ONE

Cinema and Psychoanalysis: Parallel Histories

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How was it, wondered Lou Andreas-Salomé in 1913, that the cinema had come to play a role of no small significance “for us”? Despite work, weariness and lack of time, she could regularly be found with Victor Tausk and his boys at Vienna’s Urania picture house (still there today): “It is only for half an hour and I always have to laugh at this activity in which we indulge.”

Of no small significance for us, but not really us analysts. In the parallel histories of psychoanalysis and cinema, interest is, on the face of it, one-sided: cinema’s in psychoanalysis. When Melanie Klein’s ten-year-old patient Richard used to ask at the close of their sessions whether she was going to the cinema that evening, he invariably received the discouraging reply that no, she was not, that she much preferred reading, walking, anything but the movies (ironically, Klein insists in her work on dislike of the cinema as bound up with a refusal of scopophilia stemming from repression of the sexual curiosity aroused by the primal scene). For Sigmund Freud himself, we have the account given by Ernest Jones of what is said to be the founding father’s first encounter with cinema, in New York in 1909, an account that has him only dimly amused by “one of the primitive films of those days,” full of “wild chasings” (whereas Sándor Ferenczi, “in his boyish way,” became over-excited). If this truly was Freud’s first encounter, it would emphasize the disinterest even more: in the year of the New York visit, after all, there were almost eighty cinemas in Vienna and films—Andreas-Salomé’s point—were easily part of everyday life. More recently, Jacques Lacan could invoke Harpo Marx and Never on Sunday to illustrate topics in his discussion of the ethics of psychoanalysis, declare himself astounded by the “female eroticism” in Empire of the Senses (“I began to understand the power of Japanese women”), write in praise of L’Assassin musicien and subsequently have its
director, Benoît Jacquot, film him for the celebrated Télévision program—but then all that does not amount to very much. Andreas-Salomé herself has to laugh and feels obliged to acknowledge cinema’s pleasure as superficial, trusting nevertheless that it provides some trace of aesthetic experience for workers deadened by the narrow routine of their lives, as well as for intellectuals professionally fatigued by commitments and cogitations (shades of Ludwig Wittgenstein at the movies, close up to the screen, “totally immersed,” taking cinema “like a shower-bath” to wash away his lecture thoughts). In the early years, psychoanalytic disinterest is partly a matter of intellectual and class disdain for the populist cultural interest, so immature, as Jones makes clear with his sneer at the boyish Ferenczi and as the enthusiastic Andreas-Salomé herself suggests, having to laugh at her own cinema-going. More importantly, it is a matter of the power of images and of their place, or not, in analytic practice and theory. As juvenile as cinema, it is a child of the late nineteenth century, psychoanalysis has a newness that at once requires and suspects dissemination, the mediation of its insights and ideas to a public that the visual representation of cinema could so strongly reach, but in ways regarded as contrary to the very sense of those same insights and ideas. Indeed, the ready appeal of cinema as an analogy for mental processes—cinema regarded from the start as a good way of imaging the workings of the mind (Andreas-Salomé provides an example: “cinematic technique is the only one which allows a rapid succession of images approximating to our own imaginative activity, even imitating its volatility”)—brings exactly by its readiness the danger of the loss of the specificity of psychoanalytic understanding, of the originality of its grasp of psychical apparatus, unconscious and sexuality. How is the talking-cure to be put into images? How is psychoanalytic knowledge to be represented? Freud reacted negatively in 1925 when disciples Karl Abraham and Hanns Sachs urged the advantages of collaboration on a proposal for a film about psychoanalysis, the proposal that became G. W. Pabst’s Secrets of a Soul (Geheimnisse einer Seele premiered in Berlin in March 1926). Abraham and Sachs saw the appeal, were willing to act as the film’s “scientific advisors”; Freud saw the danger, intractably maintained his distance from cinema.

Such distance and disinterest notwithstanding, to think about cinema and psychoanalysis today is a substantial undertaking, the histories of the two extending across a century of multiple and complex interactions, one-sided or not. “Cinema and psychoanalysis,” moreover, can be a way of enclosing and delimiting a topic that should, on the contrary, be opened up to areas of concern that are not typically taken—by film studies at least—as central. There is need, for example, to consider not just how psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts are represented in cinema but also how the recourse to film functions in the analytic session, how the analysts and speech and associations and memories may draw and depend on cinema’s given sounds and images, its provision of a residue of signifying traces taken up as unconscious material (we watch and grasp films consciously but what counts for us individually in the long run of the psyche may come with quite another urgency, be very different to whatever a film might urge in its images and their ordering, is something only analytically calculable). Still, the terms of the enclosure have their specific interest, the more so today when a powerful elaboration of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory is rather brilliantly recasting them. The concern here will be with one or two aspects of this, giving some attention to the resistances of psychoanalysis: that is, to the difficulties the latter poses to and itself finds in its encounters—or misencounters—with cinema.

The Secrets of the Soul episode is, in fact, the first great scene which psychoanalysis makes with cinema and as such, despite its relative familiarity, must be recalled for the issues it raises. Freud is on the one side, the UFA company in the person of producer Hans Neumann on the other; Abraham and Sachs are in between, the mediators: loyal to psychoanalysis, to Freud, while at the same time favoring the film precisely in the interests, as they see it, of Freud and psychoanalysis. The ambition is for a truly psychoanalytic film,” but the problem then arises as to just what that could be; a problem which Abraham and Sachs identify as that of properly showing, properly figuring psychoanalysis—adequately documenting and responsibly illustrating its theory and practice. Pabst’s film will present a real case history and be guaranteed by its advisors, with Sachs, indeed, providing an expository pamphlet to accompany its release. Entitled Enigma of the Unconscious (Rätsel des Unbewussten), the pamphlet gives a brief introduction to psychoanalysis, describes the case history, and the vouch for the film’s achievement: its figuration can be accorded every confidence.7 Freud, however, lacking any such confidence, is simply overtaken by the sheer inevitability of the project, left only to assert its resolve not to let it implicate him (even as he had just seen the announcement in The Times of “a psycho-analysis picture . . . soon to be made in Vienna, supervised by Professor Freud and explaining his system”): “There is no avoiding the film, any more than one can avoid the fashion for hair cut in a bob [Bulwark]; I, however, will not let my hair be cut and will personally have nothing to do with this film.”8 The gender-anxious, emasculating image is more than appropriate: the cover of Sachs’s pamphlet shows the oval of a woman’s face, eyes and forehead in shadow, one long erect finger to her lips in an invitation to silence or secrecy or, exactly, enigma (fig. 4). What does she want and what does cinema want with psychoanalysis through her, with her for its figure?

Freud’s fears turn on this matter of figuration, on the impossibility, as he sees it, of finding without betrayal some figurative representation (plastische
Darstellung) of the terms of psychoanalysis; he gives no credit to Abraham's assurances that means can be found to make them figurable (darstellbar). As an example, the latter suggests having the process of repression and the nature of psychoanalytic treatment rendered by a scene showing a noisy interrupter being ejected from a lecture hall and then persuaded to return more peacefully. Freud is unconvinced, dismissive, despite the fact that the illustration is his own, from his Clark University lectures. The "no bad picture [keine unpassende Darstellung]" of the popularizing lecture is no good picture for the film, merely underlines the problem: film for Freud is the intruder with whom psychoanalysis cannot successfully negotiate, something in it escapes even as he maintains that psychoanalysis escapes it (psychoanalysis is more than film can show and film's showing troubles psychoanalysis). Significantly enough, early in 1925, the year of the film proposal, he published a piece entitled Selbstdarstellung (translated in English as "An Autobiographical Study"): self-presentation, self-portrayal, figuration in Freud's own hands, an outline of psychoanalysis straight from the pen of its founder, no need for film, no compromising images, no Bübikopf. That same year too saw the publication of "A Note upon the 'Mystic Writing-Pad,' " a piece in which Freud offers his image, "a concrete representation [Vereinnahmung] of the way in which [he tries] to picture [wiedergeben] the functioning of the perceptual apparatus of our mind." Thirty years into the history of cinema, Freud stays with the Wunderblock, the child's toy that is not so childish, that
fulfills the required conditions of complexity to become an analogy for Freud's understanding of the psyche. He does so, moreover, at a time when the trope of cinema as analogy of mental life had become the commonplace already mentioned. Contemporary with Pabst's film, for example, Virginia Woolf writes an essay celebrating cinema's capacity to give the "dream architecture" of our sleep, to depict fantasies no matter "how far fetched or insubstantial," to offer a reality of mind in defiance of conscious syntax and propositions of identity, "some secret language which we feel and see, but never speak."

Introducing the scenario written by Jean-Paul Sartre for John Huston's 1962 film on the beginnings of psychoanalysis, Freud, the psychoanalyst J.-B. Pontalis quotes and repeats Freud's objections concerning figuration: "l'image ne resoit pas l'inconscient," which then turns round into "l'inconscient... ne se donne pas à voir"—the unconscious does not present itself to be seen, fall into sight; the image does not receive, entertain, quite simply get the unconscious. Extending the domain of the visible into dreams, reveries, fantasies, and so on, psychoanalysis at the same time crosses the image, disturbs that domain and its domination; what counts is not what is there to be seen but the insulation through it of unconscious desire, which indeed is decisively operative in what is seen. That film and dream were run so easily together (films said to be "dreamlike") was a result of the determinations of figuration in each case. The transformation of dream-thoughts into dream depends on "considerations of representability," the English for Freud's Rückicht auf Darstellbarkeit (rendered by Lacan as "égard aux moyens de la mise en scène"); "considerations of representability in the peculiar psychical material of which dreams make use—for the most part, that is, representability in visual images... those thoughts will be preferred which admit of visual representation"; dream representability thus involves "a colorless and abstract expression in the dream-thought being exchanged for a pictorial and concrete one." These are the same terms Freud uses in his letter to Abraham objecting to the film project (no way that the abstractions of psychoanalysis—"unsere Abstraktionen"—can be given acceptable plastic representation, "in irgendwie respektabler Weise plastisch darzustellen") but the point there for him is that in cinema considerations of representability are everywhere: the nonfigurative collapses into the figurative, the symbolic becomes a matter of symbols, cinema holds to the visual. If indeed films are, as is said, dreamlike, that is of little consequence for psychoanalysis which is, exactly, analysis, interpretation, a work on dreams (it renders them abstract, refuses to maintain the visual surface, goes for the dream-thoughts). There is no "psychoanalytic dream" and no possibility of a "psychoanalytic film" (other than in the sense that all dreams are matter for psychoanalysis, as all films could be, their constructions open to its analysis; if psychoanalysis may appear in the picturings of dreams or films, that only thematically makes them

"psychoanalytic"), as Freud insists even as Abraham assures him that there can be, that the problem of figuration can be solved. The insistence could be formulated as a Freudian rule: the more you solve that problem, the more effectively the conditions of cinematic representability are satisfied, the further you get from anything that could be seen—but then the seeing is the problem—as a psychoanalytic film.

Freud's psychoanalysis, that is, interrupts the vision of images, challenges the sufficiency of the representations they make, where cinema aims to sustain vision, to entertain—to bind in—the spectator with images. Franz Kafka at this same time talked of cinema putting a uniform on the eye, of its images taking over: "the speed of movements and the precipitation of successive images... condemn you to a superficial vision of a continuous kind." In this, it removes something from sight: "I can't stand it, perhaps because I am too visual [weil ich vielleicht zu 'optisch' veranlagt bin]." Kafka pulls away from cinema as surface continuity of images, urges an excess in seeing, a more-visual of vision, the force, as Lacan would say, of the eye made desperate by the gaze. The frame of vision—"reality," the reality that cinema shows, puts before our eyes—is troubled by what it excludes as its very condition and which thereby remains over as the point from which the frame is framed, the troubling blind spot in vision from where the images look back—Lacan's objet a as left over from symbolization, "a bit of the real" ("the field of reality" holds up "only by the extraction of the objet a which, however, gives it its frame"). For the too-visual Kafka, cinema's films are akin to false teeth, just artificial fantasies, props for the imagination, Phantasi prothesen, unbearable as such. But perhaps, in return, there is more, more than just superficially meets the eye, something else that informs the "can't stand-it" reaction, deciding perhaps Kafka's real trouble with cinema. Woolf, in her essay on cinema, wonders "could this be made visible to the eye?" She thinks, for example, not of the "ordinary forms" of anger, "red faces and clenched fists," but of anger in the image, breaking across it, out of the screen, "a black line wriggling on a white sheet"; not the statement "I am afraid" but "fear itself," something that "burgeons, bulges, quivers, disappears." Watching The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, what counts for her is not the film's stated emotions, the effects of its represented visual world; the experience—the fear itself—is "a shadow shaped like a tadpole" suddenly appearing in a corner of the screen: "It swelled to an immense size, quivered, bulged, and sank back again into nonentity." Woolf moves from figuration, likeness, to some "residue of visual emotion," some "accidental," "unintentional" thing that sticks out on the screen, radically obscene.

It is getting the screen "right" that has always been the priority in cinema's history, involving aspect and illumination to the end of settling the view it gives, rendering it less opaque to the images—the frames—it receives and reflects, improving its there-for-likeness discretion. We say "naively" of
things filmed moving toward the camera that they are "coming toward the screen," as though emerging from a depth of the image to threaten the protective limit of that depth, the proximate-but-distanced field of our secured vision (confirmed as such in the contained thrill of these almost-out-of-the-screen moments). In the history of psychoanalysis, the screen has provided one of the few analogical-conceptual elaborations from cinema, that of the dream screen, proposed by B. D. Lewin in the late 1940s as "the surface on to which a dream appears to be projected," "the blank background present in the dream though not necessarily seen." (Certain writers on cinema have anticipated this dream screen idea: Robert Desnos, for example, in the same year again as the UFA proposal, talked of "the miracle of the screen, neutral ground on which dreams are projected."). Lewin describes it as symbolizing the maternal breast hallucinated by the child asleep after feeding (assuming a white breast, a racial blank) and as the representation of the desire to sleep: on its own in a dream, just the screen, it realizes a regression to primary narcissism. In return, psychoanalytic film theory has made much of the cinema screen as mirror, a mirror reflecting everything but the spectator who is set—identified—as all-perceiving subject in a cinematic apparatus which reproduces something of the beginnings of the imaginary constitution of the ego in the infant's experience of the mirror stage (the stage that marks for Lacan the emergence of primary narcissism). Cinema is thus characterized essentially in terms of a certain mastery of likeness: the spectator-subject identifies as a point of overall perception—of encompassing vision—and, from that point, with the images on screen that it takes as his or hers, images that it likes (gets satisfaction from in their recognition as alike). Accordingly, when narcissism enters this account, it is held largely to an idea of self-recognition confirmed by images, of the subject as coherent with them (at the expense of consideration of the failure of images ever to represent the subject for itself: images for which the subject "takes itself" in the construction of the ego are external, always other, objects not just of love but also of frustration and hate and violence), with fantasy treated concomitantly as little more than a safe space of the imaginary given in a cinematically realized, socially resolved representation that the subject simply assumes (at the expense of consideration of the subject's confrontation in fantasy with the presence of the real). Versions of this, without the apparatus theory, could have been developed readily enough from mainstream psychoanalysis, making films a kind of simulation of what Masud Khan calls "the good dream": the spectator is brought to loosen waking defenses and gains pleasure from the desires allowed through a film's scenes and images, while at the same time distanced from the disruptive force of those desires, happily "asleep" in the safety of the contained filmic space.

"The visually perceived action in ordinary manifest dream contents," says Lewin, "takes place "on or before" the dream screen, just as a film is projected onto a cinema screen and its action seen not as including the screen but as happening on it, in front of it, in a screen-world that catches the spectator in its representations (this impression of a "second screen," the background of a world in which the film's events are placed, allows that "coming-toward-the-screen" effect). Woolf asks what cinema might do "if left to its own devices," without any novelistic second-screening, no covering over of its surprises or disruptions of vision, of its "accidental scenes." Reticent as regards a narrative cinema organized around the succession of actions (she criticized Compton Mackenzie's Life and Adventures of Sylvia Scarlett as precisely "a book of cinema," just so many events and incidents), having some interest at least in cinema's technical procedures (she wrote a note on the Friese-Greene color film process), Woolf in her account of the cinema experience sets it between screen-world and screen, elsewhere to the figments of the one, involving a certain material presence of the other, cutting across both: her blot is fear, something terrifying, for a moment the eye's appetite of vision drained in the loss of any identification, brought up short, skewed out of the image by some "cinema thing" itself.

In the elaboration of a film theory informed by psychoanalysis, so much a focus of critical debate over the last twenty years or more, there have been marked shifts of interest and the fortunes of various concepts have fluctuated. Suture is no longer doing too well, nor, on the whole, is fetishism; the phallus is mostly holding up, while fantasy is fine but prone to disparate appreciations; as for real and symptom, they have come up strong indeed. These shifts and fluctuations can be seen in criticism from within psychoanalytic film theory of the conjunction of cinema and psychoanalysis developed in the wake of the journal Screen. Much of this criticism has been directed at what is regarded as a reduction of the spectator/film relation to one of pure specularity, effectively suturing cinema into an ideology of the subject that takes little account of the complexity of the latter's constitution (the notion of "suture" was too often limited to just some idea of the seamless effecting in dominant narrative cinema of the spectator-subject as contained unity, but the Lacanian-Freudian insistence is that there is no coherent subject to be thus simply accommodated). No doubt, in its concern to grasp the particular terms of subjectivity realized in a dominant cinematic institution, to demonstrate the subject positioning in which film-in-cinema involves the spectator (even as he or she may take their distances), Screen did at times put the weight so heavily on describing the representation made that it fell into an overdeterministic account, a theoreticist version of closure (already there potentially in the concept of suture itself, introduced as it was as part of an attempt to cast Lacan's work as "forming a system" and provide its formalization). Screen's point, of course, was an appropriation of psychoanalysis politically, insofar as it could be made conjuncturally useful, and
notably as regards identifying and describing mechanisms of subject inscription for ideology. If such appropriation is open to charges of not being properly psychoanalytic, it remains that "cinema and psychoanalysis" necessarily opens up a field which will not be containable within some enclosure of psychoanalysis itself; as it remains too that attention needs to be given to what investment in the "properly" psychoanalytic carries with it in any given context. "Cinema and psychoanalysis" involves the specificity of psychoanalysis in a way that equally recognizes it, sets it at the distance from itself that its deployment in relation to cinema produces—and the same holds in reverse for cinema, reconceived by the psychoanalytic theory and concepts with which it is newly posed.

One need here is just to ask: what should film analysis do and what does psychoanalysis have to do with it? Well known is the film analyst (the present writer once hesitantly included) who scrutinizes the film in the hope of possessing it, holding to it as comprehensively—manifestly—identifiable. Raymond Bellour nicely, suggestively, captures the desire at stake: "I spent years in the dark . . . eyes fixed not on my notebook but firmly on the screen, trying to fix, with a hand grown expert but fatally clumsy, ever inadequate, the skeleton outline of the manifold succession of elements that almost always makes up a film" (he is describing his situation in a moment between cinephilia and cinema studies, before the latter gave access to viewing equipment, as too before commercialization of VCRs brought the easy routine of supposed command).22 The compulsive frenzy of "notabilization" (making as much as possible notable, significantly available) sought to achieve an encompassing vision of the film analyzed that created precisely thereby the experience of it as "unattainable," in the sense not just of a matter of innumerable moving frames that could not be mastered in the dark but also of a symbolic reality that could not be finally settled for the subject, sustained indeed. Bellour's own analyses, so different to many that subsequently projected films into the foregone conclusions of their academic grid, finely demonstrate this play between the film analyst's identifications and the film's continuing divagations at the cost of any subject (self)-possession: it eludes, even as the analyst more and more fully represents "his" or "her" film—the hand grows expert but stays fatally clumsy. The analyst's compulsion, moreover, is the corollary to the particular cinema's own compulsion to visibility; a cinema itself haunted by the possibility of something more than its vision, its controlled continuity of screened reality; analyst and film come across and miss one another on the common ground of their failure not to be seen by this "more"—the slippages, splinters, skewings, everything that bears the trace of what is not symbolized, not in view.

Understanding of the desire at stake in any film analysis can be gained through consideration of what is envisaged as its end (aim and termination). A powerful idea taken over from psychoanalysis is interpretation—what, indeed, does the psychoanalyst do but look to reveal the meanings of dreams and symptoms and all the various manifestations through which the unconscious finds expression? In film analysis, the recourse to psychoanalysis as interpretative source has mostly worked illustratively, resolving things into the confirmation of a set of given themes, a repeatable psychoanalytic story duly repeated. Which is not without its reason since the Oedipal and other norms can indeed be opportunistically brought to bear on the films of "cinema": psychoanalysis, that is, fits a cinema culturally permeated by psychoanalytic awareness, developed in societies in which psychoanalysis itself developed (the parallel histories precisely). The difficulty is that film interpretation in these terms functions too easily within and as a kind of enclosing imaginary: the cinema's films meet the interpretation they facilitate and from which they in some large sense derive. Themes and explanations pass back and forth between psychoanalysis and cinema in a way that ultimately makes of interpretation an avoidance of any reality of either, as of any reality of their encounter. There is no resistance, no following through of any experience of transference; the film analyst finds him or herself everywhere on screen and there is no trouble between film and interpreter that is not already contained within the interpretative circle, with supposed "divergent" or "critical" readings themselves sustained within the given bounds of sense.23

The same is generally true of the contemporary, theoretically aware version of interpretation, in which what is at stake is not so much interpretation of the meaning of films but rather the establishment of a "theoryfilm-analysis" in which psychoanalytic concepts (narcissism, paranoia, repression, whatever) are conjoined with a film in the interests of the interpretative elaboration of issues around (mainly) sexual difference. Psychoanalysis here becomes, as it were, a discourse-generator, making up with film a new genre, a new imaginary (within which, for instance, to construct "the female spectator"). The metapsychological description of the psychical reality of the cinematic apparatus itself—the cinema's imaginary, its conditions of spectatorship, its structures of identification, and so on—equally fed into this (what counts became much less the account of cinema than the theory for which cinema was the rhetorical matter, the ground for the exchange with psychoanalysis around "the subject").

A psychoanalysis is terminable and interminable, comes down ceaselessly on the bedrock impasse of the distinction of the sexes and their resistance to femininity: that resistance, says Freud, "prevents any change from taking place . . . everything stays as it was"; the analyst's consolation being only that the analysand has had "every possible encouragement to re-examine and alter his attitude to it."24 In Lacan's later work, this altering of attitude is called "going through the fantasy." Where fantasy gives a frame of consistency to the world, offers to make up the lack in the symbolic order and to
answer the question as to “the desire of the Other,” analysis seeks to bring the analysis to recognition that there is nothing behind his or her fantasy. Slavoj Žižek, who has been the major new expounder and extender of Lacanian theory in English-speaking academic circles (and more especially those concerned with cultural and cinema studies), talks of the final moment of analysis as when the analysis accepts his or her being as “non-justified by the big Other.” Brought into being in an already given symbolic order that is radically other to it, the subject seeks in a posited big Other the justification for its being, some mandate with which to identify, some truth of being (hence the question as to the Other’s desire: what does the Other want of me, what am I for the Other). But if the subject is divided, so is the symbolic: there is no master signifier except precisely the purely negative signifier of division, of the loss experienced through the castration complex, except the phallus as the paradoxical signifier-without-signified representing non-sense within the field of sense, standing for the very enigma of the Other’s desire. Fantasy postpones this truth of division; to go through it is for the subject to assume the lack in the Other, to experience the Other’s nonexistence, and so give up any assumption that it could provide some final answer; that there is any ultimate guarantee of meaning, any place from which identity can be secured.

What does that mean for cinema and psychoanalysis? Žižek’s striking move is a use of cinema not as an object for psychoanalysis, with films understood through psychoanalytic concepts (though that also features in his work), but as itself providing the means by which those concepts can be truly understood, films as the material with which to explicate psychoanalysis. Conviction of his “proper grasp of some Lacanian concept” comes “only when [he, Žižek] can translate it into the inherent imbecility of popular culture,” notably Hollywood cinema: “the notion or complex is explained by way of examples from Hollywood,” declares the introduction to Enjoy Your Symptom (subtitled Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out). There is sometimes more again, however, than understanding concepts. Cinema can be called upon not just to furnish ways of translating; it itself shows and can be shown to show: “If a student asks ‘What is the psychoanalytic Thing?’ show him Alien,” Žižek will exclaim in a lecture, “and fling screened as the parasite viscously bursts through human flesh.” This is an appeal to figuration of which Freud never dreamed, nor indeed Abraham and Sachs: cinema not as the vehicle of an exposition but as a matter of experience, on the edge of the real, at an extreme of psychoanalytic shock. Seen thus, film no longer subtracts from psychoanalysis, “bobcuts” it off; on the contrary, it exceeds it with the very excess with which psychoanalysis has to concern itself, that it faces, comes down to, impasses on. Cinema translates psychoanalysis but also confronts it: film with Žižek—or rather “Žižek-film,” the particular new conjunction he makes out of cinema and psychoanalysis—realizes the unrepresentable, pushes on screen what is more than in representation, gets it.

We can come back here to interpretation. It is significant that once past the study of Aiméé in his 1992 doctoral thesis, Lacan’s seminars and writings offer no developed case histories, dealing more readily in demonstrations from literary and philosophical sources (the Symposium, Antigons, Joyce, Kant, Poe . . . ) or readings of Freud’s great cases and dream analyses (Dora, Little Hans, “Irma’s injection” . . . ). There is no display of interpretation, little attention to ramifying meanings along the signifying chain; indeed, interpretation is seen precisely as directed “not so much at meaning as at reducing signifiers into their non-meaning so that we get back to the determinants of the subject’s entire behavior.” Everything turns increasingly on the experience of fantasy, of the inertia of fantasy’s routine repetition of a constant staging for the subject of “the desire of the Other.” As the real becomes the prime emphasis of the seminars, it is this going through of the fantasy that is crucial, coming to recognize that the sense fantasy makes adapt the nothing “behind,” the final absence of sense (abs-sens in Lacanese). Fantasy resists interpretation inasmuch as it is thus involved not in a production of meanings (nothing of the metonymy of desire, the unconscious structured like a language) but in the obturation—the screening—of the failure of meaning (analysis seeks to disengage the formula of this obturation, to get at the fantasmat underpinning of dreams, symptoms, and so on). What the fantasy does is to coordinate the mobile subject of desire in the play of the signifier with the object that fixes it. This is why Lacan talks of a statics—une statique—of fantasy: it always comes round with the same thing, the same thing “which cannot be integrated into the given symbolic structure, yet which, precisely as such, constitutes its identity.” Constitutively divided, the subject has no assured identity, no name in the Other of the signifier. A signifier represents a subject for another signifier but no signifier is the subject’s own designation: the subject falls between signifiers, always in the interval, always subject to lack. Fantasy fills the void with an object, the objet a, at once imaginary and real, outside representation but given a representation in the fantasy as foundation of the illusory unity of the subject. In Jacques-Alain Miller’s gloss: “The subject of the signifier is always delocalized, and lacks in being, is only there in the object that the fantasy dresses up. The pseudo-Daossin of the subject is the objet a.”

So fantasy in this Lacanian version involves both the confrontation of the divided, lack-in-being subject with the presence of the real, the impossible objet a, and the putative filling out of the void of the real by this dressing up of object for subject in a scenario of the Other’s desire (fantasy screening in that sense too: concealing the inconsistency in the symbolic order in its projection of consistency, its staging of desire). Fantasy here is absolutely
particular, nowise available for universalization, involves a specific subject matter, exactly the matter with the subject: "the absolutely particular way every one of us structures his/her 'impossible' relation to the traumatic Thing." In the film studies version, however, fantasy goes somewhat differently, notably because it has so often been pulled more or less exclusively toward one only of its coordinates, that of the mobility of the subject across the play of signifiers: fantasy as a space in which the subject is everywhere, able successively to assume all the positions in the fantasmonic scenario. This same version of fantasy—nomotically open, spectatorially bland, so many equal opportunities positions—has played a significant role in some approaches to pornography which begin by firmly distinguishing fantasy from reality (but in Lacanian theory, fantasy is fundamental to our sense of reality) and then use the distinction to defend, if not celebrate, pornographic representations which are taken, as fantasy, to ensure a circulation of roles—one can be victim and victimizer equally (supposedly a gain). Where the psychoanalytic insistence is on fantasy as the specific articulation of a relation to the disturbing presence of the real, the scene in which the subject finds support for his or her desire, this cinema account leaves fantasy without specificity, collapsing the subject into an instance of free-floating spectatorial availability, no more than an unproblematic fulfillment of offered positions. Important for psychoanalysis, however, is not moving from one position to another, but the formula, the scenario, which is where the subject is, is fixed. "The fantasy is the support of desire; it is not the object that is the support of desire. The subject sustains himself as desiring in relation to an always more complex signifying ensemble. This is apparent enough in the form of the scenario it takes, in which the subject, more or less recognizable, is somewhere, split, divided, habitually double, in his relation to that object, which usually does not show its true face either." What Lacan describes is not open mobility but a definite construction that analysis seeks to bring out, grasping the subject with regard to the complex signifying ensemble in which he or she is sustained in desire. Seeing a film is indeed to be individually involved in different positions, the specific positionings proposed, but the complex negotiation of that seeing implicates a range of fantasy constructions, those operative culturally and socially as well as those psychically determining for this or that spectator, and with all their interactions and disjunctions (and with various processes of identification, or disidentification, both conscious and unconscious). The wish to find ways to recast and revalue the experience of films—not just those of pornography but those too, notably, of Hollywood cinema—runs too simply into an account of identifications and meanings in terms of subject mobility that shifts in one go from closed to open systems, from Oedipal law and symbolic blockage to fantasy as ludic freedom—what Jacqueline Rose describes as an "idealization of psychic pro-

cesses and cinema at one and the same time (something for everyone in both the unconscious and on screen)."

The newly urged psychoanalytic account of fantasy specifies that the order of the signifier and that of jouissance are radically discordant. What remains over from the subject's production in the symbolic "always comes back to the same place: to the place where the subject in so far as thinking subject—the res cogitans—does not encounter it," so that we are forever called to "an appointment with a real that eludes us"; the real being this resistance, the term of an impossible "enjoyment"—jouissance—whose terrifying presence fouls up the symbolic circuit. In its staging of a scenario of desire, fantasy brings the heterogeneous orders together round the objet a, screening their discord and, as it were, allowing the subject to sustain the appointment. It is this account which underpins that "going-through-the-fantasy" idea of the end of analysis. "No analyst to this day," wrote Louis Althusser to a friend in 1963, "has ever (except by chance, and without knowing why) been able truly to end an analysis. Freud himself came a cropper on the subject." But what Freud ran up against was castration, the bedrock impasse; as Lacan would put it, there is no sexual relation. Things run on internarily—nothing stops the signifying chain—but it all runs out on the same thing, the traumatic kernel produced in the process of symbolization, the lack in the Other, the objet a as surplus enjoyment, the Thing, Freud's das Ding. Interpretation comes down to the fundamental fantasy, in which the subject supports him or herself in desire—finds how to desire. To go through this is to see through fantasy's screen and recognize the void it masks in a process of "subjective destitution": the Other does not have what the subject lacks and there is nothing behind the screen, no ultimate sense, no absolute reality, nothing "more real." The Lacanian real, on the contrary, is impossible, not some substantial unity but always a bit, a scrap, an excescence. An important focus for the later Lacan is James Joyce, whose work is said to defy fantasy and speculate on the symptom; "the dimension of the symptom is manifest in Joyce, because that of fantasy does not set a screen," comments Miller. The symptom here refers not to the evident run of symptoms with which a person might appear at the start of an analysis and which might be dissolved through understanding of their meaning, but to the "key symptom," the core of enjoyment around which signification is structured and of which we cannot let go; in Lacan's words, "the way in which each person enjoys the unconscious inasmuch as the unconscious determines him or her," in Žižek's, "a particular signifying formation which confers on the subject its very ontological consistency, enabling it to structure its basic constitutive relationship to enjoyment (jouissance)." Lacan refers to this as the sinthome (an early form of the word, from medieval Latin sinthoma): the fantasy can be traversed but the symptom-sinthome persists as the irreducible
structuring of enjoyment. It addresses no message to the Other, keeps instead "a sense in the real" (the symptom "is of the effect of the symbolic in the real"). Symptoms fall to analysis, are open to interpretation; the \textit{sindrome} befalls the subject, is the unanalyzable, psychic (outside discourse) nub that assures it minimum consistency. There is no "curing" the subject of the \textit{sindrome} since without it there is nothing, other than abandonment to the death drive. The end of analysis with the going through of the fantasy can only be \textit{identification with the symptom}: the analysand must come to recognize in the symptom the very support of his or her being, must get to "manage with it."

The exemplariness of Joyce for Lacan is that he gives "the \textit{sindrome} such that there is no way to analyze it"; the Joyce of \textit{Finnegans Wake} baffles interpretation, pushes to the symptom-point of a "pure jouissance d'une écriture" (the \textit{Wake} is \textit{just there}, interminably, as this obdurately cipher of \textit{sens joui}, meaning enjoyed). The unconscious is structured like a language but, in this huge work of language, Joyce "dis-subscribes" from the unconscious, identifies with writing, is closed to the artifice of analysis: "Joyce the symptom: in that of the symptom, he gives the apparatus, the essence, the abstraction." The \textit{Wake} imposes no fantasy, just this object-text-kernel of enjoyment, a literature with no cinema (not a "book of cinema" in Woolf's sense, though cinema appears in it along with all the other bits and pieces around which its writing pulses), no fantasy constructions of "reality" are allowed to stand, not even the theories and themes of psychoanalyses (above all not even), and no bad pictures; only the \textit{sindrome}, something of the formula of impossible enjoyment, of a sense in the real. Understandably, Lacan is speechless, at a loss, like "a fish with an apple." How could Joyce get there without psychoanalysis, unanalyzed ("it's extraordinary")? Lacan the analyst but Joyce the "afraid," deriding the "grisly old Sykos" in a book that mulls over all the matter of "psaakoonaaloose," citing it for the limits of its symbolic purchase, having it confront its failure. "Perhaps analysis would have tricked him with some balan ending," sighs Lacan, who then goes over to Joyce's side, proclaiming himself "sufficiently master of language" to have attained "what fascinates in bearing witness to the specific enjoyment of the symptom," to "opaque enjoyment from excluding meaning."

"Every object," says Lacan, "depends on a relation," every object except the \textit{objet a}, "which is an absolute": "The trouble is that there's language and that relations are expressed there with epithets. Epithets push towards yes or no. Language makes identities, relations, \textit{outlines}: to push towards yes or no is to push towards the couple, because there is a relation between language and sex, a relation which has certainly not yet been altogether made clear but which I've broached." Left over from symbolization, the real is what does not relate, what aborts relation; the key statement of which again is that there is no sexual relation (although this statement itself is suspect since formulated in the "yes or no" of language: "there is no ... "). The division of the subject is constitutive, not resolvably, and definitely not in any sexual relation, since the stake for men and women is castration, the phallicus always between them, the only partner of each, the very signifier of the subject's division and lack, that from which any subject is entailed (whatever the difference of that entailment as between male and female). "There is good and bad, and then there is the Thing," the prehistoric Other, the primordial Mother-Thing, alien and threatening, the traumatic embodiment of impossible \textit{jouissance}; "good" and "bad" are within representation: "indices of what directs the position of the subject, according to the pleasure principle, in relation to what will only ever be representation, pursuit of a state of election, a state of aspiration, of anticipation of what? Of something which is always at a certain distance from the Thing, although regulated by that Thing, which is there beyond." To pit it another way, the real is not like anything, any thing.

Cinema works with likeness, its figurations were what filled Freud with suspicion and gloom. The problem is that it holds to figures for desire, is a cinema of epithets, so many representations of good and bad, yes or no identifications, including of the visual that it contains in terms of likeness, on a surface of reality (Kafka's cinema as "too visual"). The trouble with language is the same trouble with cinema, linguistically so too with the coming of sound that those most concerned with the possibilities of film's rendering of psychical processes inevitably oppose (film for a Dorothy Richardson will "go male," fall under a fixed order of meaning that will lose the plasticity of cinema as mind). Woolf's cinema-thing experience is exactly \textit{not} in language: "fear itself, and not the statement 'I am afraid.'" As it is \textit{not} in the identified visual either but in "some residual of visual emotion," with Woolf proposing that experience in 1925 as an exception, a surprising indication of what cinema might do "left to its own devices." Silent cinema's images are full of language's representations, images brought to order by the narrative and its epithets. Freud's reactions that same year to the UFA proposal are themselves in that context: he has no idea of a potential of cinema but he does have the critique of an existing cinema that he has to see as an inadequate mode of translation of psychoanalytic insights given its reliance on a common sense of images. The unconscious does not give itself to be seen and what analysis comes up with of it in the listening silences and resistances and transferences of the analytic situation does not figure (and if Freud retains confidence in the relation of psychoanalysis in language, he nevertheless has difficulty enough with his own case histories: half novels, half scientific papers, and in addition excessively full of the matter of dreams and
symptoms, something more). The woman on the cover of Sachs’s *Enigma of the Unconscious* pamphlet puts her finger to her lips for silence but the image speaks loudly, presents the film image *per excellence* of the mystery of the unconscious as the mystery of the woman: what is the history of film in cinema’s institution but that of ever-renewed versions of the always failed resolution of the sexual relation in her image, she—woman—as its idealized and impossible point of attainment, the phallic representation of the Other’s enigma. Psychoanalysis, as Freud foresaw in his refusal of film, was indeed quickly adopted as a source of epithets and narrative joints, a whole panoply of terms of identification to feed cinema’s images and fictions: fetishism, voyeurism, Oedipal goings on, so many illustrations and figurations that, ironically, film theory—“cinema and psychoanalysis”—took up, repeated.

The problem of psychoanalytic representation is exacerbated in Lacanian theory which comes back always to what is not-in-representation: the subject is the impossibility of its own signifying representation; there is no signifying representation of *jouissance*, just the gap in the signifying system that symptoms and fantasies serve to hide; the domain of the real is what remains outside of symbolization; the Thing, the void at the center of the real, cannot be integrated into any field of meaning, is “traumatic,” “impossible,” “entfremdet.” Of which Thing, Lacan will say that “only a representation represents it,” appealing to Freud’s concept of *Vorstellungsrätsel* (the representative of drive in the domain of representation: “the symbolic representation of an originally missing, excluded [‘primordially repressed’] representation”). Outside representation, “there beyond,” the Thing has only representatives: not “good” or “bad”—just and then there is the Thing.

The problem of analysis is that of passing through representation something which *radically* escapes it (its exclusion, indeed, is the condition of representation); analytic theory cannot represent *jouissance*, only locate it, help the analyst to get some bearings on the real. Of course, psychoanalysis, Lacan’s “apposite swindle,” does itself make representations (what else could it do?), notably in terms of “the rock of castration” and “the maternal thing” (“the pre-symbolic thing” as that). But then Lacan is nonplussed in the face of Joyce’s writing, the *sinthome* at odds with representation and with the representations—the whole representative flat—of psychoanalysis, what it maintains. On the one hand in Lacan’s work, we have mathematical formalization; the pursuit of “mathemes” that, hopefully, will purely transmit his psychoanalytic teaching, guarantee its integrity; on the other, style: the seminars full of wordplay, syntactical contortions, verbal meanderings (but the two are not so separate, the mathematics is “elastic,” the mathemes themselves so many images, illustrative seminar figures, and anyway language is still around, “which is what lances it all”). Lacan is represented in the published seminars but the seminars were also in disarray of any such representation. Miller as editor establishes a text, brings order, restores the meaning “when the meanderings of the oral style obliterate it,” but then the meanderings, the spiraling drifts, the shifting inconsistencies are what Lacan has of Joyce, of the *Waste*, are his “abstraction” in the sense of what is at the core of analytic experience as unrepresentable, nonfigurable *jouissance*.

Freud is disturbed at the prospect of the rendering of the “abstractions” of psychoanalysis by cinema; Lacan is faced with Joyce’s act of writing as having given “the essence, the abstraction” of the symptom—*sinthome* and so as halting the analyst’s discourse; Woolf, the writer, looks to “something abstract,” to a cinema of “movements and abstractions [of which] . . . films may in time come to be composed.” “Abstraction” here is a term for the crisis of representation, the question of what might or might not be screened: Freud expects nothing but trouble from any screening of psychoanalysis; Joyce refuses fantasy’s screen, expecting nothing from psychoanalysis, which is left with no representations to make; Woolf, who shared the disrespect for psychoanalysis, sees something in cinema more than cinema that could be screened, something that could mishappen (those “little accidents”). And questions of screen and representation did, of course, have their early acuteness in cinema, parallel again with the development of psychoanalysis. “Primitive cinema” showed a fascination with the precariousness of the field of vision, of the image in frame; so many of its little films ending in an abrupt fall into blackness, dramatized in some terminating narrative violence or upset or extinction—a nice example is Cecil Hepworth’s *How It Feels To Be Run Over* (1900) with its projected spectator-annihilation in a spatter of question and exclamation marks until the inscription “Oh! Mother will be pleased” plunges us, evidently enough, into the amorphousness of the original Other, leaves us at Mother’s whim (“primitive cinema” has its aptness as a description at least in regard to this primordiality, this lawlessness).

*Uncle Josh at the Moving Picture Show* (1902) shows Uncle Josh tearing down the screen but now leaves the film for the spectator intact on screen, with Josh placed as naive (“a country bumpkin”) and this film already celebrating a certain history and future of cinema in the films he sees (and we with him, comfortable in our position in cinema as we watch his disturbance): the immediacy of reality as the train races toward the screen (*The Black Diamond Express*), the central spectacle of woman (*The Parisian Dancer*), the narrative action (*A Country Couple*). Twenty years or so on from this, Woolf nevertheless has her cinema-thing experience in that developing future, against it, standing out for cinema’s “own devices,” the possibility of getting the “residual in vision,” what falls representation, falls out of representation’s modes, those notably of language.

Some thing again is Žižek’s theme: *das Ding* enshrined, in fact, as the unifying nodal point from which it all makes sense. This sense sustains his
work in its non-nonplussedness. Representation is a topic with which he deals but not a problem in his writing, his representing. For all its theoretical paradoxes, his work stays within the realm of an exuberantly masterful discourse that offers Lacanian psychoanalysis as the basis for truth-claiming propositions: “phallus is the form of mediation-sublation as such,” “the desire staged in fantasy is not mine but the desire of the Other,” “the Real qua Thing is not ‘repressed,’ it is foreclosed,” and all the rest. The twist is that he passes them along with, and through, and across popular culture, appealing to the latter’s “inherent imbecility” (as he declares it) as a point of non-sense in the field of academic sense, something obstinately, stupidly other, imbecile indeed. This appeal is Žižek’s equivalent to Lacan’s baroque linguistic display; it is his style. At the same time, however, it takes its place readily enough in the academy, is successfully part of a popular academic culture (and an academic popular culture) which in the United States, as too in differing degrees in certain European countries, is strongly present, well to the fore in one or another version of “cultural studies.” Simply, Žižek’s grain of sand, thrown gratefully into the well-oiled wheels of the cultural studies machine with its smooth brand of discursive relativism, is this very Thing, the endlessly hammered-home truth of that.

The characteristic turn of phrase with which Žižek picks up his film examples is let us recall... “Let us recall Hitchcock’s Rear Window...” “Let us recall here a detail from Hitchcock’s Frenzy...” “Let us recall the very last shot of Ivory’s Remains of the Day...” So much so that he does indeed seem at times to have total recall (naturally another film to which he particularly refers) but what exactly is the status of what one recalls of a film? The answer here, oddly, is illustration, exemplification, testimony: “To exemplify the ‘travel in the past’ constituent of the fantasy-constellation, let us just recall the famous scene from David Lynch’s Blue Velvet...” “as illustrated by a scene from Blue Velvet...” “Chaplin’s Great Dictator bore witness to...” Recall runs Lacanian theory in and out of films, deftly “translates” from one to the other, but with no surprises, no surprises of cinema; what is surprising is all in the theory which the films elucidate and confirm, the theory which provides Žižek’s enunciative position, is what he knows. Left out is then cinema, which the process of translation lets drop, the signifier of cinema in Metzian terms, and it is indicative that Žižek has, in fact, little to say about “institution,” “apparatus,” and so on, all the concerns of the immediately preceding attempts to think cinema and psychoanalysis (films and novels will thus mostly be referred to without any particular distinction between them as forms). Concern with the history of cinema will be solely in terms of the representation of psychoanalytic material; so that, for example, as regards “the progressive modes of how to present ‘pathological’ libidinal economies” in “the history of modern cinema,” “it is [possible] to distinguish three phases” (the sentence as printed reads “impossible” but three phases are distinguished); anchored in the diegetic reality of an objective narrative; reflected in the cinematic form itself as expressive of some diegetic content; rendered directly without reference to any such content, as in “the modernist ‘abstract cinema’ which renders its ‘pathological’ content directly, renouncing the detour through a consistent diegetic reality.” The kind of avant-garde cinema to which Žižek here refers can be characterized in terms of direct pathological content only from a psychoanalytic position that reduces cinema to a matter of expression, exactly what such an “abstract cinema” was explicitly challenging in a critique of a specific institution of cinema and its regime of representation (think of Peter Gidal’s practice and theory of “structural-materialist film,” for just one example). The risk of reduction dogs “cinema and psychoanalysis,” the reduction of cinema by psychoanalysis just as much as the reverse, and it is easy to see here one set of psychoanalytic themes simply coming to replace another as the new Lacanian concepts are now resolutely deployed. The significantly original aspect of Žižek’s work, beyond the brilliance of his conjunction of concepts and films (itself undeniably productive), is what was suggested earlier: the creation of something else again, “Žižek-film,” but which perhaps depends exactly on a specific situation: that of the theorist, the bits of film to be shown on screen, the lecture hall. In the spilling over from theorist to film-films and back, the irruptions of each into the other, together with the return on and from the listening-watching audience, a certain experience is made to be had of cinema—not cinema left to its own devices but pulled into its abstraction, what it can do of the real, the symptom, where it and the analyst can in every sense leave one another.

The Žižekian-Lacanian Thing is “an unhistorical kernel that stays the same,” to which psychoanalysis always returns, the real which remains unchanging through all of what Lacan calls “its little historical emergences,” Žižek its “diverse historicizations/symbolizations.” If the former showed no particular interest in the historical reality of these emergences, for the latter the historicity suggested is a central emphasis, grasped in terms of a dialectical relationship to this hard core, to the rock which defies every attempt at symbolic integration and so which, in its very unhistorical coreness, “sets in motion one new symbolization after another.” But if “the Real qua Thing stands for that X on account of which every symbolization fails,” the X is precisely repressed out of the history of which it is the determining precondition: “its repression is not a historical variable but is constitutive of the very order of symbolic historicity.” Once this is understood, there is in some sense little more to say, little more, that is, outside of the field of psychoanalysis itself (which is why Lacan was not that interested): the Thing just is this rock: the rock of castration, the part of the real that suffers from the signifier, the outside of the annihilation of the subject in the death drive, and
so on, nothing of which can change (alias, no jumping over the phallic, "only castration is true"). One could talk about the symbolizations without worrying about the Thing—the pre-Zižek routine—or adopt the insight of an excluded outside and a totalizing master signifier as the basis for a conceptual apparatus providing a new kind of analytic grasp of such symbolizations—Zižek’s procedure: the symptomatic analysis of ideological formations, along with the demonstration of the ways in which certain systems of analysis themselves contain this insight. So, for example, Marxism: for which "such a ‘real’ of the historical process is the ‘class struggle’ that constitutes the common thread of ‘all history hitherto’; all historical formations are so many ultimately failed attempts to ‘gentrify’ this kernel of the real." The class struggle, however, is not the rock of castration, or is so only figuratively: the figure—the symbolization—which Marxism proposes. Marxism’s "real" (here as elsewhere, Zižek’s inverted commas are indicative) is not, in fact, the ultimate real, the unchanging, irrefragable psychoanalytic rock of which, in this vision of things, it is a figure. The containment by historical formations of the class struggle is at a different level from the repression of the Real qua Thing, which is un-vendrängt, primordially repressed, "not a historical variable."

Ideology, in Zižek’s account, is a fantasy-construction masking "some insupportable, real, impossible kernel," namely social antagonism: "a traumatic social division which cannot be symbolized." The relation between some kernel and the always-staying-the-same, unhistorical rock-of-castration kernel is not clear: at times the former seems to be stated as equivalent to the latter, at others as its particular symbolization, and at others again as an analogical version of it in the social field. Ideology which always finds its last support in "the non-sensical, pre-ideological kernel of enjoyment" also "implies, manipulates, produces a pre-ideological enjoyment structured in fantasy," a formulation which can leave it uncertain as to whether "pre-ideological" sends us back to the rock of castration or to a particular historically-symbolic articulation of enjoyment, a specific ideological symptom. Doubtless the answer is both, but then Zižek himself feels obliged to talk of "the domain of ideology proper" over into which psychoanalytic notions are to be carried. Fantasy "in the last resort" is "always a fantasy of the sexual relationship"; carried over, this is written as "there is no class relationship," but what kind of force is this rewriting claiming? Psychoanalytic-subject fantasy is not the same as "socio-ideological fantasy," it is their articulation which is crucial, not some equivalence: the psychoanalytic domain of "desire, fantasy, lack in the Other and drive pulsating around some unbearable surplus-enjoyment" is more and less than the social domain with which it intersects in the process of any subject. It is striking that Zižek, whose Lacanian theory puts the emphasis so strongly on the impossible constitution of the subject, so often seems to take the subject for granted in his analyses of ideology, running psychical and social seamlessly together, translating the one into the other in what often finally seem to be simply equations, unhelpful as such.

One such translation is that of the analysands’ going through the fantasy in his or her analysis. Zižek talks of "going through the social fantasy," traversing, that is, the fantasy-frame of reality—"the field of social meaning, the ideological self-understanding of a given society." Identification with the symptom here becomes the experience of "some impossible kernel": "the point of eruption of some otherwise hidden truth of the existing social order." In a psychoanalysis, the aim is the recognition by the analysand in the real of his or her symptom of the only support of their being, abandonment of which equals death. Recognition that there is nothing behind fantasy leads to nothing other than subjective destitution, to realization of the unchanging and unchangeable real of castration and identification with the symptom. In what senses is going through the social fantasy to be equated or put in parallel with this? In what respects are "the reality" and "the field of social meaning," and "the ideological self-understanding of a given society" to be run together? Or, to come back to the concern here, what are we to do with psychoanalysis—the psychoanalytic Thing—and cinema, the whole heterogeneity of social practices and discourses the latter implicates, brings with it, as it?
order; which in turn means that identification of the phallic order is more or less insignificant—being a foregone conclusion, it tells us nothing in particular. If the kernel is unhistorical, we can look at historicizations without reference to the Thing other than in simple acknowledgment of its there-beyond, invariant sameness or, by analogy, in a use of psychoanalysis to furnish a mode of recognition that is equally applicable to psychoanalysis itself as a particular historicization/symbolization of the Thing: the Thing is just a name for the surplus excluded from any system as the latter’s condition, its very definition; which surplus is variously realized, variously named. Psychoanalysis can never say anything other than that the phallus is contingent at the same time that it can only continue to insist that that contingency is necessarily in this phallus form, founding thereby the truth of psychoanalysis, its whole sense.

"I propose that the only thing of which one can be guilty, at least from a psychoanalytic perspective, is to have ceded on one’s desire." In his account of Sophocles’s Antigone, Lacan describes its heroine as taking “to the limit the accomplishment of what we can call pure desire, the pure and simple desire of death as such.” Fantasy, in its very staging of desire defends against desire, manages against the abyss of the desire of the Other—against this ‘pure’ trans-phantasmic desire (i.e. the ‘death drive’ in its pure form). So not giving way on one’s desire as a matter of psychoanalytic ethics coincides with going through the fantasy as the end of an analysis: “the desire with regard to which we must not ‘give way’ is not the desire supported by fantasy but the desire of the Other beyond fantasy . . . a radical renunciation of all the richness of desires based upon fantasy-scenarios.” Since desire from the psychoanalytic perspective is not in opposition to law but, on the contrary, given from it, there is no question here of some “liberation,” of some lifting of oppression in order finally to reach jouissance. How then should we understand the desire on which one is not to give way? Whatever the importance, stressed by Zizek, of the going-to-the-wall, suicidal, death-driven figure of Antigone, it is not evident how the “frighteningly ruthless” pursuit of jouissance for which she stands (desire as that) and which exempts her “from the circle of everyday feelings and considerations” could effectively be adopted as an ethical stance (unless “from a psychoanalytic perspective”, assumes the severance of the psychic into some purely absolute realm in which persistence in the death drive can be envisaged, ruthless indeed, as the logical—‘guiltless’—outcome of psychoanalysis’s account of the subject). Others put a different stress, taking Lacan’s imperative more prudently as the call not to abandon desire as defense against this subject-obliterative jouissance: “in order not to attain the nevertheless longed for jouissance of the Other, the best thing is not to cease desiring and be content with substitutes and screens, symptoms and fantasies.” In other words, not giving way on one’s desire is an injunction distinct from any sense not just of liberation but also of the simple inversion of that into “radical renunciation.” The crux again is the psychic/social imbrication, the need to grasp their articulation without loss of the specificity of each to and in the other.

For “cinema and psychoanalysis,” this means not merely figuring cinema from psychoanalysis or psychoanalysis as cinema. Freud’s fear of the latter, of cinematic figuration, has been overtaken by the psychoanalytic film theory of the last decades, which has erected its own consistencies, its own particular likenesses of cinema. The versions of this liking have been various: as essence (the imaginary signifier, apparatus theory); as play of signifiers (available for “filmanalytic” interpretation); as reflection (mode of translation, theoretical display). Which prompts something of a reversal of the Freudian rule formulated earlier: the more psychoanalysis satisfies its conditions of psychoanalytic representability, the further it gets from cinema—not from some essence “cinema” but from cinema’s questions of psychoanalysis, the forcing of its issue. Such a reversal is significant solely inasmuch as it can point, across the intersection of those two “rules,” to the dialectical mismatch of cinema and psychoanalysis, to their constant and necessary misenounter, which is only one-sidedly to be expressed through determining reference to the Thing. The reduction of psychoanalysis to a platitude of representation that was effectively part of the history of the dominant narrative cinema went along with a similar reduction of cinema by psychoanalysis, this then informing the latter’s reactions of dislike and distrust on that basis (which in the interweaving of these “parallel” histories found justification in the face of the fictions and imagings proposed in that cinema’s films); the shift to a different consideration of cinema via the film-studies “cinema and psychoanalysis” emphasis changes nothing of this unless that consideration involves cinema in its heterogeneity as well as in its availability for the analytic representations made. Where is cinema being seen from and what is the desire that is assured in seeing it from there and what stands out against that seeing, pushing to the real of such a vision, the vision that seeks to maintain that seeing?

Andreae-Skolenié, in the early years, loved going to the cinema, though she shrugged off its “superficial pleasure” while also recording its potential significance for exploring and transforming “our psychological constitution.” Zizek, today, loves films, but also calls on them in his work as popular-culturally “imbecile,” at the same time that he grasps them something excessively psychoanalytic: not just some conceptual demonstration, more a standing-out experience that pushes psychoanalysis to the edge of representation, queers its pitch (much as Joyce in writing halts and perplexes Lacan). Lacan’s “What I look at is never what I want to see” holds for psychoanalysis’s vision of cinema, however much psychoanalysis may elaborate what it likes or dislikes, may seek to avoid the blot in that field of vision, the point—
the void—where sense runs out. That point is then not just to be left as some sense of non-sense, the void made up in some master discourse of Thing and phallus. The excursion through cinema takes psychoanalysis directly into the stakes of the relations between psychic and social, into confrontation with the sociality of its own discourse, the limits of its representative procedures. “Cinema and psychoanalysis” is, in any consequent realization of what such a conjunction entails, the not giving way on that confrontation, the negotiation of a specific situation (hence the extreme interest of Žižek’s situation-demonstrations). Andreas-Salomé wondered about cinema for analysts, “for us,” and the focus on kernels of spectatorship is indeed where psychoanalysis seems likely now to play its contributing part, grasping interactions of psychic and social in the development of an account of representation each time that looks to the operative terms of identification—the makings of and relations to and investments in likeness and likeness (and dislikeliness, disliking)—determiningly at work in such situations, where these include the terms of the proposed negotiation of “cinema and psychoanalysis,” of the fantastic interchange that yields and that is itself to be gone through as a condition of any appropriation of psychoanalysis politically, and not essentially, as some “it-matters-not-a-whit” fantasy that brings everything down, indifferently, to its fixed position of knowledge. From Andreas-Salomé at the Urania to Žižek with VCR, the pleasure and also the momentary traces of detachment carry through, but then Žižek quite specifically sets up the encounter of psychoanalysis with cinema, opens a scene between the parallel histories that is currently where that significance “for us” can be understood, the “for us,” of course, being the critical issue, so often the assumption and the void of “cinema and psychoanalysis.”

(1993–94)

NOTES


3. Ernest Jones, Sigmund Freud: Life and Work: Years of Maturity 1901–1919, Vol. 2 (London: Hogarth Press, 1955) 62. Cinema is entirely absent from the family recollections of Freud’s eldest son, who records that his father “did not appreciate new inventions,” citing his intense dislike of telephone and radio: Martin Freud, Glory Reflected: Sigmund Freud—Man and Father (London: Angus and Robertson, 1957) 121. Sigmund Freud, His Family and Colleagues, 1928–1947, the moving, historically complex film made by Lynne Lehman Weiner from footage of Freud and many other psychoanalysts shot by her father Philip R. Lehman, renders very clearly Freud’s dislike of himself being filmed (when Lehman entered analysis with Freud, a focus of their sessions became his desire to film the latter, for whom it was a symptom to be dealt with); needless to say, given Jones’s account of the New York cinema outing, Ferenczi appears in the film as totally at home, grinning happily into camera.


6. Andreas-Salomé, In der Schule bei Freud, 103; trans., 101. The analogy was shared by Rank: “cinematography [Kinoerstellung] reminds us in numerous ways of the working of dreams [Traumtechnik];” films, he suggested, might well be able to express certain psychical phenomena in “a clear and sensuous language of pictures [einer deutlichen und sinnsfülligen Bilder sprache],” phenomena that “the writer is often unable to render in words”; “Der Doppelgänger,” 97; trans. 4.

7. Hans Sachs, Psychoanalyse: Rätsel des Unbewussten (Berlin: Lichtbild-Bühne, 1926); the cover image to which reference is subsequently here made is reproduced in Ernst Freud, Lucie Freud und Jürgen Remmler, Sigmund Freud: Leben in Bildern und Texten (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), published in English as Sigmund Freud: His Life in Pictures and Words (New York: Norton, 1987) 224 (same pagination in German and English editions). The idea for the accompanying pamphlet came from Neumann, who envisaged it as an easy-to-understand introduction—
“einer leicht fasslichen, populären Schrift über die Psychoanalyse” (the film itself was to be a popular, scientific, psychoanalytic film: “einen populär-wissenschaftlichen psychoanalytischen Film”); Karl Abraham, letter to Freud, June 7, 1925, Hilda C. Abraham and Ernst Freund eds., Sigmund Freud—Karl Abraham Briefe 1907—1926 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1980) 357; trans. Bernard Marsh and Hilda C. Abraham, A Psychoanalytic Dialogue: The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham 1907—1926 (London: Hogarth Press, 1965) 382–83. Sachs maintained a continuing interest in cinema, contributing three pieces to Close Up, the London-based film magazine edited by Kenneth Macpherson and Bryher (H.D. was also closely involved), both of whom met Sachs at Pabst’s house in 1928. For the connections between Close Up and psychoanalysis, see Anne Friedberg, "Writing About Cinema ‘Close Up’ 1927–33" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Cinema Studies, New York University, 1983) 141–44. 8. The Times (August 4, 1895) 8; Sigmund Freud, letter to Sándor Ferenczi, August 4, 1925, cited in Freund, Freud and Grubrich-Simitis eds., Sigmund Freud: His Life in Pictures and Words, 224. Abraham and Sachs were based in Berlin and a certain rivalry led to an alternative film proposal from Viennese analysts. The International Psychoanalytical Press, in the person of its managing director, Josef Storfer, announced that it had itself decided to undertake a film and had therefore commissioned a script from “a well-known psychoanalyst”; the film was to be “an authentic representation of Freudian teaching [einer authentischen Darstellung der Freudseh Lehre],” avoiding the “danger of a misleading representation or an offensive or nonsensical parody [die Gefahr einer irreführenden Darstellung bzw. einer unsinnigen oder unsinnigen Verhältniswahrnehmung].” The project was offered by Storfer to various film companies but came to nothing, other than a great deal of ill-feeling, scheming and backbiting, reaching boiling point at the Bad Homburg Ninth International Psychoanalytic Congress in September 1925 (Abraham, for example, alleged that an attempt was made there by Storfer to bribe him and Sachs to abandon the Neumann-UFA film). Storfer’s “well-known analyst” was Siegfried Bernfeld whose treatment survives: "Entwurf zu einer filmischen Darstellung der Freudsehs Psychanalyse im Rahmen eines abendfüllenden Spielfilms" (Sketch for a cinematic representation of Freudian psychoanalysis in the form of a full-length film), Siegfried Bernfeld Archive, Library of Congress. Where the UFA film is organized around the presentation of psychoanalysis as therapeutic method (“a life history from the viewpoint of psychoanalysis,” that is, as it emerges in the course of a cure), Bernfeld’s treatment of it as an investigative method, a particular knowledge (the central character, a young man interested in dreams and the workings of the mind), becomes friendly with a psychoanalyst, but this is not developed into a patient/analyst relationship. Bernfeld also envisaged recourse to avant-garde, technologically inspired, modernistic representations. Freud’s account of the psychical apparatus was to be depicted with a set involving three stages, one over the other; the topmost, for example, was to have a window-structure in the shape of an eye with a film camera turned outward and film stock running down through a processor set into the floor to a projector projecting the images of the external world onto the ceiling; the superberg was to sit at a lectern stacked with telephones and radios; permitted wishes to have radio antennae on their heads...; see Karl Fallend and Johannes Reichmayr, Psychoanalyse, Film und Öffentlichkeit: Konflikte hinter den Kulissen,” in Fallend and Reichmayr eds., Siegfried Bernfeld oder Die Grenzen der Psychoanalyse (Basel/ Frankfurt am Main: Strofenfeld/Nexus, 1992) 132–52 (the quotations regarding authentic representation and the avoidance of parody come from Storfer’s 1925 “Frescensendung,” as cited in Fallend and Reichmayr, 137; Bernfeld’s scencographic imagination of the psychical apparatus is cited on 140–51 and occurs on 24–25 of the original typescript of the “Entwurf”; my thanks to Karl Sieriek for letting me have access to his copy of that typescript). The episode is briefly mentioned by Jones, Sigmund Freud: Life and Work: The Last Phase 1919–1939, vol. 3 (London: Hogarth Press, 1957) 122. 9. Freud, letter to Abraham, June 9, 1925; Abraham, letter to Freud, July 18, 1925 ("We [Abraham and Sachs] think we have succeeded in principle in presenting even the most abstract concepts"); Sigmund Freud—Karl Abraham Briefe, 357–58, 362; trans., 382–83, 387. Paul Federn in 1921 had already drawn the attention of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Association to these problems of cinematic representation: Federn points out the malicious representation of psychoanalysis [die böswillige Darstellung der Psychoanalyse] in Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler and encourages us [his fellow analysts] to do something about such representations. Freud categorically refuses; Protokoll der Sitzung der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung, November 1, 1921, cited in Fallend and Reichmayr, "Psychoanalyse, Film und Öffentlichkeit: Konflikte hinter den Kulissen,” 132. Freud’s reaction as recorded can be read both as a refusal to engage in public objections to the representations being produced and as a refusal to envisage authorized alternatives, exactly in response to the Neumann proposal. 10. Sigmund Freud, Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud XI (London: Hogarth Press, 1927) 25–27 (hereafter S.E.). Lacan shares something of this unease with imaging: even the diagram of the second topic he offered Freud "merely for purposes of exposition" prompts comment on "the disadvantages of figuration in images [figurations images]"; Lacan, "R.S.I.," seminar of December 10, 1974, Omiac 1975 (March 1975) 90; for the diagram, see Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, S.E. XIX (London: Hogarth Press, 1951) 24. 11. Sigmund Freud, An Autobiographical Study, S.E. XX (London: Hogarth Press, 1919) 1–243. "A Note upon the ‘Mystic Writing-Pad’," S.E. XIX (London: Hogarth Press, 1961) 229–32 (quotations). 12. Virginia Woolf, "The Cinema" (1926), Collected Essays II (London: Hogarth Press, 1996) 266–72. The piece was first published in the United States in the magazine Aris (June 1926) and then in Britain in The Nation & The Athenaeum (July 3, 1926). In a letter to Vita Sackville-West of April 13, 1926, Woolf records an informal gathering with Dadie Rylands, Eddy Sackville-West and Duncan Grant: "we compare movies and opera: I’m writing that for Todd: rather brilliant"; Nigel Nicholson ed., A Change of Perspective: The Letters of Virginia Woolf (1922–1926, vol. 3 (London: Hogarth Press, 1977) 254 ("Todd" is Dorothy Todd, editor of Vogue, for which Woolf had originally intended the piece). 13. J.-B. Pontalis, "Préface" to Jean-Paul Sartre, Le Scénario Freud (Paris: Gallimard, 1984) 21. These questions of figuration find a recent echo in the collection of photographs of Lacan published by his daughter Judith. In her preface note,
the latter repeats the resistance of psychoanalysis to image—"the instrument of analytic practice, speech, cannot be photographed"—but publishes the photographs nevertheless on the grounds that they will show Lacan "as he really was [tel qu'en lui-même]," while also acknowledging that he "used to complain about his person being a screen to his teaching". Judith Miller, *Album Jacques Lacan* (Paris: Seuil, 1991) 9.


15. Freud, letter to Abraham, June 9, 1925, Sigmund Freud—Karl Abraham Briefe, 357; trans., 354.

16. Franz Kafka, reported in Gustav Janouch, *Gespräche mit Kafka* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1968) 216. When Janouch told Kafka of a Prague cinema called "Cinema of the Blind [Die Sterben]" (its license belonged to a charitable association for the blind), the latter commented that all cinemas should be so called, 200.


19. B. D. Lewin, "Sleep, the Mouth, and the Dream Screen," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* XV (1946) 340. Lewin subsequently acknowledged the cinema analogy: "The term was suggested by the motion pictures; because, like its analogue in the cinema, the dream screen is either not noted by the dreaming spectator, or it is ignored due to the interest in the pictures and action that appear on it. However, under certain circumstances, the screen plays a role of its own and becomes perceptible. Then it enters to alter what is called the form of the dream;" "Inferences from the Dream Screen," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* XXIX, part 4 (1948) 242. For Desnos’s formulation, see Robert Desnos, *Journal littéraire* (April 25, 1925) in Marie-Claire Dumas ed., *Les Rayons et les ombres* (Paris: Gallimard, 1992) 69.


21. Virginia Woolf, "The ‘Movie’ Novel" (1918), *Contemporary Writers* (London: Hogarth Press, 1939) 82–84; "I was given the opportunity to see . . . " paragraph on Frey-Greene color process included in the "From Alpha to Omega" column, *The Nation & The Athenaeum* (April 5, 1924) 16. For Woolf’s question as to cinema "left to its own devices," see "The Cinema," 270.


23. The point is forcefully made by Paul Willemen: "the absence of these two key concepts [transference and resistance] allowed critics freely to delegate their neuroses to the films where they would then be ‘read’ . . . this reduced the films to the reader’s screen memories," *Looks and Frictions: Essays in Cultural Studies and Film Theory* (London: British Film Institute; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) 225.


46. Miller (with François Ansermet), *Extravagances sur le séminaire* (Paris: Navarin, 1985) 20. At the same time that he "decides meaning," Miller also considers that Lacan's meanderings are his teaching, that the seminars also need "the same reading as the unconscious" (98). The difficulty of these two emphases together, the question as to the representation of psychoanalysis, is the point here.
47. Žižek, *The Metastases of Enjoyment*, 202, 177, 199.
50. Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative*, 249.
52. Žižek, *The Metastases of Enjoyment*, 199.
53. Ibid.
58. Žižek, *Looking Away*, 140.
61. Ibid., 329; trans., 289.
63. Ibid., 117.

The advent of mechanical reproduction inaugurated a discursive thematics of excess and oversaturation that is still with us today. The sheer quantity of images and sounds is perceived as the threat of overwhelming or suffocating the subject. In his 1927 essay on photography, Siegfried Kracauer appeals to figures of natural disaster to capture the anxiety attendant upon the accelerated diffusion of photographic images. He refers to "the blizzard of photographs" and the "flood of photos" that "sweep away the dams of memory." Excess is embodied within the form of the photograph itself to the extent that it represents a spatial continuum without the gaps or lacks conducive to the production of historical significance. This continuum of the photograph becomes, in Kracauer's argument, the continuum of a photography that supports an overwhelming and ultimately meaningless historicism. Hence, we have the crucial and yet puzzling problem of the development and maintenance of a photographic archive, as so provocatively delineated by Allan Sekula. What taxonomic principle can govern the breakdown and ordering of a "flood" or a "blizzard?"

The excess and unrelenting continuum of mechanical reproduction is not, however, limited to the consideration of space (and Kracauer himself is insistent upon historicism's dependence upon the fullness of a temporal continuum). The emergence of mechanical reproduction is accompanied by modernity's increasing understanding of temporality as assault, acceleration, speed. There is too much, too fast. From Georg Simmel to Walter Benjamin, modernity is conceptualized as an increase in the speed and intensity of stimuli. Time emerges as a problem intimately linked to the theorization of modernity as trauma or shock. Time is no longer the benign phenomenon most easily grasped by the notion of flow but a troublesome