalytic transmission as I have tried to outline them here. Seen in these terms, the importance of Melitta Schmideberg resides not in the question of her participation – interestingly rebellious or virulently obstructive – in the controversy surrounding Melanie Klein, but in what she reveals about the institutional and theoretical difficulties of the collective project in which all the participants were caught.

‘A neurotic woman patient said: “In fact everything – reading, going to the theatre, visiting – is like eating. First you expect a lot, and then you’re disappointed. When I come to analysis, I eat your furniture, your clothes, your words. You eat my words, my clothes, my money.”’⁵³ In her 1934 paper ‘Intellectual Inhibition and Eating Disorders’, Melitta Schmideberg provides one of the clearest accounts of the relationship between orality and intellectual production, between eating and mouthing, between taking in and giving out words. Since it can be read as an extended gloss on the concerns of the last chapter, I have included a translation as an

Appendix here (it is this paper to which Lacan refers as part of psychoanalytic material which has become difficult of access today). It was written in her mother tongue, but remained untranslated into the language which both mother and daughter finally made their own – the clearest statement of the allegiance between them, it never passed into the language of their falling out.

Already Schimideberg lays out in it something of a psychic double bind: the woman who rejects her mother's nourishment or experiences it as bad will be bound to that same mother, in the apathy of failed autonomy, for life; the woman who achieves intellectual and personal independence acknowledges, in that very gesture, the indissoluble nature of her – oral – debt (it is exactly the oedipal drama that Freud describes for fathers and sons rewritten for girls). Ironically, then, according to her own account, Melitta Schimideberg's final repudiation of her mother – the daughter strikes out on her own – is a form of perverse tribute, the point of her greatest allegiance, to the body of Klein's work. This trajectory would then have to be placed alongside – it does not neutralize it, but gives it a different refrain – the journey from the endless citation of her mother in her early papers ('M. Klein has shown . . .'; 'M. Klein points out . . .'; 'M. Klein believes . . .'; 'Mrs Klein has emphasized . . .'; 'Cf. the writings of Melanie Klein'; 'these conclusions agree with those which Melanie Klein has embodied [sic] in her book'⁵⁴) to the utter repudiation of her work and the entire psychoanalytic project for which she is most renowned.

Even in those early papers, however, we can see Melitta Schimideberg making some kind of bid for herself – in her frequent allusions to a primordial narcissism, a concept she saw as discarded by current theory, in which reality is equated not with the mother's body, but with the child's own.⁵⁵ Anna Freud, in a related but distinct movement, will argue in her paper on passivity that there

is a point, prior to object love, of primordial identification with the object which in later life threatens the subject with the complete dissolution of self.⁵⁶ Parodies of total autonomy and total surrender – how far back, in order to bypass the object which most immediately confronts them, do these daughters of psychoanalysis feel they have to go?

This searching back would then be the other face of the opposite and more obvious move in her writing – away from psychoanalysis and outwards into a larger world, from the impulses and phantasy life of the infant to the factors of environment and external reality which, she argued, Melanie Klein ignored.⁵⁷ Certainly she saw her trajectory very much in these terms – from 'external factors can probably contribute' ('The analysis of these patients showed that their anxiety derived from instinctual sources and not from the ill-treatment they suffered') to 'the fateful effect of unfavourable reality', to 'I was criticized because I paid more attention to the patient's actual environment and reality situation', to the reproach that analysis had become the hallmark of a liberalism untested by 'the stress and possible dangers inherent in being involved in social and racial issues'.⁵⁸

Thus Melitta Schimideberg seems to cross from one side to the other of the inner/outer boundary which, as I discussed in chapter 3, has so often been at the heart of the psychoanalysis and politics debate. In fact, even when she became involved in social work, she never relinquished her commitment to the complexities of the inner life; her 1948 book *Children in Need* can be seen as exemplary of a psychoanalytically informed project of social reform.⁵⁹ And in the 1971 paper in which she attacks the institution of psychoanalysis most strongly, she herself acknowledges, in the face of alternative therapies, the importance of the 'scrupulousness and rigid adherence' to psychoanalytic rules.⁶⁰

But there is, I would suggest, another way of reading her writing that can avoid this inner/outer dichotomy which, in her dramatic shift of allegiance and identity, she none the less seems so starkly to embody or repeat. And that is to read her repudiation in terms of a problem theorized by psychoanalysis which has recurred throughout these texts: the problem of how subjects take on, in the fiercest and most punishing core of their identities, a social legislator both unavoidable and impossible in any simple way to obey. If this cannot be reduced to an inner/outer dichotomy, it is because it is precisely the point where inner and outer worlds clash and coalesce. (As Lacan puts it, it is the psychoanalytic account of social exigency which makes it incompatible with any theory based on the distinction between the individual and her or his social world.⁶¹)

Like Anna Freud, Melitta Schmideberg provides her own commentary on the way in which this problem rebounds on the process and dynamic of analysis itself. When she talks of the patient's reality, it is the reality of the *analytic scene* that she is most often talking about. When she introduces the element of reassurance into her technique, it is not – as with Ferenczi (she insists on the difference⁶²) – ‘active’ or ‘relaxation’ therapy attached to the principle of pleasure, but a way of trying to alleviate what she sees as the punishing elements of analysis, the extent to which the analysis itself, as much as the analyst, can take on the role of the superego who puts, or rather takes, its subject to task. The superego, she writes after Klein in her paper on ‘asocial’ children, ‘is never lacking’, unlike the more beneficent figures of the ego-ideal (another reproach against her mother?) which can fail.⁶³ If the superego is a persecutor – site of ‘psychotic anxiety [*Gewissensangst*],’⁶⁴ – then how can analysis proceed; how can interpretation reach its object, since once it is uncovered in the course of analysis, the obvious

place for the superego to take up residence is in the speech of the analyst herself?

What Melitta Schmideberg seems to be asking is whether, finally, Kleinian analysis (whether analysis) can dissolve the ferocity of this superego or whether, despite its best intentions, it can only drive it further in. It is this question of the superego as *generic* to the analytic scenario which underlines the more obvious questions about ethics and procedures which she raises. Thus, when analysis aims for the relinquishment of pre-genital defences, how can it be certain that it has not simply ensured that they are more successfully repressed? When the child gives up its asocial habits, is reduced anxiety or an increase in inhibition the cause? What does it mean to require of the patient that he or she be depressed? What, finally, is normality in a Kleinian world? ‘The objection that a patient cannot be well because he still has manic defences, unconscious paranoid anxieties or an anal fixation would be justified only if it could be proved that there are people without them.’⁶⁵

To put it at its crudest, the risk is that the Kleinian analyst, no less than the Anna Freudian, will identify with the police:

Thus a patient may remain homosexual or polygamous, continue to bite his nails, or to masturbate, though usually not to excess, without feeling guilty about it. In evaluating symptoms, I should be disposed to attach greater importance to those representing inhibitions of instinct than to manifestations of primitive instinctual life. This policy might usefully be adopted if only to counteract the analyst's unavoidable moral bias . . . especially when he fears the disapproval of parent-substitutes: other analysts, the patient's parents, the police, probation officers., etc.⁶⁶

(There is an interesting slide here from authorities inside to those outside the analytic community – is it really the police who disapprove of masturbation?)

Health, Melitta Schmideberg seems to be arguing, can be the ultimate form of consent. What is the fantasy of a 'fully analysed person?', she asks, rejoining the question which Freud put to Jones at the very beginning of the dispute.⁶⁷ The point here is not to evaluate her contribution to analytic technique, but at least to hand back to her the validity of her dilemma and of the questions which she raised. How could the analytic theory which most graphically described the fierceness of the superego be expected to avoid, clinically or institutionally, the worst of its effects? (The history of the analytic institution – of most institutions – suggests that the Kleinian aim of dissolving its severity is not in itself enough.) How, as Fornari puts it, can you analyse the unconscious components of political violence without provoking a transference war?⁶⁸ How, finally, can you pass on the legacy of the unconscious, so stunningly elucidated by Melanie Klein, without founding an institution, without – for all the differences with Anna Freud – setting up school?

We come back, therefore, to the beginning of these essays, or at least to the general principle that has informed them. That psychoanalysis is political in two senses: in what it has to say about the fantasies which inform our political identities and, in what it reveals in its own history about the vicissitudes and blind spots of political allegiance, the two senses linked by the question of what it means to try and constitute oneself as any kind of social or political group. For those of us still committed to some form of socialist vision, the fourth Conservative election victory in Britain has forced us to recognize this as one of the most difficult and challenging issues today. One of the things that the Conservatives seem to have mobilized so effectively in the last election is, not so much the opposition between collective and individual priorities, as a fear of the group; the only group that can be trusted, they constantly reiterated, is the one that tells you to trust only yourself. ('[The La-

bour Party] is still too closely identified with groups. It is thought to be the party that, as one interviewee said, "would rather group you together".⁶⁹) As Rivière puts it, if individual security depends on autonomy in phantasy, then sharing and co-operation, the condition of collective security, threatens at the very moment it protects.⁷⁰ While the concept of rights starts from that recognition, we could say that what distinguishes Conservatism is that it exploits the fear on which it rests.

In his 1955 paper 'The Freudian Thing' (in some senses the basis for the seminar on ethics of 1959–60), Lacan suggests that there has been a move in psychoanalytic theory from guilt to frustration.⁷¹ The issue of guilt, he writes, its meanings, its discovery in the action of the subject, dominated the first phase of psychoanalysis, to be superseded by the concepts of emotional frustration and dependence. Something which Freud recognized as a fundamental aporia at the heart of social identity was, as Lacan saw it, taken over by an emphasis on what was needed for the subject to be socially, no less than sexually, completed or fulfilled. In one of his first public interventions, Lacan argued that what distinguished human subjects was the existence of the superego, the internal arbiter of the mind (he was repeating something of a pattern, since he was speaking against, indeed addressing, his analyst, Loewenstein).⁷² Although he is closer than anywhere else to Klein on this subject, he none the less felt that she detached the superego from the moment of social recognition, running it back to the mythic body of the mother towards which the subject must then make restitution, thereby repairing the mother and securing a harmonious social participation at one and the same time.⁷³ The subject and social redeem themselves together (everybody makes up).

It is, I have suggested, arguable whether Klein ever in fact theorized this moment with the singular completion that this reading suggests. Meltzer, for example,

distinguishing between manic and true reparation, where objects repair each other or are repaired not defensively but for their own sake, describes the way in which reparation takes on a more 'mysterious meaning' at this point in Klein's account.⁷⁴ Certainly the institutional history and the writings on war, conducted at the same time as the disputes described in these two chapters, offer a type of caution to the more redemptive movement in Klein's own work.⁷⁵ In this context and reversing the normal order of things, the political component might be seen as the 'repressed' of the clinical debate.

There is, however, a more general point to be made. It has become commonplace, especially for feminism, to argue, that psychoanalysis reveals a failure of sexual norms, that the meaning of the unconscious is that it always knows more than what our socially circumscribed sexual identities appear to declare to the world. But for the most part that recognition has not been accompanied by an equivalent acknowledgement of the social aporia, or impasse of social identity, which psychoanalysis simultaneously describes. It is as if there has been a type of lag in the theory – sexuality as trouble against a social reality theorized as monolithic in its origins and effects (the idea of patriarchy, for example, as efficient or functioning exchange). But if social being is slashed with the same bar that distances the subject from her or his sexual roles, then it becomes impossible to pit 'another' sexuality as simply antagonistic to social law. There is no simple 'outside' of the law any more than there is a simple 'outside' of sexual norms – it is the participation in *and* refusal of those norms which psychoanalysis so graphically describes (take the first without the second and you get normalization; take the second without the first and you get a euphoric but ineffective liberationist version of Freud).

At a time when we seem to be confronted with the blandest and most terrifying versions of a seemingly interminable Conservatism in Britain, when claims for

national identity at the heart of Europe seem barely to articulate their legitimate aspirations before tipping over into their most disturbing separatist and absolute forms, the idea that we are by definition at odds with a social reality in which we cannot at the same time help but participate might be worth restating once again. Against those accounts that turn to Klein for a redemptive account of social and political being, I would suggest that the value of Klein's insights resides precisely in their negativity, in their own points of internal resistance to narratives of resolution, even if it is those narratives which her own writings and those of her followers have increasingly come to propose. The history of her (but not only her) institution suggests that we are never more vulnerable to the caprices of the superego and to the potential violence of identities than when we take it at its word.

NOTES

- 1 I take my title from Denise Riley's brilliant account of the relationship between psychoanalysis, social policy, and politics, with special reference to Melanie Klein and John Bowlby, at the end of the Second World War; *War in the Nursery – Theories of the Child and Mother* (London: Virago, 1983).
- 2 Anna Freud, *The Psycho-Analytical Treatment of Children*, 1945, Preface, p. ix (subsequent references are cited in the text).
- 3 Riccardo Steiner, 'Some Thoughts about Tradition and Change Arising from an Examination of the British Psychoanalytical Society's Controversial Discussions (1943–44)', *International Review of Psycho-Analysis*, 12, no. 27 (1985), pp. 33–4; cf. also *Complete Freud–Jones Correspondence* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1993).
- 4 Juliet Mitchell, Introduction to *The Selected Melanie Klein*, ed. Juliet Mitchell (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), pp. 25–30.

- 24 Edward Glover, 'Examination of the 'Klein System of Child-Psychology'', *Psycho-Analytic Study of the Child*, 1 (1945), p. 114.
- 25 Cited by Steiner, 'Some Thoughts about Tradition and Change', p. 31; cf. also *Complete Freud-Jones Correspondence*.
- 26 S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, 1930 (1929), in *Standard Edition*, vol. 19, p. 143; Pelican Freud, vol. 12, p. 337.
- 27 Leo Bersani, *The Freudian Body – Psychoanalysis and Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), ch. 1, 'Theory and Violence', pp. 7–27; Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, 'The Freudian Subject: from politics to ethics', *October*, 39 (Winter 1986), pp. 109–27; Lacan, *Le Séminaire VII: l'éthique de la psychanalyse* (Paris: Seuil, 1986), trans. Dennis Porter, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 1992).
- 28 S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, p. 123; Pelican Freud, p. 315.
- 29 S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, p. 129; Pelican Freud, p. 322.
- 30 *Ibid.* At one point, Anna Freud gives a definition of the superego which is uncannily close to this one by Freud: 'What else is the superego than identification with the aggressor': discussion at Hampstead Centre on 'The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence' (*Hampstead Bulletin* and Sandler et al., *The Analysis of Defence* (New York: International Universities Press, 1985)), cited by Young-Bruhl, *Anna Freud*, p. 212.
- 31 S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, p. 125; Pelican Freud, pp. 317–18.
- 32 S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, Pelican Freud, p. 126; p. 318.
- 33 Lacan, *Le Séminaire VII*, p. 208; trans., pp. 176–7. In her discussion of Klein, Anne Alvarez makes the distinction, after Money-Kyrle, between 'persecuting conscience or god, who demands penance and propitiation' and a 'more depressive god who . . . is felt to grieve at his children's moral failure rather than to threaten punishment' (*Live Company – Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy with Autistic, Borderline, Deprived and Abused Children* (London and New York: Tavistock/Routledge, 1992), p. 142).
- 34 Lacan, *Le Séminaire VII*, p. 89; trans., p. 73 (translation modified).
- 35 Joan Rivière, 'Symposium on Child Analysis', pp. 374–5.
- 36 Susan Isaacs, 'The Nature and Function of Phantasy', in *Developments in Psycho-Analysis*, ed. Joan Rivière, International Psycho-Analytic Library, vol. 43 (London: Hogarth, 1952, and Manesfield, 1989), p. 106.
- 37 Joan Rivière, 'On the Genesis of Psychological Conflict in Earliest Infancy', in *Developments in Psycho-Analysis*, p. 47.
- 38 Lacan, 'Intervention sur le transfert', in *Écrits* (Paris: Seuil, 1966), pp. 215–26; trans. Jacqueline Rose, 'Intervention on Transference', in *Feminine Sexuality – Jacques Lacan and the école freudienne*, ed. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose, (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 70.
- 39 For various readings of the 'Dora' case, see *In Dora's Case – Freud, Hysteria, Feminism*, ed. Charles Bernheimer and Claire Kahane (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Virago, 1985), esp. essays by Suzanne Gearhart, Toril Moi, Neil Hertz.
- 40 Julia Kristeva, *Pouvoirs de l'horreur* (Paris: Seuil, 1980), 'De la salèté à la souillure', pp. 69–105, trans. Leon S. Roudiez, *Powers of Horror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 'From filth to defilement', pp. 56–89.
- 41 See essays by Gearhart, Moi, and Hertz in *In Dora's Case*.
- 42 Paula Heimann, 'Some Aspects of the Role of Introjection and Projection in Early Development', in *Freud-Klein Controversies*, p. 511.
- 43 Nina Searl, 'Symposium on Child Analysis', p. 379.
- 44 See Grosskurth, *Melanie Klein*, pp. 230–1 for an account of Searl's eventual resignation from the British Society.
- 45 Ella Sharpe, 'Symposium on Child Analysis', pp. 380–4 (subsequent references are cited in the text).
- 46 Bick, 'Child Analysis Today', p. 170.
- 47 Kristeva, 'Le temps de femmes', *33/44: Cahiers de recherche de science et de documents*, 5 (Winter 1979), pp. 5–19; trans. Alice Jardine and Harry Blake, 'Women's Time', in *The Kristeva Reader*, ed. Toril Moi (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 187–213.

- 48 Janet Sayers, *Mothering Psychoanalysis – Helene Deutsch, Karen Horney, Anna Freud, Melanie Klein* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991).
- 49 'Interview with Hanna Segal', *Women – A Cultural Review*, 1, no. 2 (1990), pp. 198–214.
- 50 Klein, *Love, Guilt and Reparation*, pp. 1–53, pp. 59–76, p. 46.
- 51 Klein, cited in Grosskurth, *Melanie Klein*, p. 197; Grosskurth comments in a note on the same page: 'There is no indication that Melitta was suffering from any physical ailment. Is she suggesting that Melitta was schizoid?'
- 52 *Ibid.*, pp. 381, 53, 90, 99–100, 218.
- 53 Melitta Schmideberg, 'Intellektuelle Hemmung and Esstörung', p. 109, trans. Robert Gillet and Jacqueline Rose, 'Intellectual Inhibition and Eating Disorders', p. 262.
- 54 Schmideberg, 'A Contribution to the Psychology of Persecutory Ideas and Delusions', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 12 (1931), pp. 343, 344, 349; 'Some Unconscious Mechanisms in Pathological Sexuality and their Relation to Normal Sexual Activity', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 14 (1933), pp. 228, 252, 256.
- 55 Schmideberg, 'Persecutory Ideas and Delusions', p. 344; 'Some Unconscious Mechanisms', p. 248.
- 56 A. Freud, 'Studies in Passivity', 1952, in *Writings of Anna Freud*, vol. 4, p. 259.
- 57 This is, at the very least, a difficult issue, and is a reproach often made against Melanie Klein. The 'Controversial Discussions' and the papers subsequently published in *Developments in Psycho-Analysis* make it clear, I think, that it involves a simplification of the complex significance which Klein and her supporters attach to the external world. While it is undoubtedly the case that their unique emphasis was on internal psychic factors, the intensity of the latter in fact *increased* the importance of the environment. In 'Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy', Rivière describes the way that 'inexorable internal need' is 'referred as a demand upon the external mother' (p. 46; my emphasis); the fact that the child experiences the behaviour of real objects as a 'mirror

- reflection' of its feelings towards them is what 'determines the importance of the child's real experience and of the environmental factors in development' (p. 56). Note too that Anna Freud's position is also a nuanced one; while she stresses external and environmental factors, she comments, for example, that conclusions drawn from home life can be 'as misleading in some cases as they are accurate in others' ('Certain Types and Stages of Social Maladjustment', 1949, in *The Writings of Anna Freud*, vol. 4, p. 85). In relation to Melanie Klein, it is in fact very hard to establish a clear causality between inner and outer. Cf. for example this passage from her late paper 'On the Theory of Anxiety and Guilt' (1948): 'The frustrating (bad) external breast becomes, owing to projection, the external representative of the death instinct; through introjection it reinforces the primary internal danger-situation; this leads to an increased urge on the part of the ego to deflect (project) internal dangers (primarily the activity of the death instinct) into the external world' (in *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–63*, in *Writings of Melanie Klein*, vol. 4, p. 31). In an unpublished paper, 'The Fissure of Authority: violence and phantasy in the work of Melanie Klein', John Phillips gives a very convincing description of how ambiguity between external and internal determination is integral to Klein's work.
- 58 Schmideberg, 'Persecutory Ideas and Delusions', pp. 349–50; 'The Psycho-Analysis of Asocial Children and Adolescents', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 16 (1935), p. 45; 'A Contribution to the History of the Psycho-Analytical Movement in Britain', *British Journal of Psychiatry*, 118 (January 1971), pp. 63, 67.
- 59 Schmideberg, *Children in Need*, with an introduction by Edward Glover (London: Allen and Unwin, 1948).
- 60 Schmideberg, 'History of the Psycho-Analytical Movement in Britain', p. 67.
- 61 Lacan, *Le Séminaire VII*, p. 126; trans., p. 105.
- 62 Schmideberg, 'Reassurance as a Means of Analytic Technique', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 16 (1935), p. 317.
- 63 Schmideberg, 'Asocial Children and Adolescents', p. 37n.

- 64 Schmeiderg, 'The Play-Analysis of a Three-Year-Old Girl', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 15 (1934), p. 261.
- 65 Schmeiderg, 'After the Analysis . . .', *Psycho-Analytic Quarterly*, 7 (1938), pp. 135-7.
- 66 *Ibid.*, p. 140.
- 67 *Ibid.*, p. 128; Freud to Jones, cited by Steiner, 'Some Thoughts about Tradition and Change', p. 32.
- 68 Franco Fornari, *The Psychoanalysis of War* (Bloomington, Ind., and London: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 247.
- 69 Giles Radice, Labour MP for Durham North, reporting on research conducted in five South-East marginal seats that Labour failed to capture in April 1992: 'This is How Labour can win', *Independent*, 29 September 1992.
- 70 Rivière, 'Hate, Greed and Aggression', in Melanie Klein and Joan Rivière, *Love, Hate and Reparation, Psycho-Analytical Epitomes*, vol. 2 (London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1937), p. 8.
- 71 Lacan, 'La chose freudienne', in *Écrits*, p. 433; trans. 'The Freudian Thing', in *Écrits: a selection*, p. 142.
- 72 Cited by Elizabeth Roudinesco, *La Bataille de cent ans: l'histoire de la psychanalyse en France*, vol. 2, 1925-85 (Paris: Seuil, 1986), p. 136; trans. Jeffrey Mehlman, *Jacques Lacan & Co. - A History of Psychoanalysis in France 1925-85* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; London: Free Association Books, 1990), p. 122.
- 73 Lacan, *Le Séminaire VII*, p. 127; trans., p. 106.
- 74 Donald Meltzer, *The Kleinian Development, Part II* (Perthshire: Clunie Press, 1978), p. 47.
- 75 Leo Bersani, *The Culture of Redemption* (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1990) criticizes Klein in terms of the concept of redemption. Bersani's writing on violence and culture in relation to Freud anticipates some of the themes addressed here (cf. *The Freudian Body*: Columbia University Press, 1986, esp. Ch. 1, 'Theory and Violence'); see also Jessica Benjamin, *The Bonds of Love* (New York: Pantheon, 1986, London: Virago, 1988).

An Interview with Jacqueline Rose

Conducted by Michael Payne and Maire Jaanus

JAANUS I thought that the first question I would ask you is about questions, because it is so noticeable to me when I read you that both the beginnings and the ends of your essays are always questions. You take other people's - often feminists' - answers, and you undo them as questions, or you re-pose questions as new questions. As I was reading your essays, I thought that they are just propelled by questions. There's a motor movement, an unrest in the essays, and it makes them very difficult. I was reminded of Derrida saying that the question is the real discipline in philosophy. And Kristeva saying that a question is a suffering. And then I thought, I will ask her, what is a question for her?

ROSE I don't have my definition of a question; but a way of understanding what you are saying would be in terms of the difficult forms of compatibilities which I would like to put into play. On the one hand, there are political questions in the very substantial sense of the word, as in the feminist struggle to transform forms of oppressive social organization for women, questions which can be transmuted fairly directly into political demand. On the other hand, I would want to place alongside these the project, which I have always seen myself as part of, which is involved in trying to articulate