Social Aspects of Psycho-Analysis

LECTURES DELIVERED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

BY

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INTRODUCTION

The lectures of which this volume is comprised were delivered in October and November, 1923, at the request of the Sociological Society and under its auspices. The occasion itself is noteworthy enough to deserve some comment, for it is, I think, the first time that a scientific society in any country has expressed a desire to partake of the new knowledge brought to light by psycho-analysis. The limits bounding the fields of knowledge studied by various scientific societies are often jealously drawn, and it is unfortunately not a very frequent event for such a society to shew any desire to co-operate with another one. Yet the advantages of interchange of ideas among workers in neighbouring fields is undeniable, and many examples could be given of sug-

gestions proffered by an investigator in one branch of knowledge proving exceedingly fruitful on being taken up and developed by someone whose main concern is with some other branch. I have the impression that interchange and overlapping of this sort is more freely permitted in England than in almost any other country, probably a beneficial part of our distrust of "narrow experts," but there can be little doubt that it could advantageously be carried to much further lengths than it is. In these circumstances it must be regarded as a remarkable tribute to both the prescience and the courage of the Council of the Sociological Society, and particularly of its indefatigable President, Mr. Victor Branford, that they should have ventured, not simply to ask for knowledge from a body of workers in a field different from their own, but actually from psycho-analysts, people who are mainly accustomed to hostility and even calumny from their scientific colleagues. This little volume is the result, and one may express the hope that it may prove to be only the beginning of a lasting co-operation between sociologists and psycho-analysts.

Of the course itself I have not much to say. The outstanding merit to which it can lay claim is that the lecturers are all well qualified to speak on their particular subject. This is guaranteed by the fact alone that they are all members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, for there are no trained analysts in England outside the ranks of this society. About the merits of the disposition of the course I can speak with less confidence. I cannot help thinking that it might have been better for an avowedly introductory course of this kind to have been given in some more concentrated form, either by confining to fewer subjects the ground covered or by restricting the number of lecturers. Possibly it might have been better if the time devoted to the more applied aspects of sociology could have been allotted to more primary and fundamental issues, such as the genetic and archaeological aspects. On the other hand it should be said that special efforts have been made in two ways to overcome the obvious defect arising from any possible lack of continuity: preliminary meetings were held to apportion out the various topics and to guard against any over-

lapping, and the whole have been edited by a single hand.

These, however, are rather carping criticisms. More serious is the consideration, which I must press on the attention of the reader, that the limited time at our disposal imposed two grave restrictions on our efforts. In the first place, it was necessary to preface any discussion of the application of psycho-analysis to sociology by some account of the former; and, as the subject is both unexpectedly novel in its nature and very extensive in its content, most of the time came to be devoted to sheer exposition of psycho-analysis itself. In my general introductory lecture I was acutely aware of this difficulty, and I can only marvel that the other lecturers were in the circumstances able to convey so many points on the other side as they did. In the second place, the topics dealt with in the various lectures are necessarily only selections from the whole field, so that it was impossible to transmit a smooth perspective. Some important branches of the subject, of especial interest to the historical side of sociology, had unfortunately to be altogether omitted. I have in mind here particularly the close relationship subsisting

between the findings of psycho-analysis on the one hand and the extensive data yielded by anthropology, folk-lore, and religion on the other. In these and in many other products of the human imagination psycho-analysis has been able to shew what lies behind the superficial appearance, to penetrate to the why and wherefore, and to disclose the motive forces actually operative.

Although only one half of the present lecturers are medical practitioners, it should not be forgotten that psycho-analysis is, strictly speaking, a branch of psychological medicine, and therefore of medicine. In the past quarter of a century medicine has fortunately discarded a good deal of its old mystic significance, and has established many points of contact with the general affairs of the public. This is, of course, especially true of preventive medicine, of what is known as Hygiene or Public Health. But it can be safely predicted that in no respect in the future will medicine come into closer contact with the everyday life of the nation than just in the field now being intensively studied by psycho-analysts. There are two reasons for this. As I tried to explain in my introductory

lecture, the pathological states to which psycho-analysts have devoted most attention, the various disorders known as neuroses, are themselves not so much diseases in the ordinary sense as forms of individual reaction to social situations, problems and difficulties. We maintain that the intensive study of these reactions that has been possible by the help of psycho-analytic methods is throwing a great deal of light on the inner nature of the social problems themselves, on the origin, function and significance of the social situations in question. Further than this, in forming a heuristic judgment of the various forms of social institutions, politicians will in the future have to take into consideration in making decisions, among other factors, the question of how far the mental health of the people will be affected by this or that social arrangement. Few people now are in the least aware of the enormous loss of capacity and happiness resulting from the inhibitions and emotional conflicts which find their most developed expression in neurotic disorders. When these factors are more generally appreciated at their true significance they will often weigh heavily in the balance against real or supposed

advantages to be gained by introducing or maintaining various social institutions that bring these grievous penalties with them.

ERNEST JONES.

December 15, 1923

CHAPTER I

THE RELATION BETWEEN PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND SOCIOLOGY

BY

ERNEST JONES

BEFORE taking up the subject proper of this lecture, it will be well to consider briefly the relation of sociology to psychology in general, of which science psycho-analysis is only a branch. Valuable studies can be and have been made of the social institutions that form the object of sociological investigation without taking into account any of the human motives and purposes related to these institutions, without inquiring, in other words, into the motives that led men to build them up, or into the functions that they serve in human society. Very little reflection, however, is needed to shew that such studies must inevitably remain

on a purely descriptive level, and that the very first attempt to induce a fuller comprehension than mere description can give leads directly to the consideration of some psychological problem. Thus sociology must remain in a high degree imperfect and incomplete unless it is infused with knowledge derived from psychology.

Sociologists have freely recognised this state of affairs, and have naturally turned to psychologists for assistance and co-operation. They must in the past have been somewhat bewildered, and not a little disappointed, at the result. The main response from what may without disrespect be called academic psychology has emphatically been a negative one. Many psychologists explicitly, and most of them implicitly, deny that they are concerned with such mundane topics as motive and meaning, and the few—with the notable inclusion of Wundt himself—who have made any study of sociological data have again done so mainly along descriptive lines and have contributed little to our understanding of the psychological significance of the phenomena they describe. The reason for this curious predicament probably lies in the at-

titude of psychologists towards their own work, for they have extensively avoided studying just those aspects of the mind which could yield the answers to the questions put by sociologists. I refer to the intimacies of the life of feeling in the individual. That psychoanalysts, on the other hand, have shewn considerable intrepidity in the investigation of these very problems is a familiar feature of their work, one that has often been brought forward against it as a reproach. To which their answer has been that the march of science and the relief of suffering would seem to them to be more important than wounded susceptibilities.

In this *impasse* some writers, particularly those standing midway between sociology and psychology, such as Le Bon, have hit on the idea that the side of man from which light is needed to explain sociological phenomena, the side about which psychologists have been able to tell them so little, may perhaps be one which is actually not present in the material studied by the psychologist, *i.e.*, in man considered as an individual. They have therefore put forward the view that the mental tendencies and motives concerned with social

institutions are quite dormant in the individual man unless they are stirred to activity through his coming into close contact with his fellows. They postulate a special class of instincts—the herd, gregarious or social instincts—which are manifest only in the relation of the individual with the group, and have on this basis attempted to found a section of psychological study called social psychology. This view would explain why the academic psychologists had overlooked the tendencies in question. It must be said, however, that if the view were correct one might reasonably have hoped for more fruitful products of it to have become manifest in the twenty years that have elapsed since it was promulgated than have actually appeared.

This is not the place to consider the many objections that can be brought forward against the view just enunciated, and I will mention only one of them. It would appear to attach far too great an importance to the mere fact of number in human relations. It would surely need much evidence to convince us that instincts which play no part in a man's relations to those next to him, friend, enemy, wife and family, should suddenly emerge if

he comes into contact with a larger number of people. At what point do they appear, and what is the magic number that has this effect? It is true that a distinguished writer of this school, Wilfred Trotter, differs from the other members of it by insisting that in fact these instincts do play a part in the simpler and more individual relations of life, and not only where group contact is present. He maintains that man is at every moment, even in the privacy of his chamber, nothing but a gregarious animal, and that much of his most individual behaviour is dictated by the indirect effects of his social instincts. He would, therefore, not excuse the psychologist for overlooking these tendencies in the study of the individual.

The psycho-analytical explanation of the state of affairs is different. We hold that what has been overlooked has been the intimate regions of the mind. Working in a field where the aim—the relief of suffering—must over-ride the considerations of discretion which have deterred the academic psychologist, the medical psychologist has had to enter these intimate regions and has made there unexpected discoveries of a kind that have

great importance for other fields of investigation, including the sociological. The purpose of these lectures is to lay before you at least an outline of these discoveries.

Incidentally, we are of opinion—*vide* Freud's recent book on "Group Psychology"—that it is possible to dissect the so-called social instincts into still more primary elements. We think, further, that human contact in group formation never creates any new psychological element, but only releases reactions and tendencies already present, which have previously manifested themselves in the life of the individual at one time or another. That all these social tendencies are nothing but elaborations of those which were evoked to begin with in the life of the family circle is an important tenet of psycho-analysis which will be expounded at various points in these lectures.

If, as I think may be fairly assumed, the most useful thing to know about the various objects of sociological study, social institutions and so on, is not so much their external structure as their meaning and purpose, i.e. the motives of the human beings who create and employ them, then for several reasons it

may be asserted that psycho-analysis is in a better position than any other branch of psychology to make valuable contributions to sociology. In the first place, psycho-analysis is peculiarly concerned with the study of motives and aims. Its point of view is essentially a *dynamic* one, and in one sense of the word a teleological one. This has been its characteristic from the first. Even in its first field, that of the neuroses, it differed from all other views on the subject by maintaining that the symptoms were created by unavowed motives on the patient's part, were willed by him for perfectly definite reasons. This wish-theory of the neuroses, of dreams, and of numerous other mental products, is a central one in the whole psycho-analytical theory. In the second place, it deals with the real motives moving man, and not merely with the rationalistic ones he so commonly gives in explanation of his conduct. The most important of these motives are unknown to the subject himself. They appertain to a buried stratum of the mind, which we term the "unconscious," and their existence and effects can be demonstrated only by special means of investigation. Psycho-analysis might

well be defined as the study of the unconscious mind, this being its special realm. If it is true, as we think, that this is the most important part of the mind, and that psycho-analysis is the sovereign method for investigating this part of the mind, then the importance of psycho-analysis for any practical and applied, as well as the purely theoretical, aspects of psychology must follow. In the third place, it so happens that the actual content of the unconscious has very much to do with the psychological sources of the very institutions studied in other ways by sociologists. The noteworthy point here is that this holds not only as regards the current significance of the social institutions. Much more remarkable is the circumstance that we can detect in the unconscious more or less plain indications of the ultimate origins of these institutions, indications which really give the appearance of being archaic residues of prehistoric epochs of humanity. Naturally this is a matter where specially careful scepticism is called for, but the findings made in this direction are such as in my opinion can only be called highly significant. It may well prove that further research in this fascinating field may open a

new world of mental archæology to the sociologist.

There are several difficulties in the way of acquiring knowledge about psycho-analysis. Those who do not take the trouble to ascertain what are the authentic sources of information on the subject run the risk of falling into the hands of those unqualified persons who have chosen to exploit it for their own purposes. I refer here not only to those who purport to practise psycho-analysis without having any qualification to do so, but also to those who write uninformed and misleading books.[1] This unfortunate circumstance is naturally prone to bring discredit on the work, and members of the public are in no position to exercise their own discrimination in such matters.[2]

Other reasons for the difficulty, which will become more apparent in the course of these

[1] For this reason we have decided to append at the end of the present volume a list of literary references that may be regarded as trustworthy.

[2] Yet it is always open for anyone to write for information to the Secretary of the British Psycho-Analytical Society. Dr. Douglas Bryan, or in other countries to the corresponding official of the local branch Society of the International Psycho-Analytical Association.

lectures, reside in the complexity of the subject being enormously greater than is popularly supposed and, most important of all, that the student has first to overcome certain inevitable reactions of repugnance before he will be able to think freely and judge clearly on topics which have all his life been under the strictest possible taboo. It is well to realise at the outset that this is not so much a question of mere conventional prejudices, to which many of you—doubtless with right—consider yourselves superior, as of much deeper inhibitions of thought which are quite unrecognised by consciousness. These inhibitions necessarily interpose at first a resistance to understanding and they have to be gradually overcome; there is no way of simply avoiding them.

It is time at last to give some answer to the obvious question: What is psycho-analysis? The term is used by us in three cognate senses, and these should be carefully distinguished from the loose connotations often attached to it by outsiders who have their own reasons for doing so. The word was coined by Freud to describe a special technique he used in the treatment of neurotic

patients. It may be said, by the way, that to secure a mastery of this technique is far from easy and demands a very special study, yet without it it is impossible to pass any judgment of value on the conclusions reached by means of it, for it remains the indispensable basis of all psycho-analytic practice and theory. It was subsequently found that this technique, which was a means of acquiring knowledge about the hidden mental processes of suffering persons—in fact the ultimate reasons for their suffering, could be used for other purposes and in other circumstances. It thus became a method of investigation pure and simple, just like any of the many other methods that are used for scientific exploration in psychological work. This use of the term is in practice much the same as the first, for it is the same method, and it implies very little extension of its original meaning. The term is also used in a third sense, to denote the body of knowledge which has been acquired through the application of the psycho-analytic method, and this is the sense in which it is mainly used in these lectures. What is called the psycho-analytical theory is little more than an empirical co-ordination of the actual

findings made in the course of applying the psycho-analytic method. As befits a scientific theory, it has been built up piece by piece in accordance with the ever accumulating results of investigation and has never preceded these. Therefore, as might he expected, it is still far from being a complete and rounded-off theory, and in the thirty years its author has spent in elaborating it he has amplified and modified it to a not inconsiderable extent. This is only another way of saying that he has taken constant account of the steady increase in knowledge brought by widening opportunity and experience, as well as by refinements and improvements in the technique of the method itself.

The next question that will surely arise is: What is the connection between the field of neurotic suffering, which has been the main object of psycho-analytic study, and the problems of more normal conduct, such as we have to do with in sociology; and, further, by what justification can conclusions reached in the former sphere be held to have validity in the latter? Scepticism on this point is very general and is, I think, largely due to misconception of the nature of neurotic suffering.

This is usually conceived by the laity, including here most of the medical profession, to be a matter of a disease occurring in an abnormal personality, one who deviates from the "normal" in having been subjected to noxious influences from which they have been free. This is a very partial view of the question. Both of the points just cited need correction, and it is the reasons for these corrections that make it possible, usefully, to connect our studies in psychopathology with normal psychology.

In the first place it is near the truth to say that neuroses are not so much diseases in the ordinary sense as social maladjustments. By this I mean that a psychoneurosis is one particular way of meeting a social difficulty, i.e. a difficulty in respect of one's relations with one's fellow human beings. Appreciation of this circumstance surely puts the matter in a different light, and for the sociologist a more interesting one. It would not be surprising if an intensive study of one mode of reaction to social problems revealed something of value concerning both the psychological significance of these problems and the other more "normal" modes of reaction to them. And

that is what we actually find. There are few social problems, difficulties and conflicts which have not had to be the occasion of a penetrating psycho-analysis, and the gradual accumulation of this intensive experience with individuals is beginning to throw important light on the inner significance of social questions of all kinds. The second fact to bear in mind here is that the reactions observed in the neurotic are merely distortions of the "normal" reactions, differing from these quantitatively but not qualitatively. We have all had to deal with the same problems and conflicts as those underlying neurotic reactions, but the microscope of "disease" renders them in many ways easier of inspection in the latter case. Yet they are of no less significance in the life of the "normal," for here they have to do with the most important activities of mankind. Neuroses are simply unsatisfactory substitutes for these activities, but the energies in play are the same in the two cases. The inner motives that impel one man to climb Mount Everest, to build a battleship or to write a poem is with another the operative force in the production of some neurotic symptom, an obsession, a phobia or a paralysis. The

external practical differences in the results are, of course, of vast importance socially, but the inner psychological difference in the two reactions, though also important, is very much less than might be thought. Again, remember that no one is throughout neurotic, so that in psycho-analysis we have the opportunity of observing "normal" and neurotic reactions side by side in the same person. We can thus compare and contrast the two, trace out the respective genesis of both, and ascertain at what point the one began to diverge from the other and under what psychological conditions. Further, the control experiment has been performed a good many times of conducting a psycho-analysis on "normal" people, or on as "normal" people as can be found by using a somewhat lax standard. In all of these ways the closest connections have been shown to exist between the motives and conflicts underlying "neurotic" reactions and "normal" reactions.

I do not propose to give here an historical survey of the order in which the different discoveries were made in the course of psycho-analytic work, interesting as this theme is. For present pnrposes it will be more expedient

for me to sketch an outline of what I consider to be the most important conclusions to which psycho-analytic research has led. Perhaps the most outstanding one of these, one around which all the others are really grouped, is the realisation that what we know of ourselves, our consciousness, constitutes only a part, and often a very secondary part, of our whole minds. The part of our minds of which we know nothing we term the "unconscious," and when I say the part of which we know nothing I mean this in the most absolute and literal sense. I wish to lay especial stress on this, for I have observed that it takes a long time before a student grasps how really unconscious the unconscious is. By the term we intend to refer to mental processes of whose existence the subject has not the very faintest suspicion, ideas which when mentioned to him appear exceedingly remote and unconnected with himself; he would greet with the greatest incredulity and often horror the notion of such ideas being actually vivid parts of his own personality. To say to the average person what I have just said only provokes astonishment, and even if he were polite enough to say he believed me

I should know that there could be no possibility of real apprehension or conviction in such assent. I know of no way of his truly appreciating the reality and significance of unconscious ideas except by actually experiencing in his own person the analytic bringing to his awareness of ideas previously quite unrecoguised by him, and this is one of the many reasons why one regards a self-analysis as an indispensable preliminarv to the conducting of any psycho-analysis on others.

The discovery of the unconscious is momentous in its consequences. It immediately raises many obvious questions. What is the meaning and the significance of the unconscious, how does it come to exist, what sort of ideas does it contain, and to what effects do they lead? It will be our business to give some answer to these questions before much can be said about the bearing of them on social problems.

As may be imagined, many estimable people have taken umbrage at the use of such an expression as an "unconscious idea." It has always been considered that consciousness is the hall-mark of a mental process, the only criterion we possess for distinguishing it from

a physical process, so how can we possibly speak of a mental process such as an idea being "unconscious"? Of course we cannot so long as we retain the dogma: mental equals conscious. But there are the best reasons for thinking that this was an assumption based on insufficient knowledge. Without going into these reasons here[1] let us be content with the position that processes do occur, which we call unconscious ideas for the good reason that we are only able to describe them in terms of ideas, and if you will we can leave open the question of whether they are in their essence "mental" or "physical," one which is largely a question for the metaphysician. Our own opinion is that they are quite as "mental" as conscious processes, and whether both of them prove to be identical with or distinct from physical processes is a question that need not detain us, for it has no discernible bearing in practice.

Perhaps the most important feature of the unconscious is its relationship to the conscious mind, in which there are both negative and positive aspects to consider. The negative

[1] See Freud: Collected Papers, vol. IV (to appear shortly in translation), or Levine: "The Unconscious," 1923.

side is represented by a certain incompatibility between the two regions of the mind, and this is the main reason why they are shut off from each other. The most important part of the unconscious consists of elements intrusion of which into the conscious mind would be resisted. We are slightly aware of this attitude towards unwelcome thoughts and of striving to "put them out of our mind," to "turn away from such thoughts," and so on. This turning away from, or flight from the unpleasant, is a process which is incomparably more extensive and significant than might superficially be imagined. For the greater part it goes on automatically, without the subject being at all aware of it. We note, therefore, that the process of *preventing* thoughts from entering the conscious mind is a far wider and more important one than the mere expelling of certain thoughts, though the latter is more familiar to introspection. Further, this state of affairs is not to be pictured as a static one, as though there were a fixed, lifeless obstacle interposed between the two parts of the mind. It is throughout a matter of dynamics. Active impulses oppose each other from the two

sides with a constantly varying energy, and the total result is constantly changing.

We are thus presented with the conception of deep-seated and entirely unknown *intra-psychical conflicts*. Now, what can these impulses be that are so incompatible with the conscious self as to be debarred even from entry into consciousness? The whole idea must surely seem very startling to those who are unfamiliar with it. And this impression can only be heightened when I make the further announcement that all our conduct in life, all our interests, and all our conscious ideas and emotions take their origin in this deeper unknown region of the mind. Still more, that the conscious mind contributes nothing at all beyond criticism, control and direction of all these processes. The living motive force comes from beyond, from the unconscious; the conscious mind merely interposes obstacles in its path, only this and nothing more. Surely a most revolutionary view of the human mind, one well calculated to evoke the strongest opposition.

To repeat the question just put: what, then, are these unconscious impulses, "repressed," as the technical term is, from the conscious mind?

Perhaps the simplest answer, one reaching to the heart of the matter, is to say that they are the derivatives of our primitive inborn instincts, the heritage we have in common with the other animals. If one reflects on this one may begin to see some sort of sense in the statement that the unconscious is incompatible with the conscious, for the latter represents the civilised part of man, the part always at war with what the theologians would call his "lower self," *i.e.* the primitive. It is comprehensible that such passions as lust, greed, hate and murder are rarely allowed to express themselves freely, or even to appear openly in consciousness, but are subject to a more or less constant check, inhibition or restraint. This inhibition Freud has likened to the censorship function with which we became familiar during the war. Note that, as there, the inhibition is rarely an absolute one, and that it can be evaded under particular conditions, by circumlocution, by weakening the statement, by allusion, and so on—in short, by disguise. The unconscious impulses similarly can enter consciousness and lead to effects provided that they first undergo a suitable process of modification, weakening, distortion, and the like. A considerable part

of psycho-analysis is taken up with the study of these numerous forms of distortion.

Another less obvious answer can be given to our question. It is that the unconscious impulses are the infantile self, the part of the child's mind which has not had the opportunity of growing up through establishing contact with reality. It is constantly forgotten how much we—quite naturally—overlook in a young child's conduct on the score of his age, and that we use totally different ethical standards by which to judge it from those applicable to adults. This loving blindness is commonly carried so far as to deny any significance to the facts actually observed. For instance, if a young child tortures a small animal or another child he is said to do it from ignorance, which is a very partial view, and not at all from cruelty. Yet it is plain that the behaviour to be witnessed among children, with their ruthless egotism and callousness—not to speak of more personal improprieties—would not be tolerated for a moment among adults. As Browning wrote: "The sweetest child we all smile on for his pleasant want of the whole world to break up or suck in his mouth, seeing no other good in it—would be

rudely handled by that world's inhabitants if he retained those angelic infantile desires when he has grown six feet high, black and bearded." The whole process of education means essentially the transformation of this asocial creature into a civilised human being. Psycho-analysis has shewn that this transformation costs the individual far more effort than is generally realised, and also that it is relatively rare for it to be brought about smoothly or completely. A great part of the primary endowment resists transformation and is simply repressed into the unconscious—to be replaced perhaps in consciousness by what are termed "reaction-formations" in character, *i.e.* counter-charges of exactly opposite tendencies. Thus, a person may, instead of really transforming a dirt-loving tendency, merely react against it with a morbidly excessive cleanliness. The original tendency, however, now repressed will probably come to some expression or other, for instance, in miserliness.

The fate of these primitive and infantile impulses is a matter of great importance. We have just considered the two more normal ones, reaction-formation and transformation. In the latter case two changes occur: modifi-

cations ensue in the quality and intensity of the impulse itself, and the goal of the impulse is replaced by a more suitable and social one. The series of changes in the original impulse that can in this way be brought about are very considerable, so that only an expert could tell the source of the tendency finally resulting from it. In the case of sexual impulses, this transformation is given the special name of "sublimation." A third fate of the repressed impulses is that they may remain unaltered, unaffected by the educative process. The subject then manifests a trend towards sexual perversion or criminality. The fourth is that an unconscious compromise may come about between the two sides of the conflict, in which neither gains the upper hand. There is then present the remarkable condition known as neurosis, the condition which was first of all to be investigated psycho-analytically.

I want again to lay especial stress on the complexity of the process of normal transformation, since the process is one of the greatest importance for the understanding of everyday conduct and interests. We even maintain, as was mentioned above, that the whole of the latter, *i.e.*, of our conscious activities, take

their origin in the unconscious mind, largely in the part that has undergone repression, in the course of development. Inhibitions prevent in most cases any direct manifestation of the unconscious impulses, so that before they have to pass the barrier—or what may provisionally be called the censorship existing between the conscious and unconscious, and this they can do only after undergoing very considerable modification. The displacement of feeling from one idea on to another, the condensation of ideas, and the numerous other changes that take place in the course of this modification, are too complicated even to give any notion of here, but you will imagine that the study of this process of transformation constitutes an important part of psychoanalytic work, particularly of that of it which interests us here—the relation of the unconscious to conscious mental activities.

So far I have been laying emphasis on Freud's dualistic conception of the mind, on the division of the mind into conscious and unconscious regions, and on the conflict between these two. I now wish to introduce to you another dualism in Freud's theory, one which, though not identical with the other,

has much in common with it. This is the contrast between two main groups of instincts, those serving self-preservation and racial preservation respectively. Freud himself describes them under the name of "ego-instincts" and "sexual instincts." Naturally each of these groups comprise a considerable number of components, though the fine dissection of these is still far from complete. The investigation of these components, however, has already taught us much, and I wish to call attention to the importance of one outstanding discovery. That is that the sexual group comprises a great deal more than is commonly classed under this term. There are strong motives which actuate most writers to restrict the conception of sexuality to its narrowest possible limits, often to the mere consummating act of coitus itself. Freud, on the other hand, would also regard as sexual, three other classes of phenomena; first, the preliminary acts that lead up to the consummating one, acts such as kissing, which have this as their ultimate logical goal, whether this goal is actually attained in a given case or not; secondly, acts and tendencies derived from

obviously sexual ones by a process that may be called deflection, a group of which love and affection are perhaps the best examples; and thirdly, a number of others, particularly auto-erotic or perverse ones, which, though they do not tend towards the normal consummation, can be recognised as sexual by the specific sensations and mode of gratification characteristic of them. It is a curious but undeniable fact that it is possible for a person to indulge in certain forms of erotic activity without being at all aware of their erotic nature; it is quite common, for instance, for girls to masturbate in all innocence until they suddenly discover the nature of what they are doing. Now detailed investigation shews that the frequency of this unconscious erotic gratification is far greater than might be supposed, and further that the unconscious mind itself is occupied with erotic phantasies and wishes to a quite astonishing extent. It will therefore not come as a surprise when I remark that the sexual instincts are not only more often and more severely condemned in consciousness than any other, but that the intra-psychical conflict of which something was said earlier is pre-eminently between this group of instincts

and the other ego group. It is from the conflict between these two groups that Freud derives so much of the resulting activities and interests of the conscious mind, but you will at once perceive that it is incorrect to say, as is so often done, that he "attributes everything to sexuality." The truth is that he attributes very much, certainly not "everything," to the conflict between the sexual and the non-sexual instincts, not to the former alone.

An apparent contradiction will surely be noticed between my last remarks and what I said earlier. I indicated that there was a considerable correlation between the two kinds of conflict, that between conscious and unconscious impulses and that between the ego and sexual groups of instincts. Of the repressed unconscious impulses, which are so largely coterminous with the sexual ones, I said that they are primitive and infantile. Now you may agree that many sexual impulses could fairly be described as belonging to the primitive part of the personality, but the idea that they are also infantile will not be so readily accepted. And yet the concept of infantile sexuality is the touchstone of the psycho-analytical theory, by which this theory

will stand or fall. It is the part of the theory that has aroused the strongest opposition of all, and nevertheless increasing knowledge and experience only strengthens our conviction of its truth and importance. Some, no doubt, of the opposition is due to mere misunderstanding, to the confining of the word "sexual" to the narrow limits indicated above, just as the word "mental" is confined to "conscious." We admit, of course, that the sexual activities of children are widely different from those of adults, that for a great part they consist of acts which in the adult are only preliminaries in love-making or else of acts which the adult has as a rule renounced and therefore no longer counts as parts of his sexual life. But in addition to these, mainly auto-erotic, manifestations there is one central group which I cannot pass by without saying a word about it. We maintain that the dawn of sexual love for another person, of what is called "object-love," is to be seen in the child's relation to its parents; in other words, that it is always at first of an incestuous nature — the so-called "Oedipus complex." At this point opposition to our views concentrates at its intensest. In spite

of this, you will find that the main part of the following lectures will be taken up with tracing out the passage from these primitive incest complexes to all kinds of social activities and interests. Our thesis is that the child's relation to its family remains throughout life the prototype of its relations to its fellows in general, that this exercises the profoundest influence on its character and conduct, and that the essence of the relationship is a sexual one. In what will be said on this theme there will certainly be food for thought and discussion.

In summing up the short sketch I have just given of the psycho-analytical theory, I would select as perhaps the three most important constituents of it the concepts of repression, of the unconscious, and of infantile sexuality. Those of you who are cognizant of the matter will probably agree that I have here enumerated them in the order according with the strength of the opposition to them. The doctrine of repression is in some form or other accepted to-day by most clinical psychologists and by a large number of academic psychologists. That of the unconscious is also widely accepted, at least in a limited and

general form. The conception of infantile sexuality, however, is still bitterly denied, though really the other two owe a great deal of their importance to it.

Before concluding I should like to return for a few moments to the theme with which we have started, namely, the bearing of psycho-analysis on sociology. Before this audience, where no expert knowledge of psycho-analysis could be assumed, it was inevitable that I should spend most of my time in saying something about this subject rather than in concentrating on its application, and that you will probably find will be so with the subsequent lectures of this course also. I regret that in the time at my disposal I can do little more than assure you that those applications are both numerous and practically important. It is hard to think of any problem of sociology on which light could not be thrown by the knowledge gained through psycho-analytic research. Some of the main problems of sociology lie actually in our chief field of investigation. I need only mention the enormously complicated subject of sexual relations, the manifold form of antagonism and misunderstanding between the sexes, the

almost incredible number of ceremonies, superstitions and rituals surrounding the institution of marriage, and the attendant institutions of the family and prostitution. The problems here alone are almost endless and are much more complicated even than is generally supposed; and they all of them bear closely on the daily work of psycho-analysts. And very many of them are also connected with other social and political questions. Take the one matter of the status of the family. It is customary for conservative politicians to oppose various innovations, from compulsory education to the introduction of death duties, on the score that they diminish the importance of the family in social life, after which they sapiently add that the family is the fundamental basis of all civilization. Psycho-analysts would agree that this latter remark contains a far deeper truth than might appear, inasmuch as in their opinion the greater part of civilization owes its origin to indirect attempts to deal with psychical conflicts arising in relation to the family. It does not necessarily follow, however, that no other basis for civilization could be discovered. That is a matter for further inquiry. But we think

we can show that hitherto there has never been any other basis.

I have time for only one example from another sphere. In 1915, when the cost of living began to rise, I had the hardihood to publish the opinion, on purely psycho-analytical grounds, that rationalized motives arising from quite unconscious sources would impel the authorities of this country after the War to deflate the currency so rapidly as to bring about great suffering (from high taxation and wide-spread unemployment). It is only within the past year that the connection between unemployment and too rapid deflation has become evident, and even so only to the advanced currency experts, for the "orthodox" financial authorities still take an opposite view. This instance alone may indicate that psycho-analysis has immediate possibilities of application in everyday affairs, and Dr. Eder, in his lecture on politics, will doubtless illustrate the same thesis in other fields.

Another vast field is that opened up by the recognition that many of the ideas and phantasies present in the unconscious date not only from the infancy of the individual, but apparently also from that of the race.

What the actual connection between the two is a keenly debated issue, which need not concern us here, but the working analyst gets an unescapable impression that many of the phantasies in question are in some way echoes of actual happenings of aeons ago, and this thought is confirmed by the astonishing resemblance of them to the beliefs and ideas of still living primitive peoples. Along these lines, and constantly checked by other work, it should be possible to contribute, or at least to suggest, much that may be of value for the study of social origins and of dawning social institutions.

I will conclude by quoting a remark made to me by a far-sighted sociologist many years ago. It was in the early days of the Sociological Society, of which I was then an ardent member, and in commenting on the aridity of much of the work I said: "Sociology will never be a fruitful science until it is fertilised by Psychology." "Ah," replied my companion, having in mind the similar aridity that characterised contemporary psychology, "but the bridegroom is so coy." The present course of lectures is mainly designed to introduce you to the idea that psycho-analysis has cured this complaint, as it has many others.

CHAPTER II

MAN THE INDIVIDUAL

BY

JAMES GLOVER

IT has been thought advisable that one of these lectures should be devoted to Psycho-analytical consideration of the individual as such.

When we submit an individual to a psycho-analysis, we are not content till we have brought to light all the vicissitudes of his emotional development, from infancy till the present time, and in this and in other respects a psycho-analysis occupies a unique place amongst scientific observations of human individuals.

But this prolonged and intensive scrutiny takes account, not only of the individual himself, but of the entire nexus of his

relationships with the outside world of persons and things. In a sense, therefore, a psycho-analysis is a sociological investigation, revealing in detail every one of an individual's characteristics as a social being. It is even in a sense a sociological experiment, since during the process fresh social adaptations make their appearance: moreover, since the analyst is unconsciously identified with a number of other significant persons, the scope of this sociological enquiry is not limited, as might appear, by the fact that only two persons take part in it. I propose to deal here briefly with certain important factors in the development of the individual himself, merely indicating in passing the origin and nature of his social attachments.

To begin with, something must be said about what might be called the raw material of the individual, namely those inherited instincts which, in spite of subsequent complex changes, remain throughout life the hidden sources of all his manifold activities.

Out of this raw material the individual is fashioned by the moulding pressures of his familiar and wider social environments, and psycho-analysis has brought to light so many

unsuspected facts concerning the processes of instinct modification in man that its findings and hypotheses, incomplete and tentative as certain of them still are, already constitute a promising basis for a new science of man's instinctual life.

You have already heard in the first lecture of the psycho-analytical classification of the instincts into two great groups, the Sexual Instincts and the Ego Instincts, a classification determined in the first instance by its great utility as a working hypothesis, and justified later by important wider theoretical considerations. At first sight such a classification might appear too meagre, since in man the energies supplied by his instincts are capable of a wide range of indirect expression ; so that many of their manifestations, superficially considered, appear to have no connection whatever with direct self-preservative or race preservative ends.

Psycho-analysis however has demonstrated a firm genetic continuity between the earliest nascent manifestations of these instincts and their most complicated and remote end products.

This range of indirect expression is especially

marked in the case of the energy derived from the sexual instincts, and psycho-analysts have felt the need of a term of rough quantitative significance wherewith to designate this energy, wherever or in whatever way it manifests itself. (In thus using the word energy they are employing a purely psychological concept). The term used to designate this energy ascribed to the activity of the sexual instincts is *Libido*. It corresponds roughly with the popular use of the word love, and includes in its scope not only love between the sexes but every relationship in which the word love is appropriate, e.g., self-love, love of parents and of children, friendship, and even love of inanimate objects and abstract ideas. Psycho-analysis has shown that all these forms of "loving" are fundamentally manifestations of the sexual instincts. Now, while the ego impulses are on the whole fairly accessible to discernment both in ourselves and in others, this is far from being true of the *libidinal* impulses, the precise nature and developmental fate of which have remained hidden from human knowledge till psycho-analytic research brought them for the first time under scientific scrutiny, and demonstrated their unsuspected importance.

Like the ultra-violet components of light, although invisible under ordinary analysis, they have proved to be extremely active in their effects.

But, hidden as these manifestations are from ordinary observation, psycho-analysis is, for reasons that cannot be gone into here, actually on surer ground in dealing with them than in its knowledge of the ego impulses.

We must now consider for a moment one way in which all instinct-impulses make their activity known. Considered psychologically, the result of instinct-activity might be described as a *cumulative tension* in the organism, which can only be relieved when certain motor adjustments, often of a complicated sort, bring about its discharge. While it lasts, this inner tension is experienced as a special sort of discomfort, accompanied by restlessness, etc., till discharge is achieved through an appropriate activity. When this happens we say that the instinct is gratified. In a technical sense ungratified instinct-tension is experienced as "pain": while the discharge of this tension in gratification is experienced as pleasure. We cannot avoid this internal source of discomfort by flight as we can avoid external sources of

discomfort. We are allowed no rest until we take some steps to allay it.

Now in respect of these internal tensions arising from instinct-pressures, there is one exceedingly important difference between those belonging to the ego group and those belonging to the sex group, namely the fact that the latter can to a surprising extent be satisfied by substitute gratifications, replacing their primary goal, or by gratifications falling considerably short of their primary goal.

For instance, the self-preservative impulse called hunger can neither brook too long postponement, nor accept any substitute for its appropriate gratification. It is only on the stage that a "property" meal will suffice, whereas, to select one of the most transparent examples of displacement in the other class of impulses, a domestic pet will in certain cases replace and receive the love ordinarily destined for a child. Now suppose for a moment that the tensions of hunger could be appeased by the mechanisms possible in the case of libidinal impulses. We should then have cases in which a hungry man would remain unmoved by the sight of food, or would satisfy himself by reading a menu, or even by some fantastic-

ally remote activity such as climbing a tree. Again he might satisfy his hunger by eating a part of himself, or by requesting someone else to eat him! And in all these cases he would remain unaware of the real significance of the unrest impelling him to activity. Absurd as they sound, these imaginary transformations of a primary self-preservative impulse are by no means exaggerated analogies of the varying fates of primary libidinal impulses.

From the sociological point of view the most important form of substitute gratification is that termed *sublimation*, in which one of the several primary libidinal impulses manifesting themselves in infancy and early childhood accept substitute gratifications more in accordance with the child's developing social personality and, what amounts to the same thing, more in accordance with social requirements. In essence sublimation is the replacement of a sexual by a non-sexual gratification, "sexual" here denoting the primary components of the sexual instinct, and not its later co-ordinated direct expression in adult life. We are here reminded of an important fact, namely that both ego impulses and libidinal impulses are in active operation from the first moments of life.

When the self-sufficing state of pre-natal life is suddenly brought to an end by the violent change of birth, when, to mention only one of the important immediate consequences of this change, the withdrawal of the nourishment of the maternal blood-stream creates the tension-pangs of hunger, the organism is compelled to take up an attitude of *activity* towards the external world. It must find certain suitable *objects* outside itself, and on account of their urgency, it is the ego impulses that lead the way in this process of object finding; but once this path to the object is opened by the ego-impulses, the libidinal impulses as it were follow closely in their tracks.

The prototype of this dual process is the child's discovery of the mother's breast, the assuaging of its hunger tensions and the subsequent prolongation of suckling for the sake of the pleasant sensory stimulation of its mouth, which is the earliest form of *libidinal* satisfaction, and one that re-appears in later life in the libidinal satisfaction of the kiss.

When the breast is no longer available for this purpose, the child will accept substitutes for this primary libidinal object, its own

thumb, a comforter, etc.; objects entirely useless for the satisfaction of hunger but capable of gratifying this primary libidinal pleasure.

Here we see illustrated two important peculiarities of libidinal impulses in general, *i.e.* (1) their relative independence of the outer world, since in default of external gratification, they can in some way or other be gratified in act or fantasy within the boundaries of the self, (2) their capacity for accepting substitutes in the outer world.

In childhood libidinal satisfaction is experienced in a variety of ways, characteristically often as the accompaniment of the satisfaction of ego-tendencies. As a sensory experience it accompanies the relief of bodily needs, but it also accompanies other activities carried out by the child or experienced by him. It accompanies the expression of mastery impulses exercised by himself on external objects or exercised by them on him; it accompanies the tendency to display the self or to view others, and so on.

In childhood these libidinal impulses lack co-ordination and unified direction: it is only when maturity is reached that they become

synthetized and focussed in what is ordinarily meant by a sexual impulse, by which time the reproductive organs have become the main channels of libidinal experience and libidinal activity, though the kiss is an example of the persistence of an infantile erotogenic area. Moreover, in the adult situation we re-discover the earlier isolated libidinal components. The earlier libidinal pleasure in mastery re-appears in the man's initiative in love, the libidinal pleasure in submission in the yielding of the woman. Equally obvious are the pleasures in displaying and being touched and their active complements of viewing and touching. All these tendencies, however, are now welded together, in a situation of race-preservative import, and their gratification is usually, though not necessarily, accompanied by certain emotions which, although also derived from the sexual instincts and libidinal in character, are relatively independent of physical gratification, constituting what Freud has called *aim-restricted* love impulses. These are manifested as tenderness, devotion, respect, etc., and more will be said of them later.

But between the first appearance of libidinal impulses in childhood and their final fusion

in the love-life of the adult there intervenes a lengthy and complicated developmental history.

The libidinal impulses themselves pass through certain well-recognised stages of development and organization, which cannot be dealt with here.

At the termination of infancy they have become largely *repressed*, *i.e.* denied entrance to consciousness or access to the motor adjustments called behaviour, and to a varying extent their energy has found other channels which may in later life deflect energy originally derived from the sexual instincts into, for instance, forms of artistic expression. From the termination of infancy till the onset of sexual maturity the individual passes through what is called the "latency period" of his sexual life, a distinctively human phenomenon and one of profound significance for his emotional development. During this period his love-life, so far as consciousness is concerned, is made up almost exclusively (in most cases) of the above-mentioned aim-restricted impulses which find their freest expression in affectionate attachments to others of the same sex. During this period

also the individual's own personality has become a libidinal object, a phenomenon technically described as *Narcissism*, which explains his greater facility in loving others most like himself, *i.e.* of the same sex.

Before leaving the subject of the libidinal impulses and turning to the more difficult one of the development of the ego, it is necessary to draw attention to yet another important distinction between the two groups, namely the fact that the ego impulses, not being able to fall back on self-gratification, become much better adapted to reality. They must perforce submit to the schooling of necessity. They are much more educable. They can be trained to renunciation of what is called the Pleasure Principle and to acceptance of what is called the Reality Principle. In other words the individual learns in respect of them to forego immediate gratification and accommodate himself to postponement and painful effort.

Whereas in virtue alike of their fluidity and capacity for withdrawal into the self, the libidinal impulses can largely evade this stern schooling, notably by flight into the interior satisfactions of fantasy production.

The first crucial stage in ego development

is gradual and only accomplished with considerable difficulty: in fact one might say that none of us ever completely accomplish it. I refer to the capacity for distinguishing between the self and the outer world.

To begin with the infant is very much in the same position as the animal beloved of St. Anthony which was so stupid that it ate its own paws. All healthy infants can be observed doing their best in this direction. The distinction arises partly from experiences of pain, partly from experiences of obduracy and thwarting on the part of outside persons and things, and partly on the gradual appreciation of the essentially different steps necessary to remove internal and external sources of discomfort.

To begin with there is a tendency to regard *all* sources of discomfort as originating outside the self, whether these are due to internal instinct-pressures or to unpleasant external stimuli, and this tendency persists throughout life. The technical name for it is *Projection*. The psychological reasons for this tendency are too complicated to be dealt with here: the fact itself is of paramount importance in human development; for the greatest obstacle

impeding an objective view of the external world of persons and things is just this primitive mechanism of projection.

It is more apparent in the child who peoples the external world with the creations of his fantasy, than in the adult; it is more prominent in the sick than in the healthy adult, in the neurotic, whose fear of his own internal repressed impulses darkens the external world with false anxieties and phobias, above all in the insane who have replaced the real world in whole or in part by a fantastic world of delusion. It is more prominent in primitive man, whose world is haunted by demons and hobgoblins which are the projections of his own evil wishes, than in civilized man whose science has to a large extent replaced these superstitious projections by its conceptions of causality and law. But even civilized man is not so free as he imagines from the manifold deceptions of this curious mechanism. The unconscious sources of superstitious projection are not so securely buried as they seem to be. A sudden fright, a startling coincidence, a so-called "uncanny" experience will for a moment people the external world with the same evil entities that haunted primitive man.

There is no more potent stimulus to the mechanism of projection than a guilty conscience. Only those who have the integrity of the village blacksmith can "look the whole world in the face." "The wicked flee when no man pursueth." "Thus conscience does make cowards of us all." We project the internal discomfort called guilt into the outer world and attempt to escape it as we would escape an external discomfort or menace, *i.e.* by flight.

Or we may attempt to deal with internal sources of discomfort by projecting them into the outer world and *attacking* them there, a fact which explains some of the ferocities of our penal systems. The criminal has to expiate not only his own transgressions but the "sins of the people," the sins of repressed unconscious wishes projected on to this "scapegoat."

Many people who would not hurt a fly hear with significant satisfaction and relief of certain offences being punished "with the utmost rigour of the law." Enthusiastic advocates of the deterrent principle in penology are usually unacquainted with the mechanism of projection, and indeed it does not seem likely that

humanity as a whole will hail this discovery with excessive enthusiasm and gratitude.

But even in the child there are limits to this capacity for "projecting." It gradually acquires, through more accurate use of its senses, a more reliable picture of the outside world and a juster appreciation of its internal reactions. In this way is laid the foundation of what we call the *real ego*, what in later life is distinguishable as the conscious self, including under that term mental processes which although not actually conscious at any given moment are nevertheless capable of becoming conscious.

But this real ego is far from constituting the whole of human personality, which includes extensive buried tracts standing in different relationships to the real ego.

There is, speaking topographically, a large area of unmodified instinctual tendencies, out of which the real ego has been elaborated as the result originally of contacts with the outer world. There is a buried tract of instinctual tendencies and associated ideas and memory traces, which have undergone *Repression* and are therefore permanently denied access to consciousness, and there is another mental

system also largely unconscious which is of such paramount importance from the sociological standpoint that I propose to describe its origin and characteristics in some detail. This mental system is called the *ego-ideal* or over-ego. It is partly conscious and partly unconscious, and the conscious part of it is what we call "conscience." It might not inaptly be called the "social organ" of the mind, and many of its manifestations, conscious and unconscious, have been ascribed without further enquiry to the operation of a "Herd Instinct," a conception of wide and occasionally somewhat haphazard use in sociological writings.

In order to understand the origin of this mental system to which, rather than to any vaguely conceived Herd Instinct, psychoanalysts ascribe the most important of man's social reactions, it is necessary to consider certain aspects of the child's relationship to his parents.

Referring back for a moment to the libido-development of the child, we find that the parents are not only the protectors demanded by its ego instincts but also his first love-objects. This is true of both the parent of

the same sex and the parent of the opposite sex, but at a much earlier age than is commonly realized a preference is felt for the parent of the opposite sex, and the parent of the same sex is regarded as an obstacle in the way of the full enjoyment of this preference. This infantile drama of preference and jealousy is spoken of as the *Œdipus situation*. It is the prototype of all subsequent love-situations, the fortunes of which are largely determined by the form in which it persists in the unconscious as the *Œdipus complex*. Needless to say, the manner in which the individual weathers this early emotional crisis is decisive for character-formation in other respects than the one mentioned. Indeed the situation itself is so complex and its consequences so far-reaching that it could only be treated adequately in a long series of lectures.

For the present it will suffice to dwell for a moment on one aspect of it, namely the child's tendency to *identify* itself with each of the parents, normally more especially with the parent of the same sex. It takes this parent as a model and strives to be like him or her. Self-love obviously plays a large part in this striving for identification. Conscious of

weakness and inferiority by the side of his father, ascribing to his father the attributes of omnipotence, etc., which he has had to renounce in himself, the little son would like to incorporate into his being the characteristics of this magnificent and powerful person. When identification is achieved, he or rather a part of himself actually *is* his own father; for it is a characteristic of infantile thinking that identification is *being* a thing, not merely *being like* a thing.

Put in another way we might say that the personality of the father impressed on the plastic mind of the child has left there an enduring *imprint*, has permanently altered a part of the child's ego. Even in later years especially plastic and labile types of personality unconsciously take on the imprint of other personalities in much the same way, although to a considerably less extent. We notice the unconscious reproduction of mannerisms, opinions, even slight nuances of behaviour of the model. On the undeveloped and receptive ego of the child, such emotional contacts make an infinitely deeper and more lasting impression. Part of his ego is now permanently

changed, is a sort of *psychical replica* of the parent.

The result is a deep and enduring division in the mind. He is in a sense no longer one person, but two and between these two persons in himself conflict has begun. He has now two standards of behaviour, the standard of his wishes, the pleasure principle, and the standard of this other part of himself modelled on grown up points of view. The pleasure-loving child intent only on the immediate gratification of his primitive wishes, without shame or reproach, entirely pleased and satisfied with himself, begins to be troubled with questions of right and wrong, irrespective of the presence of an external supervisor. He is beginning to grow a *conscience*. The parent once an external monitor, has through *introjection* in the way described become an internal monitor. Once only external thwartings could affect his happiness; now a new inner restraint is placed on the fulfilment of his wishes. He is becoming a social animal.

The same sort of process can be observed in the case of adults of the type above-mentioned, who unconsciously model themselves on

stronger personalities. When this happens they experience strong discomfort in thoughts and conduct of which the influential personality would disapprove. Indeed, we must remember that the formation of the ego-ideal is only begun by the first parental identification; it is continued by subsequent identifications, e.g., with teachers, etc., and in persons of a recognizable type it is permanently plastic. The most important result is that self-love cannot now be gratified until the ego lives up to the requirements of the ego-ideal. In the language of ordinary conscious experience we would say that we cannot "respect" ourselves unless we obey the dictates of our consciences, but this gives an inadequate idea of the violent conflicts that can go on beneath the level of consciousness.

It is impossible to examine in detail all the factors that contribute to the strength of the "categorical imperatives" of this conscience-system. Freud believes that the images of the parents thus set up inside the ego of the child fit, as it were, into inherited dispositions already present in still deeper levels of its mind. He also believes that the libido withdrawn from the actual parents on account of

resistance arising against too close libidinal attachment to them goes to reinforce the sway of their images in the child's mind. This is supported by the fact that children who have had to struggle with too intense emotional attachments or fixations to the parents are apt to develop hypersensitive consciences (examples of which abound in literary studies of childhood). One result of this exchange of an external monitor who must be obeyed, and whose esteem must be retained, for an internal monitor, exacting sometimes even more stringently the same obedience if self-esteem is to be retained, is that henceforth there is no possibility of escaping this new monitor by the simple expedients of flight or concealment. The one resort left to the ego, torn between the demands of its instinctive cravings and this remorseless criticising system, is the psychological mechanism of *rationalization*. When this is successful the forbidden impulse is gratified under the guise of a permissible motive. Needless to say, this is one of the hardest worked mechanisms in the human mind!

In certain serious mental disorders we can

actually see the reversal of this developmental process—a return to its more primitive phase. Once upon a time the child was surrounded by *real* voices expressing observation and critical appraisement of its actions. Normally these are replaced by the still small voice of conscience, but in certain insanities in which the mental system called the ego-ideal has become in part dissociated from the personality the patient hears *imaginary* voices, noting and criticising his actions. A persistent voice says, "Now he's going to do it again. He's thinking it again, etc."

An important fact which psycho-analysis has discovered about this criticising and restraining part of the ego, is that its activities are carried out only to a limited extent at the level of consciousness. At this level it makes its influence felt in the solution of conscious ethical dilemmas, and the discomfort we feel in disobeying its dictates is experienced in the feeling we call guilt. Conscious guilt is intense in proportion to the discrepancy between the wishes of the real ego and the standards of the ego-ideal.

But to an unsuspected extent the operations of this conscience system are carried on beneath

the level of the conscious personality. Here its censoring activities reject certain ideas before they reach consciousness, distort the representation of unconscious fantasy in dreams and other products of the unconscious mind. And here, strangest of all, it brings about what we call *unconscious self-punishment*. It has other functions, but these will suffice to give some slight impression of its importance. One important distinction between the conscious and the unconscious parts of the ego ideal deserves special mention. Conscious conscience, what we might call modern conscience, observes, criticises and at times compels the real ego to do penance for breaches of adult civilized standards, and in this respect is infinitely more concerned over *actual* breaches of such standards than over these which have existed only in intention. The unconscious conscience, on the other hand, does not distinguish to the same extent between deed and intention. It began to operate at a stage of mental development when this distinction was not yet valid, when the child, like primitive man, believed in the magical efficacy of thought and wish. Certain neurotic sufferers are burdened by an in-

tolerable sense of guilt and tendencies to self-reproach, which they cannot adequately explain on conscious grounds, which they are constrained to explain in terms of the most trivial actual occurrences. They occupy themselves with the most unreal straw-splitting ethical dilemmas, and inflict on themselves many disabling restraints and limitasions of activity. When such cases are investigated psycho-analytically, it is found that they are restraining and punishing themselves for imaginary crimes existing only in the form of unconscious wishes.

Another interesting result of this guilt due to unconscious conflict is the commission of a *real* crime *in order to be punished*, which has the result for a time of alleviating mental distress. This opens an important chapter in the study of criminality.

Still more curious is the fact that the dictates of primitive conscience and modern conscience may not only fail to coincide, but may actually contradict each other. A concrete case will illustrate this and also serve as an example of the difference between conscious and unconscious conflict, a distinction often inadequately grasped, yet vital to any satis-

factory understanding of the psycho-analytical view of neurotic illness. We sometimes hear of a husband disappearing or even committing suicide the day after his marriage, and in many of such cases it transpires that the secret cause of such desperate measures was the man's realisation of his physical incapacity to consummate the marriage. This condition is well known to medical men and fortunately does not often lead to such tragical results. It is not due to any bodily trouble or defect. It is due to mental conflict, but this conflict is not a conscious one. Here conscious conscience approves and places no veto on the now lawful fulfilment of strong conscious wishes, but something has happened to render fulfilment impossible. Now the same man may have experienced not the slightest difficulty of this sort in relations with women of another class—of the prostitute class, for example, and after his matrimonial failure may resume such relations with complete success from the point of view of physical function, even although he views such relationships with conscious disapproval and reproaches himself for resorting to them. Here is a psychological puzzle. In one case conscious conscience says 'yes' and

unconscious conscience says 'no'; and since unconscious conscience is in much closer touch than consciousness with bodily processes, it can place a very effective veto on the forbidden activity. But why does it withdraw this veto in a situation consciously disapproved? An obvious answer is that the act of which the conscious mind approves may represent a crime to the unconscious mind, while the act of which the conscious mind disapproves may be relatively innocent from the standpoint of unconscious conscience. This is just what we find to be the case. The act from which the unconscious conscience recoils is the primitive crime of incest, guarded against in primitive societies by the most stringent taboos and drastic penalties. In the case described we find that the patient has married a woman of his own or of a superior social class and cultural traditions. Such women he can idealize, respect and love tenderly and devotedly, but he cannot achieve a normal conjugal life with one of them. Such women are unconsciously associated in an especially close and significant way with *another* woman who may be loved tenderly and devotedly, but who is out of the question as a sexual partner—

namely his mother. So like the man of primitive exogamic society he must (sexually) avoid the tabooed woman and seek the strange woman—in this case represented by the prostitute. He does not *know* of this reason for avoidance; indeed would indignantly repudiate it if it were pointed out to him, and so he may attempt marriage with the object of his ideal love.

This is merely an especially striking example of a tendency which is almost characteristic of the love-life of civilised men, and for which prolonged familial contact seems specially responsible, *i.e.*, a splitting of sexual attraction into two separate streams of tendencies, one characterized by tenderness, idealization, etc., which can exist and flourish in a high degree of intensity without requiring the discharge of its tensions in physical gratification, and another of what are commonly called sensual cravings which unlike the first constantly press forward in the direction of physical gratification. This distinction is embodied in the phrase "Sacred and Profane Love." Now the very fact that the first set of aim-restricted impulses can exist without physical gratification confers on them a stability and tendency

to permanence which is apt to be lacking in the case of the direct sensual impulses that find each time a discharge of their tensions in gratification.

We might imagine a roughly analogous situation by contrasting the attitude of a connoisseur towards a priceless bowl in his collection with his attitude to a bowl filled with eatables. Both feelings might be very intense, but one would temporarily vanish with gratification, while the other would serenely survive the vicissitudes of instinctual needs.

This separation or cleavage in the libido is a fact of profound social significance. The aim-restricted libido impulses constitute a powerful social cement. They bind together individuals of the same sex and of opposite sexes in a fashion which makes for social solidarity. Their manifestations do not awaken the same intense jealousies, stimulate the same exclusive possessiveness, or require the same segregations from the group for their satisfaction. They are extolled by group opinion and encouraged in every possible way. Every other form of libido-satisfaction, on the other hand, is felt to be dangerous and asocial.

Even socially legitimized gratification of direct sexual impulses is regarded as at least potentially asocial. There are many occupations in which every possible difficulty is placed in the way of marriage. It is as if every husband might be suspected of a tendency to make the biblical excuse "I have married a wife and therefore cannot come."

On the negative side, this cleavage when too pronounced results in a quite unnecessary degradation of normal impulses. Its results can be traced not only in the sufferings of neurotics but also in innumerable unhappy marriages and above all in the social phenomenon of prostitution. So long as man, as it were, segregates too completely his direct sexual needs from his aim-restricted impulses, so long will the tendency exist to find *two sorts* of relationships with women, a more or less idealized one, and one in which the degradation of the love-life is not only inevitable but actually a condition of its success.

I have chosen to dwell on this characteristic, partly to illustrate the sort of data that psychoanalysis can contribute to the understanding of social problems, in the absence of which many sociological enquiries are apt to be

superficial or even lead to quite erroneous conclusions. Did time permit I could adduce a lengthy list of equally important findings.

In speaking of individuals the word "normal" is sure to crop up sooner or later. Strictly speaking it has, applied to individuals, a purely statistical significance, but as used by most people in this connection it is intended to convey much the same meaning as the words 'healthy,' 'stable,' etc. Psycho-analysis has emphasized the arbitrary nature of the term normal by showing that the difference between normal and abnormal persons is, so to speak, often a quantitative rather than a qualitative one. Many characteristics labelled abnormal seem to be merely exaggerations of normal ones.

But, using the word in its accepted sense, the psycho-analyst might be asked to say something of the conditions that favour normal development. The first condition is without doubt inherited, although environmental influences can profoundly affect it. It is what, using a physical analogy, one might call the fluidity of the libido—its capacity for detaching itself from objects or aims appropriate to one stage of development

and attaching itself to those appropriate to the next. In this respect ego-development is less likely to go wrong than libido development, because ego-tendencies must adapt themselves more or less to the requirements of reality. When ego-development does go wrong this is more often due to decisive inherited defect than is the case when libido-development is unsatisfactory. The co-existence of fairly satisfactory ego-development with faulty libido-development is by far the most frequent state of affairs in all save the most serious psychological disasters (e.g. the Insanities).

Man's libido-development consists in the satisfactory surmounting of a series of occasions, some more important than others, when the libido must relinquish certain objects and aims in favour of others more appropriate to his stage of growth.

The occasion of weaning, for instance, may be chosen as an early, prominent and fairly typical example, and may be used to illustrate the difference between mainly innate and mainly environmental causes of subsequent mal-adjustment. Certain children inheriting what might be called metaphorically a

viscosity or adhesive quality of libido will take weaning badly, no matter how carefully it is carried out. But other children, potentially normal as regards libido inheritance, under certain conditions show the same disturbance when compelled to relinquish the first object of their libido attachment. In these cases the causes of the disturbance are environmental. The child has been weaned too soon and too abruptly or it has been suckled for too prolonged a period.

In all these cases the libido, as we say tends to remain *fixated* to its early objects. It is as if the mind cannot relinquish its pleasurable preoccupation with them, is constantly harking back to them; striving to reconstruct the pleasurable situation, either in fantasy or by reproducing situations in the real world which are as nearly as possible their equivalents, and owing to the Repression of these infantile libidinal interests, this fixation, the striving remains unconscious.

A large number of persons who are assuredly normal in the ordinary sense habitually put objects in their mouths in order to obtain pleasure, quite apart from nutritive needs. It may be that they are assiduous smokers or

eaters of sweets, but the case is more striking when the objects introduced are of an indifferent nature and the sucking or chewing of them is called 'a sort of habit.' Such persons would probably indignantly deny the interpretation that they are unconsciously seeking the satisfaction once obtained as sucklings, but it is nevertheless true that all these objects are 'baby's comforters.' The 'comfort' produced by such satisfactions is often partly conscious, but its real nature never is.

Another crucial point in individual development is the child's reaction to thwarting and disappointment, particularly when this is recognized to be brought about by the wills of others, for it is here that hate at first directed vaguely against all sources of discomfort, internal or external, becomes attached to persons as such and profoundly influences his attitude to their subsequent representatives.

Since this hate is first directed to persons usually devotedly loved on other grounds, it tends to be repressed, and if it is especially resistent to repression the opposite emotions of love, etc., are commonly exaggerated in consciousness, as what we call a *reaction-*

formation on the part of the conscious ego—a special form of defence against a painful idea by emphasizing its opposite.

This state of affairs is called *ambivalence*, which implies the co-existence of two opposite emotional attitudes, notably love and hate, towards the same person at the same time, only one attitude of which usually is conscious.

When the repressed emotional attitude is especially strong and its repression maintained with difficulty, certain untoward results may follow. To take an example; should a parent towards whom the child has experienced hatred and rage (and repressed its accummulating hostility) happen to die, then the child's life may be clouded by feelings of guilt and unhappiness. It may develop curious little scruples, it may even develop a serious neurosis. The explanation of these manifestations is that it feels itself responsible for the death. All children have experienced such hostile wishes for the death (i.e. permanent absence in the child's interpretation of death) of both parents. As Dr. Ernest Jones once wittily said, "Murder, like charity, begins at home."

The problems of ambivalence are of course especially significant in connection with the already mentioned Œdipus situation. In what way does the healthy child emerge successfully from this situation, and so avoid the crippling effects of a strong Œdipus complex? The little boy's attitude to his father is three-fold. He loves him on his own account, hates him as an obstacle betwixt himself and the exclusive pleasurable possession of the mother, and thirdly he tends to identify himself with him.

Here are dynamic tendencies the resultant of which is fateful for the child's after-life.

The 'normal' adjustment is as follows. He makes what might be called a 'positive' rather than a hostile identification with his father, i.e. his wish to 'be' his father is on the whole determined more by love and admiration of him than by the wish to oust him and take his place, although this wish is inevitably also present. In consequence of this he modifies his attitude to his mother. He does not relinquish her as a love-object but successfully surmounts certain infantile fantasies of gratification where she is concerned, retaining in consciousness those tender aim-

restricted emotions to which I have referred.

On the basis of this satisfactory father-identification and harmonious non-fixated mother love, the potentially bisexual libido organization of the child will proceed along fundamentally masculine lines. When he grows up he will be active and energetic, independent yet able to co-operate with other men, and able to restrain impulses strongly disapproved of by his fellows. And when he comes to marry, his greater freedom from unconscious fixation to the image of his mother will permit a fuller synthesis of his aim-restricted tender emotions with his direct sexual impulses.

But the Œdipus situation bristles with difficulties for the sensitive child or for the child with unwise parents. To select one example. Through inability either to gratify or surmount his early libidinal attachment to the mother, he may turn from her (unconsciously, of course) in despair and anger and focus his unsatisfied libido on his father, towards whom he takes up a feminine attitude. This turn of events involves the weakening of his identification with the father (whose place with regard to the mother he no

longer seeks to fill), and the strengthening of his identification with the mother whom he now wishes to supplant in his father's affection. I need not dwell on the many untoward consequences of this reversal of the normal Œdipus situation, which is the basis of so many aspects of neurotic disorder, of conscious and unconscious homosexual tendencies and of many disabling character traits.

It is obvious that failure to overcome the Œdipus difficulties may have quite opposite effects. The boy's hatred of and rebellion against the father may render him subsequently incapable of social co-operation with men who in any respect unconsciously remind him of father, or it may render him timid and unenterprising in all relations with men and women alike.

The child's relationships with other children is also fraught with developmental dangers. The arrival of other children is a profoundly stimulating event, and the child's reactions to the new-comer normally run the following course. The event is regarded as a menace to its own value and enjoyments in the home. The child regards this disturbing occurrence

much as a trusted senior employee would regard the sudden promotion of the office-boy over his head. But he quickly learns that overt hostility to his rival imperils his own position, and there are at hand compensatory mechanisms, e.g. he may adopt a parental rôle towards the child.

The mechanism of greatest interest here is that of identification, which replaces the now repressed hostility. In large families one can often observe the breaking through of this hostility in violent bickerings, only to be succeeded by apparently entirely amicable "esprit de corps" (identification, social solidarity). The restoration of this harmonious solidarity is greatly aided by occasions of hostility against others—a fact which, in respect of wider groups, has an obvious connection with the occurrence of wars.

Perhaps the most interesting way in which the repressed hostility usually manifests itself is the child's demand for justice or equal treatment for all, a prominent characteristic both in families and in the larger life of schools. As Freud puts it: if one cannot be the favourite oneself, at all events nobody else shall be the favourite. From this point of view (he says)

"social justice means that we deny ourselves many things so that others may have to do without them as well, or what is the same thing may not be able to ask for them."

I have already mentioned the most important positive emotional bond that unites individuals, namely the aim-restricted libidinal tendencies which exist both between persons of the same sex and between those of the opposite sex. In addition to these and to the process of identification just mentioned there is yet another factor making for social solidarity, namely the common investment by members of the group of some person or even some abstract idea with the attributes of their ego-ideals, and the most suitable person for this purpose is someone with the prestige and authoritative attributes of the parent-figure on which the ego-ideal originally was modelled.

Nothing rallies large numbers of people so effectively as a leader with father attributes conducting a campaign against some recognised evil or other. The recruit identifies the leader with his ego-ideal when the leader speaks, there speaks the voice of conscience, and all the better if the evil corresponds to the recruit's repressed tendencies. The efficiency

of a leader upon whom the ego ideals of the people are "projected" is shown in many other ways—in politics for example.

To return to the normal individual. One might say of him briefly that he is one who can fit into certain broad requirements of social life and find satisfaction for his surplus libido energy along lines which do not bring him into disturbing conflict with his own ego-ideal either in its private form of conscience or its projected form of the disapproval of persons identified with his ego-ideal. When this adjustment is not achieved failure is apt to be followed by the appearance of manifestations which are called abnormal—a neurosis for example.

The neurotic, hampered by his fixations at infantile levels of libido-development, finds difficulty in obtaining libido satisfactions through social contacts and activities which absorb a large amount of the libidinal energy of the healthy person. He withdraws a large amount of his libido into the world of fantasy and becomes "introverted."

This alone does not constitute him a neurotic. Introversion of libido and fantasy production may have other results. The introverted per-

son may give his fantasies some form of literary or artistic expression which is not only a valuable substitute outlet in itself but one that is highly appreciated by other persons and so maintains social contacts. Or he may find substitutive satisfaction of this withdrawn libido in certain solitary pursuits if these are sufficiently satisfactory sublimations to absorb it.

In the case of the neurotic this introversion of libido proceeds further. The libido, as we say, regresses to the points of infantile fixation, as if it would fall back for comfort on libidinal pleasures long ago abandoned and the very knowledge of them repressed. This extra charge of libido now travelling back strengthens these old tendencies till repression begins to break down. Then neurotic symptoms appear—these being the disguised expression both of the repressed tendencies and of the punishing and restraining tendencies of the ego-ideal.

Persons who fail to fit satisfactorily into broad social requirements may be roughly divided into two classes, namely these whose ego-ideals are too exacting for the capacities of their real egos and those whose ego-ideals

are under-developed. The most prominent example of the first class is the neurotic, of the second the criminal.

I wish to avoid giving you the impression that these matters can be glibly dealt with in terms of hard and fast types. I select prominent examples for the sake of clearness. The important point here is the distance between the ego and the ego ideal, which may be too great or too small. At one end of the scale we have the neurotic who inflicts severe suffering on himself as a self-punishment for unconscious wishes never carried out; at the other end the sort of criminal (there are many sorts) whose conduct is controlled almost entirely by outside rather than inside restraining influences. Between these two extremes there is room for countless gradations.

An interesting sociological aspect of this tension betwixt ego and ego ideal is the tendency to periodical relaxation of social rules. Primitive man had his orgies, when the most stringent taboos were openly violated with the approval of tribal authority. The ancients had their saturnalia characterized by the wildest licence. In our times, Bank Holidays and other occasions of "bean-feasts" are

not without traces of tendencies to disregard the ordinary rules of decorum, and in smaller groups occasions called "sprees" are still not unknown. The significance of all these occasions of relaxation is the same; for once in a way the individual helped by the moral, or shall we say the immoral, support of others lowers the standards of his ego-ideal till it coincides more nearly with his real ego, a feat he cannot achieve by himself. Social co-operation is essential to bring about this more complaisant attitude of the ego-ideal. A public carouse may have unpleasant consequences, but it is not attended by the same guilt as a private tipple. A body of undergraduates may parade the streets in ridiculous costumes but a solitary member of the party would shrink from the same behaviour in the same place next day.

We are here reminded that, just as man must periodically give up the task of attending to the stimuli of the outer world and retire into sleep, so it seems that he must at times seek relief from the exactions of his ego-ideal. To some extent he can do this vicariously. He can enjoy on the film or the stage or in books, etc., representations of behaviour of an

exciting sort by persons who have escaped from the thraldom of this inner monitor. The enormous vogue of certain film comedians is explained by this fact. But even in our private domestic lives there are occasions when grown-ups cast aside their adult dignity and indulge, say, in childish games. Then solemn dignified people may become unexpectedly hilarious. For a brief moment they have re-captured the careless happiness of the child before his developing ego-ideal firmly and permanently harnessed the social yoke on his shoulders.

To conclude this very fragmentary account of the individual, I should like to anticipate a question which sociologists of a practical turn of mind are sure to ask; namely in what way can this new psycho-analytical knowledge, only really hinted at in this lecture, be utilized in order to favour the production of more satisfactory individuals, or, since there might well be violent controversy about what constitutes a satisfactory individual, at any rate of less unsatisfactory ones, less inefficient ones, less unhappy ones?

The answer is bound to be disappointing. We are still very far from the stage, if we

ever reach it, of being able to propound *simple rules* for the education of individuals who will in the widest sense make good citizens. At the present stage of our enquiries we are much more conversant with those factors that *do harm* than those that do good in this direction and even in this respect our knowledge is still far from complete.

Just as, contrary to a widespread belief, the adult cannot by consciously trying "sublimate" instinctual energy, so we do not know how to direct this process in the child. The best we can do is to avoid influences and situations which will certainly obstruct this process, and in the case of the adult to make his unconscious conflicts conscious and give him a belated second chance of better adaptation.

But psycho-analysis, even if you decide to ignore the rich harvest of data it has already garnered, can hardly fail to convince you of one fact of the happiest augury for future human development, namely that it has discovered a new and unexpected field for research and effort.

Social reformers are roughly divisible into two camps, those who believe in environmental

changes (including, of course, educational measures) as the main lever in human advancement, and those who pin their faith to some form of selective breeding or positive eugenics; each can adduce the weightiest arguments wherewith to confound the others.

The entry of the psycho-analyst into the controversy is potentially opportune, although not in practice actually regarded as such. He can show that many tendencies in the individual hitherto regarded as strictly determined by inheritance, are in reality very largely the result of very early environmental influences. This is surely a hopeful discovery, for so long as undesirable characteristics are believed to be inherited, one is bound to regard them fatalistically, or else indulge in fantasies of biological pruning and selection which are exceedingly unlikely to be entrusted to eugenic experts.

Not that the psycho-analyst does not thoroughly appreciate the importance of inherited tendencies; but he has enormously extended the range of what is understood by social inheritance by showing that it commences to operate at birth and achieves its most striking and enduring results during

early childhood. The important difference between organic inheritance and social inheritance is that in the present state of science the first cannot be directed before it has happened, or remedied after it has happened, whereas the second has been shown by psycho-analysis to abound in possibilities of modification which we are only beginning to understand.

At least we know that these eventful first years of human existence recapitulating as they do so much of the history of the race, blotted out as they are from the memory of the adult, are full of eventful happenings, of educational opportunities that never recur. Even if psycho-analysis can do nothing more at present than convince society that to a surprising extent its good citizens are made or marred in the nursery, this fact in itself would be an invaluable contribution to the science of sociology.

CHAPTER III

THE FAMILY

By

J. C. FLÜGEL

WITH the subject of to-day's lecture, we definitely enter the domain of sociology. At the last meeting Dr. Glover dealt, so far as this was possible, with man as an individual in abstraction from his social environment. To-day we are concerned with the earliest and most primitive forms of man's behaviour as a "political animal." For the family owes its chief sociological importance to the fact that, in the vast majority of cases, it constitutes the first social group of which the child becomes aware of being a part—the group in which he first develops his relations to other human beings. It is in the interplay between the individual child and the other members of

his family that there come into operation the first checks upon purely egoistic behaviour and desire, that there occur the first stirrings of such feelings as love and lust, tenderness, admiration and esteem, with reference to other persons recognized as such. It is here also that there are aroused the first outer conflicts between the will of the individual himself and the will of others, as also the first inner conflicts between egoism and altruism and between love and hate.

There is no need for surprise therefore that the influence of the family environment, so potent in the impressionable early years, should leave a deep trace on individual personality and destiny, and therefore also upon social history and social institutions; for these latter depend ultimately upon the social tendencies of the individuals comprising society, the very tendencies which are first developed within the bosom of the family. Viewed in this light, it is not astonishing that psychoanalysts, when they began to tap the unconscious and archaic levels of mental activity, should discover in many aspects of conduct traces of this influence of the early family environment, and should find that many of the

social activities of later life owed their form and their intensity to the permanent influence of the early reactions of the individual to his parents, his brothers, or his sisters.

In the history of the individual there is one relationship that stands out from all others both as regards priority and intimacy—the relation of the child to its mother. Both biologically and sociologically the relation between child and mother is the most fundamental and primitive of all social relationships. Above all, the child's love for its mother is the most primitive of all bonds of affection which unite the individual to his fellow beings. Setting aside altogether such debatable influences as the possible persistence of certain psychical effects of pre-natal life, (psycho-analysis has brought to light certain tendencies which are difficult to interpret otherwise than as cases of such persistence) it is clear that the reasons for this are not far to seek. Love in its ultimate and most primitive form is the attitude of the individual towards those parts of his environment which he finds pleasant, *i.e.* which satisfy his desires. Now it is the mother who, above all other individuals, is associated with the satisfaction

of the child's desires during the first months and year of life. The very earliest interests of the child, as psycho-analysis has shown, and as careful observation of new born infants will easily confirm, are centred round one particular part of the body, viz., the mouth. It is the mother's breast that provides the chief gratification of these interests; or else the feeding bottle, which is provided and prepared by the mother. It is the mother also who provides the other satisfactions of the child, who keeps it warm, lulls it to sleep and removes causes of discomfort in response to the child's cries of pain or anger. As the child grows up and develops wider interests, these too are for a time largely connected with the mother. Above all, it is in the mother, as a rule, that the child observes in largest measure that kind of behaviour—kissing, cuddling, stroking, etc. —which it gradually comes to recognise as manifestations of affection, and to which it responds—perhaps to some extent in virtue of a performed instinctive mechanism—by manifestations of affection of its own.

But if the mother is the first person to whom the dawning love impulses of the child are directed, it is she also who is destined to

arouse the first stirrings of hate. The same circumstances connected with the intimate relation between mother and child which, as we have seen, account for the primitive love of the child towards its mother, are also responsible in many cases for the awakening of some degree of resentment and hostility. In the course of the mother's ministrations for the welfare of the child, it inevitably occurs that she not only produces pleasure by the alleviation of wants but also causes displeasure by failure to satisfy the child's needs in sufficient measure, or with sufficient promptitude, by involuntary painful stimulation of one kind or another, or by interference with the child's desires. These causes of resentment are powerfully reinforced by the fact that it is usually the mother who undertakes the first steps in the education of the child, who first teaches it that certain forms of behaviour are pleasing to herself and to other adults, and that other forms meet with disapproval.

Psycho-analysis has shown that one aspect of such education that is of special importance in this connection, is the teaching of habits of cleanliness. The young child often resents

interference with the primitive desires associated with the processes of excretion, and struggles to maintain the privilege of disposing of its excreta at such times and places as it may itself desire, rather than at those determined for it by its mother. It is this situation which, more perhaps than all others, first brings into being the clash of wills between the individual and his social environment. At a rather later stage, the centre of interest as regards this antagonism may sometimes revert to the other end of the alimentary canal, and the conflict between mother and child may be continued with reference to feeding; for it is the mother who restricts the child's activities by dictating what the child shall eat, how much it shall eat, when it shall eat, and the manner in which it shall eat.

Owing to this combination of circumstances the attitude of the child towards its mother is, from the start, a complex one; it is, in the language of psycho-analysis, "ambivalent," in that it contains both love and hate elements. In this respect the relationship between child and mother is similar to that of most other fundamental social relationships. One of the great lessons of psycho-analysis is that our

attitude towards nearly all persons to whom we are bound by intimate ties of one kind or another, is a complicated blend of love and hate—a blend in which either love or hate may predominate (especially at the conscious level) but in which the complementary aspect is always present in some degree or other.

In wealthier families, some of the functions of the mother are taken over by the nurse, and as a consequence, certain aspects of the child's attitude, as we have described it above, are directed to the nurse instead of to the mother proper. It is therefore not surprising that in certain individuals the influence of the nurse can be traced throughout life, playing a similar part to that which is elsewhere played by the influence of the mother. That the influence of the nurse (in the cases where it exists) is not a larger one is probably due to a number of causes. In the first place a child will often have experience of several nurses, while he has but one mother (except in the case of step-mothers or foster-mothers, both of whom give rise to important psychological complications). In the second place, it is possible that certain pre-natal influences such as we referred to above may not be without effect in binding

the child by a closer tie to its real mother. But most important of all, probably, is a certain tendency which the child has to exaggerate the power and importance of its parents, as a result of which the real mother, who in most cases possess greater power and higher social standing, plays a greater part in the phantasies of later life than the humbler, though possibly at first more influential, nurse.

This tendency to exalt the parent is so important that a word or two may be devoted to it on its own account. To the young child the parents must inevitably appear to a very large extent to be all-powerful, all-wise and (since primitive morality consists in obeying their commands) all good; they are the centre and the supreme controllers of the child's environment. They thus become the objects both of envy and of admiration. The child to some extent too identifies himself with his parents; they serve as models to the excellence of which he may perhaps hope one day to attain. But with the increasing experience that comes of a widening environment, the parents gradually come to lose that glamour which they possessed in earlier years. The child discovers the existence of other persons, richer,

wiser, more powerful, more clever and of higher social standing than his parents. This discovery is usually a source of disappointment; in the first place, because it thwarts the sentiments of love and esteem which have been formed with reference to the parents; in the second place, because (in view of the process through which the child has identified himself with his parents) it causes a blow to the child's own self-esteem. As the real inferiority of the parents cannot be denied, the thwarted tendencies which aim at the glorification of the parents often give rise to the phantasy that the supposed parents are in reality only foster-parents, and that the real parents who exist elsewhere are endowed with just those attributes (particularly that of social station), the lack of which is now so painfully felt in the individuals who have hitherto been regarded as the parents. In a recent study by the Questionnaire Method it was found that no less than 28% (and 50% of those reporting between the ages of 8 and 12) of the persons investigated remembered having held this "foster child phantasy" at one period or another of their lives. The influence of the phantasy is also to be traced in a widely

prevalent form of folk-tale, in which the young hero is exposed or otherwise lost by his real parents, who are of noble rank, and is found and brought up by foster parents of humbler station, sometimes even by animals ("Tarzan of the Apes" is one of the most recent striking examples of the treatment of this immemorial theme).

The father as a rule begins to play an important rôle in the individual's life at a rather later age than does the mother. As mental development proceeds and the environment in which interest is taken gradually extends, the child begins to appreciate the influences of the father and the part he takes as head of the small social world constituted by the family. To the boy, this discovery of the father's influence is by no means in all respects a pleasant one. Psycho-analysis has shown that this is very largely due to the fact that the father appears to disturb and complicate the affectionate relations between mother and son. The father also, it is discovered, has claims upon the time, love, and interest of the mother—claims which to some extent conflict with those of the son. The father thus comes to be looked upon as in some sense a rival for

the affections of the mother. If, as is usually the case, the father is away from the home for certain parts of the day, or, as happens not infrequently, is occasionally absent altogether for certain longer periods, the son at these times enjoys a more exclusive possession of the mother than is possible when the father is at home. The father, on his return, is then resented as an intruder or interloper, and there inevitably arises the wish that the absence of the father might be permanent. But, as Freud has shown, to the young child permanent absence is much the same as death; the terrifying aspect of death is one that only comes into existence at a later stage of life. The son therefore easily comes to desire the death of the father in order that his own love for the mother may meet with no impediment. From this attitude of the boy towards his parents there arises the "Oedipus complex," which plays such a large part in psycho-analytic theory. Œdipus, who kills his father and marries his mother, is fulfilling just those most primitive of all social tendencies, which the normal conditions of family life inevitably and universally impose upon the mind of the young boy. The sociol-

ogical work of psycho-analytical writers has shown that a great number of social phenomena can only be understood when viewed in the light of the Oedipus complex, which in the course of the innumerable developments and modifications that it undergoes during mental development, produces far reaching manifestations in almost every sphere of human activity—particularly perhaps in those aspects of social life which will be dealt with in the subsequent lectures of this course.

But though hate, rather than love, characterises the most primitive reactions of the boy towards his father (and often indeed remains the predominant feature of the filio-paternal relationship throughout life), the situation usually becomes complicated before long by the arousal of counteracting tendencies to affection, esteem and admiration. In most cases marks of affection are bestowed upon the children not only by the mother but also by the father, and these tend in both cases to elicit a corresponding response from the children. The arousal of father-love on the part of the son is, moreover, powerfully assisted by at least two further factors of importance. In the first place the son tends

to identify himself with his father. The father with his immensely superior knowledge, wisdom and power, comes to represent an ideal on which the son to some extent models his own conduct and ambitions. This admiration of the father and the taking of him as a model facilitate the transference to him of certain ("narcissistic") elements of self-love; the father is loved inasmuch as he represents a sort of superior self, a self as it one day hopes to be. From this source alone there may arise a strong bond of sympathy linking the son to the father.

In the second place the son may possess certain tendencies, in virtue of which he may willingly submit to, or even welcome, the domination of the father as the head of the family community; even though this domination may involve some degree of interference with, or frustration of, the son's wishes in so far as they relate to the mother. These ("masochistic") tendencies, which are gratified by submission to the authority of the father, may however, if of high intensity, lead to the adoption of a passive and more typically feminine attitude in later life—an attitude which is associated with certain homosexual

components and which may rob the boy's personality of energy and initiative. There is a good deal of evidence to show that the development of a strong, independent and self-reliant personality is to a considerable extent connected with the arousal of a spirit of rebellion against the dominion of the father. Some degree of this spirit of rebellion is probably essential to the healthy development of character; where deficient, a lack of an adequate measure of self-assertiveness is to be feared. Though it is equally true that where it is excessive, it may give rise to a permanent intolerance of authority in any form; an attitude which may lead to grave consequences, both to the individual himself and to society.

It is obvious that the degree in which this spirit of revolt is present depends not only on the mental constitution of the son himself, but also on the circumstances of family life and, more particularly on the character of the father. A father with a very strong personality will tend either to exercise an excessive domination over the son, and thus to arouse the latter's passive "masochistic" tendencies, or else to awaken his rebelliousness to an undue extent. In

either case (and especially in the former) there may result an interference with the harmonious development of character, with the consequence that the son comes to possess a less forceful or efficient personality than the father. When the father himself, however, possesses relatively little force of self-assertion and initiative, the son is necessarily thrown more upon his own resources. In this way there may result something in the nature of an alternation of certain important character traits in successive generations, an alternation which would probably be more marked if it were not, so to speak, damped by the more constant influence of purely hereditary factors (in virtue of which the son tends, we may suppose, to be like rather than to be unlike his father as regards these traits, just as in the case of other bodily or mental characteristics).

The attitude of the girl towards the father tends to be, almost from the start, in certain very significant respects different from that of the boy. It is probably about the time that the father becomes of importance that the first characteristic differences in the mental development of the sexes begins to

appear, in that the girl becomes, as a rule, more easily reconciled to the presence of the father, and more quickly and easily develops an affection towards him. This affection soon becomes of sufficient intensity to compete with that felt for the mother; a competition in which the father-love is in most cases ultimately triumphant. In this respect, the early development of the girl is more complicated than that of the boy, inasmuch as the girl exchanges her initial (homosexual) love object—the mother, for a (heterosexual) one—the father, while the boy undergoes no corresponding change, but retains the mother throughout the early stages as the principal object of his love. The principal reasons which lead the girl to transfer the major part of her affections from mother to father are probably two in number. There is perhaps, in the first place, a relatively stronger development of the above mentioned passive "masochistic" trends in the girl; this aspect of her character making it easier for her to become reconciled to the authority of the father as the head of the family than it is for the boy. In the second place there can be little doubt that a heterosexual direction

of the affections is fostered by the attitude of the parents themselves. In virtue of their own heterosexual dispositions, both father and mother are apt to be more indulgent and more lavish in affection towards a child of the opposite sex. The father tends, in certain subtle ways, to favour the girl, while the mother shows a similar preference for the boy. Both boy and girl will usually respond to this—often quite unwitting—favouritism. As a consequence, the boy's original affection for his mother tends to undergo a reinforcement, while in the girl the same circumstances will lead to a displacement of the chief affection from the mother to the father. In this way the manifestations of the "Oedipus complex" in the girl will be the opposite of those in the boy; the girl will come to love her father and to regard her mother as an intruder and a rival.

Hitherto we have spoken only of the relations of children to their parents. Although these are the most important and fundamental of all the relationships of early life, (and to some extent of the whole period of human life), it is obvious that in all

families where there is more than one child the relations between the children must also be of great significance, both for the development of the individual character and for that of social life and institutions.

There can be little doubt that the original attitude of brother and sister to each other is nearly always one of hostility. This hostility springs from the fact that between children of the same family there almost inevitably exists some degree of competition; a competition that manifests itself in two main directions: first as a rivalry for the love of the parents, secondly as a struggle for the use of material possessions. As regards the former it is clear that the interest and affection of the parents are not indefinitely expansible, but have necessarily to be distributed among their children; each fresh addition to the family reduces the share of parental attention available for the older children, hence the new arrival is apt in the first place to be regarded with anything but approval. So strong indeed may be the feelings aroused in this connection that they may sometimes lead to attempts to do away with the newcomer. As regards the second

form of competition, it is equally clear that in the majority of families, where the material resources available are strictly limited, there will inevitably arise some degree of conflict as to the manner in which these resources are to be shared. Here, as in later life: "the more the merrier, but the fewer the better fare." Toys, treasured odds and ends and tit-bits of food are among the earliest and most primitive objects of such conflict, while at a later stage, the rivalry may be extended from the sphere of strictly material possessions to include that of opportunities for enjoyment, excursions, holidays, parties, etc. This youthful competition may indeed be continued into later life with reference to the use and distribution of money and to the enjoyment of educational or vocational opportunities.

These rivalries between children of the same family—at any rate those that take their origin in early years—are apt to manifest themselves most strongly where there is a difference of a few years between the children concerned. Relatively small or relatively large age differences tend to reduce hostility from this source. In the first case because the elder children have but little time to get

used to the enjoyment of their parents' love and possessions without the competition of the younger: these latter seem always to have been members of the family circle, hence they are not regarded as interlopers, but as essential and inevitable features of the home, towards whom there is no alternative but reconciliation. In the second case, because at a later age feelings of tenderness towards the small and helpless newcomer on the one hand, and a sense of indubitable superiority on the other, are from the first liable to counteract the rivalry that would otherwise occur.

In any case however, whatever the age difference between the children, the primitive hostility tends, as development proceeds, to be held in check or covered over by an attitude of love or at least of toleration, and there is reason to believe that the process by which this is accomplished is of considerable importance from the point of view of sociology. If, as seems fairly clear, the filio-parental relationship is the basis and prototype of all autocracy, the relations between a group of brothers and sisters constitute the most primitive form of democracy, as the word "fraternity" reminds us. It is in the nursery that the first educa-

tion for democracy takes place. Finding themselves all more or less in the same situation, particularly with reference to their dependence on the love and interest of the parents, the children begin to identify themselves with one another. In this process of identification the primitively selfish interests become to some extent diffused over the whole group, and the original rivalries tend to give place to a certain feeling of solidarity, not unlike that which unites different individuals or sections of an adult community, in spite of certain antagonistic interests of the individuals or sections concerned.

In many instances, particularly in the case of children of the opposite sex, the superseding of primitive hate and rivalry by more amiable sentiments is facilitated by the displacement on to the younger brother or sister of a portion of the love originally directed to the father or the mother. The process of displacement, in virtue of which desires and emotions undergo transformation as regards either the activities through which they manifest themselves or the goals to which they are directed (or both of these), is one which psycho-analysis has shown to be of the very greatest importance

for mental development in general. It is the displacement of the emotional attitudes originally adopted towards members of the family (and in particular the parents) on to other persons, groups or objects, that more perhaps than all else, makes the family life a subject of such great importance to the sociologist. Displacement is a process which occurs by means of relatively small steps at a time, and which in every case requires the assistance of some mental association between the earlier and the later manifestations or goal of the desires concerned. It is, futhermore, a process which seems to take place only under the influence of some inhibition affecting the gratification of the desire in its primitive form.

With regard to the displacement of love from mother to sister or from father to brother, the inhibitions concerned arise principally from the fear of incurring the wrath or displeasure of the other parent; there is no such competition for the love of a brother or sister as there is for that of the father or mother, and there is no one who has, as it were, special or exclusive claims upon the affections of the younger members of the family, as in the case

of the father or the mother, who are bound to one another by the special tie of marriage.

Whether directed to parents or to brothers or sisters, the incestuous affections for members of the family circle eventually undergo further extensive displacements, as the result of which they are directed to persons outside the family. The precise nature of all the factors that bring about this readjustment is not as yet completely understood. The facile biological explanation which would attribute the avoidance of incest to the ill effects of inbreeding is, in its usual form at any rate, too simple to account adequately for the facts. The psychological data obtained by psychoanalysis seem to indicate that there exist, both in the individual and the race, two fundamental tendencies of opposite nature, the one impelling towards incest, the other away from incest; that the former tendency is ontogenetically and phylogenetically earlier and more primitive than the latter and that the process of normal development in human beings implies a gradually increasing predominence of the latter tendency and a gradually increasing inhibition of the former. At any rate it is clear that a

failure to achieve a sufficient degree of displacement of the incestuous tendencies is one of the most potent causes of neurosis and of other forms of inefficiency as regards the affective and conative aspects of mental life. Insufficient displacement of this kind may lead to lack of independence and initiative, such as we have already discussed in a slightly different connection, to severe troubles of the sexual life, such as may utterly debar the individual from a successful marriage, or, (in extreme cases) to an almost complete inability to leave the parental home or to live happily in any other environment.

But instances of this kind in which there is a pathological "fixation" at the stage of incestuous affection only exhibit in an exaggerated form a tendency which seems to be present to a greater or less extent in every individual. In every case psycho-analysis, if sufficiently prolonged, reveals an incestuous residue as the fundamental basis of the love life; displacement is never so complete but that it leaves behind it some trace of the conditions under which, and the objects in relation to which, the love life of the in-

dividual first began. The influence of these incestuous fixations may often be traced in literature. Several psycho-analytic writers have made careful studies of the important rôle which the incest-theme (usually of course in a more or less disguised form) plays in the works of many of the prominent poets, dramatists and novelists of all countries. It may be sufficient to remind the reader here of the classical case of brother-sister incest in Defoe's—"Moll Flanders," and the still more open treatment of the same subject by a living writer—d'Annunzio—in his "City of the Dead." These incestuous tendencies are moreover, much more often than is commonly supposed, of sufficient strength to achieve some degree of satisfaction in real life. Among primitive peoples there have been reported fairly numerous cases where incest is permitted, or even enjoined, and even among civilised peoples there is evidence that occasional incestuous acts occur not infrequently, especially among the lower social strata of the population. Thus according to the report of the Chicago Vice Commission in 1911, no less than 50 per cent of the girls examined reported that they had received

their first sexual experience at the hands of their father.

If these facts indicate the great strength and persistence of the tendencies impelling towards incest, the facts which reveal the other side of the conflict—the tendencies impelling away from incest—are of course even more striking and more accessible to observation. From the point of view of psychology, we have the wide-spread horror which the very thought of incest so generally arouses, and on a lower mental level, the formidable resistances which have to be overcome during the process of psycho-analysis before feelings and memories connected with the incestuous tendencies can be brought to consciousness. From the point of view of sociology, there are the widespread restrictions—legal and religious—upon the marriage of near kin, and the severe penalties incurred by those who infringe these restrictions; while from the point of view of anthropology, there exist the corresponding institutions of exogamy and of the "avoidances" which have to be observed in social intercourse between near relatives.

It is the view of psycho-analysts that an important factor in the displacement of the

primitive incestuous tendencies is the occurrence of a relatively "latent sexual period" in the later part of childhood, during which the affections are less intense than at an earlier or later stage of development. This reduction of the intensity of the libido facilitates the task of the inhibiting force, and by the time the libido undergoes reinforcement at the age of puberty, the displacements due to the action of these inhibiting forces are so well established that in normal cases there can be no return of interest in the original incestuous direction; the increased energy of the libido is, therefore, available for the discovery of love objects in the wider outside world, and, to some extent also, for the general increase of social activities and interests. Not of course that the love of the individual for the members of his own family is altogether destroyed, even at the conscious level (we have already seen that there is reason to believe that in the unconscious it always persists in something like its original form). There is, rather, a splitting up of the libido in so far as it has reference to an incestuous goal. The elements of tenderness, dependence, admiration and esteem, continue

to be directed to some extent upon the parents or other members of the family; but all the more sensual elements are strictly inhibited in so far as these persons are concerned, and are available only for use in some quite different direction. When we recollect that the total nature of these sensual elements has undergone highly important changes during the latent period by the greatly increased importance and predominance of the impulses more directly associated with the genital organs and the processes of reproduction, we are in a position to realise the significance of the above mentioned process of splitting in producing the typical adult attitude towards near relations—one in which certain non-sensual elements of affection have full play, but from which the slightest conscious reference to "sex," in the narrow everyday sense, is stringently excluded. Such a thoroughgoing dissociation of certain elements of the libido can, however, scarely fail to have some influence even outside the sphere of incestous attachments; hence it often comes about that even with reference to objects of affection that are quite unconnected with the family circle there may be a difficulty in experiencing the

above mentioned sensual and non-sensual elements in adequate combination; a difficulty that may have far-reaching social consequences and which was considered in some little detail by Dr. Glover in the previous lecture.

Let us return now to the consideration of the displacement of the family-regarding tendencies on to other persons and objects. We remarked above that the process always makes use of some *mental* associative connection between the old and the new goal or object of the tendencies concerned. These associative connections may be of various kinds; they may be of greater or less complexity, and may bear a greater or less correspondence to any *real* connection or resemblance. In certain cases the connection used is similar to that which may have already played a part in the first displacement of affection from parent to brother or sister—*i.e.* there is a bond of *family relationship* between the old and the new love object. Under this heading comes the displacement of love (as also of hate) on to such persons as uncles, aunts, cousins, step-parents and parents-in-law. As regards the displacement of love, the attraction towards cousins is the

most frequent and socially important, since cousin marriage, so to speak, just touches the fringe of the incest barrier, is just on the borderline between the permissible and unpermissible. With regard to hate, step-parents and parents-in-law are by far the most important objects. In the case of these relatives, the hate components in the parent-regarding attitude find freer and less inhibited expression than they usually do in the case of real parents, because they are less liable to be held in check by opposing elements of love and respect. The frequently recurring figure of the cruel step-mother in fairy tales represents the crystallization in folk-lore of the difficult relations between step-child and step-parent ("Hamlet" is a subtle psychological study of a particular aspect of these difficulties), while the disagreeable nature of a man's relations to his "in-laws," especially his mother-in-law, is so generally recognised as to have become the theme of innumerable jests in comic papers and in music halls.

Among the associative connections which present the closest correspondence to reality are those that relate to *physical or mental similarity*. There is little doubt that owing

to displacement along these lines, there is a widespread tendency to fall in love with, and to marry, persons who present certain significant resemblances to the parents, and it would seem that this tendency must exercise a powerful influence in the direction of maintaining the relative purity of racial and individual types. Sometimes, however, "association by contrast" may take the place of "association by similarity," and in this case the husband or wife selected in later life may be of a markedly opposite type to that of the father or mother.

Markedly different from the influence of similarity as regards appearance and character in that it seems to have but the slenderest reference to reality, is the influence of *name* as the associative connection operative in displacement. That such a relatively superficial basis of similarity should be made to determine processes of such far-reaching importance as displacement of the family-regarding tendencies, is very characteristic of the unconscious, which takes throughout very little account of reality. By way of emphasising this latter point, we may add that, here as elsewhere where linguistic factors are concerned

in unconscious processes, some form of play on words may be just as effective as an actual identity of name. Thus in a case that recently came to my notice where there was good reason on independent grounds to believe that this influence of name was operative, the Christian and the surname of the fiancée when taken together resembled that of the mother's maiden surname, as in the following examples (which are similar to, but not, of course, the same as, the real names of the ladies concerned):—fiancée's names—Anna Lee, mother's maiden surname—Anerley.

In other cases again, it may be no one single factor but a whole complex of factors that is operative. Of particular importance here would seem to be a *similarity in the general circumstances of life*, a tendency to transfer the original parent-love to someone whose situation in reference to the individual lover is in some way similar to that of the original loved object. Especially frequent would seem to be the tendency to find some new object of affection whose situation recalls that which gave rise to the Oedipus complex. Just as in the first love of son for mother there were *obstacles* to the exclusive possession

of the loved object and a *rival* in the shape of the father, so in later life there may be a tendency to love only where there is some impediment to the consummation of the love or where there is a rival in the shape of a husband or fiancée. An historic case of some interest in this connection is that of King Henry VIII, whose well known matrimonial adventures were, as I have tried to show elsewhere, very probably due in large measure to influences of this sort. It is obvious that persons whose conduct is determined by unconscious motives such as these, may cause an immense amount of misery both to themselves and to others in the course of their career.

Important as are these influences of the early family environment upon the later love life of the individual, their interest to the sociologist is not perhaps so great as where the displacement of the parent-regarding tendencies is directed to social groups or social institutions rather than to individuals. Such displacements of sociological importance occur especially with reference to the school, the university, ("Alma Mater"), the native town and native country ("Fatherland" or

"Motherland"). This last instance is of quite outstanding significance in this respect, and illustrates the fact that a knowledge of the psychological factors connected with early family life is often essential for the proper understanding of the problems of national and group psychology. In the other cases, even where the displacement is directed to individuals rather than to groups, the sociological interest of the displacement may be due to the part which these individuals play in the life of the community. This is especially true in the case of the teacher, the policeman, the magistrate, the employer, the professional or military superior, the statesman and the king or ruler, all or any of whom are apt to be regarded in a way that is largely determined by the displacement of the father-regarding tendencies—a displacement in which both the love elements and the hate elements may be represented, and the manifestations of which may be largely determined by the conflicting nature of these different elements. The unconscious determinants of the attitude towards the ruler are, of course, of quite especial importance in this connection, and would

demand a lengthy treatment on their own account. But all these are matters which will be dealt with in the subsequent lectures of this course. It is sufficient here to have drawn attention to the way in which the psychological study of the family leads up to the study of society and must in turn be presupposed in any fundamental treatment of the more complex problems of social psychology.

Let us return in conclusion to say a last word about the family itself. We have seen how the adequate mental development of the individual requires a gradual extension of interests and a corresponding displacement of affection from the narrower sphere of the family to the wider field of social life outside the home. This extension of interests on the part of the younger members of the family implies in some degree a corresponding mental readjustment on the part of the parents. Very young children make great demands upon the affections and attention of the parents, particularly in the case of the mother. As they grow up, their demands become gradually smaller, as the children's interest and activities are in large measure transferred from the home,

first to the school and then to the wider field of a vocation; and a still greater break-away from the interests of the original home may eventually occur when the children marry and set up homes of their own. It is clear that these gradually lessening demands upon the parents must imply that an ever increasing proportion of the parents' mental energies is free for disposal in other directions. More than this, if the parents fail to carry out a redistribution of these energies, such as is demanded by the natural change of circumstances as their children grow up, various evils of one kind or another may result. By prolonging beyond the appropriate period the manifestations of solicitude rightly appertaining to the early years of their children's lives, they may encourage a "fixation" of their children's interests on the parents and the home; and this, as we have seen, may constitute a very serious impediment to the proper development of the children's character. If, on the other hand, the children have sufficient independence and initiative to withstand this harmful influence of the parents' conduct, the parents themselves will suffer an ever increasing frustration of their interests and affections,

which will inevitably be productive of much unhappiness to themselves. Most usually of course both effects will be produced in some degree; there then tends to arise a long-drawn conflict between the gradually unfolding personality of the children and the will of the parents, who—consciously or unconsciously—strive to prevent these personalities from developing and to keep the children in a state of infantile dependence on parental care; a conflict which underlies some of the bitterest tragedies of family life. The problem of the readjustment of parental interests is therefore one that is second in importance only to the readjustment and displacement of the family-regarding tendencies in the children; one moreover which has an intimate bearing on this latter all-important process. It is undoubtedly a problem which deserves far greater attention from the students of mental and social hygiene than it has yet received.

In these remarks on the bearing of psycho-analytic discoveries concerning family life upon the problems that confront the sociologist, I have, as I am well aware, only touched here and there upon the fringes of a subject of immense importance and almost inex-

haustible interest. Much of what I have said, will perhaps appear both dogmatic and fragmentary. But if I have succeeded in conveying an impression of the immensity of the vistas that are opened up by the application of the psycho-analytic method to the problems of the family, I shall have succeeded in my aim. In many instances the knowledge that has already been won by psycho-analysis is even now capable of filling many of the blanks that have been left untouched in the present brief discussion of the subject. In other cases there is much that we have still to learn. But there is one point which, in my opinion, psycho-analysis has established beyond possibility of dispute: that our knowledge and control of social affairs is ultimately dependent upon our knowledge of the psychological factors operative in family life. Only with the proper understanding and regulation of that smaller home environment which is the field of interest and activity during the early years of life, will it be possible to deal successfully with the wider field of adult social life which presents us to-day with such a multitude of difficult and urgent problems.

CHAPTER IV

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS IN RELATION TO POLITICS

BY

M. D. EDER

THE method I propose to adopt this evening, and the point of view from which I set out, namely the application of the results derived from the study of individual psychology to sociological problems, and the possibility of understanding that the study of the unconscious may throw on political questions, run, I am painfully aware, in opposition to the views of some eminent sociologists and students of politics.

Durkheim, for instance, states that "La cause déterminante d'un fait social doit etre cherchée parmi les faits sociaux antécédents et non parmi les états de la conscience individuelle,"[1] Laski claims that "politically we

[1] Emile Durkheim : "Les règles de la méthode sociologique," 1895, p. 135:

can be concerned not with the hidden motives but with the overt acts of men."[1]

It is however with the facts derived from the study of the individual who is a member of at least a small circle that I set out; and it is with the motives so carefully hidden that the individual is himself unaware of them, yet which so largely determine his activities, that I am concerned this evening.

If I go counter to certain views I can claim on the other hand that the standpoint of psycho-analysis is in accordance with the views of some modern sociologists. I remember how Prof. Geddes corrected me when I referred to him as Professor of Sociology at the University of Bombay. "No," he said, "I am Professor of Sociology and Town-planning." That is to say, practical life must be the guide for sociological principles. Now if, as I hope to show, psycho-analysis has some interest when applied to politics, it is because of its extremely practical nature. As you know, psycho-analysis began humbly enough as a branch of medical therapeutics. "Par

[1] Harold Laski: "Authority in the Modern State," 1919, p. 30.

l'inspiration d'un esprit ingénieux, les faits les plus insignificants en apparence deviennent le principe de découvertes considerables,"[1] as Le Play said in another connexion. From what seems to be mere psychological trifles, such as the motive and the meaning of a misquotation, a dream, a nervous symptom, Freud, that "esprit ingénieux," has been impelled to a consideration of the meaning of our attitude towards general social and political questions. This evening I shall adopt rather the Greek view of politics as embracing all activities of human association, but I warn you that I shall deal with these political questions from one point of view only, from the standpoint of the unconscious. Sociology, biology, geography, history, law, economics, philosophy and other disciplines, I need not remind you, have all important bearings upon political questions. My treatment is confessedly one-sided, but it is a side which has not had much of a hearing. I do not think the Œdipus complex has yet appeared on a political platform; at all events, it has not yet become a party question.

Furthermore I am afraid I must disappoint

[1] Le Play: "Les ouvriers européens, 1855," appendix p. 281.

you by saying that although I firmly believe practical values may be some day reached as the result of the application of psycho-analysis to politics, I do not expect you to obtain any practical help from my discourse. At the end of the evening I shall not have helped any one of you in your voting at the next election; perhaps you will even say that I am attempting to make confusion worse confounded. This is to some extent inevitable, for in trying to solve one problem we usually find that we are confronted with a new set of problems of which we must first seek a solution; but indeed I am not here seeking a solution to any political problem, being solely concerned with the study of certain human associations from a purely scientific point of view, where the question of values or action is not under consideration. I have one more preliminary observation. I have ventured to treat you as a scientific audience with whom I can discuss fearlessly and frankly questions that may be painful or repulsive. Those of you who belong to the Sociological Society of course know that you will not be able to deal with overcrowding, for example, or venereal disease, or war, so long as these are abstractions;

the sociologist of to-day is a town-planner, a physician, a soldier. He returns to his professional chair after having taken his stand in the market-place. To some extent also my task is lighter this evening by reason of the increased freedom that has been given to the discussion of many subjects of vital importance to the community, however unpleasant they may be; I think, for instance, of the press and public campaign on venereal disease. There is also an increased realisation that this is a grim world, that man is not so much a rational creature as a would-be rational one.

The importance that the family, demonstrated by Mr. Flügel, is found to take in the moulding of the individual is an aspect with which the Sociological Society, lodged in Le Play House, will certainly find no cause of complaint. Le Play writes: "Je regarde comme établie que ceux même qui refuse d'envisager la famille comme une création directe de Dieu, y voient tout au moins une conséquence necessaire des lois naturelles qu'il a instituées."[1] It is not surprising to find a genius like Le Play making the family

[1] Id: "L'organisation de la famille," 1884, p. 7.

one of the triad in the genesis of societies; he reached his conclusions as a result of repeated observations. Compare Paley's remark that the "condition of human infancy prepares men for society, by combining individuals into small communities, and by placing them from the beginning under direction and control. A family contains the rudiments of an Empire."[1]

Freud, another man of genius, arrived at a similar result—the Oedipus complex is, he says, a regular and most important factor in the relationship of the child to its parents: the Oedipus complex therefore displays the situation of an individual in society, in a miniature society, namely in the family circle. But this grouping is the pattern upon which the affective relationship of all other groupings is modelled. When Mr. Laski asks, "the psychologist to disclose the factors of human association,"[2] I can answer: they have been and are being disclosed; the factors of human association are the factors seen in the psychoanalytic survey of the family. The other day

[1] Paley: "Moral and Political Philosophy." Complete Works, 1825, Vol. II, p: 280.

[2] Laski: op. cit. p: 32.

in an article headed "The Fourth Terror," the *Times* quoted a Japanese proverb enumerating the four greatest terrors which Japan is called upon to endure: "earthquakes, thunder, fire and too strict fatherly discipline."[1] To the psycho-analyst the proverb does not seem quite so paradoxical as it did to the writer of the article. It is a recognition that the father plays as great a part in human destinies as does an earthquake.

The relationship of an individual to his father, to his mother, and to their surrogates, to his brothers and sisters, forms not only the model for a primitive society but for such a complicated structure as the governance of England. Voltaire said that man had fashioned God in his own image; it would be nearer the mark to say, in the image of his father, *i.e.* of the ideal which is built up in the earliest years of childhood. "Identification," says Freud, "is known to psycho-analysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person. It plays a part in the early history of the Oedipus complex. A little boy will exhibit a special interest in his father: he would like to grow like him, and

[1] The *Times* Sep. 17th, 1923.

be like him, and take his place everywhere. We may simply say that he takes his father as his ideal."[1] I have pointed out elsewhere all that the father means in power, intelligence, wisdom to the infant and child. I do not think you will regard it as an exaggerated picture were one to say that in a child's view the father is not only incapable of doing wrong but even of thinking wrong, he can never mean to do any improper thing; in him is no folly or weakness.

Much of this is matter of everyday observation, but what psycho-analysis brings out is that this emotional relationship remains throughout life; I mean our relationship to other men is emotionally activated by the father-ideal. What occurs as we come more in touch with the external world, when the principle of reality develops, is the finding of surrogates for this ideal father. We discover that he is not all-wise, all-powerful, all-good, but we still need to find persons or abstractions upon which we can distribute these and similar attributes. By a process of fission these feelings are displaced on to and may be dis-

[1] Sigm. Freud: "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego." 1922. p. 60.

tributed among a number of surrogates. The surrogates may be persons, animals, things or abstract ideas; the headmaster, the dog, the rabbit, the Empire, the Aryan race, or any particular "ism."

It is upon this ego-ideal that is formed the possibility of leadership, of leaders, then of the supreme leader, the king—the one who can, that is, who can do all, just as the father did in the child's view. As the late J. N. Figgis maintained in his "Essay on the Divine Right of Kings," this theory gained currency because it appealed to some of the deepest instincts of human nature. "It gathered up into itself notions of the sanctity of the medicine-man, of the priestly character of primitive royalty, of the divinity of the Roman emperors, and perhaps of the sacredness of the tribunician power."[1] "It was essentially a popular theory, proclaimed in the pulpit, published in the market-place, witnessed to on the battle-field."[2]

One of the typical disguises for father and mother in dreams is their appearance as king,

[1] J. N. Figgis · "Divine Right of Kings." 2nd Edition. 1914. p. 256.

[2] Id.: *ib.* p. 3.

queen, kaiser, president; the dreamer himself appearing as the eldest son, the Prince of Wales, etc. For my present purpose I have only to point out the equation: king = father, father = king, *i.e.* the ideal we have taken: that is, the king stands for all. Let me repeat the description I have already quoted adding the two first words—it is of course Blackstone's well-known formula: "The sovereign is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong; he can never mean to do an improper thing; in him is no folly or weakness."[1] Put briefly, it is the maxim that the king can do no wrong, and its genesis is: My father can do no wrong. I am like my father—I can do no wrong. This ego-ideal splits off and is projected on to the father of his people—the king. The reverence that doth hedge a king is thus the reverence unconsciously paid to our ideal self. It must be borne in mind, as I have already said, that this feeling may be displaced on to a number of persons or ideas; there may be, so to say, many kings—many projections of the original identification, for, as Freud has pointed out,

[1] "Blackstone's Commentaries." 4th Edition. 1876. Vol. I. p. 218.

identification may arise with every new perception of a common quality shared with some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct.

Identification does not exhaust the emotional tie between father and little son, as you will know from the previous lectures. There is the basic Oedipus relationship, hostility to the father who stands in the way of the little boy, whose wish is therefore to get the father out of the way. This hostility comes into conflict with the ego-ideal, giving rise to the sense of guilt and remorse. To sociologists acquainted with Le Play's work the idea will not seem very startling although, of course, the permanence of the child's attitude in adult life may be a new view. Le Play said that at each generation, society is menaced by a great invasion of little savages; the child is "foncièrement et uniquement egoiste;" against Rousseau he maintained that "L'enfant nait mauvais;"[1] or as psycho-analysts might preferably express it, the child is not born with an ego-ideal.

These conflicting relationships—tenderness, the wish to be like the father in every way.

[1] Le Play: "La Réforme Sociale. p. 388.

and hostility, the wish to be rid of the father, exist side by side. Just as we have seen the one tie, identification, spreading out and finding a number of partial substitutes, so we also find the second of the ambivalent emotions displaced on to one or more substitutes. Thus the hostility felt by the child towards the father may be preserved towards the father himself, and the tenderness displayed towards an uncle, a teacher, the gardener, the dog, a collection of stamps or butterflies. The reversed case is also possible, but the former may be regarded as the ordinary course of development.

For this fission of affects the British Constitution provides admirably. I think it was Mr. Zangwill who once said that it is a principle of the British Constitution that the king can do no wrong and his ministers no right. That is to say, the ambivalency originally experienced towards the father is now split; the sentiment of loyalty, etc., is displaced on to the king, the hostility on to the king's ministers, or on to some of them, or on to the Opposition, the Labour Party, etc. The President of a Republic like the French is in much the same case, but in the

United States the President seems to know no such softening of the primitive affect.

Death at the hands of their subjects, which includes their sons, was the common fate of rulers in rude days, as it still is the fate of many savage royalties. Primitive people have all kinds of taboos which save the life of a king, and betray in the various ceremonies the underlying unconscious wish.

Modern society has discovered the principle of election, and the vote to give expression to the subjects' hostile feelings towards their rulers. Psycho-analytically an election may be regarded as the sublimation of regicide (primarily parricide) with the object of placing oneself on the throne; the vote is like a repeating decimal; the father is killed but never dies. The ministers are our substitutes for ourselves. Hence the political axiom of the swing of the pendulum.

In the United States the President comes in for the vituperation that is here reserved for the government in power. It is the Old Gang, the father, who must be got rid of. The rise and fall of President Wilson illustrates this typically; for a time he was the projected ego-ideal of a large mass of

American mankind; then came the surge of the parricidal impulses and the President is hurled from power with every expression of ignominy.

The behaviour of the elected or representative politician betrays many characteristics derived from the family. For example, during the time that I filled a political rôle in Palestine I noticed in myself (and in my colleagues) the satisfaction it gave me to have secret information, knowledge which must on no account be imparted to others. Of course good reasons were always to be found: the people would misuse the information or it would depress them unduly and so on—pretty exactly the parent's attitude about imparting information, especially of a sexual nature, to the children. Indeed when our secret information was common knowledge we still tried to keep it to ourselves, just as we do with our children though we have ourselves been through the same schooling.

At the back of secret diplomacy, trade secrets, and indeed the whole relationship of the official to the non-official, there rests this father-child affect. This also serves to explain the passion aroused in former days by any

proposed extension of the franchise: let me illustrate it by a quotation from one of the less demonstrative politicians. Macaulay in his speech on the People's Charter, May 8rd, 1842, said: "My firm conviction is that in our country universal suffrage (i.e. manhood suffrage) is incompatible not with this or that form of government and with everything for the sake of which forms of government exist, but that it is incompatible with property, and that it is consequently incompatible with civilisation."[1] I am not giving the analysis of the politician, or it would have been tempting to undertake an explanation of what "property" meant to Macaulay the bachelor.

In this opposition to the extension of male suffrage, in this objection to allowing others to share in our private knowledge or privileges, we can recognise a sentiment having as its emotional disposition the original jealousy of the father towards his male offspring. We know how closely guarded from the children is, among primitive men, sexual knowledge, the appanage of the adult; in most savage tribes the youth have to undergo a series of

[1] "Macaulay's Speeches. Popular Edition. 1889. p. 626.

ceremonies at initiation in which painful rites inflicted by the elders are prominent, rites which express in their veiled form the more barbarous practices of early man.

Like any primitive savage, a Macaulay, now an elder himself, will keep out the rest, resents any sapping of his power. Notice that Macaulay's opposition is especially aroused towards those who may approximate to himself, towards English Protestants. To those whose sentiments may be regarded as more widely separated from his own there is no opposition. He is the advocate of Catholic and Jewish suffrage rights—these are no children of his and arouse no fierce jealousy.

That this jealousy of the fathers towards their male children, unconscious in part or wholly so, is one of the causes of war, seems not to have escaped the notice of the youth of this age—at least of some of the more sensitive among them, poets and novelists. War, with its special death-roll among the young, fulfils the desire of the old men for the removal of their lusty rivals; the war memorials, the cenotaphs are not only monuments raised in expiation of the old people's

sins, but are also survivals of days when it was feared that the ghosts of the killed, taking material shape, would revenge themselves on the living; these monumental erections will prevent the dead arising.

Of course this young generation will in turn become the fathers, and in their turn, standing in fear of their sons, will seek the gratification of their unconscious wishes. But I attach some importance to the recognition, however incomplete, and allied as it is with other unconscious emotions, of the motives of the father's jealousy as a cause of war. It is one of the methods, it seems to me, by which changes may come about in the organisation of society. Broadly speaking, we find that social changes are brought about by external pressure—geographical, economic and so on, so that whilst the forms change there is not a corresponding change in the psyche. Freud says: "what to-day arises from within was once a compulsion from without, perhaps imposed by the necessity of the time. The demands made to-day by the external world upon every child may some day be fulfilled by some simple repression from within." But it may be that

among those compulsions from without will be included at some future time a reformation inspired by an understanding of and a power to deal with such unconscious reactions as I am now alluding to. Probably you will think me rather presumptuous if I suggest that psycho-analysis may be the precursor of another regulator; the individual learns how he shall grow to independence through his experiences in the psycho-analytic laboratory; and it seems not inconceivable that at some future period much of what is now unconscious may become conscious material, allowing mankind to deal with it in the same way as do a few analysed individuals to-day. This would mean greater changes in human nature than our written records can show.

This is speculation: I will now return to my politics. In the Conservative the tender tie towards the father is preserved in loyalty to the sovereign and to those persons identified with him, whilst hostility is felt towards the children (including himself) who are seeking to overthrow the father, to usurp his place, *i.e.* the People. Hobbes laid it down that "originally the Father of every man was also

his Sovereign Lord with power over him of life and death."[1] Paley says sovereignty may be termed absolute, omnipotent, uncontrollable, arbitrary, despotic and as alike in all countries.[2]

Whether this is historically accurate or not is for my purpose to-night indifferent; I quote it for its psychological truth; Paley's statement is but an echo of the father's significance to the son. I do not maintain that this is the only mode of genesis. Conservatism can arise also as a reaction formation against hostility towards the father.

The common bond uniting the children in antagonism to their parents is a matter of daily observation; it may unite the children of one family or a group of children; it is the theme of innumerable novels; it is seen later in any assembly of people where there are children-substitutes: in the committee and unofficial members of clubs, etc. This bond is found in later life as a desexualised, sublimated homosexual relationship with other men (and women) springing from work in common. I have pointed out that the

[1] Hobbes: "Leviathan." Everyman Edition, p. 182.

[2] Paley: op. cit. p. 314.

emotional affect can be displaced on to abstract conceptions or ideas just as readily as on to something concrete. Identification with the other children of the family or little friends can become in adult life identification with the people, with democracy, with a quasi deification of the people. As Dr. Glover said, the child says: "if I cannot be first favourite, then none of the other children shall be;" "justice for me," becomes "justice for all," "equal rights for us all," and we get the famous slogan: "Workers of the world, unite, you have a world to gain, you have nothing to lose but your chains."

It is the affect arising from this hostility of the children towards the father (the possessor) that gives force to the abstract conception of the class-war. Then arises another father, another god: "The voice of the people is the voice of God"—an instance of what Ferenczi calls the infantile happy condition of omnipotence. This idea of the children against the father, carried on from childhood's relationships, is well expressed in the motto of the French Republic: Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité: Freedom from the tyrannical father, who monopolises everything; we band of brothers

will share and share alike. It is eloquently expressed in Lincoln's famous Gettysburg speech: "This nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom, and that the government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth." Whereas then, for the Conservative the dynamic is derived from identification with the father, in the Radical or Democrat it is derived from identification with brothers and sisters.

The impermanency of such a revolt on the part of the band is seen in the French Reign of Terror, which offers in this particular a striking contrast with the Russian Revolution.

Louis XVI. was executed on Jan. 21, 1793; Marat was assassinated on July 13, 1793; Hébert was executed on March 24, 1794; Danton was executed on April 5, 1794; Robespierre on July 28, 1794. Thus in the eighteen months after the death of the King four of the revolutionary leaders had met their deaths by violence. It is now six years since the Bolshevik Revolution took place (Oct. 1917) and we find the original leaders still in power. I do not think any prominent Russian revolutionary leader has been assas-

sinated or executed since the Czar was killed. Psycho-analysis offers a hint as to one factor in this difference. When I was in Russia in the winter of 1920-21 I could not but be struck by the large number of busts of Karl Marx everywhere displayed, by the prodigal array of quotations from his works; that bust with the flowing beard, you may remember, got on the nerves of Mr. H. G. Wells. What did the French Revolutionists set up? Statues of Liberty, Reason, Nature. The Russian leaders, although they had killed their father the Czar, found another father, Marx, to worship; that he was dead was unimportant—in the unconscious the dead are no less powerful forces than the living.

The French revolutionary leaders found no common father; as each emerged from the band in the attempt to make himself supreme leader, to become the Old Man, the Sire, the band must destroy him; Equality and Justice for all, just as in the nursery. These attempts to establish the rule of a band of brothers on the basis of equality of powers fail, and the people fall back again on a father—Napoleon—who receives the worship of a god and the vilification of a devil—god and devil being

both facets of father-worship, the extensions of the original ambivalent feelings of love and hate.

The peculiar horror which regicide has always inspired we understand when we know it as the fulfilment of a wish, namely parricide, that was ever buried in the unconscious. Is the extraordinary fear which some regicides experience, e.g. Cromwell, the expression of a desire to be killed? Cromwell, himself now ruler-king-father, is intolerable to the son of his father. This splitting of the personality is familiar enough to us in individual psychology but its possible application to Cromwell I must leave to some student of history.

The investigation of individual cases will, of course, bring to light more than one determinant; an interesting example in point is that of a social reformer like Lord Shaftesbury, the seventh earl. From earliest childhood he was in conflict with a tyrannical, forbidding father, and the subject of his mother's neglect. The headmaster of the school to which he was early sent was, according to all accounts, inhuman and brutal. Neither at school nor at home did he obtain the common necessaries of life. There was, says one of his

biographers, neither joy in going back to school nor joy in coming home, where he was often left with insufficient food. It is easy to see the narcissistic projection in this champion of children, the Chairman of the Ragged Union, the reformer of asylums. There was another determinant; a question was asked of Mr. Flügel as to the results of a child's being brought up by a nurse. Now the sole person who seems to have bestowed any love on this unfortunate son of an earl was his mother's old maid. Until the day of his death Lord Shaftesbury wore a watch which this maid had left him in her will. His love for this woman of inferior station finds expression in adult life in his efforts to amend the lot of the oppressed, the lowly, the humble, but he does not throw in his lot with them, he remains always faithful to his rôle of protector, of master, nor apparently could his complexes allow him to regard an independent working-class with complacency—as you probably know he was an opponent of the Education Acts.

Much reforming zeal is genetically related to similar reactions in childhood. The desire to defend the oppressed, to protect the weak or inferior in rank may be the outcome of

some such motive as the one I have mentioned. Jealousy felt towards a younger child, such fratricidal impulses as cited by Mr. Flügel, come under the subjugation of the ego-ideal impulses, with feelings of remorse, of guilt; as a reaction formation there ensues solicitude for the younger child, regarded as the victim of parental discipline, and in later years these emotions are radiated on to other persons, on to all who are oppressed, on to the general class of the "under-dogs."

The rôle of protector is also derived from the phantasy of protecting the mother against the onslaughts of the father, for coïtus is often regarded by the child as a brutal attack on the part of the father against the mother.

The other side of the Oedipus complex, the boy-child's relationship towards the mother, his wish for union with her, for return to the maternal womb, undergoes partial sublimation in social life. It finds expression in attachment to the earth, the land, the mother-country, home; the "Heimweh" of the Swiss, or the Scot, the pious Jew's desire for burial in Palestine, the agitation over the proposed removal of Gen. Oglethorpe's remains, are instances of this emotional tie which are fraught with

potential political consequences. It is a factor that must not be overlooked in any serious consideration of emigration and of the exodus from the country-side in to the town. The earth is familiar as the symbol of the mother; as Eve, Mother-Earth. Richard Jeffries in "The Story of my Heart" describes this influence when "lying down on the grass I thought of the earth's firmness—I felt it bear me up; through the grassy couch there came an influence as if I could feel the great earth speaking to me." Is this exodus from the country-side an attempt to get away from the more primary sexual attraction and to fall back in the city upon aim-restricted sexual impulses?

How these impulses affect politics when the sovereign is both father and mother is well seen in the cases of Queen Elizabeth and Queen Victoria: note the loyalty, veneration and love extended to the latter after the death of the Prince Consort, when there is no rival to dispute the unconscious wish to possess the supreme earthly mother; if that wish is impossible of fulfilment, then no one shall possess her—she shall remain perpetual widow, fulfilling at once various unconscious

phantasies of the Virgin Queen, the Virgin Mother, the ultimate wish-phantasy of every male.

Besides the major forms of such hostility towards the father (authority) as seen in the rebel and revolutionist, we may notice all kinds of minor symptoms. It is a partial explanation of smuggling, of evading the income-tax, of cheating a railway company, etc. On the other side we see the need of the father in the call for the strong man, for the return of the omnipotent being of our childhood, with his magical control over watches, able to emit clouds from his mouth and nose. In the ultimate analysis the cry for the strong man is but the child's cry for daddy and mummy to kiss the sore place and make it well again—for the soothing words of the magician who has power to charm away all the ills that affect us.

As a derivative from the hostility to the father we may note the heat with which the question of a sovereign state or of a pluralistic state is being discussed at this moment. I will not embark upon an analysis of the Regional Movement which is one form, but stop for a moment to call attention to this

tendency to set up counter authorities to Parliament. It is found in such movements as the national guilds, trade unionism, the claims of the different churches to control of their adherents. The pluralistic state, if I understand the conception correctly, is no return to mediaevalism, for then the authority of the Church was paramount in Europe. It is significant that a churchman, the late Dr. J. W. Figgis, should have been one of the most original and powerful advocates of this doctrine, demanding, at the least, increased authority for associations that are to be ultimately co-equal with Parliament. "We are in the midst of a new movement," writes Mr. Laski, "for the conquest of self-government. It finds its main impulse in the attempt to disperse the sovereign power."[1] This movement has become vigorous at a period which sees the return of women to authority in the affairs of the state. I would regard it as suggestive of the growing influence of what I have called the Band of Brothers, a decline in the authority of the father.

It is noteworthy in the United States that law has taken the place of all other authorities;

[1] Laski: "Foundations of Sovereignty." 1921, p. 243.

there is almost a "divine right" of the constitution; the work of the framers, of the elders, must not be touched. This is but another instance of the need mankind seems still to feel for a father, for some final authority. The majesty of the law receives very great reverence in England, which prides itself on its respect for precedence; but I take it the existence of a monarch to some extent weakens the position of the law: I am speaking, of course, entirely of the non-rational side.

I will turn to a current political issue which demonstrates the same forces at work. When you are told in England that those who are in favour of that economic system known as Free Trade are in league with the enemies of England and the Empire, or that the advocates of Protection are seeking for selfish ends to tax the working man's breakfast, it does not require a psychologist to conclude that there are here emotions engaged which are apart from economic considerations. The chosen banners, Protection and Free Trade give an indication of the underlying motives. The home industries must be protected from outside interference, at all events they must

be safeguarded in their youth until they are strong enough to be resistant to the onslaughts of the stranger. This is one of the attitudes of the parent towards his children; the father and mother will watch over the children, in the interests of the child; for the child is but a projection of ourselves. Protection is, as one would expect, a Conservative tendency. It is worth passing notice that Mr. Joseph Chamberlain was a free trader in his republican and radical days; it was when he had found a father — the Empire — which gave him a political fatherhood, that he became the advocate of protection; the father's children must be looked after and helped.

Cobden and the early free traders were all rebels against the political authority of their day. They were seeking a means to rid themselves of the influence of authority, of their fathers. Trade and industry, *i.e.*, themselves, must be freed from the trammels of the State, *i.e.*, of authority, of the father. In their hostility towards State interference they had to find a surrogate upon which they could bestow their tender emotions and they found it in the idea of Free Trade.

Another attempt to set up some authority

against the power of the sovereign is seen in the League of Nations. I think the psychological grounds will be sufficiently clear for an appreciation of the difficulty experienced by the United States, with its powerful father-worship in the constitution, in accepting the setting up of a rival. It is understandable that the League should have the support of churchmen like the Cecils, and of the democrats like Sir Gilbert Murray, just as it has the opposition, open or veiled, of those still under the positive influence of the father.

The conclusion to which one seems drawn is that hitherto the band of brothers does not easily exist without a father; they become like

> Sheep without a shepherd
> When the snow shuts out the sky.

The study of the psychology of the individual has taught us how severe a struggle it is for him to rid himself of the father, to rid himself in such a way that his conduct is not inspired either by a positive or a negative emotional attitude. In the social organisation there appears a similar struggle for independence, and though the father is often cast out he returns to power in devious ways—the con-

stitution, law and order, Das Kapital and many and various simpler examples. There are not wanting signs that in the most developed western countries the gerontocracy is being displaced by a grausocracy.

Whether the attempts now being made to set up co-equal authorities such as the League of Nations will be more successful than previous efforts of societies at independence remains to be seen. But the question really needs to be considered in the light of the renewed political activities of women. I have confined myself to the political developments of the male, and must here overlook entirely the corresponding sublimations and partial sublimations in the case of women. It would lead me into the all-important question of the political and social relationships of the sexes, more than a chapter in themselves. That I started off with the boy and not with the girl must be put down to the bias of sex.

In the movement away from the country, the detachment from the land to which I alluded just now, the Oedipus complex, the relationship to the mother, is only one of the determinants. A factor in the movement to the towns is concerned with the oral phase

of human development. There is a tendency to increase the distance between our foods and their original sources—so we go from raw to cooked foodstuffs or to tinned foods, disguising the original connexion with their animal or plant origins, a reaction-formation against the oral phase of the libido; as Kropotkin says, we moderns don't know where our bread comes from. It plays a part also in the fear which our more highly cultured citizens express of the impending downfall of European civilisation through the rising power of the peasantry over the town-dwellers; in the rather impassioned demand for a "parlour," a withdrawing-room from the associations of food and cooking, the influence of this trait can also be found.

But indeed the whole of our house-building is formed on a human model, with its system of pipes and tubes for the supply of water and air. An examination of the reasons given for the universal preference of the water-carriage system for sewage-removal over the conservancy system betrays the fact that the modern sanatarian doctor or engineer is still influenced by infantile wishes or reactions against such wishes. The only conceivable

method for these modern persons of sewage-removal is by means of pipes, drains and sewers, just as its waste products are removed from the human body; out of sight out of mind is another of the principles on which the modern system is constructed. I do not mean to say that those who have opposed these methods are not likewise influenced by infantile wishes or the reaction against them. I only wish to draw your attention to the possibility of these unconscious factors appearing in questions that seem to be decided entirely by scientific reasoning. You will not misunderstand me and conclude that my view is that such questions cannot be decided on scientific grounds. Quite the contrary: but first we must eliminate as far as possible the infantile, unconscious affects that prejudice our judgments and render genuine scientific reasoning so difficult.

One of the unexpected results of psycho-analytic investigation was the discovery of the connexion between the libido derived from the alimentary canal and the interest in money. Freud says: "Wherever the archaic mode of thought has prevailed or still prevails, in the older civilisations, in myths, fairy-tale,

superstition, in unconscious thinking, in dreams and in neuroses, money has been brought into connexion with faith.[1] The observation has been abundantly confirmed since it was first made, as has also been his observation on the relationship between this particular libidinal attachment and avarice. Ferenczi has worked out this complex for the individual.[2]

What becomes of these infantile coprophilic tendencies in social life? (1) In part they remain, for I think the interest in bodily functions is so general that it would be ridiculous to regard it as pathological. (2) Partly they find verbal transmutation, in jokes, wit, in pantomimic expression. (3) Neuroses are another expression of them. (4) They are partly transferred into the interest in gold, precious stones, precious metals. (5) A further transformation is into collections, property, possessions. It is only with the fourth and fifth that I am now concerned.

We talk about a collecting mania when

[1] Freud: "Charakter und Analerotik." Sammlung kleiner Scriften. 2 Folge. 1909. p. 136.

[2] Ferenczi: "Zur Ontogenie des Geldinteresses." Internationale Zeitschrift fue Psychoanalyse. 1914. p. 506; Pecunia—olet. Id. 1916. p. 327.

some poor harmless being has an accumulation of rubbish, stones, bits of rags, etc.—an accumulation as useless to him as it is harmless to others. I do not think, on analogous principles, that the term mania is out of place in reference to the other accumulations. The irrational element is very marked in some modern capitalists who have little personal satisfaction out of their possessions but who remain under the compulsion to collect.

The earliest attempt at retaining anything, the beginning of saving-up, is found in the infant's pleasure in holding back its bodily excretions. As the child grows this primary interest undergoes a series of transfigurations; it becomes the love of mud pies, "messing about" with water, building sand-castles, collecting stones for their prettiness, later on postage-stamps, coins, bus tickets, etc. From the collection of stones to the collection of precious stones is but a step; stones, sand, etc., come from the earth, and the transition from this to coins is the next step. Children value coins at first for their brilliancy and colour; bright coins show also something of the colour of their derivation. The part all precious stones have played in civilisation is

probably a familiar chapter. The libido attached to gold, from its lowly origin, is later transferred to other possessions and property. It is interesting to note that the philologists are unable to give the origin of the word property; our "possession," like the German "Besitz" is, as Ferenczi points out, derived from sitting, and is probably a coprophilic symbol.

Substitute forms of property for gold are of course found in stocks, shares, paper-money, etc. That however gold (money) is the more original and deeper source of pleasure in such possessions is shown by the contempt with which paper-money is regarded by peoples possessing a gold basis. Note that the political economists still attach importance to the lustre of our wealth-tokens. It is said "gold and silver alone are of small volume, of equal goodness, easy of transport, divisible without loss, easily guarded, beautiful and brilliant and durable almost to eternity."[1] The definition quoted shows that if this were all that money means, if gold and silver were only tokens, then paper-money would fulfil

[1] Article: Money. Encyc. Brit. 11th Edition. Vol. XVIII p. 698.

the conditions as well except for its want of beautiful brilliance and durability.

That irrational elements are present in capitalism is shown not only in the discussions on currency but in every commercial transaction, in the very conception of succession, in the accumulation of large fortunes. There are of course ego-impulses involved, the satisfaction of the primary needs of hunger, shelter, the desire for power, etc., but my object this evening is to call attention to a factor seldom recognised, and yet one with which every sociologist, whether capitalistically or socialistically inclined, must reckon, namely the large share that these unconscious analerotic tendencies play in economics; capitalism has as one of its main supports the infant's pleasure in its bodily functions and the reaction formations caused by the proper demands of education. That these very early infantile tendencies play a part in national characterology has been shown by Maeder and others in the case of this country. That again these tendencies may be of first rate political or economic importance is seen in the financial policy of rapid deflation which this country has adopted. You have but to read some of the

recent speeches for and against deflation to opine that there must be some other motives than those given making the idea of a gold standard so full of horror or so attractive. The *New Statesman* in a note on the subject in a recent issue seems to have guessed the secret. The writer says that "The policy of the abandonment of deflation is obscured at present by excited controversialists who throw about the words deflation and inflation like stink-bombs; while complacent city editors talk of stabilisation as a visionary ideal, and the public either holds its nose and runs away or laughs at the whole thing as a stunt." [1]

It is worth noting that, generally speaking, (Mr. McKenna is an important case to the contrary) the bankers and the financiers, those who deal in money, are the powerful adherents of deflation, while the industrialists tend to disfavour rapid deflation—for they have, as a class, found substitutes for the primitive infantile analerotic wishes. There are of course other factors; perhaps Miss Sharpe will be able to enlighten us about the vocation of bankers and industrialists.

[1] "The New Statesman." Oct. 27th, 1923.

I repeat that I do not stand as the advocate from the psycho-analytic standpoint, of any political or economic views—although I do not profess to be unbiassed or without my own political persuasions—but my object is the dull, though I think very necessary, one of asking you to reflect on the manifold ways unconscious mental processes enter into judgments of political and economic issues.

And in conclusion I shall for a moment depart from the scientific attitude and make a professional apology. Roheim[1] says that the medicine-man, of whom the doctors are the direct lineal descendants, was the first collector. He brought together all kinds of objects—stones, plants, animals—to effect his cures. In return for these services he received the necessaries of life and so was the first man who obtained his food without direct work. The doctor was not only the first collector but the first capitalist. I can only throw myself on the mercy of the court and plead the time-honoured excuses that it was a very long time ago, whilst the doctor's capital to-day consists

[1] Roheim: "Nach dem Tode des Urvaters." Imago. IX. Band. Heft I. 1923. p. 110.

of little more than the bits of things of his professional predecessor—the first capitalist and doctor.

CHAPTER V

THE BEARING OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS UPON EDUCATION

BY

BARBARA LOW

MY predecessors in this course have shown you how psycho-analysis reveals to us the motivations and impulses of man, unknown and unsuspected in his individual life, in his family relationships, in his life as a 'political' unit fashioning social relationships, and it will be obvious to you that the educational process also (using 'educational' in a wide as well as in a specific sense) both in respect to the educator and the educated, must be concerned with the same psychic mechanisms and psychic events. As already there has been put before you some account of the principles and laws involved in analytic research, I now

only seek to touch upon a few applications of those laws and principles, especially the ones very much concerned in the education of the young. Perhaps it is as well to emphasize here what was pointed out by Dr. James Glover in the second lecture of this course, namely, that, from a study of psycho-analysis, we learn above all things the intricacy and delicacy of our problem (i.e. the understanding of the mind of man), and consequently no psycho-analyst who is such seriously has a ready-made panacea to offer to Education.

We are sometimes informed, not a little to our surprise, that psycho-analysts clamour for psycho-analysis in the school-room and for every teacher to psycho-analyse his or her own pupils. We find ourselves too occupied in tackling real problems to concern ourselves with obvious phantasies and such a suggested state of affairs, even supposing anyone desired it, is outside the bounds of possibility. It will be a very great advance indeed if psycho-analysis can show our educationists that new knowledge and understanding can never be ladled out in vast spoonfuls, either to adult or child, but that only by

slow growths do we add a cubit to our stature externally or internally. What we may hope for is that by degrees the teaching world may come to have some realization and understanding of at least the general implications of psycho-analysis and be able to use it somewhat as a testing instrument: then the approach to education will become different, consequent upon the altered attitude to mind. And here we come to the matter of this new approach. Speaking roughly, we may say that education of the past, both in its earlier and in its later stages, has been preponderantly an affair of giving over to the child a body of traditional suggestion, example, and information which is the outcome of adult knowledge and desire, some of it the direct product *of* experience, some of it a powerful reaction *to* experience. In addition there has, of course, always been the study of the child personality, linked sometimes with remarkable intuitive perception and sympathy, seen in such instances as the genius of a Pestalozzi, of a Rousseau, of a Tolstoi, of the Jesuits, and to speak of contemporaries, of a Madame Montessori, or a Margaret Macmillan. Such approach we must

inevitably have, but psycho-analysis enables us to add something more, without which much of the value of all else may be nullified, namely, an insight into that part of the personality which is not manifest, or only indirectly manifested, and a power of correct interpretation of that which is manifested. Goodwill, careful study of manifest behaviour in ourselves and others, most desirable ideals—these things will not necessarily give us adequate apparatus wherewith to find and deal with the most difficult human problems: so long as educators take into account only the conscious mind, whether their own or that of those to whom they speak, they remain unequipped for the task. The child, from the very nature of its situation in life, can only become conscious, and thus express consciously (I here speak of the age just beyond babyhood, the very young child stage), a fraction of its innermost self. Partly this is due to its own internal repressions (which, as you have seen, begin with the beginning of life and develop with its progress), partly to the impassable barrier between child and adult. The adult has been through the repression-process, and can no longer entertain

in direct consciousness the unsuitable and undesirable wishes and ideas of childhood—he has turned his back on them and so he can only recognize them in the child dimly, confusedly, often not at all, or with a recoil of disgust. In a word, he has sent to Coventry his own unconscious desires, and will not admit the offenders in fresh guise in another human creature especially one to whom he is intimately and emotionally bound. Hence our preference (though an unconscious one) for taking into account consciousness only, with disastrous results. Consider an example of this—always bearing in mind that an illustration without all its context is little more than an end conclusion and probably more than a little unconvincing. In some systems of education (the great majority so far existent) a code of discipline is imposed and judged by certain manifest results. The children come to make adjustments, such as power of steady work, outward attention. obedience, co-ordinated action. Now all these things may be highly desirable and certainly are essential for civilized living—I do not intend to convey one word of opposition to them—but such manifestations

on the part of the child may be a part only—sometimes the less significant part—of his developing personality and by giving to these manifest behaviours, and to them alone, all significance, we may go very far astray. What is happening, often, beneath these outer garments of satisfactory and civilised behaviour? Innumerable rich happenings may be afoot, some of which are destined to bring about astonishing developments in later life. Under the cover of the ordered disciplined appearance a vivid life of phantasy, speculation, desire, love and hate, goes its way.

Some of you present are acquainted with that poignant document, "The Diary of a Young Girl," the private record of a clever girl of eleven to thirteen, belonging to a well-ordered, pleasant, upper-middle-class Austrian household, and you will remember that what I have just referred to is vividly brought to light by the child herself. She sits in class well-conducted, very bright and eager, doing her intellectual work well—just that type of pupil the intelligent teacher sighs for and hails with joy, and she is consumed with passions of love and desire for some of the teachers (male and female), for other girls, (some older,

some much younger), with desire for gratification of her incessant curiosity which the teachers and the set curriculum never fulfil. One of her beloved teachers talks with the tongue of an angel on delightful topics, such as mediaeval life, the crusades, Napoleon Bonaparte and what not. This intelligent child is enthralled, but all the while her half-conscious thought and her wholly unconscious emotion is concerned with questions of love, of physical feelings, of death. No one knows the most important of even those matters with which she consciously concerns herself, so guarded with triple bars of reticence are they, and the teachers and parents have little clue to the threading of the maze of her mind. Such a condition of affairs may be largely unalterable. Long before Freud began his work, the poets and philosophers have pointed out the inevitable isolation of each human soul, but if it is inevitable, then we must know it and drop the unfounded claims made by parents, teachers, and guardians of the young generally that the child is known through and through by them. Here you will say I have spoken of what is largely conscious, but we will see that still more

significant in effect is the work of the unconscious. The identifications and fixations already found in the earliest environment—that of the family (dealt with by Mr. Flügel a fortnight back)—must now transfer themselves to other suitable objects, and the school, the teachers, the fellow-pupils, these become such objects of feeling. The teacher is the substitute now for the father or the mother-figure, and all unknown to himself the child hands over to this new object the love or hate (or both), the sympathy or envy, the admiration or depreciation which the parent figures have already called forth. You will recall the fact stated by Dr. Ernest Jones in his introductory lecture, that human contact, as in group formation, never creates any new psychological element, but only releases reactions and tendencies otherwise obscured. From this we get some explanation of the antagonism so often evinced by the pupil for the teacher of the same sex, and the affection shown for one of the opposite sex or for one of the same sex but sufficiently far away from the original object. The boy can crystallize upon his male teacher all the latent antagonism which in regard to this latter has been repressed by the

opposite emotion: in regard to the teacher the intense repression is unnecessary, the teacher may be made legitimately the scapegoat for the father or mother. But the teacher has another rôle as well, fortunately for his own happiness, perhaps; he can also be the recipient of the love which is the more repressed element in some of the relationships between parent and child: and yet another function he performs, (or rather, should perform, for this function is too little fulfilled by the teacher as a rule) he can be the gratifier and fulfiller of curiosities and speculations, maybe the harmonizer of conflicting ideas—he may be "the leader of the band of eager explorers, *towards* (if never right into) the promised land."

It is inevitable that the unconscious forces shall exert their great influence not only in regard to the relation between teachers and taught, but in innumerable directions: towards the comrades, who become brother and sister or even father and mother substitutes; towards the "subjects" which have links with the unconscious in all sorts of ways; towards the whole process of education which Freud has designated as "the substitu-

tion of the reality-principle for the pleasure principle involving a high degree of sublimation," It is inevitable that this should be, but in face of such a situation we are faced with the obligation first of *recognising* and *realising* the facts—a thing we have not yet begun to do in our educational ideas and methods, secondly, of endeavouring to evolve systems and methods which shall not add to the difficulties and problems inherent in this inevitable situation but will use it to the best advantage for the human creature's happiness and development. Such educational systems will not spring up ready-made: the first essential is knowledge, and perhaps still more, desire to make use of knowledge when gained. That psycho-analysis has already acquired much knowledge of its subject, you have some proof before you in what you have already heard, and if there is a wish to make use of its findings much can be done. But much also must be sacrificed. We have to abandon our own fears and wishes which prevent a realization of reality, placing before us as substitute some more attractive vision, a phantasy of our own making. By this means we are able to turn

away from a knowledge of ourselves, and we employ all manner of weapons for the maintenance of self-ignorance. As Nietzsche realized when he wrote : " Man is exceedingly well-protected from himself and guarded against his self-exploring and self-besieging : as a rule, he can perceive nothing of himself but his outworks." It is this unconscious wish to avoid the painful and the difficult which impels us so often to see the young as compact only of what is attractive and "innocent," of easily malleable substance which can be adapted to adult standards and goals. In addition, such a view gratifies unconsciously the adult's sense of power and affords some compensation for the moulding-process which he himself has been through in earlier life. Education, as we know it, has roughly for its aim the adaptation of the child to the external world by using its powers and energies upon that world. Such a goal is implicit in Freud's own statement, though only a part of the truth involved. This process we must learn to realize is a very intricate, very delicate, very gradual affair, especially as regards the adaptation of the unconscious psychic life, whereas we are apt

to consider consciousness alone, and even that we seek to speed up with very undue haste.

The following passage from a paper on "The Conflicts in the Unconscious of the Child" by Dr. Eder and Mrs. Eder, expresses that danger. "In the physical and intellectual spheres we have recognised, tardily it is true, and still too often only in theory, how great a distance the child must traverse—no less than from primitive man to the pinnacle of our present civilisation—in the few years of life. But in the emotional and ethical aspects the adult criterion still reigns. The babe has no easy path to grow into the civilisation of its time: it brings indeed much with it from more primitive times, but also the potentiality innate not only of reaching the current standard of civilisation but of pushing it on a stage farther. The child is thus not born at the zenith of its own civilisation: rather it belongs to the 'lower culture," the twilight of myth and fable. From this babe, thus always in a condition of unstable equilibrium, and therefore exquisitely sensitive to injury like all embryonic tissue, we demand a rigid standard of behaviour and feeling applicable enough to the relatively stable adult . . .

The child, the ordinary normal child, so apt for civilisation is anxious to conform to the external demand. Thus there grows up very early a differentiation between what he will talk of, play at with his fellows, and what he will produce for parents, nurses, teachers . . . We at present know too little to permit the laying down of hard and fast rules, but the great danger seems to us to lie in going too quickly, in imposing an external compulsion that is too far removed from the standard of civilisation *which the child has reached within himself*." The child must enter the alien adult world at his own pace, encouraged as he should be by the environment provided, leaving behind him the phantasy-world—his beloved native land from which the demands of life must separate him.

Nothing could better illustrate the necessity of the psycho-analytic test of validity in psychic spheres than this question of phantasy, but it is impossible to approach it or make judgments concerning it without a knowledge of the Unconscious and its mechanisms. In the existence of every human being phantasy plays a vital and continuous part, and has many manifestations, two or three of the

most important of which must be touched upon. Phantasy is always the expression of the Unconscious (although it may have conscious elements in it as manifested to our knowledge), a wish-fulfilment, from the fancy of the tiny child that he is a giant, lord of all, ruling a great kingdom, to the phantasy of the creative artist who is able to make of his phantasies (the raw material) a finished product of the greatest objective value to mankind.

It is in this aspect of *wish-fulfilment* that phantasy plays one important part: through understanding of the phantasies of child and adult, we gain a more complete understanding of the human mind, especially in the sphere of the unconscious. The myth-makers, for instance, who phantasied the Happy Isles of the Blest were expressing their desire for eternal youth and strength and their fear of death; at a still deeper level the turning towards the mother once again, the haven of peace and effortless existence. The author of "Alice in Wonderland," and "Alice thro' the Looking-glass," along with the countless multitudes of readers who delight in his phantasy, has there expressed his wish to remain the little creature, able to creep snug

and warm into delightful and mysterious spots, able to enter unknown lands (the land "Behind the Looking-glass") and to penetrate others' secret doings—in short to be omnipotent and omniscient, yet free from danger and responsibility. The child lives the larger part of his early life in this world of phantasy — partly because his immature development creates in him a continuous stream of wishes, which the external world and his own inner power, or rather lack of power, combine to thwart; hence the phantasy is not only the expression of such unfulfilled wishes, but also a *compensatory activity*, whose function is to lessen the pain of unfulfilled desires. This is a second aspect to touch upon, and its importance is great. For the child (that immature "delicately-poised unstable entity" referred to in my extract above), life-development would be impossible without the compensatory force of phantasy. The gulf between the subjective life—the life of egocentric pleasures and fulfilment which is the infant's heritage—and the objective life he must enter into, would be impassable without this bridge of phantasy which spans the chasm between the irreconcilable claims of the object

and of the subject, the creature and his outer world. To a more limited extent, this is true in reference to the adult, but there is this great difference: the child has a legitimate right to his phantasies, the adult must recognize phantasies as such and must forego them, even much against his desire, in favour of a realization and facing of the real objective world, else he meets with shipwreck. Probably we all would echo Robert Louis Stevenson's wish that he might retain some phantasy joys throughout life:

> "Still, O beloved, let me hear
> The great bell beating far and near,
> That odd unknown enchanted gong,
> That on the road hales men along."

There is yet another aspect of phantasy important for consideration, and that is, its function as *explanation* of the unknown and non-understood. The human mind must ask, and answer in some form or another, its own questionings. This is an inevitable mechanism of mind, and such answers are provided in the beginning of life, and very largely throughout life, by phantasy material. As has been said: "Phantasy is the creative activity which

gives birth to the answers to all questions admitting of answers," and I would add—to all not admitting of answers in any rational sense. All the great questions of the origin of life, of death, of mysterious sex-processes, of the impulses to love and hate, beauty and ugliness which stir the child, must be, mainly at least, replied to by his own phantasy, and one may say that his phantasy-answers are his way of coming to terms with these problems, often fraught with such fear and suffering for him; just as we have now come to see, through the genius of Freud, that every neurosis is a sort of phantasy elaborated by the sufferer to enable him to make some compromise (however unsuitable and wasteful) with what he sees as reality.

What is the bearing upon education, and what has education to say to this situation? Clearly it must be the work of the educator first *to understand* what part phantasy is playing in the child, for without such understanding he is only dealing with a fraction of the human being before him: secondly, to help the child by degrees to abandon the pleasure-life of phantasy for the life of reality, a thing quite impossible unless he has comprehension of the

child's phantasies and their significance to the owner: thirdly, to supply where possible, adequate reality-explanations which the child can accept in place of his phantasy-explanations, which he must hold, as I have already pointed out, rather than no explanation at all. Such work carried out through education may help to remove at least some of the inhibitions and obstacles in the way of the individual's development. If I may take an example or two in passing, my meaning may be clearer. To turn to the first aspect of phantasy, the expression of unfulfilled wishes: how little our educators and educational methods reck of this. Parents, nurses, teachers, they scarcely give a thought to noting or seeking to interpret such expression, so often revealed in symbolic acts, in strange forms of naughtiness, in childish "illness" in daydreaming or nightmare. It is clear that in the case of the very young child, only by means of his own free expression in play, in talking, in any kind of doing can we get at the phantasies which possess him, from which follows, incidentally, the rightness of condemnation of any mass instruction and great classes, and the validity of Madame Montessori's idea of leaving the child

to carry out his own pursuits as far as possible, with those to supervise him who are adequate observers and interpreters. An instance from child-analysis will illustrate the need for such skilled observation and interpretation. A boy of five was presented by his parents with a very fine live rabbit as an "Easter-egg," to which he became passionately attached. He believed that the rabbit could perform all sorts of actions, could bring him gifts, find him treasures, tell him secrets and so forth, and he became most solicitous for its safety and comfort (desired to give up his own food lest the rabbit should be hungry). About a couple of months after this gift, he was given some Marzipan sweetmeats, shaped as small rabbits, and on being told that they were for him to eat, angrily pushed away the gift, bursting into tears and sobbing out, "No, no, they are the children of the Easter rabbit," to the extreme bewilderment of his concerned parents. By means of the analyst's observation and help, the child revealed (unconsciously) the source of his emotion. His live rabbit had become identified with both his father and himself, hence the marked interest in, and solicitude for, the creature. The child had

transferred from his father on to his Easter-rabbit belief in the former's miraculous powers, strength, omniscience, benevolence, and equally his own interest in, and love for the father: through this situation, in which he is the tiny child, loved and protected, the little Marzipan rabbits can easily be identified with himself and his indignation and grief over their destruction were emotions in reality directed towards himself, behind which more unconscious desires lay hidden, since the eating of the child by the parent is an expression of the unconscious desire for the closest contact—even incorporation—with the beloved father. The manifest anger and sorrow, then, cover the child's phantasies and wishes concerning his relations with his father—love for, and dread of, desire to be, and fear of being, dominated, (eaten) by the latter. But the Marzipan rabbits have also another role, inasmuch as the child identifies himself with the live rabbit, and so himself becomes the father, and the little rabbits his own children, which he fears to eat. This covers deeper phantasies concerning birth and its mechanism, especially those connecting birth with the mouth, the taking of substances into the body resulting

in a giving birth, so familiar a theme in the records of primitive peoples, in mythology, in folk-lore (compare the story of Dionysus who is killed and dismembered by the Titans, who in their turn were slain by Zeus: then Zeus swallowed the heart of Dionysus and the latter is reborn as Iakcos; of Hiawatha who overpowers (devours) Mondamin and from whose grave springs forth the maize-god, to nourish man-kind; of the queen-mother in "Little Snow-white" who eats an orange-pip and soon after is delivered of the daughter (Snow-white.)

It is now possible to interpret the behaviour of the five-year-old in respect to his rabbits, behaviour which is not only unintelligible to the adult without the clue provided by knowlege of the unconscious, but also covers ideas and desires which need understanding in the interests of the child himself.

Another instance illustrates the significance of a seemingly unreasonable dislike to a school subject, so commonly met with among children, even when the teacher is appreciated personally. A boy of nine years, very bright and intelligent, was brought to the analyst on account of his unaccountably tiresome be-

haviour in a new class and in addition his recourse to petty pilfering. All the first days of treatment were occupied by the child's complaints against his geography-lessons and geography-teacher: he learnt about stupid things, he said, rivers and mountains and forests, (it should be noted that evidence was obtained that this particular geography-teaching was excellent, vivid and real, and much enjoyed by the majority of the class). In answer to the analyst's question whether he never heard about the people in the foreign lands he studied, he grudgingly admitted that he did, saying: "Oh yes, and we learn a lot about them, their dress and houses, but not anything very interesting."

After a longer investigation involving a good deal of patient, laborious work, the real grievance against the geography (and its teacher) was laid bare. The boy was deeply concerned with the problem of "How do people get born;" hence his interest in *people*, which really signified "In what way were men and women different?" and his consequent disappointment and anger when "not very interesting things" concerning people were the only ones talked of (e.g. their customs and

dress), still leaving undiscovered the eagerly sought-after information. His attention, therefore, could not be concentrated upon the geography-work presented to him, for it was distracted by a more powerful unconscious interest: his disappointment expressed itself in dislike of the whole subject and hostility towards the teacher of it, since she appears to him the manifest cause, and further he vents on her an earlier and quite unconscious hostility felt towards his mother who had refused to answer his questioning about the origin of babies two years before. After being told in a very simple way what he so ardently wished to know, he was able to return to his geography with normal interest and his hostility towards it entirely died down. Such an example serves well to show how intricate and how delicate are the unconscious associations which any one thing may set up and how necessary it is to have some knowledge of the possibilities at work. In this case, the analyst quickly realized that an emotional attitude towards his geography was extremely likely to indicate (as later proved to be the case) some curiosity of a sexual kind, since landscape and countries have been found again and again, in

dream, in mythology, in art, to symbolize the human body and its mechanisms, a fact not very hard to appreciate if we merely consider geographical terminology, *e.g.*, headland, mouth, arms (of a bay), nose (ness, naze), breast (of a mountain), shoulders (of a plateau), and so forth.

At a little later stage when a more formal education must come about, we want to be able still to observe and interpret the phantasy-manifestations, and to add a more positive work—to provide material of education most suitable for developing a reality-life out of, and away from, the phantasy-life, in so far as this is possible.

This work of providing suitable material may be considered in its positive and negative aspects. We can help to *prevent* or lessen undue phantasy and harmful phantasy by realising what the phantasy stands for, and by trying to create circumstances within and without which will make such phantasy unnecessary. To take one or two simple examples: the powerful wish of the little child to be admired, adored, the centre of everything, with its accompanying antagonism to others—brothers and sisters, for example—who stand in the

way, can be rendered unnecessary to some extent by giving very full measure of praise and appreciation for all achievement on the child's part and by trying to get it to do what the others do not do, at the same time letting it see admiration given to the rest for their different qualities. It is psychologically a mistaken virtue to attempt to treat human beings alike. "To each according to his merits, from each according to his ability," is much more sound doctrine for developing a reality-adjustment, only "merits" must be interpreted, in early life at least, subjectively as well as objectively. The product of school and college education so often has to face the bitterest disappointments in life—perhaps resulting in neurosis—owing to the profound narcissism which has been promoted all along the line by his education. It may be that his youthful successes, easily won and unduly praised, become for him a cover under which he can remain secure from adventuring forth to new efforts in which his "beloved ego" may meet with some rebuffs, hence he will demand less of himself than is possible. It may be that the ego-ideal is too exalted—he demands far too much of himself, in response

to criteria which have very early become strong influences, *e.g.*, he must be as clever, as quick, as nice as his elder or younger brother —his objective achievement falls short of this ideal, and he again returns to narcissistic self-pity, self-reproach, or hostility to the rest of the world. Both the compensatory phantasy and the explanatory (if I may call it so) can be, to some extent, mitigated or diverted from their more dangerous aspects by providing, in the one case, more opportunities for obtaining compensation from reality, and in the other suitable reality explanations. Both of which things are easier said than done, I hasten to add, and how to carry them out is, and probably always must be, a matter calling for much knowledge, wisdom, and artistic quality. But something can be done with the aid of psycho-analytical knowledge: here is an instance of reality-compensation. Parents and teachers (provided they are able to adjust themselves to reality and forego regret and envy concerning their own vanished youth) can lay far more emphasis than they are wont to do on the advantages of being small and young (which are many) not only on the disadvantages. The child's life is dogged by its

inferiority sense, which is to some extent inevitable since it shares a world with adults, but it can be made to feel that its smallness, its youngness, its lack of burdens, its *own* kind of knowledge, are possessions of great value. Reality-explanations are a difficult problem, especially those concerning sex-matters, which are among those of most import to the child. Here again, without some psychoanalytical knowledge we are likely to go far wrong in our treatment of the question: neither the outcry for educating child and adolescent in sex-matters at school, nor for leaving such matters alone, will solve the problem—one, it must be remembered, linked to the profoundest instincts and emotions which will never be dealt with by mere intellectual approach, however excellent. Any such "instruction" and explanation must be linked on to the unconscious mental life of the child, so rich and varied in phantasy; for example, the father, very often in the young child's unconscious, is someone who is fierce and hurtful to the mother, and in answering his questions it is essential to give explanations acceptable by him at the given stage.

By this I am not suggesting that perversions

of the truth be told, unless inevitable; on the contrary, as much of the truth as is possible in answer to the child's questionings, but it is not always possible, and that must be recognized by the adults. The adult's "truth" is not the child's, nor can they ever be identical. With the adolescent a new stage of development is reached. Psycho-analytic research has been able to show that the stage of adolescence is surprisingly similar to that of the child in infancy (*i.e.* up to five or thereabouts), that indeed, according as the child up to five has manifested capacity for inhibition (*i.e.* for exchanging the pleasure-principle for the reality-principle) so he will evince such capacity in his adolescence. Dr. Ernest Jones, in a paper on "Some Problems of Adolescence" (*British Journal of Psychology*, 1922,) writes: "I venture to propound the general law that adolescence recapitulates infancy, and that the precise way in which a given person will pass through the necessary stages of development in adolescence is to a very great extent determined by the form of his infantile development." One of the striking parallels which he points out is the rich phantasy life in both, a second is the

acquirement of inhibition capacity. The bearing of this upon education is plain: the essential motive force in the educational process, at home and outside it, is the attachment of the inhibited libido (that is, the process by which feeling diverted from sexual goals is directed on to non-sexual ones, commonly known as the sublimation process) which thus implies both inhibition-capacity and freedom from inhibition at one and the same time. Too much repression, as also not enough repression, hinder this process. It is often erroneously supposed that by sublimation is meant a conscious process, a leading of the individual consciously, by the conscious agency of the educator, to more developed ideals. Such a process of course takes place, but is insignificant compared with the unconscious process which, from its very quality of unconsciousness, cannot be directly controlled. In his most recent published volume, "Das Ich und Das Es" (The Ego and the It), Freud has developed further his discoveries in connection with sublimation, showing that through this process the ego-ideal is evolved, which expresses the moral and æsthetic tendencies in the ego. He writes :—

"We need not share the anxiety (often expressed as a reproach against psycho-analysis) concerning the persistence of the higher nature of man, so long as we concern ourselves with the study of the repressed material in the psychic life. Now that we venture upon the analysis of the ego, we are able to answer all of those whose moral consciousness is shocked and who have complained (*i.e.* that psycho-analysis does not concern itself with the higher, moral, impersonal qualities of mankind) as follows: 'Certainly, and this is the higher nature, the ego-ideal or super-ego, the representative of our training by our parents. As little children have we known this higher nature, admired it, feared it, and later incorporated it into ourselves.' . . .

"It is easy to show that the ego-ideal is sufficient for all claims made upon the higher nature in human beings. As a substitution for the desire of the father, it enfolds the kernel out of which all religions have been built up. The conviction of personal inadequacy in comparison with its ideal by the ego gives rise to the humble religious attitude professed by the ardent believer. During the further course of development, teachers and

authorities have kept up the father-rôle, whose prohibitions and commands have remained powerful in the ego-ideal, and still exercise moral censorship as conscience . . . The social sense arises from identifications with others upon the grounds of similar ego-ideals."

The bearing of the above upon the educational process will be clear. First, it reaffirms and strengthens the evidence for the fact already referred to, namely, that the unconscious work carried out by the educator must be a continuation of the links already forged between parents (or other family relations) and child: secondly, it shows that the sublimation process, upon the possibility of which the educating process must largely depend, is bound up with the repressions, and it is useless to hope to give any directive-aid to the former (sublimating process) without a recognition and understanding of the latter. The mechanisms of sublimation which Freud deals with in this book, will have great bearing upon the science of education, and one of the most valuable pieces of work the teacher-psychologist will have to carry out in the near future is the finding of the material and methods best suited to aid sublimation. We

know, very roughly, a certain amount in this direction. The familiar recourse, for example, to games and other vigorous pursuits at the period of male adolescence has some reality-basis, (it is a fact that the majority of human beings do achieve, however partially and imperfectly, sublimation of primitive sexual impulses), but it is obvious how much is still left to be discovered and understood. The root principle of the process is hardly yet grasped, namely, that the transference of libido from a sexual impulse directed towards a sexual goal on to a non-sexual activity directed towards a non-sexual goal, will only be made if the latter goal and the path leading to it can adequately represent and satisfy the original desire: not mere substitution, but a real replacement is an essential condition for sublimation (for instance, play with sand and water for the very young child replaces more closely the more primitive interest in his own functions, than plasticine or paint). The problems of how best to achieve such replacements, the most suitable stages for fulfilment, the most economical methods (in a psychic sense) the degree to which sublimation can be carried—these remain unsolved as yet.

But with knowledge, suitable conditions can be provided, and here comes in the work of the teacher since he himself is one of the most significant of such "conditions." It is this which demands that the teacher become acquainted with the unconscious in his pupils and its mechanisms, which further postulates that he must first know something of his own unconscious. I should be inclined to say that this is the most valuable "next step in education" which we could take: no doubt it is a counsel of perfection to ask for all concerned in education to get this knowledge of the unconscious, though I believe it will be a part of the educational equipment in days to come. At all events it is a goal to set before us. We could go a certain way towards that goal here and now if as many teachers as could, would avail themselves of the existing opportunities for getting analysis, and if educational bodies and authorities would realize the need of the expert analyst in the work of education. Once more, there is neither time nor opportunity for detail, beyond a few words. The teacher (the parent substitute) has unusually large opportunities for indulging his own unconscious gratified wishes, and when we look closely

into the matter we realize how many of the educational theories and systems are the product of such unconscious desires. Exhibitionism, hostility towards the parent-figures, envy of the child, these can get satisfaction in such ways as great display in teaching, love of dominating large masses of pupils, (a Headmaster I know has told me: "I always enjoy myself, and I'm sure the boys do too, when I feel I've a jolly good crowd to handle, a great roomful: I hate a handful to teach, it's so tame) or by the ironic, satiric, or frankly tyrannical method of discipline. Equally, fear of one's own hostile emotions, may produce that cult for "freedom" for the child, the child's lead in all things, equality between teachers and pupils, so prevalent at present in the educational world. In the essay on "Politics" it has been pointed out how the demand for fair and impartial dealing and democratic ideals may be a reaction to an ungratified power desire. "If I can't get first place, no one else shall, we'll be all alike." Consider the attitude towards emotional relations in the school, sometimes an over-indulgence in them, more commonly a drastic suppression of them (again and again I

have heard Heads of Schools, male and female, inform audiences amidst much applause. "In my school we have only healthy relations between the teachers and the pupils: sentimental nonsense, *Schwärmerei*, is quite unknown." But what if we learn from Psycho-analysis that undue repression and the lack of opportunity for necessary emotional expression, is the way to promote emotional difficulties at a later stage, a way to render difficult a developed love-life between two persons of the opposite or even of the same sex? Co-education has been discussed and re-discussed from almost every point of view, it would seem, except the most vital one of all—the point of view which enables us to know what are the unconscious factors involved: we are merely fumbling in the dark so long as we consider consciousness alone. One of the most dynamic influences in human beings, of both sexes, is the castration complex with its innumerable reactions. The woman more generally resolves it into some fairly tolerable aspect by her compensatory specifically feminine functions, functioning either directly in child-bearing (the more satisfactory method for the majority probably) or indirectly

in home-making, child-tending, or in kindred occupations. Now it may be that parallelism and competition with the male make it more difficult for her to bring about these adjustments, direct or indirect, and that therefore an education alongside and of the same type as that of the male is adding still more in the way of repression and inhibition for her to contend with. In the case of the male again, it would seem that his castration complex to some degree is resolved by the achievement of work, (the more creative the more able is it to symbolize the unconsciously-desired yet lost possession) which shall be his distinctly masculine contribution. This adjustment may become all the more difficult if it is impossible for him to achieve anything distinctly masculine in a non-sexual direction. These possible results are only put forward as speculative, but the vital fact of the castration complex and its influence cannot be ignored in any fundamental consideration of the pros and cons of co-education. Another significant matter, very germane to this problem, is the fact—for it is an established fact—that in the early stage of adolescence (just as in infancy) the narcissistic homo-sexual stage is dominant, which

must involve the turning away from the opposite sex to those of the same sex as the adolescent. This can often be seen in working and has of course been noted by writers on the subject. Even inside the co-education school the sexes are constantly to be found segregating themselves; this we know from psycho-analytical findings is in accordance with their appropriate development, yet the co-educators often see in this something false and undesirable, to be removed. When they can delightedly point to the schools in which the two sexes appear (*appear* I say, with set purpose) to be comrades and fellow-workers, without troubles, without emotional difficulties, they believe that all problems are solved. Psycho-analysis, on the contrary, warns us that this may be a false situation, arising from the presence of severe repression which is fated to have its reaction in one direction or another. I am not speaking against co-education necessarily, neither for it: our business as investigators is not to hold briefs for this or that doctrine, but rather to aim at discovering what is involved in the problem.

And so with every other of the problems arising from the educational process, be it a

matter of self-government, self-instruction, mental tests and what not, but above all in relation to that one which is most identified with education and training, the problem of authority. As you have already realised from the two lectures which preceded this, (on the family and politics), the fundamental significance of the parent-figures in the life of the individual, as a unit and as a social being, it will not be so difficult to understand that powerful dynamic emotions must attach themselves to ideas of authority, power and discipline, and I suppose we always have been aware that the educator, whether of the young or of the adult, can effect nothing without authority, however disguised its functioning. The difficulty and danger of this matter, the over functioning or the under functioning of authority (every bit as much a problem for the adult community as for the young) lies in the fact of the marked ambivalency of the human being in this respect—his deeply-seated desire for authority (that is, for the parents, his guides, and patterns and protectors), the equally deep-seated necessity for revolting *against* authority, (that is for freeing himself from the parents

in order to attain his own adult development). As a result we find in both the governor and the governed conflict produced by these opposing motivations. According to inherited disposition and early environment, one or other of the motivations will preponderate, giving us, for example, in the teacher, either the dominating power-loving personality, or the personality who fears to control, who "goes under" with pleasure to a stronger influence (to the head, to another teacher, even to the pupils) and who is wont to insist that there is no need for adult authority in education. It is interesting to note how dominant this latter attitude is in present-day educational ideals and systems, in community life (the following of fashion) in our press (standardized and run by two or three leaders) in our art and our amusements (mass production as in the cinema industry, also standardized) in sport, in occupations, a phenomenon possibly due to the excessive repression resulting from our long-standing industrial era. I have no further space to continue this subject, except to say that if we wish to find any solution of this "authority" problem we are forced to study

it from its root upwards, and its root lies in the unconscious.

The conception of education as a bridge from the infantile to developed adult life can only have meaning in so far as it is a system which serves to link the latter phase to the earlier, and is able to realise at every step the significant motives in human conduct: as the other writers in this volume have already pointed out, innumerable factors must enter into all our desires, our ideas, our behaviour. I have aimed only at drawing attention to a few of the less known, and some of the unknown, those which operate in that territory so mysterious, so inaccessible without toil and effort, often so terrifying to the voyager therein—the realm of the unconscious.

CHAPTER VI

VOCATION

BY

ELLA FREEMAN SHARPE

VOCATIONS—in the sense in which the term is employed in this paper—like true marriages, are made in Heaven, the Heaven that lies about us in our infancy, when all things are lawful, nothing common or unclean, the golden age before

> "Custom lies upon us with a weight
> Heavy as frost and deep almost as life."

We need to unlearn a great deal of our sophistication before we can enter without our dull unimaginative reactions of repulsion and disgust into the amazing world to which the infant comes screaming and protesting at its expulsion from Nirvana. Through the gateways of the five senses he finds himself and the world around. For him there is no

taboo concerning seeing, touching, hearing, smelling, tasting. His initial interest is his own body. His initial curiosity is himself. His first powers are his own bodily functionings. The first phantasies are concerned with these things, until they take a wider range and concern others. The world is full of a great number of things—before outward discipline eliminates many and the slow incorporation of the ego-ideal represses the interest in them to the unconscious. Yet

> "Those first affections,
> Those shadowy recollections,
> Which be they what they may,
> Are yet the fountain light of all our day."

there at the hidden root of us lie the primal impulses to see, feel, touch, smell, taste, the curiosity and phantasies of all we experienced in the earliest infancy.

If we ask what shall we do with our boys and girls at sixteen, it is a different question from the one we ask about a lively child of two. The boy or girl often does not know what to do, and of the child we do not know what it will be doing next, it has a hundred—generally adjudged—mischievous, naughty, dirty, tiresome ideas ready for execution.

Now a person who finds a real vocation has carried the maximum amount of energy that was invested in those early infantile pleasures up through successive stages of development from one form to another—the vocation or calling of adult years is engrossing, satisfying, pleasurable, because it is charged with an interest that springs from the very roots of primitive life. In that case, little hitch in development has occurred. Repression has but served the purpose of sublimation. We might say that the thing tabooed is repressed, but the vital charge of energy with which it was invested has been switched off at just the psychological moment to something that is *not* tabooed, and yet which is capable of taking the energy charge. So that the energy belonging to the forbidden repressed thing is not dragged down to the submerged mind.

We might put it in another way—the person with a vocation is one who

> "When brought among the tasks of real life, hath wrought
> Upon the plan that pleased his childish thought"

only that we must understand "unconscious" thought.

Or let us think of a waterfall in its natural power as emblematic of our impulsive primitive life—a great spectacle. Then think of its power turned to light and heat, the greatest conversion into light and heat, and that means the most effective machinery, conduits, contacts. The water hidden deepest in the earth springs to the greatest height, but that means fine and accurate borings. And we cannot wait till adult life to do the boring, the energy must find its way from stage to stage of development.

The term vocation is perhaps most fitly applied to those adult callings that by their spontaneity and individuality seem to adopt the individual rather than that the individual has adopted them. Spontaneity and individuality are commensurate with ability to perform, and pleasure with toil go together. Wherever this occurs the deepest phantasies of the infantile pleasure life have successfully gained a socialised objective accomplishment satisfactory to the ego.

Let us try in a very general way to comprehend something of the difficulties encountered and surmounted when phantasies of the infantile pleasure life have succeeded

in gaining a socialised accomplishment satisfactory to the ego.

We will return to the infant. We see in him a creature nearest to the big elemental things of Nature, nearest to Nature's forces, the immense experience of birth having been gone through, and seeing, feeling himself, and the mother in a primitive way. The elemental interest concerns the functions of his little body, the products of the body, feeling his power in producing, seeing the effects of his power in production. Every detail is absorbing, whether it be sound, sight, colour, shape,—earth, air, fire, water—the elementals of the macrocosm—he meets in the microcosm of "his little worlded self."

Now we will take a big jump from there. A great explorer, a born traveller, a great astronomer, a physicist, a physiologist, a chemist, will illustrate very clearly the socialised accomplishment satisfactory to the ego, based upon these elementals of the pleasure life of the infant, curiosity concerning earth, air, fire, water—what they are, how they work, the channels of their working, the results of their working.

Or take another order of vocation—the

artist, and we will confine ourselves to the artist-genius in the first place. The poet—with his innate knowledge and manipulation of sound—and rhythm. "I hear a voice that whispers in the wind," says Tennyson at the age of four, when he is found alone in the garden listening to the trees shaken in storm. "I lisped in numbers—for the numbers came," says another. Think of Byron's "Ode to the Ocean," or Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind," or where you will in great verse, of the detailed, vivid, intimate feeling-knowledge of the natural forces and one cannot fail to recognise that the elemental interest and knowledge of the infantile world has been resolved into the intimate feeling-knowledge (with all the power of translating to others) of the elemental things of the universe. Or think of musicians, whose driving interest is sound, and rhythm too, but whose fingers are so often the means of its production. Artists of the brush, whose hands from infancy have been dirty. Sculptors, with their first love of the human form rescued from taboo. Or one step removed from the concrete sublimation of these first elemental interests lies the abstract. All those who are

engrossed in mind processes, the born teacher who knows how to draw the child's capabilities out, understands the child's difficulties, can see the child's point of view—the teacher not to be confounded with the born disciplinarian, or the imparter of knowledge: the teacher, that is, who is allied to the artist—and has innate feeling for mind-processes—which are but one remove in the sublimation process from the elemental interest in watching and knowing *how* the body worked e.g. Pestalozzi —Froebel. Think of the great inquirers into the world of mind; the great dramatists and novelists with their innate capacity for feeling their way into the minds of others—into other situations than their own—identifying themselves with each other and all so that they know what it is to *be* there, *feel* like that, and in consequence *do* what these people did.

We have taken genius as the supreme example for the sake of clarity. In actuality we have every shade of degree from mere casual interest to supreme interest and participation in these particular sublimations based upon the first infantile stage of development. And of course there is the incalculable factor of just *what* attracts the infant's interest

most—sight and the thing seen, or touch and the things touched, or sound and things heard,—the actual producing or the things produced—processes or results. But according as the interest falls,—and "the spirit listeth where it will, in mystery the soul abides"—into that we cannot penetrate,—but according as it falls, so have we the potentiality at least of the sublimation in later life of one of these spontaneous—one might say, predestined vocations which carry with them that mysterious quality of inspiration and sense of inner knowledge.

But let us return to our infant in that first stage of oral and anal interests. Let us remember that they belong to both girl and boy infant alike. That the first phantasies of how things are made are based upon personal experience of making things from the self—the child has the evidence of its own senses. The first obstinate questionings of the little creature moving about in worlds unrealised cannot be put into words—it supplies its own answer. They are the answers that the great world stories give. Man was made from dust. Woman was made by taking something from man. In the Apocrypha the boy Jesus picks

up the mud and fashions it into birds and they fly. These are the phantasies of every child's unconscious mind absorbed in problems of life, death, of how babies are born—where they go to when they die. And both the little boy and the little girl, through the power of identification, and ignorant of the different functions of the sexes—in this anal phase of development—are alike procreators.

Now if an attempt is made to trace what may happen in two divergent developments in the case of two boy children, it must not be thought these are to be considered normal and abnormal. There is no norm, no standard case, there is an infinite number of variations, as infinite as the incalculable inherited dispositions, the infinite variety of parents, nurses, teachers, the whole infinite number of differences in environment which in any one or every particular may influence the child's development.

Take the case of the boy who as the repression sets in identifies himself narcissistically with the father—the mother becoming the boy's first love-object. We have then the typical Œdipus situation. The early repressed anal interests, symbolical of power and pro-

duction, become linked unconsciously with the power of the phallus. So that anal phantasies and sexual phantasies are inseparable from the unconscious love of the mother. Boys who proceed smoothly along this line of development generally want to be engine drivers, or tram conductors, or motorists. They must have machines with intricate parts which they understand, can work, or drive—and they call them "she." Often the interest holds till manhood, and so gives rise to a vocation. The same unconscious motive leads some boys to sea with the hope of the command of a ship, and others to the land where the ploughshare furrows the earth, and it is made fruitful. Or curiosity and phantasy regarding the mother may lead in other directions, *e.g.* the geologist with his intimate knowledge of the earth, the botanist with his knowledge of how things grow. We have mentioned before the physicist, the chemist. We might add the banker and mathematician, with their addition and subtraction and multiplication. Although here one finds probably a more vital interest upon the anal power symbol than on the power of the phallus. And one might mention in this

connection the concentration of interest upon the power symbol of fecal possessions as the unconscious motive that drives some to collect money. Where this is the main unconscious phantasy any business will do—the boy will make money—it is a vocation—the business a means to the end. "And is your silver ewes and lambs," asks Antonio, "I cannot tell," says Shylock, "I make it breed as fast."

Now the successful following of any of these vocations means that the Oedipus complex has been just sufficiently repressed, and that the guilt reactions are not inhibiting. Guilt concerning curiosity and the unconscious sexual phantasies woven concerning the mother will inhibit in every variable degree to actual prevention such sublimations as these. Intellectual curiosity may be thwarted, the interest will flow only in certain directions, some channels are tabooed because unconsciously associated with the repressed phantasies—so enormously narrowing down the actual possible *choice* of vocation.

The unconscious guilt situation in relation to the father is partly responsible for this, but it is complicated also by the attitude of the love-object herself, namely the mother. For

as she is generally the first disciplinarian in connection with the formation of cleanly habits, a conflict arises on this ground too, causing the boy's ambivalence to her, and enhancing the guilt feeling regarding the phantasies which are woven around her.

A too narcissistic identification with the father may or may not lead to choice of successful vocation. If the boy's talents are similar to the father's, then the following of the same profession or carrying on of the same business will turn out well, but unconscious motive may here be at variance with actual capabilities, which but for the too strong identification might lead to happier results. On the other hand the negative attitude arising out of the unresolved Œdipus situation may lead to the son's refusal to follow any calling associated with the idea of the father, either in actual fact, or by suggestion, and it may well be that the boy's faculties fit him for the accomplishment of such tasks. Or the unconscious desire to prove superior to the father may be successful if the boy's actual talents are commensurate with the motive, but if not we have the spectacle of a vain endeavour to do things

beyond the actual skill and power possessed. The exhibitionistic motive common to all children may be happily gratified in artistic and intellectual attainment. But if this motive is very strong, and associated, as it always is, with anal and sexual phantasies, the consequent guilt reactions will inhibit initiative; hence the avoidance of vocations which may mean any individualising or prominence of the self before other people; or the successful following of vocations where the individual himself is prominent will be seriously hampered by self-consciousness and sensitiveness to public opinion.

Out of the very conflict with the Œdipus situation, the problem of adjustment with the brothers and sisters, the sense of justice and injustice, the sense of guilt and punishment unconsciously meted out to the self and visited upon others—out of this conflict some children find their way to a vocation. It may be the law, which through childhood has been the unconscious problem. The great advocate pleading passionately for the life of the condemned has indicted himself at the bar of his own conscience. The unconscious phantasies were never executed, but of their execution

many prisoners will stand convicted. "There, but for the grace of God," or in other words, a sane psychological development. And this is the meaning of the fervour of the great advocate. He has identified himself with the prisoner, and can plead his cause. And the judge theoretically must be above the conflict, neither the injuring or the injured party, beyond identification with either—neither father nor son—beyond bias—or shadow of turning. One surmises the motive leading towards this ultimate high place of power, to be that of attainment of the place of the exalted father imago—the omnipotent wielder of life and death—or reward and punishment over the lives of men. One surmises too that justice is the more nearly reached the more the judge himself has resolved this inner conflict between father and son in his own soul.

The conflict between the self's ego-ideal and the libido strivings leads many to the vocation of teaching. We find the assimilation of our own ego-ideal so difficult, that we can find some easing from the conflict by imposing it on others.

"I would rather teach twenty what 'twere good to do
Than be one of the twenty to follow mine own instruction"

says Portia. The way of righteousness is very difficult for us. It has been so difficult for us to be good, that we can only think it will be just as difficult for others. We have so hardly saved our own souls, that we must perforce find the saving of souls the absorbing task. Morality will fall into decay unless we expend ourselves supporting it—so some preach, and some become missionaries—and others teach. But some teach "with a difference," as some wear their rue with a difference. And the difference is this—that some impose on others what they have suffered themselves. They are the great disciplinarians. There are those whose motive is to teach and train as they themselves were never taught and trained. They better their own instruction. And where this driving motive is united to an innate interest in the processes of mind we get the pioneers of new educational methods.

Let us turn next to the case of the boy who makes a strong unconscious identification with the mother, instead of the father. Again we will take an extreme case for the purpose of illuminating the psychological mechanism. In such strong identifications the little boy wishes to be like the mother physically,

to be able to do as she does, to be the beloved of the father. Homo-sexuality, of course, arises upon this foundation. I once had the privilege of a little boy's confidence. You will not be shocked at a little boy's confidences. A grown-up gets the truth so rarely from a child that it is very precious when one is so entrusted with it. He had had a happy holiday in the country, and he told me of all the glad things he had seen, among them were goats which the farmer had milked. The little boy's eyes were eager with excitement, and pointing in the direction of his own genital organ he said "And that's where *my* milk will come from." I heard also another remark he made later. "Can fathers give milk to babies?" "No," was the answer. "Do fathers have babies inside them?" "No." "Then," he said, "what are fathers good for?" That gives a glimpse into the kind of thinking that goes on in the mind of a child of this type.

A boy who develops along these lines psychically is going to have a baffling problem when he reaches manhood—neurosis of varying types often being the result. The power of sublimation of the repressed wishes is the

only satisfactory gratification that can be acceptable to the ego, and the greater the identification with the woman the more strenuous the sublimation must be.

In the poetry of a man like Francis Thompson we see an almost complete identification with the woman—his poetry is his child, to which he gives birth with great travail of his spirit.

> "Poet! still, still thou dost rehearse
> In the great fiat of thy verse
> Creation's primal plot.
> And what thy Maker in the whole
> Worked, little maker, in thy soul
> Thou work'st and men know not."

> "Song, a water-child like Earth
> Stands with feet sea-washed—a wild birth."

This is an extreme case. Now there is every imaginable degree of this woman identification. But in the productive genius of poetry, painting, sculpture, we often find the fine flower of its sublimation. In ancient Greece homosexuality did not arouse the horror that it receives in modern times, when the repression is so strong that we fail to get its finest

sublimation, and find the repressed phantasy life resulting in perversions and neurotic symptoms. Greece gave us deathless stories of heroic friendships between men, and it created sculpture that has never since been equalled. In this light too one might look at the great Italian pictures, the painters pre-occupied with the Madonna and suckling child. When men ask where are the great poems, the great sculpture, the great pictures that women have created, we know something of what is at the root of the matter. It begins with the little boy, absorbed with the functions of the mother, her procreative powers, asking "what are fathers good for?" *i.e.* if they are not mothers. The men who have made the greatest sublimations of this unconscious wish, have, so to speak, proved that they too can give birth. A woman cannot sublimate to this exalted state, her own wish to be a mother. Her *actual* potentialities, the constant recurrence of physical processes within her that mean the ever-present possibility of giving real birth will always mean less sublimation. She does not need the compensation, she has the actuality.

We have mentioned extreme types. In

some degree or other the repressed woman identification is present in every boy's psychology—the greater the degree the more we shall find the unconscious selection of vocation that approximates to association, unconscious or conscious, with the feminine rôle. Butchers, for instance, are a very different race of beings from bakers. One sees the evidences of their sadistic work in the shops and markets. But the baker bakes whole things in ovens, or he brings the loaves in baskets and delivers them at the door. His satisfaction is a more withdrawn, a more interior one than the expansive self-assurance of the butcher. As for milkmen, one cannot imagine a gratification so complete as his must be. I am told that over ninety per cent. of the milk-dealers in London are Welsh. Again one can only think of Welsh fervour, Welsh oratory, Welsh bards, the flow of eloquence so characteristic of the Celt. So one supposes if a Welshman has no exalted channel of sublimation he perforce turns to supplying milk.

Who can doubt that in other circumstances the postman would be a poet? There is such daily yielding up—the bag and the letters—the letters dropped through the hole in the

door. And nothing given him in return! It is surely most poetic of humble callings.

We will turn to the question of women's vocation. Let us recapitulate the normal development, only remembering again that there is no normal, but infinite individualising of reaction to fundamental impulses. We must keep in mind that for the first years of childhood until the approach to puberty there is the minimum difference between the sexes psychologically—less than there can ever be again. One might mention two outstanding considerations upon which later psychological developments depend. For the girl as for the boy the infantile anal interests are constant, the curiosity concerning birth and sexual life are the same. The phantasy of the wish and power to produce a child in the case of the girl is in line with her biological function. The girl as a rule, however, for several fundamental reasons—the greater severity of the mother to the daughter, than mother to son, being a simpler reason—makes earlier and greater reactions to the anal interests. As a rule, too, her exhibitionistic trend is more repressed. The other incalculable factor is what hidden reaction—what phantasy ex-

planation the little girl is going to make of the actual fact demonstrated to her by actual sight—of the difference between her own anatomy and her brother's, or if she has no brother, then at the time, sooner or later, when she experiences this fact. She will not ask questions—and if she did, she could not then comprehend the difference, or appreciate any evaluation of the difference. For her it is something missing, not there, lost. Why? Whose fault? Will it grow? When? are questions and speculations in the child's mind, the self-supplied answers to which are bound up with many courses of outward conduct, habits of mind, and emotional attitudes. It is not apparent to the girl-child that she, too, possesses organs the boy has not; seeing is believing, and the boy scores, and she is the loser. This initial loss is all along accompanied by other evidences that the boy has the advantage, greater physical strength, and its demonstration in all outdoor activities, the greater independenee and freedom the boy is always allowed in comparison with the girl. The envy and resentment may be repressed. It is often quite open and conscious, but it is there, always in the girl's unconscious mind.

The degree of that envy, how it is modified, compensated for, resolved, upon these depend largely both the question of vocation and the satisfactory adaptation to life in general.

The period of adolescence brings to a girl a much closer involvement, a nearer contact with the great processes of Nature, than it does for a boy. She is much more implicated and responsible for the next generation than he is. There is no escape from the fact that she has a biological vocation, that of motherhood, and motherhood is a vocation in a different sense altogether from that of fatherhood.

The so-called normal girl in the course of the early years identifies herself with her mother in her unconscious attitude to the father. When this fixation is not too strongly rooted and repressed, in due time her love passes to a mate, and she bears children. The envy of the male ceases to trouble her so much. She has the compensation of children. In the case of girls who thus complete a normal development, vocations of an absorbing type —the necessity for a life work—can never be so serious a matter as it is for a boy. The unconscious mind is set upon one goal, marriage

and children. And in such cases the intervening years can be spent in professions, businesses, or work that may be interesting or profitable—for any such normal girl will have sufficient freed energy, and consequently interest, to furnish activities. Were our educational systems not so motivated by the unconscious envy of the man we should see a worthier place in the girl's curriculum held by all the allied subjects that belong to this biological vocation—house-keeping, child study, physiology, psychology, along-side with those natural sublimations of the sexual impulse—music and dancing, and interest in great literature.

It is when one considers the case of the unmarried woman of normal psychological development that the question of vocation becomes of the most serious moment. For this reason, that she has no great desire to emulate men, to rival them, to take their place. Her desires are those that lead to differentiation—to complement—rather than re-duplication. For some years, the young and waiting years, any occupation that is to the woman's taste, and within her scope and environment will satisfy her. But after that

time, typing and shorthand, teaching, business, the social or frivolous round are found inadequate enough as substitutes for the natural vocation. It is here again that the severer repression and our unconsciously motivated educational system prevent the wider and deeper satisfaction of true sublimations.

The anal interests common alike to boy and girl lead to sublimation so much oftener for the boy than for the girl. The girl as a rule makes reactions. In the ruling and ordering of her environment, in neatness and cleanliness of person she finds satisfaction. But research in educational method based on knowledge of psycho-analytic principles might lead to discovery of more effective channels of actual sublimation. For instance, the taste and cult of hand-wrought things and their appreciation lies with the cultured classes. It was not always so. The peasant arts were once the production of peasant hands. Machinery robs us of this natural sublimation of anal interests of hand-wrought pottery, weaving, dyeing, the production of simple and beautiful things that could be used—things that in the making would bring joy and satisfaction. A greater satisfaction one would think than the

pampered lap-dog of the childless woman. For we must remember that the anal phantasies of the early days are inwoven with the desire for a child.

Where the girl is hampered in psychological development by a deeply repressed father fixation with the consequent repression of the wish for children, we may have neurotic illnesses and serious inhibition. One very common inhibition is that of intellectual curiosity with its prevention in any serious participation in intellectual interests—quite a different thing from lack of intellectual capacity.

I remember once a little girl of nine who grew nervous and unhappy at school. She was discovered giving to her teacher at the end of the week marks for bad conduct. It was the custom of the school that each child kept a record of the bad conduct marks awarded during the week. The little girl did this for a week or two. But as she was a good child the teachers were puzzled, and consulted one another. It was found she was awarding *herself* bad marks. The mother was consulted, and as Betty seemed nervous and ill at ease and could give no reason why

she was thus punishing herself, she had a holiday from school. She was an only child. The mother was more puzzled when the child was at home. Betty would ask anxiously if she were a good child. She would be found weeping at odd times on the stairs, and then would ask her mother to forgive her if she had been naughty. And no explanation could be found. The mother could do nothing to assure her. Betty came for a series of interviews and the trouble was found. Happily the mother, in this case, was imaginative and only too anxious to co-operate. Betty talked easily, not about her crying, nor the bad conduct marks, but about holidays and flowers and creatures. Then one day she asked if frogs came out of eggs. She was told about frogs. Where did kittens come from? and then very shyly—where did the baby come from that her mother had taken her to see at Christmas. She was told. Then I consulted her mother and found that Betty had been taken to see a new baby in bed with the still convalescent mother. It was the first very tiny baby Betty had seen. She herself was the only child. The mother recollected Betty's inquiry, "where had it

come from?" The mother had answered nothing. She did not invent a story but just kept silent, her own inhibitions preventing any answer. There were other contributing causes that brought about an overpowering feeling of guilt to Betty's mind. Her question was obviously a wrong one—or the usually responsive mother would have answered. That is the obvious explanation. But psycho-analysis has proved the deep unconscious incestuous wishes to be accompanied by equally strong guilt reactions. In this case the inquiry went alongside of the fact that Betty's father was in Dresden and had written to her at this very time to tell her that when he came home he should bring her a doll, with eyes that shut and opened, just like a real baby's. One cannot go into further detail here of the actual analysis. But Betty got well, was happy again with her mother, went back to school and troubled herself no more with order marks.

This again is an extreme case. Actual prevention of school work took place. But if we imagine every variable degree of guilt concerning curiosity and the repressed unconscious wishes then we can understand

what inhibitions upon interests in life, biological and other vocations are possible where intellectual powers are intact and unused.

We have dealt so far with girls who have the potentiality to develop along so-called normal lines. But there is another big factor in the girl's case that makes this development difficult. We have referred to the reactions she makes unconsciously to the fact that she is aware of the difference of her body from the boy's long before there is any reason to be given that would be intelligible. In fact if it were there would be no difference then. It is a case of sight, and something missing—the elemental fact that comes first. And some girls never reconcile themselves to this "injustice," any more than some boys ever recover from the sense of their importance through possession. The drive of this initial and fundamental sense of injustice is found in the temper of many adult women, with their double attitude of disparagement of men and their adoption of manners and dress that approximate to the male as nearly as possible.

But with some women the unconscious strife to obtain what was denied them leads to

sublimation of very great value—just as the woman identification in the case of men does. The women who follow male pursuits, for instance—the women who organise and execute are among these. We hear of the woman with the brain of a man. But surely it is rather the unconscious motive that should be designated as man's. It is rather that where the girl cherishes in her unconscious this desire for equality (i.e. sameness) this need to prove herself equal (i.e. the same) we have the immense need for sublimation, and sublimation in those fields that hitherto have been men's. We are not saying what *ought* to be, but what must be, because of facts. Hence again the motive for the choice of vocation. And where natural talent is driven by an unconscious motive like this, we have the brilliant and famous women of any age. Where this phantasy is strong and too repressed, again we have the possibility of neurotic symptoms, restless unhappiness and lack of fulfilment.

One might say in passing what tremendous backing the "castration complex," as it is termed, has in our modern educational system. How intent we seem that a girl's education should run on parallel lines to a boy's—our

school houses—sports—examination lists. We must do as well as the boys, in the same way, show we can get the same results. We must not be beaten by them. The whole system is ridden through with this motive, accentuating thus ten-fold the unconscious desire always there—by ideals based on this very phantasy. Whereas for girl and boy alike the only possible basis of real and ultimate satisfaction is equality in difference. This does not imply *less* education—or that boys should receive more than girls. George Meredith cried in reference to women, "More brain, O Lord, more brain." More brain, for what? That is the important question.

The testing of faculties is a testing of consciousness. That may certainly give us some result as indicating what employment a child may at that particular moment be able to follow. But employments are not vocations. Vocations spring spontaneously, if not too repressed, from deep infantile interests.

We shall always have a great body of normal boys and girls whose energies are freed sufficiently and broadly for them to be turned along any channel that circumstance and opportunity offer. This, together with

the other accompaniments of life, love, procreation, pleasures of different order, will make fulfilment enough.

Vocations are another matter. The unknown, unrealisable factor is here the all-important thing—whether it be the sublimation of those spontaneous hidden sources of interest—the inhibition of sublimation—whether it be unconscious motives that help us to use our faculties, or those unconscious motives that prevent our using our talents.

Nothing in this lecture can add to your equipment concerning how to find out suitable vocations. Psycho-analysis could not do that. But a little may have been done to add to your conviction that it is knowledge, and ever more knowledge we need. It is the preliminary to action for which we are not ready.

A writer in a recent periodical says:—

"It is not easy for one who has breathed the air of the old European tradition to say 'good-bye' to the intellectual consciousness, even though he knows it is necessary, and can watch with his own eyes the fabric of Europe settling into decay."

"All the thought-adventure possible has

been done, done superlatively. Now we need someone who will spy out a new path from another side that will take us beyond the blank wall to which the old European tradition has been leading since the renaissance."

Psycho-analysts have said "good-bye" to intellectual consciousness as a means of reaching a new path from another side. That blank wall has been reached by every civilisation in turn from its rise to its fall, even until to-day when Europe herself stands facing it. We do not know the way, nor how to reach the path. All we know is, that the way and the path will only be reached through knowledge of the unconscious mind.

THE END