
The Subject of Philosophy

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
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Chapter 3

Apocryphal Nietzsche¹

I would like to begin by simply making two remarks—remarks that are, moreover, complementary. First, what I will say (or rather what I will read) is deliberately inscribed within what others here have already said (that is, written). For this reason, nothing of what I will propose here is “new.” At the very most—but this is not so certain—I will combine things a little differently. Be that as it may, this will remain, in the strictest sense of the word, a *contribution*. If, nevertheless, I insist (and here is the second prefatory remark) on returning to certain questions (or even one question), this is neither innocent nor without design. Today it is a question—as I think we all understand—of persevering *despite everything*. But as Nietzsche says in *Ecce Homo*, “nothing decisive is constructed except by building upon a *despite everything*.”

“Question of Literature”

This is why I will try in my turn to reintroduce myself into the question we are (nearly) all asking ourselves here and that—in diverse ways, it is true—has constantly animated these debates. Without further precaution, I will formulate this question as follows: *Where does Nietzsche depart from philosophy?* Or, to be more precise: *Where does Nietzsche dissociate himself from philosophy?* And I will not add: *exactly*. . . .

Despite appearances, this is not a Nietzschean question, although Nietzsche is certainly no stranger to it. But that we still ask it today, that we are constrained

to maintain it as a question, should indicate in sufficiently clear manner that between Nietzsche himself (assuming the expression "Nietzsche himself" means anything) and us, between the affirmation of philosophy's *Überwindung* and our uncertainty (or our suspicions), something has occurred that henceforth renders problematic our relation to Nietzsche—or, which amounts to the same, to philosophy. This something, as we all now know—if only by denying it—is Heidegger's reading, in which, moreover (this perhaps makes all the difference), "Nietzsche himself" really and truly exists. And as to the question raised above, what indeed are we faced with today, whether or not we like it, if not the Heideggerian *answer*: Nietzsche is the last philosopher; it is in him that metaphysics as a whole reaches its culmination and conclusion?

In one respect—and of this no one can be unaware either—Heidegger's reading is unavoidable, because it is the only one (or one of the few) that actually takes Nietzsche absolutely seriously, meaning to the point of showing that the question of overcoming philosophy is itself a philosophical question. Hence the establishment of this complex relation in which the patient and painstaking work of repetition replaces affirmative derring-do [*coup de force*], where the *Überwindung* (the overcoming) is displaced and degraded into *Verwindung* (distortion)—in short, where the Nietzschean objective is indeed reiterated, but in the process twists back so to speak upon itself, reinforces itself and loses in innocence, which is to say also in weakness, what it gains in implacable rigor. Thus, if Nietzsche is the "last metaphysician," Heidegger is the first post-Nietzschean or at least—since we must not forget Bataille—one of the first to have tried to be.

But if this reading is unavoidable, it has also never been self-evident. To say that the question of overcoming philosophy is itself philosophical is only possible precisely if we turn the overcoming of philosophy into a *question*. Nietzsche himself, in part, refused to do this—or rather, he *also* made it an affirmation. And inasmuch as affirmation can go so far as to become detached from, or move beyond the orbit of, interrogative circularity, and thereby disperse itself in the unending reverberation of all unique and definitive answers, Nietzsche might finally and forever escape philosophy's grasp. At least this is what one is always slightly tempted to oppose to Heideggerian closure, which in its way is even more redoubtable than the Hegelian kind. But it is also, of course, what one can never seriously oppose to it, since affirmation is never simple (it must be further affirmed or affirm itself) and since, not being simple, it is paradoxically always too simple, clutching its own *will* [*vouloir*] and consequently incapable of dispersing itself without falling back well beyond its supposed point of detachment, in the infinite but closed exchange of philosophical theses.

All of this is well known, but it is perhaps worth repeating, first in order to note this: if the Heideggerian reading is to be called into question, it would be naïve, to say the least, to imagine that we can do it simply. Its power of encirclement

practically eliminates the recourse to anything but “ruse,” so that it is necessary to deploy a whole strategy of infinite complexity in which, as we know, repetition itself, in the Heideggerian sense, must be repeated, and this in such a way that, separating from itself, it folds back and comes to intersect itself, drawing within itself the outer limit of the closure. This strategy bears a name: *deconstruction*. And if, for simplicity’s sake, we might say that deconstruction does not proceed by concepts, in the classical, philosophical sense of the term, we also know that it at least has a “site,” a “field,” or a “terrain” (but is it still a matter of “property”?) in which to function: the *text* of philosophy insofar as we can distinguish it from *discourse*, or, more exactly, insofar as we can follow its work in discourse—assuming the text is that on account of which discourse, in general, does not function, decomposes and resists itself, fails to reach completion.

To take into account, in Nietzsche’s case, the text so defined is a task that could in some fashion be taken for granted (I say this very cautiously, conscious of the risk one always runs of *restricting* the concept of writing), since Nietzsche, of all the “philosophers” (Kierkegaard included), was the one who distinguished himself the most systematically (partly in spite of himself, but with his usual ostentatious rage) by his contradictory and multifarious, enigmatic and, let us say, disruptive practice of writing. Indeed, without him the “question” of the text would doubtless never have emerged so forcefully, at least not in the exact form it has taken today. This task naturally led, therefore, to a shift of emphasis, in a rereading of Nietzsche, onto the irreducibly “literary” part of his discourse (or discourses), in order to follow the contorted, tortuous path of the philosophical *disengagement* [*démarque*]² and retrace at least the outline of this complex textual apparatus in which the philosophical as such becomes variously but unceasingly blurred.

This aim is, of course, not Heideggerian. In fact, up to a point, it corresponds to none of Heidegger’s questions—ultimately incapable of allowing itself to be subsumed under the general form of a question. But this is only true up to a certain point, since, at least concerning Nietzsche, if Heidegger does not take into account “literature,” “form,” “style,” etc. (still less the “text”), this is done deliberately. It is neither a gap nor a silence, but a refusal, and an explicit refusal at that. (As everybody knows, we cannot say as much about all refusals.)

Here is, quite simply, where I wanted to enter into the discussion: if, on the one hand, concerning Nietzsche, focusing on the text inevitably raises the question we can designate as “the question of literature” (with, as you might guess, all the requisite skepticism), and if, on the other hand, Heidegger (from whom we have the strategic project itself, whatever displacements it may have undergone) resolutely dismissed this problematic, is this not the sign that we should guard against a certain haste? Is this not, above all, an indication that we should begin by patiently reading Heidegger, by examining the reasons for this refusal or this dis-

missal? For by imagining that we could take advantage of this ambiguous silence [*non-dit*] (by hastily confusing it with the text's unthought and its correlative: the profoundly philosophical privilege unreservedly granted by Heidegger to the concern for presence, being, truth, etc.), do we not run the risk of remaining well within the limit to which Heidegger succeeded in carrying the interpretation of Nietzsche?

It is this simple question that I would like to raise here. But one immediately sees the immensity of the task it sets us: nothing less than the systematic deconstruction of the whole Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche. As it is clearly out of the question to undertake this today, I will limit myself to proposing a kind of programmatic outline. Still, we will also see, or at least I hope we will see, that in following even a short way the thread of this suspicion, one cannot avoid introducing, concerning Nietzsche's writing, a texture infinitely more complex than any we could have imagined.

Poiesis and *Dichtung*

There is, then, in the Heideggerian commentary, a refusal to consider the "literary" process in Nietzschean discourse. More precisely, since it is obviously *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* that is involved (but we will no doubt have to reexamine this obviousness), there is the clearly marked refusal to confirm the opposition of the "theoretical" and the "poetic" in which classic commentary on Nietzsche operates as it were spontaneously.

Let us begin by reading this refusal.

Everything turns upon what we might consider as the connection between the first two courses devoted to Nietzsche, where, in the mode of a complex exchange of their principal themes (the will to power and the eternal return), the question of the "poetic form" of *Zarathustra* and of the relation this "form" maintains with the teaching and doctrine of the eternal return surfaces, or, more exactly, resurfaces, at least twice. Here is what Heidegger says:

We must free ourselves straightaway of a prejudicial view. The editors say (XII, 425) [here Heidegger is referring to the *apparatus criticus* of the large *octavo* edition]: "Right from the start two different intentions run parallel to each other; the one aims at a theoretical presentation [*eine theoretische Darstellung*] of the doctrine, the other at a poetical treatment [*eine poetische Behandlung*] of it." Now, to be sure, we too have spoken of a "poetic" presentation [*"dichterische" Darstellung*] of the doctrine of eternal return in *Zarathustra*. Yet we avoided distinguishing it from a "theoretical" presentation [*Darstellung*], not because the passages cited from *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil* are not theoretical presentations, but because here the word and concept *theoretical* do not say anything, especially not when one follows the

lead of the editors and of those who portray Nietzsche's "doctrine" by equating *theoretical* with "treatment in prose" [*eine Prosabehandlung*]. The distinction "theoretical-poetical" results from muddled thinking. Even if we were to let it obtain in general, such a distinction would in any case be out of place here. In Nietzsche's thinking of his fundamental thought [*In Nietzsches Denken seines Grundgedankens*], the "poetical" is every bit as much "theoretical," and the "theoretical" is inherently "poetical." All philosophical thinking—and precisely the most rigorous and prosaic—is in itself poetic [*dichterisch*]. It nonetheless never springs from the art of poetry [*Dichtkunst*]. A work of poetry [*ein Dichtwerk*], a work like Hölderlin's hymns, can for its part be thoughtful [*denkerisch*] in the highest degree. It is nonetheless never philosophy. Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is poetic [*dichterisch*] in the highest degree, and yet it is not a work of art [*ein Kunstwerk*], but "philosophy." Because all actual, that is, all great philosophy is inherently thoughtful-poetic [*denkerisch-dichterisch*], the distinction between "theoretical" and "poetical" cannot be applied to philosophical texts.³

As we can see from just one reading, the operation attempted here is particularly contorted. So as neither to distort its logic nor miss its results (for it is, literally, an *operation*), we must quickly break it down.

What is in question is the *Darstellung* of *Zarathustra*, which is not its "form" but, if we must translate, its mode of *presentation* (and, for that matter, that of philosophy in general). As regards this *Darstellung*, the conventional opposition of the "poetical" and the "theoretical" (of the *poetisch* and the *theoretisch*) is strictly irrelevant, all the more so if it comes to correspond to the distinction between "poetic version" and "prosaic version" (*poetische Behandlung* and *Prosabehandlung*), which is to say the prose/poetry distinction itself. Moreover, regarding what is at stake in *Darstellung* (that of *Zarathustra* as well as of philosophy), and which is *Denken*—thinking—the terms "poetical" and "theoretical" are completely interchangeable.

On the other hand, the *Darstellung* of *Zarathustra*—philosophical *Darstellung* in general—can be characterized using a word that is radically untranslatable (except perhaps by clumsy, if handy, recourse to the resources of Greek and to the difference, which Heidegger never fails to stress, between Greek and Latin, though we will soon see that even this recourse is irrelevant): philosophical *Darstellung*, says Heidegger, is *dichterisch*—"poietic," therefore (but above all not poetical). This does not mean that philosophy (including *Zarathustra*) is *Dichtkunst*—poietic art or Poïesis. For the relation of philosophy to Poïesis (*Dichtkunst* or, better still, *Dichtwerk*—the work of Poïesis, in other words) is not symmetrical: just as philosophy, however little it may be thoughtful, is always poietic, so Poïesis, precisely because it is thoughtful, is never philosophical. There is, there-

fore, an absolute privilege of Poïesis over philosophy, and one can clearly see that if Poïesis never fails to be thoughtful, the same cannot be said for philosophy.

The *result* is simple: as philosophy, as thinking philosophy, *Zarathustra* is poïetic. Were it written otherwise, moreover—less “poetically”—matters would remain the same. But it is a book of philosophy, and thus has nothing in common with a “work of art,” that is, with a work of Poïesis. What this means, if we know how to calculate and deduct, is that it simply has nothing in common with a work. And this is what Heidegger implied some pages earlier, when he broached for the first time the question of the *Darstellung* of *Zarathustra*:

What is difficult to grasp about this work is not only its “content,” if it has such, but also its very character as a work. Of course, we are quick to propose a ready-made explanation: here philosophical thoughts are presented poetically [*dichterisch*]. Yet what we are now to call *thinking* [*denken*] and *poetizing* [*dichten*] dare not consist of the usual notions, inasmuch as the work defines both of these anew, or rather, simply announces them.⁴

This remark, noticeably prudent concerning the work-being of *Zarathustra*, and the operation it consequently assumes, are in fact comprehensible only if we refer at least to the three lectures on contemporary art included in the course and since collected in the first text of *Holzwege* under the title “The Origin of the Work of Art.” It is here, indeed, in the painstaking study of the work-being of the work, that that which—following a connection unremarked by all of philosophy at least since Plato—essentially ties art to truth (to *aletheia*), or more precisely, *Dichtung* (which is the essence of art) to Being itself (to the meaning or the truth of Being), is determined. We will soon have to return to this determination of *Dichtung*, but if we also remember that “The Origin of the Work of Art” assumes the “destruction” of aesthetics carried out in the first course on Nietzsche (*The Will to Power as Art*) in reference to the Nietzschean stance on the question of art, we see by which endless detours we would have to travel in order to attempt this deconstruction of the Heideggerian interpretation which is our horizon here.

To simplify things and try in spite of everything to move as quickly as possible to the heart of the matter, we might content ourselves with the following remarks. They are, of course, only reminders:

1. In Heidegger’s view, Nietzsche’s thought is fundamentally determined as an anti-Platonism (a reversal or an inversion of Platonism), which is also to say that it is determined as the most extreme, the most radical, application of the post-Kantian onto-theology of the will against metaphysical nihilism (which amounts, as we know, to the devalorization of the sensible in general).
2. This reversal, which proceeds from Platonism and which consequently fulfills it, is carried out on the theme of art (“at present art wants its revenge,”

Nietzsche said in 1870), that is, within and at the limit of the (Platonic) field of aesthetics such as it has been reworked by the metaphysics of modern times from Baumgarten (or Kant) to Wagner. However much Nietzsche distances himself from this tradition, nothing is ever disturbed (from *The Birth of Tragedy* to the last texts) in the “physiological” ontology of modern aesthetics (of “aïsthetics” *stricto sensu*) or in the mimetology constitutive of Platonism.

3. Though philosophical in nature, this reversal is *thought* (*gedacht*), and, as such, it does affect the decisive question (decisive for the fate of metaphysics) of the relation between art and truth. But if it touches upon this relation, it does so according to the Platonic determination of the two concepts of art and truth, that is, first of all, according to the Platonic interpretation of *aletheia*, and this in such a way that even if the “discord” between art and truth, wherein is concealed (and revealed to interpretation) the whole question of the oblivion of Being, is displaced in this reversal—for example, in the saying: “Art has more value than truth”—it is nonetheless renewed and remains “unsurmounted.” This, as one might suspect, does not mean that it remains *unsublated*.

4. It is to this that Heidegger “opposes,” in a purportedly nondialectical (non-Hegelian) manner, another understanding of *aletheia*—following the unity of lighting and concealing, of presence and withdrawal—but which is such that “the *impulse toward the work* [this pull, *Zug*, once again untranslatable] lies in the nature of truth as one of truth’s distinctive possibilities by which it can itself occur as being in the midst of beings.”⁵

5. This truth at work, this position (*thesis*) or implementation of truth, is art itself—which in turn is essentially determined as *Dichtung*, or, let us say, still tentatively, *Poïesis*, in the sense least considered in Platonic thought. For *Dichtung* is basically nothing other than language itself (*die Sprache*), as we see if we free ourselves of all instrumental interpretations of language and are able, in language, to make ourselves attentive to its “inaugural,” “enlightening” power—to its *speaking* or its *saying*, to that *Sage* which is both diction and fable (*muthos* in the most archaic sense) and which constitutes it in this historical relation to the access or the destination [*envoi*]⁶ of truth.

In the last analysis, everything in this refusal to consider the “poetic” character of *Zarathustra* depends upon this determination of the *work* wherein we find at stake the difficult destruction of the metaphysical “discord” between art and truth. To put it another way, everything depends upon this *position* of *Dichtung*, which we see (despite the “metaphysical” emphasis on the motif of speech and saying, despite the manipulation of an apparently conventional opposition between *phusis* and *thesis*, etc.) corresponds to none of the classical or modern positions of Art, and which, it would still be necessary to prove, is not, as regards the philosophical oppositions (of the “poetic” and the “prosaic,” the “literary” and the “theoretical,” etc.) that it comes to paralyze or perturb, in a position, let us say, of *supplementarity*. I am thinking in particular of this enigmatic *Zug*, of this *pull* which comes

in addition and which complicates the simple structure of *aletheia*, that is, the unity apparently without remainder of presence and withdrawal. But, of course, this would require an analysis all its own.

Furthermore, it is doubtless the object of this other analysis, which is the most intractable part of the Heideggerian text, that renders the whole interpretation of Nietzsche unavoidable and compels us to envision its deconstruction. We will always be able to reduce Heideggerian discourse to some negative theology of the most contorted variety, but we can still not prevent (despite the interpretation that Heidegger, moreover, was the first one tempted to give) the text (the *Dichtung*?) in which all of this is laboriously woven—and provided we do not imagine that we have always already read it—from forbidding us to take lightly, and as the compulsive repetition of the old, this extreme forward thrust of philosophical discourse which forces it to reach, under this or that far from innocent name (*Dichtung*, *Sage*, etc.), its very limit.

Nevertheless, let this not prevent us from observing that, for the Heideggerian operation to be possible, at least three conditions must be met:

1. that on the one hand, support confirming the dissymmetry between *Dichtung* and the philosophical be provided. And this is the whole problem of the Hölderlinian *Dichterwerk* as an unexamined resource, which, in Nietzsche as in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” fulfills the same strategic function. We will return to this;

2. on the other hand, that, in Nietzsche’s work, a certain privilege be granted *Zarathustra*, even if we must immediately—though a little in the fashion of ritual precaution—adjust its scope. Here it would be appropriate to follow, without being overly hasty, the many descriptions given by Heidegger of Nietzsche’s whole work, published or not. We would see that, ultimately—and with the exception of *Zarathustra*—nothing but *The Will to Power* is taken into consideration, in other words, only what remains of the great *philosophical* work intended to follow *Zarathustra*—to fulfill or reorient it. Hence, that *Zarathustra* be considered “‘eccentric’ to [Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole],”⁷ that, in spite of everything, it bears in secret and, as it were, silently the weight of the “highest thought,” does not mean that it is, of the same Nietzsche, “the highest peak attained by [his] thinking.”⁸ If silence or secrecy are criteria—and they are—then *The Will to Power*, if only by virtue of its incompleteness, which is also to say its non-disclosure, outmatches *Zarathustra* in “depth.” Yet for all that, *Zarathustra* is certainly the “vestibule” (a Nietzschean word Heidegger adopts; see 1: 12) of this great promised work; everything preceding it was “foreground” [*hors-d’œuvre*] (1: 9); and the last opuscles from the year 1888 are regarded as simply the products of an anxious urgency, having no other finality (on the eve of the presaged collapse and with a clear awareness of the inevitability of incompleteness) than to “prevent anyone’s confusing that basic position with any other.”⁹ Conse-

quently, everything is organized around this *work* which is missing, but which *Zarathustra* prefigures, and which, because it is missing, keeps all of Nietzsche's production within the realm of the philosophical and on the threshold of *Dichtung* as such;

3. finally (this is the last condition), that "the question of art" itself, its position and its function in the history of the modern completion of metaphysics, become the object of a certain skepticism. Art is here considered in its philosophical determination, as the art of aesthetics, which arises when "the magnificent art of Greece" (which had no need for aesthetics), as also "the great philosophy" corresponding to it, come to an end,¹⁰ and when in Plato, and a fortiori in Platonism, what went before is no longer understood. This "event"—this accident, this fall or decline (*Verfall*)—is at bottom nothing other than the end of *muthos*. But this can only be understood if we conceive of *muthos* outside of its philosophical opposition to *logos*, in that exteriority which is precisely that of *Sage* (*muthos* in German) and of *Dichtung*. Only Hölderlin had access to this exteriority, this (nearly) pure outside; and it is because he did not sufficiently reflect upon pre-Platonism, or, which amounts to the same, because he thought Platonically about pre-Platonism, that Nietzsche—whose intuition of the Greeks and of the fundamental antagonism governing their thought is nevertheless so close to that of Hölderlin,¹¹ and even though he suspected what was at stake behind the question of art—could not go beyond the "liquidation" of aesthetics in which post-Kantian metaphysics culminates. For the question of art, far from being a fissure portending the crumbling of the philosophical edifice, is precisely the means by which metaphysics pulls itself together. As long as art is thought within the horizon of Platonism, and even more so as long as it is thought, against Plato, in the categories of the physiological, of creativity or productivity (whatever name we use to dress it up and whatever "subject" one imputes to it), of lived experience, of sensibility, of energy, of desire, of *aisthesis*, etc.—and all this despite its extraordinary complexity and its internal contradiction, the deep sense of the Dionysian—the question of art, which is not "fortuitous," still does not bear on what is "essential."¹² The opposite is the case, as we have just seen. What is essential takes place when what is called into question and interrogated is, through *Dichtung* and *Sage*, the relation between Being and humanity, between *aletheia* and language.¹³ And it is only at this price that we can consider the "poetic" and, in general, poetics, as negligible—beginning with that of Plato (*Republic*, III, for example)—meaning that we can subordinate *poiesis* (as an already distant echo of *muthos*) to *techne*, which corresponds, as we know, to the form/matter opposition and refers to the understanding of being as *eidōs*. This is the reason why *Poiesis* does not translate *Dichtung*. But it is above all the reason why, in the text of the *Republic*, no distinction is established between the two formulations of the question of *mimesis*, the "poetics" of Book III, and the general "mimetology" of Book X, and why the first is summarily assimilated to the second.¹⁴

What Is Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*?

I would like to pause here for a moment. The last remark makes clear that we have already begun to use the language of deconstruction, that is, to consider how, textually, Heidegger's commentary sidesteps or cuts across the question of the philosophical text in general—in the case at hand, Plato's, though at the same time, and for a reason, Nietzsche's as well. The example of Plato is remarkable, however, in that it suggests the place, the location at which the general configuration of the whole conceptual apparatus of poetics (of forms and genres) is decided. Whatever our skepticism, we cannot avoid mobilizing this apparatus when we ourselves broach the question of the text. This is hardly the moment, of course, to explore the full dimensions of this question. But it is at least possible to take advantage of its occurrence here to try to measure what is at stake in it. It is, after all, very clear.

When we attempt to apply a textual reading to Nietzsche, in order to follow, in the text, the very *trace* [*remarque*], as Jacques Derrida says, of the question of the text; when we search, in other words, for the "birth of textuality" in Nietzsche's text, are we sure to avoid *art* (the poetic) and, at the same time, since one does not go without the other, *Dichtung*? In order for us to gain such assurance, the text would have to be reducible neither to art nor to *Dichtung*; it would have to exceed each of them; and consequently, we would have to be able simultaneously to hold that *Dichtung* is still a metaphysical concept and show that, in the concept of art, something has always been at work to disintegrate its very conceptuality and weaken somewhat its philosophical impact.

Doubtless, the question never arises in such simple fashion and we know that, unlike "destruction," deconstruction does not work exclusively on words or concepts but on a combination and a system, on a syntax.

When it comes to Nietzsche, and from the very point of view of syntax, it is still surprising that, despite an entirely different approach to the texts, despite the privilege granted (in opposition to Heidegger) to *The Birth of Tragedy* and the early fragments, despite the emphasis given to the problematic of language, we are necessarily led, in a textual as in the Heideggerian reading, to treat *Zarathustra* as a kind of "center" (however "eccentric" it may be), no doubt held (although for different reasons) to be equivocal, but such indeed that around it gravitates the unbalanced remainder of the work, whose whole weight is supported sometimes by the beginning (*The Birth of Tragedy*) and sometimes by the end (*The Will to Power*). To schematize in the extreme, one could almost say that the difference between *Dichtung* and text is established or played out in *Zarathustra* alone, considered in the one instance as the pivot of an aborted system, and in the other as the culmination, or at least the major component, of a system [*dispositif*] of writing. How can a single text serve both to keep Nietzsche within the realm of philosophy and to remove him from it?

Provided we resign ourselves to not being fearful of emphasizing yet again the excessive aridity of this question, one could if necessary formulate all of this in the following manner. The three possibilities are:

1. Heidegger is right, as they say. *Zarathustra* is a philosophical book and, by not entirely wishing to consider it as such, we risk paradoxically letting ourselves be governed by those philosophical presuppositions already denounced by Heidegger;

2. or else, Heidegger does not see (or even does not wish to see) how *Zarathustra* departs from the philosophical, and how it does so (this is an indispensable condition) more radically, that is, more deliberately, than any other philosophical text. Here would perhaps be a sign that, for Heidegger himself, something remains unthought in his use of the word or concept of *Dichtung* (fiction, for example, or as Derrida says more rigorously, fictioning [*fictionnement*]; or even writing, if we may here strategically use against Heidegger an etymology he would contest);¹⁵

3. or else, lastly, *Zarathustra* is not, at least by itself, the privileged site of Nietzschean writing. One could therefore say: the Nietzschean text in general, as such, is no more privileged than any other philosophical text.

This is a bit of a caricature but perhaps allows us to see that the bundle of questions is tightened and that everything converges clearly enough on this final (and pretentious) question: not, Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? but, What is Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*?

Nietzsche in "Jena"

In order to provide a new departure here, we will begin by following a path of apparently minor interest, but that may nevertheless lead us rather quickly to where we would like to go. In so doing, we will continue to follow Heidegger's reading a little further. And this quite simply in order to raise two points:

1. When he broaches the question of the "discovery" of the struggle between the Apollinian and the Dionysian,¹⁶ Heidegger, even while noting that Nietzsche can effectively lay claim to it as far as its public elaboration is concerned, traces it immediately back to Burckhardt, on the one hand, and on the other, more distantly, to Hölderlin, who, of course, "had seen and conceived of the opposition in an even more profound and lofty manner." Were it not for this reference to Burckhardt (one of the very few, in this whole commentary, to recall the scholarly history of the sources), we might think Heidegger had dealt adequately with this stunning connection established, in the mode of a "thinking dialogue," between Hölderlin and Nietzsche. But even if it reiterates Nietzsche's final declarations (in *Twilight of the Idols*), the reference to Burckhardt, ostensibly consented to in order to take "various clues" into account, creates the impression of a symptom because it sounds out of place. And, in fact, no one is unaware (because there

is no lack of “clues”) that between Hölderlin and Burckhardt—from Schelling to Ritschl, or, if you like, from F. Schlegel to Bachofen—an entire tradition of academic philology (which, on his own initiative, Nietzsche had joined) revolved around precisely this opposition. And even Andler knew that. Why, then, this silence, if not to occult romanticism (the romanticism of Jena), which is, in fact, the “source” of this tradition and, whether Nietzsche knew it or not (this is of absolutely no importance), one of the principal “places of origin” of his thought?

This, moreover, is confirmed by the second point I would like to make.

2. In the genealogy of Nietzsche’s *philosophy* that he repeatedly retraces, Heidegger always emphasizes the relation of direct filiation that, over Schopenhauer, unites the doctrine of the Will to power with the determination of Being as will common to all post-Kantianism and in particular to Hegel and Schelling.¹⁷ For this reason, disregarding the profound difference that separates Hegel from Schelling, Heidegger always speaks, using the established expression, of “German idealism.” From the point of view of the fulfillment of onto-theology, there is doubtless no “essential” difference between these variants of speculative philosophy. But to say this is only possible on the condition—if we may be allowed this expression—that we “Hegelianize” Schelling, that is, understand Schelling in the perspective of philosophy’s systematic-*dialectical* completion. This is in turn an operation that can only be carried out if, first, we underestimate Schelling’s hostility toward Hegelian onto-*logic*; second, we simply accept the Hegelian critique of Schelling and of romanticism in general; and third, we do not take into consideration their respective texts—to wit, in the case of Hegel, what Bernard Pautrat calls the “hidden Dionysianism” informing the system (and which, moreover, does not fail to recall the *patent* Dionysianism with which the manuscript of *The Ages of the World* concludes); and, in the case of Schelling, the incompleteness, the rupture, the breakup of the systematic project itself.

As these remarks may appear a bit simplistic or historicizing, it will be objected that the occultation of romanticism is minor relative to the historical. This is doubtless true. But it does not mean that what is at stake is a matter of indifference, for it is nothing other than the question (itself philosophical) of the *form* of philosophy’s completion. True though it be that the debate pitting Hegel against Schelling cannot be reduced to this one question, it is no less true that the determination of the system is decided on this question and that the romantic goal of a “literary” (poetic, mythical, novelistic, etc.) completion of philosophy—even assuming that this goal too is encompassed by a logic of *Aufhebung* and that, as such, it arises [*relève*], if we dare say, within Hegelian jurisdiction (though this would still have to be proven)—inevitably re-poses the question of the relation between “literature” and philosophy, art and philosophy, etc. This is the question to which Hegel replies by saying that “art is a thing of the past.” And it is the question that Heidegger *repeats*¹⁸ in displacing the concepts of art and truth at play in it, or, more exactly, in trying to go beyond Hegelian “*parousia*” by taking into

account *aletheia* and *Differenz als Differenz*.¹⁹ And, as we have seen, for this to happen, nothing ultimately need be done except to endorse the Platonic/Hegelian determination of art as an *intra-philosophical* determination (condemnation or subordination), so that the art that has always survived philosophical sublation is precisely not art pure and simple but, essentially, *Dichtung*.

Through their project for a “literary” completion of philosophy, the romantics also mobilize the concept of *Dichtung*. Furthermore, there is, there has perhaps always been, haunting (or confirming) the assurance of philosophical discourse, this nearly immediate proximity of poetry, this risk (or this opportunity) of a possible intermixing of the poetic and the philosophical. This is also true for Hegel, who, we might remember, must draw upon all the resources of dialecticity to sever the “affinity” of speculative thought with “the poetic imagination.”²⁰ Thus, to the extent that Heidegger does not consider romantic *Dichtung* for a single moment and says not a word about the debate it triggers between Hegel and romanticism—in other words, because of this impressive silence—we must ask what should keep us from thinking that his use of *Dichtung* is informed, as though by the very precise effect of a return of the repressed, by the entirety of romantic conceptuality itself?

The question, here again, is naïve—but not without interest, if only because it indicates the lack of an effective reading of Hegel’s relation to the romantics. This is not the place to begin such a reading, nor even to turn to the relevant romantic texts. But as it is still necessary to give at least an idea of this project for a *dichterisch* completion of philosophy, I will ask to be given credit for analyses I cannot produce, and I will simply emphasize these points:

1. The fulfillment of philosophy in *Dichtung* takes the general form of a “return to myth” (whatever its complexity and problematic character). I will limit myself to recalling here the famous text known as “The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism” (of which we do not know whether its author was Hegel, Hölderlin, or Schelling; it dates from 1794), where the “philosophy of the spirit,” defined as an “aesthetic philosophy,” must yield to *Dichtkunst* in order to engender a “new mythology,” itself conceived, according to the principle of an absolute exchange between the mythological and the philosophical, as a “mythology of reason.” We would also find, with only slight shades of difference, an analogous program in, among other texts, the final pages of the *System of Transcendental Idealism* or the “Talk on Mythology” published by F. Schlegel in the *Athenaeum*.

2. This demand for a “new mythology” forces us to consider *Dichtung* as a kind of narrative or story. This is why, for example, in the introduction to the never-finished first draft of the great philosophical myth that he dreamed of writing (*The Ages of the World*, in other words), Schelling could make a statement of this sort:

After science has achieved objectivity with respect to the object, it seems a natural consequence that science seek objectivity also with respect to form.

Why has this remained impossible until now? Why cannot that which is known, even in the highest science, be related with the same directness and simplicity as every other *known* thing? What holds back the anticipated golden age when truth again becomes fable and fable truth?²¹

We know that for Schelling – *The Philosophy of Art* is explicit on this subject – this grand philosophical story was conceived of as a “speculative epos” and was to be modeled on Dante’s *Divine Comedy*, privileged for, among other reasons, its “speculative tripartition.” But we must also note that this epic model competes with a novelistic model (the idea of a “philosophical novel”) whose outlines are provided by a dialogue (itself unfinished) entitled *Clara*, of which Schlegel attempted to produce the theory and the text under the name “absolute novel” (I am thinking in particular of the first part – here again the only one to be written – of *Lucinde*).

3. All of this is of a piece, moreover, and without there being, properly speaking, any incompatibility, with the idea of a fragmentary, aphoristic exposition of philosophy – based, for Schlegel at least, on a theory of *Witz* – as with the project of a “carnavalesque” muddling of genres as they are defined by the Platonic poetics of the *Republic*.

Such a description is obviously very schematic (we will take up these questions again elsewhere)²² and, above all, does not take into account the textual network in which this program is at once inscribed and engulfed. As such, however, that is, as a *program*, we must still insist that it is indeed an absolutely philosophical program and based wholly on the idea of a reversal and an overcoming, of a completion of science (and hence of Platonism). The reference to Plato, whether implicit or explicit, is constant, not only because all of this rests on the distinction between form and content (the text of Schelling’s to which I just referred amply demonstrates this), and not only because the theory of genres is implicated, but also, and especially, because Plato’s “literary” practice is itself at stake. So we might understand, at least from this strictly programmatic point of view, why Heidegger never feels the need to speak of it.

All of this should still not prevent us from feeling some surprise that Heidegger does not seize the occasion to confirm his own disdain for Nietzsche’s “literary” pretensions, and his refusal to consider the “poetic” character of *Zarathustra*. As one might have guessed, if we stress here the philosophico-literary program of German romanticism, it is of course because it is not difficult to read in it, particularly in the motif of a new mythology and in the dream of a philosophical epic,

the indication, almost point for point, of what will be carried out (perhaps—although this is not certain—minus the speculative rigor, but including still the rivalry with Dante) by *Zarathustra*. We must not forget that Nietzsche also thought it one of the components of the myth (to be written) of the future;²³ and this is, furthermore, what Bataille suspected during the period of *Acéphale*, when the task was to free Nietzsche from the fascist, Nazi interpretation of romanticism. That Nietzsche did not know (but, then, he did not want to know everything) that this project implied the absolute completion of science, that he was inspired, as they say, by more marginal texts (Masonic ones, for example), changes nothing. This can be demonstrated.

Aristotle's *Zarathustra*

An insurmountable difficulty remains: namely, that nothing allows us to assume that the Platonic dialogue model haunted, as it did the romantics, Nietzsche's literary work. We know how *The Birth of Tragedy* describes the role played by Socrates (a role already informed by the oratorical, dialogic decline of Sophoclean tragedy, it is true) both in the dissolution of the tragic brought about by Euripides and in the perversion of Plato, or, at least, in Plato's renunciation of poetry (*The Birth of Tragedy*, §14). We might recall that this is the reason why Plato "invented," through a suspect method of mixing genres (which, by the way, Schlegel had already noted), a hybrid genre, closer to the new comedy than to tragedy, and which Nietzsche pejoratively characterized as a "novel." I won't belabor the point. Jean-Michel Rey recalled it here just two days ago.²⁴ Of course, Nietzsche leveled this whole accusation, at the time of *The Birth of Tragedy*, from the point of view of what Pautrat calls "melocentrism," that is, as far as *Dichtung* is concerned, from the point of view of *Sprachliteratur* as opposed to *Leseliteratur* (to literature properly speaking, written and intended to be read). Hence, in this well-known note of 1870, we find: "The philosophical drama of Plato belongs neither to tragedy nor to comedy: it lacks the chorus, the musical element, and the religious theme. It derives from the epic genre and the Homeric school. It is the *novel* of Antiquity. Most especially, it is not meant to be played, but to be read: it is a rhapsody."²⁵

But if I here call attention to what is conventionally (naïvely) called Nietzsche's "Wagnerian" period, it is not in order to suggest that things would subsequently change. From a certain point of view—that is, in a certain stratum of the Nietzschean text—things in fact never changed. In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche will still say (pretty much) the same thing, Plato will still be portrayed as "the first *decadent* of style," Platonic dialogue will be compared to the *Saturae Menippeae*, etc. But this does not mean that Nietzsche never wrote the opposite—in another layer of the text and yet in the *same* text. And these (unsublatable) "contradictions" we will have to take into account here. In the text, Plato or

"Plato" (the system of propositions, figures, strategic usages, etc., which appear under the name "Plato") is never simple, nor even simply double. And even if we spoke here of ambivalence (all the more so if we imagined it to be "psychological"), it goes without saying that we would still have said nothing.

For example (and this will be but one example), in the course Nietzsche gave at Basel between 1874 and 1876 on the history of Greek literature (must we excuse ourselves for speaking here of *Professor Nietzsche*?), regarding Plato—the artist and the writer and, as we will read, the *text* passed down to us under this name—nothing is advanced that might be construed as a condemnation. Quite the contrary. In conformity with the "deep" logic, I mean with the textual logic of *The Birth of Tragedy*, the opposition between oral and written literature, between prose and poetry, etc., on which, officially, the first texts still lived, gradually but systematically begins to blur. The clearest sign of this is provided by a certain reevaluation of writing, to which a saying of Heracleides Ponticus concerning the existence of Hymns to Dionysus consigned and conserved on Mount Haemos in Thrace allows us to assign, through the intermediary figure of Orpheus—"the terrestrial image of Dionysus of Hades, of Zagreus"—a Dionysian origin.²⁶ Moreover, the same Dionysian-Orphic tradition (and the same saying of Heracleides) is used in the first part of the same course (1874–75) to account for the origin of philosophy itself.²⁷

This, of course, does not mean that the opposition of writing and speech purely and simply ceases to function (that will never happen), nor that writing, *literature* as such, is brutally, with one simple gesture (which itself would not be above suspicion), raised up *against* speech. On the contrary, the appearance of *Leseliteratur* very much remains a sign of "degeneration." But what happens is that, between written and oral literature, a third term arises, that of *Kunstprosa* (artistic prose), which partakes of "writing" but whose role is also paradoxically to have contributed to the enlargement of the oral tradition, of the *sprachliches Kunstwerk*.²⁸ This is so because *Kunstprosa* is fundamentally rhythmic, not according to the metrical demands of poetry (which are arrived at by convention, like currency), but according to the measure of a *meter in itself*, of a *metron in sich*, of which oracular discourse, for example, provides a rather good model. It is precisely for this hybrid but fundamental type of *Kunstprosa* that philosophy disposes of neither term nor concept. Proof of this is provided by the famous passage from the beginning of the *Poetics* (1447b) where, in effect, the Aristotelian classification of genres becomes confused regarding this "anonymous" non-genre in which *mimesis* is carried out "by language alone" (whether in prose or in verse) and by which is perhaps already engraved, precisely where the system of the poetics no longer functions, the place in which the modern concept of literature will come to rest and immediately founder. This is the text that Nietzsche paraphrases approximately in these terms:

According to popular opinion, it is meter that distinguishes poetry from prose. Against this criterion Aristotle, who only confers the name of poet on the basis of imitation, set himself: he denounces the granting of this name to one who merely states [*vorträgt*] a medical or musical doctrine in meter. He depores the lack of a common name allowing one to convey the concept under which fall Sophron's nonversified mimes . . . Socratic dialogues, as well as poetic presentations [*Darstellungen*] in hexameter, distichs, etc.²⁹

Thus, *Kunstprosa* as such eludes the categories of philosophical poetics, and we can see clearly here how the return (barely predating this text) of the question of rhetoric and of rhythmic comes to inform and displace Nietzsche's whole "former" conception of writing. This is all the more striking given that it is very precisely in this *Kunstprosa* that not only great history (Herodotus, Thucydides) and great eloquence (Isocrates), but also philosophy itself "at its acme," between Plato and Aristotle, finds, so to speak, a home. In order to establish this, it is further necessary radically to detach Plato from Socrates, hypothesize that Plato did not write before the end of his second trip to Sicily, reclassify all the dialogues, and prove that Platonic dialogue is in no way modeled on Socratic dialogue (of which we get an idea from the "little dialogues" falsely attributed to Plato). The proof is that in the *Phaedrus*, the first of the properly Platonic texts, Plato "discusses the cardinal question of why one must write."³⁰ On the other hand, it has yet to be shown that in the philosophy that follows, in Stoicism and Epicureanism, the decline of this *grand style* in philosophy begins.

From this the principal characteristics of Platonic writing derive: the intermixing of genres, the tendency toward comedy, the indifference toward philosophical demonstration, and the liberty taken with regard to historical truth (the life of Socrates, for example), which is comparable to the liberty taken by poets with regard to myth, etc.³¹ And from this also comes—as paradoxical as this may appear—the chaotic elaboration of the work (through the arbitrary and belated assembly of old drafts), which represents the height of artistic refinement and of which only Goethe (the great initiator, as we know, in matters of writing) could provide an equivalent. It is even uncertain whether Plato "himself" carried out this assembly, so true is it that, very often for Nietzsche, the great writer was not the same as the author.³² But what is most remarkable is that, in the final analysis, Plato wrote *against himself*, meaning he practiced the style that Aristotle, as reported by Diogenes Laertius, says is intermediary between prose and poetry—and that he thus "violated the severe anathema" that he himself had proclaimed on the genres.³³

Far from having precipitated the decline of *Dichtung*, Plato therefore carried it to its highest point (at least in the already inevitable register of writing), and this—if we take into account the equivocal status of *Kunstprosa*—at once against

and *between* the foundational distinctions of poetics he himself had developed. Nor is this all. A short but decisive tradition of philosophical writing also evolves from him, a tradition that involves Aristotle but barely survives him (assuming, however, that we keep in mind, as far as Aristotle is concerned, the lost dialogues and not simply the course notes, which are all that remain). This tradition comprises six consecrated models, or types, of dialogue: the banquet, the *magikos*, the dialogue on the last moments of life, the protreptic, the *peri poiëton*, and finally, the *erotikos*. Here is what Nietzsche says about the second of these:

2. *magikos*—this is a dialogue of Aristotle's in which a magus, Zoroaster, comes to Athens and talks with Socrates, for whom he predicts a violent end. According to Suidas, this was perhaps a work by Antisthenes. There is a dialogue of Heracleides: *Zoroaster*, in which Zoroaster comes to Gelon; Clearcus (fragment 69 M) represents Aristotle in conversation with a Jew during a trip to Asia. Aristoxenus recounted that Socrates had met an Indian in Athens.³⁴

The (to us) Borgesian style of this note is not likely to diminish the vertiginous quality of this "revelation." Modeled on a Platonic dialogue, there was, therefore, an Aristotelian *Zarathustra*. If we add Kant's, of which Jean-Luc Nancy has spoken,³⁵ and even, for good measure, Heracleides', which Nietzsche mentions here, that would make for no fewer than four *Zarathustras* in the philosophical tradition opened by Platonism. And to think that people considered *Zarathustra*, our own, to be one of a kind . . .

It is no doubt appropriate to be wary of this kind of "miraculous" coincidence. And, in fact, *Zarathustra* is not a "dialogue." In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche will sooner portray it as a dithyramb and will in any case trace its derivation to music and great poetry. We could multiply the counterexamples. In the case at hand, however, wariness may be entirely out of place. All of this would in fact remain on the level of a nominal analogy if the distinctive criterion or relevant feature of the Platonic model did not consist, in accordance with Plato's unfaithfulness to his own doctrine, in the *dissimulation* of the author (of the subject of writing) as a character. In Platonic dialogue, Plato himself does not speak or intervene in his own name. I use the word *dissimulation* on purpose here, if only to appeal to that condemnation of the "apocryphal" author Plato brings up in Book III of the *Republic* (393a-e), where it is a question of defining, between simple narrative and pure imitation, between dithyramb and tragedy, the epic as a narrative mixed with imitation—and where it is in fact in the name of the conformity, of the *homoiōsis* between the speaking subject [*sujet de l'énonciation*] and the subject of speech [*sujet de l'énoncé*] (and hence in the name of truth already thought, beginning with the question of language and the rectitude of discourse, as adequation) that, for the first time in the *Republic*, Plato "belittles" art and *mimesis*. Inversely

(though out of faithfulness to the specific mode of Platonic writing), Nietzsche himself uses no other criterion to measure the decline of the grand philosophical style: in Plato, pedagogical necessity already weakens stylistic intent; but when a certain loosening of writing works with the success and adoption of the Aristotelian model of the course, when philosophers write (as they speak) in their own name, that will be the end of great art, of style, and of formal beauty – and the birth of the pure philosophical genre, the “scientific genre.”³⁶ If this criterion is decisive, it is understandable why Nietzschean *dissimulation* in the figure, character, and discourse of *Zarathustra* does not coincide simply by chance with the “literary” will of Platonism.

Dissimulation – Dissimilation

That *Zarathustra* is “Platonic” (and it is clearly much more so than if it were *simply* romantic or Masonic, etc.) is what Heidegger both says and does not say. More precisely, this is basically what he thinks, but for reasons other than those we have attempted to foreground. But should we wish to pursue this reading to its conclusion, one suspects we would have to stress the question of truth. If what constitutes Platonic *Darstellung* is first of all the dissimulation of the author (a certain “hypocrisy”), and if, consequently, the problematic of *Darstellung* in general assumes the horizon of truth already determined as *homoiosis*, adequation – then as long as Heidegger thinks (or tries to think) something like a break accompanying the “Platonic interpretation of *aletheia*,” he will, in the final analysis, have to reduce any question asked about *Darstellung* to an “aesthetic” question. That Heidegger himself, or rather the Heideggerian text, worked to mend this break (this is evident everywhere, at least since *Holzwege*), of course does nothing but complicate matters.

We cannot, therefore, envision settling, against Heidegger and in a simple way, the question of Nietzschean writing. Moreover, in the case at hand (limiting ourselves at least, as does Heidegger, only to the case of *Zarathustra*), it is less Nietzschean writing than Platonic writing that requires examination. And even if, in order to measure the magnitude of the shake-up Plato causes in the edifice of philosophy (that is, of *his* philosophy), we could be satisfied with the lone Nietzschean criterion of the contradiction so introduced, in the Platonic text, between content and form – a contradiction it would be easy to show is established precisely in this content – would we go so far as to ratify the Nietzschean reversal (but it is only, as Heidegger says, a reversal) of the relation between content and form?³⁷

It is clear that, in fact, these questions must remain answerless, for we cannot answer for writing.

Still, since it is never true either that we can resign ourselves to leaving a question suspended, I would like to conclude by taking one last shot at this *dissimula-*

tion, where, at least in part, the infinitely ambiguous relation between Nietzsche and Plato is played out. I do this to correct (the time has come) the effect this embryonic analysis risks provoking; in other words, to reverse, or rather deteriorate, its most obvious result.

If both withdrawal and dissembling (*dissimulation*) are at play in *dissimulation* (in textual *dissimulation*, and not in the concept of which Nietzsche, moreover, makes extensive use); if truth and truth (*aletheia* and *homoïosis*) are interlaced; if “truth itself” begins to come undone, what happened when, in the “last” year, as though brutally reversing the whole “Platonic” strategy of *Zarathustra* (or the “Aristotelian” strategy of *The Will to Power*), Nietzsche suddenly spoke (wrote) in his own name? Was it in order to speak the truth? *Ecce Homo*, me, Nietzsche—the truth, I speak . . .

But we read: “I have a terrible fear that one day I will be pronounced *holy*: you will guess why I publish this book *before*; it shall prevent people from doing mischief with me. I do not want to be a holy man; sooner even a buffoon.”³⁸

A buffoon, that is, a “real” buffoon. Not Socrates, that buffoon who “wanted to have himself taken seriously”—and who did not write. Rather, a buffoon like the one in the *Saturae Menippeae*, or the buffoon of the Cynics (who are also, in the post-Platonic debacle of the grand philosophical style, the only ones who, *through dissimulation*, put up some resistance).

Yet why? In order to write some “buffooning” letters, rehash one last time some old ideas, lose oneself in all names, sign all names, write in all styles, rewrite one’s own books—never finish exhausting the inexhaustible content, the inexhaustible lack of content of what we still call, so naïvely, the “subject of writing.”

Once engaged (though who can say when that is?), *dissimulation* never ends. This is what we call madness, even when we suspect (like Gast or Overbeck) that it is simulated.

But perhaps it is urgent to say here that no writer (no “philosopher,” for example) has ever been unaware of it.³⁹

Translated by Timothy D. Bent

77. See *The Birth of Tragedy*, §§9–10. “When after a forceful attempt to gaze on the sun we turn away blinded, we see dark-colored spots before our eyes, as a cure, as it were. Conversely, the bright image projections of the Sophoclean hero—in short, the Apollinian aspect of the mask—are necessary effects of a glance into the inside and terrors of nature; as it were, luminous spots to cure eyes damaged by gruesome night” (§9, p. 67). This is the way in which Nietzsche states that neither the sun nor death can be looked in the face; but it is also, as we know, a commentary on *Tristan*, which is a little like the “national anthem” of Nietzsche’s love for Ariane-Cosima (Wagner).

78. See the plan for a drama entitled *Prometheus* (1874), which concludes with this declaration of the vulture: “I am a bird of misfortune, I have become a myth” (Naumann, 10: 489).

79. *The Birth of Tragedy*, 130.

80. See the draft of the drama entitled *Empedocles*, in Naumann, 9: 130–36.

81. This text had already been written when there appeared, aside from Sarah Kofman’s work mentioned earlier, Joachim Goth’s *Nietzsche und die Rhetorik* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1970) and Bernard Pautrat’s *Versions du soleil* (Paris: Seuil, 1971), which, on the texts analyzed here, propose in their turn an indispensable demonstration.

3. Apocryphal Nietzsche

1. Originally a talk given at the conference on Nietzsche at Cerisy-la-Salle in July 1972.

2. [Lacoue-Labarthe’s use of the term *démarquer* is based here on at least two senses of the verb (*se*) *démarquer*: first, in sports—European football, for example—it means to free oneself or to escape (from a defender); and second, more generally, it means to take one’s distance or to distinguish oneself.—*Editor*]

3. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 2: 72–73. The English translation of the first volume of this work, quoted further on, was published in 1979.

4. *Nietzsche*, 2: 35.

5. Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 62. My emphasis.

6. [*Envoi* and *destination* here translate the German *Geschick* (destiny), itself derived from the verb *schicken*: to send, dispatch, transmit, but also, in the reflexive, to happen, come to pass, chance.—*Editor*]

7. *Nietzsche*, 2: 36.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*, 1: 8.

10. *Ibid.*, 1: 80.

11. See *Nietzsche*, 1: 103–4.

12. See *Nietzsche*, 1: 131.

13. See “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Addendum of 1961, 87.

14. See *Nietzsche*, 1: 164. This analysis of the Heideggerian reading is taken up again and elaborated in “Typography,” trans. Eduardo Cadava, in *Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics*, ed. Christopher Fynsk (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), especially 71ff. Originally published in the collection *Mimesis: Des articulations* (Paris: Flammarion, 1975), 165–270.

15. See *Der Grosse Duden*, Band VII, *Etymologie*. The modern form goes back, through the Middle High German *tihten*, to the Old High German *dihton* and *tihton*: “to compose [*abfassen*], to conceive [*ersinnen*] in writing [*schriftlich*],” itself derived from the Latin *dictare*: to pronounce, to compose by pronouncing in order to have copied in writing.

16. *Nietzsche*, 1: 103.

17. See, for example, *Nietzsche*, 1: 59ff.

18. See *Nietzsche*, 1: 77ff., and “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 79ff.

19. See *Hegel's Concept of Experience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970) and *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).
20. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 2: 1001ff.
21. Friedrich Schelling, *The Ages of the World*, trans. Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, Jr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), 84.
22. See chapter 6, "The Unpresentable," and, in collaboration with Jean-Luc Nancy, "Le Dialogue des genres," *Poétique* 21 ("Littérature et philosophie mêlées," 1975): 148–75. See also Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism*, trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988).
23. See *Nietzsche's Werke* (Leipzig: Naumann, 1901), 12: 400: "Den Mythus der Zukunft dichten."
24. See Jean-Michel Rey, "Nietzsche et la théorie du discours philosophique," in *Nietzsche aujourd'hui?* (Paris: U.G.E., 1973), 1: 301–21.
25. Naumann, 9: 67. My emphasis.
26. Course of 1875–76, chapter 1; see Friedrich Nietzsche, *Gesammelte Werke* (Munich: Musarion, 1922), 5: 216.
27. *Ibid.*, 5: 140.
28. *Ibid.*, 5: 68.
29. *Ibid.*, 5: 80.
30. *Ibid.*, 5: 142.
31. *Ibid.*, 5: 142ff.
32. *Ibid.*, 5: 146.
33. *Ibid.*, 5: 143.
34. *Ibid.*, 5: 153.
35. See Jean-Luc Nancy, "La Thèse de Nietzsche sur la téléologie," in *Nietzsche aujourd'hui?* 1: 57–80.
36. Musarion, 5: 161–62.
37. See the famous fragment quoted by Heidegger (*Nietzsche*, 1: 120): "What it takes to be an artist is that one experience what all nonartists call 'form' as *content*, as 'the matter itself.' With that, of course, one is relegated to an *inverted world*. For from now on one takes content to be something merely formal—including one's own life."
38. *Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), 326.
39. Concerning the problematic so outlined of "philosophical madness," I take the liberty of referring the reader once again to "Typography."

4. Obliteration

1. From a lecture delivered by Heidegger on February 24, 1951 at Bühlerhöhe, published and translated as "La Parole dite" in *Revue de poésie* 90 (October 1964): 52–57.
2. Martin Heidegger, "Logos," in *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 78.
3. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche* (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1961), 2 vols. The French translation, by Pierre Klossowski, was published by Gallimard in 1971. [The English translation was published by Harper & Row in four volumes: vol. 1, *The Will to Power as Art*, trans. David Farrell Krell, 1979; vol. 2, *The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. David Farrell Krell, 1984; vol. 3, *The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell, and Frank A. Capuzzi, 1987; vol. 4, *Nihilism*, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, 1982. Unless otherwise indicated, all further references are to this translation.—Editor]
4. As is the case, for example, with Eugen Fink's *La Philosophie de Nietzsche* (translated into French in 1965). For reasons that will become apparent in a moment—and aside from the fact that