

## ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND EDUCATION\*

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THE word "education" will here be used in a broad sense, designating all measures applied by adults, expert or non-expert, teachers and parents, to influence the behavior of the growing child in a desirable way. When the context seems to offer safeguards against misunderstanding, the word education will also be used to designate principles upon which such measures may be based. "Psychoanalysis" as used here refers to a body of propositions and not to the therapeutic technique or the method of observation from which that body of propositions is derived.

The relationship of psychoanalysis to education is complex. In a first approach the inclination may be to characterize it as one between a basic science and a field of application. Psychoanalytic propositions aim at indicating why human beings behave as they do under given conditions.<sup>1</sup> The educator may turn to these propositions in his attempts to influence human behavior. The propositions then become part of his scientific equipment which naturally includes propositions from other "basic" sciences. In any relationship between a more general set of propositions and a field of application outside the area of experience from which these propositions were derived a number of factors must be taken into account. The more general propositions, in this instance those of psychoanalysis, must be formulated in a way that permits their operation in the new field, here that of education. The process of application is likely to act as a test of the validity of the propositions or of the usefulness of their formulation (21). Hence we are dealing not merely with a process of diffusion of knowledge from a "higher" to a "lower" level, from the more "general" to the "applied" field, but with a process of communication between experts trained in different skills in which cross-fertilization of approaches is likely to occur.

The relationship between psychoanalysis and education, however, is more complex than this schematic presentation would lead one to believe. The contact with psychoanalysis has modified and enriched not only the measures educators (whether experts or parents, and no parent is expert where his own children are concerned), use "in order to modify the child's behavior in a desired sense," but the direction of the desired modification of behavior has itself to some extent been influenced. The goals of education have come to include mental hygiene in a new and previously unknown sense.<sup>2</sup>

We are not dealing with an isolated phenomenon. Psychoanalysis started

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<sup>1</sup> For a more detailed statement see Hartmann and Kris (16).

<sup>2</sup> Another general direction in which principles of education have been influenced by psychoanalysis will be discussed later.

as an attempt at the scientific study of an area of life which had previously been dealt with by non-scientific means and in a non-scientific context. It had been in the domain of religious and philosophical systems and appeared in the works of those great intuitive masters in the understanding of human nature, the poets and writers. The scientific approach that in Freud's work has supplemented these traditional approaches in our knowledge of man, has exercised considerable influence on general attitudes toward human life. Many things which "had been taken for granted" appeared to be *modifiable*. Psychiatry was enabled to link maladies of the body to those of the mind, or better, to reduce the danger of spurious differentiation between the two—psychosomatic medicine. Psychiatry began to extend therapy to types of behavior previously not considered related to illness, to items such as "character," "unhappiness," even "lack of luck". Similarly in public welfare, charitable organizations have extended the areas in which they help clients, from material support to that of aid in psychological adjustment. In practices of management and personnel selection, intuitive procedures are being supplemented by others aiming at improved predictions. The change in goals of education is part and parcel of this development that extends from medicine to many areas of social control.

At the threshold of this brave new world it seems appropriate to halt and raise the question: how well is science equipped to meet the tasks with which it is confronted, tasks set by society, in an age of rapid social change? Let me anticipate what I think is the answer—I believe there is some danger that the demand may outgrow our supply of firmly established knowledge, and that inferior products may temporarily "swamp the market."

I shall not attempt to enumerate reasons for this state of affairs nor to describe its manifestations. These problems were treated several years ago by the late Caroline Zachry (28) in a paper in which she not only discussed the place of progressive education within the total contemporary educational scene, but also the special place of psychoanalysis within the larger setting of progressive education. Nor shall I attempt to describe how interactions and clashes of various principles of education practiced by different educators within one institution or by two parents in one home affect the child; nor how they affect the child when they manifest themselves as inconsistencies in the practices of one educator.<sup>3</sup> It is also out of place to present a survey of the relationship of psychoanalysis to education in its historical development and in its manifold implications, since such a presentation has recently been given with great completeness by W. Hoffer (18).

I propose to focus on a discussion of some typical misunderstandings of psychoanalysis by educators and, more specifically, on misunderstandings concerning the use of indulgence and deprivation as a means of education.

<sup>3</sup> Some of these problems were touched upon by Peller (24).

Both terms are used here in a very broad sense. Indulgence includes all actions of the educators which meet the child's demands. The range of these actions includes the mother's care and expressions of her love; parents' and teachers' participation in the child's play and daily life, understanding of his joys and sorrows, and tolerance for his unruliness. Deprivation includes all expression of the educator's disapproval, from the denial of the smile to disciplinary methods of all degrees of severity. Indulgence and deprivation might be taken as synonymous with reward and punishment if it is clearly understood that in the present context these terms refer not only to isolated actions, but also to a general attitude of the educator toward the child. This attitude may respond to the child's behavior during long periods of time and cover a wide range of behavioral details.<sup>4</sup>

The discussion of the use of indulgence and deprivation as a means of education will, I hope, help to clarify some of the general problems which tend to impede cross-fertilization between psychoanalysis and education, and sharpen our eye for means that might enhance it in the future.

The contact between psychoanalysis and education was established when, in the progress of his work with the adult neurotic, Freud discovered that for an "understanding of his condition or to effect a cure" it was necessary to "trace the determination of his symptoms . . . back into his early childhood." (11). The gradual development of this insight forms a considerable part of the history of psychoanalysis. Well known in outline, its importance for an understanding of Freud's work is still underrated. There is a tendency to look upon Freud's writings as a unit and to quote his views without reference to the stage of development of his hypotheses from which the quotation was drawn. This misuse is favored by a number of factors. In many areas Freud's views remained relatively unchanged over long periods; in others, changes were at first imperceptible, consisting only in minor changes of wording. Moreover Freud himself seems to have underrated the extent to which his later work reformulated and modified many of his earlier assumptions (20). Wherever his views were applied outside the closed circle of psychiatrists trained in psychoanalytic therapy, another element played its part: the time lag of diffusion and understanding. Hence Freud's earliest assumptions concerning the relationship of childhood experiences to adult behavior, which have outlived their validity, were tenaciously retained in certain fields of application and are only gradually being abandoned.

Freud's first propositions assumed that neurotic illness in the adult was due to traumatic experiences as a child. In a literal sense Freud maintained this proposition only during a short period (1895 to 1897), when he believed that actual sexual seduction by adults could be considered the decisive

<sup>4</sup> Fenichel (6) uses reward and punishment in such an extended sense.

etiological factor in the genesis of psychoneurosis. Later, the concept of trauma was modified in various ways, until it referred to experiences of the child in crucial phases of typical development (10) experiences which, from the viewpoint of the adult, may show no unusual features and yet affect the whole of the child's psychic economy.

The persistence of the older concept of trauma invited the avoidance of educational measures which were thought likely to cause traumata in the sense of shock experiences. Let me give two examples. In restricting autoerotic activities of the child, explicit threats were avoided, since psychoanalytic case histories had repeatedly demonstrated the importance of castration anxiety in the structure of adult neuroses, and the relation of this anxiety to the threats to which the patient had been exposed as child. Similarly, corporal punishment was discredited largely because clinical material indicated that the erotization of corporal punishment experienced in childhood was among the factors contributing to the development of sexual perversions in the adult. On a similar pragmatic level arose the interest of the educator in explaining to the child "the facts of life."

The frequency with which symptom-formation in adult neurosis could be connected with fantasies concerning the sexual behavior of adults (the so-called infantile sexual theories) seemed to make it desirable to give truthful information to the child on the sexual life of the adult, and even to anticipate the child's questions. Needless to say such isolated procedures could do little to pacify the demons, especially since this information tended to remain incomplete and to conceal the element of pleasure connected with adult sexual activity. Only gradually was a less specific concept of the trauma accepted. The avoidance of certain means of education was substituted by aiming at changes in the total relationship between the educator and the child.

These changes were not brought about by psychoanalysis alone. Many social and ideological factors which cannot be enumerated entered into the picture, but the name of John Dewey, one of the initiators of this movement, must be gratefully mentioned. The special contribution of psychoanalysis to the change of educational atmosphere in general was manifested in the tendency to avoid frustration and to increase indulgence in the child's life, an attitude which has rapidly expanded. In certain educational circles, it tends to pervade much of the life of family or school. The general principle on which this attitude is based is difficult to formulate. It seems to be assumed that any deprivation imposed upon the child is necessarily evil, since it creates tension and tension must in turn lead to undesirable behavior, to an increase of aggression or of manifest anxiety. It also seems to be assumed that any interference from the world of the adult damages the child's process of growth; that, left to the child, "things will take care of themselves."

The clinical experience to which this attitude of educator or parent most likely refers, is the part played by frustration and anxiety in case histories of psychoneuroses, and the fact that some interpreters of "frustration" relate it to those who imposed it upon the child.

It is tempting to quote examples ridiculing extremes, and demonstrating how, in shifting the burden from the child to the parent whose endurance is visualized as inexhaustible, intolerable situations may arise. Such examples however, are superfluous in a professional circle; moreover they are likely to lead to misunderstandings.

In discussing the dangers of a too permissive attitude one may seem to advocate returning to an outdated method of dominance in handling the child. Nothing could be less desirable. We are, to quote Freud, dealing with the avoidance of two dangers, of Scylla and Charybdis. While indulgence and deprivation may both create unwanted effects, both are essential measures of any education. Both meet with some of the child's needs; the question is one of modality and timing.

Modality is particularly difficult to assess; it is part of the most intimate interplay between educator and child. The child's receptive perception for the unconscious motivations of adult behavior has been repeatedly stressed. It is particularly great when the child reacts to the adult's aggressive proclivity that finds expression in the modality of imposed deprivations (13). The child's reaction is frequently counter-aggression. Usually reactions and counterreactions follow each other in rapid sequence and the child may be provoking or may be provoked. His incentive to exploit the educator's aggression and start upon his own bout of aggressive behavior will be the greater, the more his economy of aggression is in a general state of imbalance.

While we touch only briefly upon the modality of deprivation, the second factor, timing, can be successfully approached if we take into account some psychoanalytic propositions based on Freud's structural concepts. Introduced during the early 1920's, these concepts were later amplified by Freud (10), and have subsequently been gradually elaborated by others. The area covered by many of the propositions is frequently referred to as "psychoanalytic ego-psychology."

These structural concepts of Freud's, the id, ego, and superego, used in psychoanalysis as *constructs*, are being used in every science. They lead to the formulation of a richer, more accurate and more general set of propositions than could be formulated without them. These propositions are in turn subject to validation or disproof by methods used in science for this purpose. The constructs themselves can therefore be considered only from the point of view of their usefulness. In their formulation Freud followed the lead of a complex set of considerations; in defining them, he followed the lead of his biological training. The structural constructs are seen as psychic or-

ganizations and are defined by their functions, as physiologists define organ systems (17).

While many of the propositions of psychoanalysis are based on assumptions about the interaction of the three psychic organizations—the id, the ego and the superego—a small but growing number refers to the formation of psychic structure in a process of gradual differentiation. Thus in considering the formation of the ego, the organized functions of which control motility, thought, and perception, one must take into account the maturation of the physiological and mental equipment of the child; i.e., the maturation of the apparatus of the ego (14).

In relation to the earliest experiences of the child, the ego functions as an organization delaying response. According to what Freud called the reality principle, the need for immediate discharge of tension is transformed into waiting for well-assured but postponed gratification. Understanding of the requirements that the environment, mainly the nursing mother, imposes is mediated by the first attachment of the child to the mother (4). In the details of these intimate situations a high complexity of factors is at work. The equipment of the child and the attitude of the mother must be taken into account. While the most tangible part of the earliest mother-child relationship is linked to feeding, other bodily contacts exist in which the handling of the child and the amount of stimulation given can all be related to the general category of indulgence and deprivation.

Throughout the process of child development situations and experiences vary, but they can still be usefully described as processes in which the child strives for self-control of his needs. At first it is to satisfy his environment and retain its favors. Later, when the first steps in the formation of the ego have been taken, when processes of identification have constituted the child's "inner world," he may exercise self-control because he has accepted these demands of his environment and the control of his drives has become an essential goal of his ego functions. Control of drives does not always imply renunciation of gratification, but rather the assurance of gratification through the execution of *action*.

Freud subsumed a variety of impulses, the control and gratification of which are related to the child's needs, under two categories of instinctual drives of a libidinous and a sexual nature. The usefulness of this assumption is evidenced by a rich set of propositions (15). However, in many presentations derived from psychoanalysis, the difference between Freud's concept of drives and that of instinct has been obliterated.<sup>5</sup> Only in exceptional and ill-defined areas do drives show the capacity for self-regulation. They require the mediation of a special organization to guarantee adjustment and survival; this organization is the ego.

<sup>5</sup> The confusion is due to a mistake by earlier translators of Freud's writings (19).

The problem to which we refer has frequently been approached from a somewhat different angle. When Freud points to the prolonged helplessness of the human child, in that it depends longer on support from the outside for its survival than do other mammals, he has the same set of data in mind. The duration of dependency and the fact that human behavior is self-regulatory only in marginal areas, thus differing from those animals whose behavior is predominantly regulated by instinct, is not only responsible for the importance of social learning, but also for the role of conflict in human development. Conflict itself gains a new dimension. Not only is there conflict between the child and the environment, and conflict between opposing needs or drives, but there is also conflict between the id and the ego, and later the superego. This "new" type of intrapersonal conflict has been adequately described as structural conflict (1).

We may now describe the appropriate or desirable function of indulgence and deprivation, gratification and discipline, in the child's education. Indulgence aims at the reduction of tension by satisfying the id impulses; it also helps to establish the child's dependence on and identification with the educating adult. In establishing and reinforcing the norms of desired behavior, deprivation (discipline) supports the ego in its attempt to gain control of id impulses. Were it possible to represent each of the typical conflicts between id and ego by means of a curve, points or stretches might be suggested on which increased indulgence or increased discipline might help to improve the chances of successful conflict solution. This can clearly only be considered as a model intended to clarify our thinking. It implies a number of assumptions not all of which can here be made explicit. By successful conflict solution is implied the existence of an optimum of tension or an optimum of intensity of conflict in which the child achieves gratification and mastery of its impulses. The only measure at present is whether or not the child's development is favorably or unfavorably affected by the conflict which he has learned to resolve.

Before I comment on this point let me demonstrate the usefulness of the model by examples. Educational mistakes can in some instances be described as "missing the point on the curve."

Recent attempts to reduce the imposed feeding schedule of the neonate, and to entrust the establishment of the schedule to the periodicity of the infant's own needs, aim at reducing unnecessary tension at the time of the child's greatest helplessness; i.e., when no differentiation of psychic structure has as yet taken place. Those who advocate training to start "at once" do not take this fact into account. "Through training in regularity of feeding, sleeping, and elimination," they assume, "the tiny baby will receive its first lesson in character building . . . and begin to learn that he is part of world bigger than himself."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> U. S. Government Children's Bureau Publication No. 8, 1940 (23, p. 89).

Such learning, however, as can be achieved under these conditions may at best be of the nature of a conditioned response, and though no exact data on the potential disadvantages of this type of training are available, the impressions of trained observers and students of child development seem to be well-founded. They indicate that too early training is likely to favor a number of undesirable consequences, foremost amongst them the increased probability of fixation at the level of development on which the premature training was imposed and hence the probability of regression to this level. This danger seems to be reduced when training is postponed to a time when the child's cooperation has become possible. The recent tendency to postpone toilet training to the time when maturation of muscular equipment will enable the child to control his sphincters and sit on the pot without undue effort is based on this assumption. But bowel training is dependent not only on the maturation of the "apparatus" which the ego uses, but also on the child's attitude toward the educator who is involved in the training process.

The observations of Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham in the Hampstead Nurseries have conclusively demonstrated how the progress of the child in this and other areas involving control of his impulses are dependent on his relationship to one love object (9). Some of the complex factors in this dependency are referred to in psychoanalysis when speaking of the identification of the child with his love object. This identification in turn plays an essential part in the development of the ego.<sup>7</sup>

When the child has formed his first lasting object relationship, his need for the presence of that love object is maximized. The clinging to the mother at the end of the first and early in the second year of life is a typical manifestation of this need. The relationship is complicated by aggressive impulses in the child which arise especially in response to frustration. They threaten the stability of his attachment to the love object and make the presence of the mother even more imperative. Attempts to detach the child from the mother at an early stage of this conflict may heighten the conflict by mobilizing a circle of increased demands, subsequent aggression and concomitant fear in the child. Similar attempts at a later time, when independence has been accepted and some pleasure from it derived both in the mastered dependency and in the activity which independence permits, may facilitate the conflict solution in the child's life. The educator then has something in the child on his side; he cooperates with parts of the child's ego.

This relationship becomes even clearer as we approach latency (7). The child of five is determined to fight against some regressive impulse in himself, for example, the impulse to suck his thumb. He is aware of the ridicule to which he exposes himself. At this point the appropriate help that education can offer may consist in the strengthening of the ego in the child's battle against the regressive impulse. This strengthening can take various forms,

<sup>7</sup> For a more detailed discussion of psychoanalytic propositions concerning ego-formation, see (17).



one being the imposing of discipline, preferably in agreement with the child, as external help to strengthen the inner forces. Other methods may aim at reducing the tension which impels the child toward regressive behavior by substitute gratifications and indulgences, or permissiveness in other areas. One may resort to psychotherapy or methods akin to it, and try to support the child by interpretations, which may give him insight into the reasons for his behavior. Such alternatives in turn tend to give rise to misunderstandings, especially when the choice between some form of discipline and some kind of interpretation is involved (5) (27).

To give an example: a boy of eight stole some money from his mother's purse. The mother noticed it but did not discuss it with the child. The father, a prominent scientist, had himself just started psychoanalytic treatment. Instead of yielding to his original impulse and showing disappointment and anger, the father sat down with his son that evening and asked him what reasons he had for unhappiness. He intended thus to replace education by interpretation, much to the (unconscious) regret of the son. As it became apparent later, the boy wanted his father to set the standards and protect him against his own delinquent tendency, which resulted from envy of his father. The motivation in the father's behavior was easily traceable to his identification with his son. When he began psychoanalytic treatment, the father claimed a privilege in fee to which his academic position entitled him, but at the same time concealed considerable sources of private income. From this and similar observations one may deduce that in many instances where discipline is avoided, where pseudo-interpretations are attempted and other educational mistakes occur, the educator identifies with the child in conflict and chooses the easier rather than the more appropriate way.

Appropriateness, we said, was to be defined by the child's progress. In establishing criteria for what is meant by progress, many problems arise, some of which will be mentioned briefly. First are the general proclivities in the educator, especially the parent, which barricade the way. Any contact with the child tends to mobilize impulses and desires of the parent's own childhood. We are well aware of the fact that the adult's aggressiveness toward the child, which may be manifested as discipline, may be due to experiences in the adult's own child-parent relationship, or that displaced ambitions may become an undesirable motive in education that tries to push the child to increased performance. Both these tendencies are, on the whole, being discouraged by current educational theory, or at least by that educational ideology which bears the hallmark of the influence of psychoanalysis. This ideology, however, encourages another displacement. The idealized image of childhood as a period of undisturbed happiness, really a projective fantasy in the mind of the adult, has been discarded. Insight into the frequency of childhood conflicts is opposed to so primitive a view. Yet it sur-

vives in a special disguise as a utopia of what childhood should be; a utopia in which the adult's suffering as a child should not be repeated.

I suspect that in this displaced ideal the hope is rooted that in maximizing indulgence, conflict will be eliminated. But even those who recognize the importance of these conflicts in the child's development, are frequently tempted to consider anxiety in the child's life as symptomatic. There is a tendency to draw the line between normality and psychological illness in the child at the same point at which it is drawn in the symptomatology of the adult. This view has repeatedly been contested. Anxiety, it has been said, is part of the child's normal development; its appearance during critical periods is unavoidable. During the solution of the constellation in the child's life which we subsume as the oedipus complex, concomitant castration anxiety is the fertile ground out of which the child's moral energies grow. The intergration of the superego has its roots in this anxiety; it lives on in the adult as fear of conscience. Similarly it has been claimed that the appearance of what in the adult may be considered symptom formation, may in the child appear as temporary compromise. Thus the moral rigidity which under many educational influences accompanies the years of early latency, sometimes supported by rituals and other manifestations of obsessional-compulsive behavior, need not become the basis of an obsessional neurosis or an obsessional character in the adult. It may be a transitory compromise, protecting the newly accepted standards of behavior against threatening impulses, and thus function as one of the reinforcement techniques frequently encountered during early phases of many learning processes.

The problems with which we here deal have been treated in the psychoanalytic literature as the ubiquity of infantile neurosis. According to Anna Freud (8), diagnosis and treatment should not be based on the apparent severity of symptoms, but on other criteria, related to the flexibility of the ego in its relationship to the id, and to the development of the various functions of the ego. The appearance of infantile neurosis distorts this relationship and impedes some of these functions. It acts like a calcification in the middle of a living organism. The dynamics involved can be studied in relation to the mechanisms of defense utilized by the child in order to solve his conflicts. The excessive use of each of them may affect the child's control of his outer and inner world.

A more detailed examination of these problems may be based on a distinction that Hartmann (14) introduced several years ago. He points to the fact that not all of the child's achievements are related to his conflicts; that in physical and intellectual life, and in growth and development, many steps are normally not affected by conflicts. The factual question arises: where in the development of each child does the area of conflict cease and

the area free of conflict begin? Variations in this respect seem to be considerable. The endowment of the individual and his formed predispositions must be considered. Involvement in conflict need not necessarily act as a force which reduces ego functions. Obsessional proclivity may act as a stimulus to develop certain abilities in problem solution through thinking.

Such stimulation of ego functions in the conflictless sphere, through their function within conflict, can be mediated by the mechanism of sublimation. The particular importance of this factor can only be fully assessed if we realize that, while ego functions genetically depend on their relationship to the child's original needs and tensions, this does not necessarily determine the extent and nature of their effectiveness. The original impulse that once served may lose its importance with the disappearance of early needs and tension and ego functions may become autonomous. The child's curiosity may become the scientist's bent for research, and the quest for the truth may be as distant from his peeping impulse as striving for social justice may be from the child's effort to protect himself against jealousy by a law of equity in the nursery. Briefly, the area where the function was first developed need no longer limit its scope.<sup>8</sup>

In attempting to establish a model condition under which indulgence or deprivation might be indicated as a means of education, we implied that it should be based on criteria that includes concern for the child's development; the ego was to be prepared for its functions.<sup>9</sup> We have considered the extent and complexity of these functions. The control of impulses for purposes of socialization is only one element; the progressive capacity of the ego to detach itself from conflict and to enrich its autonomous functions, introduces new elements. This multiplicity of factors may well remind us of the stage our knowledge has reached. Psychoanalytic study of the child started as a reconstructive method; during the last two or three decades it has been supplemented by observation of the growing child. Our approach has remained essentially clinical. The knowledge and insights of some observers are extraordinary and far-reaching, but attempts to enlarge the circle of experts must necessarily be based on a more systematic foundation.

Gaps in our knowledge are not due to a scarcity of studies on child development, but rather to the fact that these studies only exceptionally include attempts to verify or modify psychoanalytic hypotheses, perhaps in part because these hypotheses have not always been formulated with sufficient clarity. In the admirable investigations of Gesell and his collaborators, are detailed and precise data on most areas of the child's maturation,

<sup>8</sup> I do not here enter into the question of a differentiation between "successful sublimation" and autonomous ego function. The latter concept was introduced independently by G. Allport (2) and Hartmann (14).

<sup>9</sup> For a similar view based on a somewhat different approach see (3) (12).

but maturation is that part of growth which is least dependent on social influences. Far fewer and less precise data are available on personality development; i. e., that part of growth which is largely dependent on social influences (17). To give only one example: the use of indulgence and deprivation as a means of education is based on assumptions concerning the child's object relation, but systematic study of the genetic aspects of this area is still in its beginning. A comparatively small number of investigations has already yielded important data and opened new vistas. Thus the needs of the child, during the first six months of life had erroneously been described before systematic observation could independently produce a correction of our views (9) (26).

The intensity of the child's need for love in this period is great, but relatively independent of the attachment to one individual. The need for the one and only mother grows as the child's ego develops and object relations gain in importance. On second thought, we may find that Freud's propositions in this area have prepared us for this finding; yet without the work of the last decade we could not distinguish between alternative possibilities.

Concerning the development of the child's ego functions, based on physical and intellectual maturation, extension of the area of observation suggested by psychoanalysis points mainly in one direction. We are interested in further elucidation of the specific relation of these functions to the child's typical conflicts—to the change from passivity to activity, from dependence to independence, to coping with libidinal and aggressive impulses which threaten the child's object relations. A new type of intensive observation by nursery and primary school teachers, who have been familiarized with the clinical aspects of the problem, promises to take the lead. It is an area in which the trained educator may well be able to increase the insight of the clinician and where cross-fertilization may become most fruitful. Systematic study of the child's ego functions can be facilitated where measurement procedures can be utilized. Projective and nonprojective tests may, under certain conditions, sharpen our eyes to discern conflict or autonomy in ego functions.

In outlining some gaps in our knowledge, and in pointing to some of the areas where systematic observation should prove useful, one difficulty has explicitly been omitted. Current studies on child development tend to be based on the isolated child. Wherever psychoanalysis is to guide child observation, the social environment in general, but mainly the person of the educator, must be taken into account. Psychotherapy of the child includes the mother, or rather much of it starts with the mother and includes the child. Similarly any study of education must include the educator. When enumerating the areas in which psychoanalysis has effected education, this relationship deserves special emphasis.

Psychoanalysis has taught us that education rests on interpersonal relationships. Clinically, we study the educator's influence, especially the parents'. We are aware of the impact of their own conflicts on those of the child (12) and of the chain formation in neuroses occurring in families (25). Systematic study of a child's reaction to his educators, as they follow each other in his development, will have to take similar factors into account. It seems particularly important to stress this point since the psychoanalytic approach to child development and contemporary learning theory have many interests in common. One point at which understanding tends to turn into misunderstanding concerns the part played by the educator. Psychoanalytic observation aims at including the total field of the child's interpersonal relations, something very difficult for experimenters to reproduce. To put it briefly: every step of learning in early childhood, as are many steps of learning in later life, is co-determined by object relations and involve conscious and unconscious identification.

It is probable that only the team work of participant observers will be able to cope with these factors. Similarly, cultural variations become tangible reality if the study of the child includes the educator and the total cultural environment. Available studies have proceeded to describe these factors and their influence by stressing what might be called patterns of deprivation and indulgence (22). Observers have noted to what extent each of the child's basic demands were met by his environment, how long he was breast-fed, how suddenly or gradually he was trained for cleanliness. Much less attention, however, has been given by the same observers to the child's ego development under culturally different conditions, to his inner world, to his concern with reality versus fantasy, retained versus repressed memories, and many other factors.

Such are the manifold tasks which lie before us. They will be solvable if the trend toward cooperation of various approaches in the study of child development continues, and if such cooperation gradually allows for an integration of concepts and hypothesis.

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