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“A Race of Wolves”

Marie de France, La Fontaine, Hobbes, Derrida, and other figurations; werewolf trials, fairy tales, Angela Carter and postmodern wolf-human mergers such as those in the Stephenie Meyers “Twilight” series—“wolf” is everywhere in the Western imagination, from moral fables to political allegories to juridical encounters and the queerness of transpecies becomings.

My interest in wolves, and wolves and humans, emerges from my work on the genealogy of the cynanthrope, the merger of dog and man. Cynanthropes were thought to live on the edge of civilization and to be intelligent and rational like humans but also ferocious and hostile toward strangers, devouring their enemies. They are examples of what I call “carnivorous virility,” a cultural fantasy that the merger between dog and human restores to human men a measure of primitive strength, virility, and savagery.¹ The figure of the cynanthrope is a “material-semiotic” figure: material because it was thought to exist as an entity—there are depictions of it—and it persists in fantastic forms of masculine-canine becoming; and “semiotic,” that is, meaningful (it persists because meaningful). The story of the cynanthrope is also queer insofar as the merger in question—a transpecies coupling—may also be said to be between men. But animal theory (and I include humans here) is also queer because it opens up questions of non-normative subjectivities, sexualities, and desire. It de-normativizes or de-centers the human by showing how the human is one subject-position among others. I call what I do figural historiography, using feminism, queer theory, critical race theory, and

1. See Carla Freccero, “Carnivorous Virility, or Becoming-Dog,” in *Interspecies*, ed. Julie Livingston and Jasbir Puar, special issue, *Social Text* 29/1 (2011): 177–95.

YFS 127, “Animots”: *Postanimality in French Thought*, ed. Senior, Clark, and Freccero, © 2015 by Yale University.

animal studies to discern the material semiotics in figures of wolf-human interactions. Such theory (and, I hope, my story) aims to tease apart the long and tangled inter-implications of sex, species, and race.

There's an intimate historical connection between species and race. That period in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe that saw an intensification of taxonomizing and typologizing of the human "races" and that gave rise to eugenics, also saw the burgeoning of the study of biological classification culminating in evolutionary theory. Likewise, the period of European abolitionist activism corresponded to animal welfare movements, especially in Britain, and some of the great humanitarian denounciators of slavery also denounced cruelty to animals, if not their "slavery" as well.

And yet, the intimacy of species and race as conceptual categories has engendered, if anything, an aversion to their co-articulation in current critical cultural discourses purporting to understand both racialization and speciation. This has occurred, I think, for a number of reasons: on the one hand, scholars of racialization are all too aware of the history of ideological analogism. Racists and civilizationists have long compared groups of humans they regarded as inferior to themselves with non-humans and have thereby justified all manner of abuse. Likewise the "less-than-human" status afforded some humans has led to a rigidification of species hierarchy, tantamount to reinstating the great chain of being, whereby the human occupies an exceptional status in the order of the living, with no comparison allowed. The counter-discourse that would distance the non-human animal from the human—as in the expression "human life," so nicely questioned by Judith Butler in *Undoing Gender*—like the counter-discourse that distances some humans from other humans and hierarchizes them, unwittingly reinstates modalities of exclusion by relegating some of the living to non-viability, to unlivable lives.² Finally, there is also the fear that, by privileging the living-in-general over the specificity of the human, there will be a turn away from human injustice toward other humans, which is the problem that progressive liberalism always seems to grapple with when adjudicating bids for greater enfranchisement or liberation: first us then them.³ This

2. Judith Butler, *Undoing Gender* (NY and Oxford: Routledge, 2004), 12–13.

3. For a brief survey of some of the difficulties of reading species and race together, see Claire Jean Kim and Carla Freccero, "Introduction: A Dialogue," in *Species/Race/Sex*, ed. Claire Jean Kim and Carla Freccero, special issue, *American Quarterly* 65/3 (2013): 461–79.

prioritization or progressivism has, however, reached its limits in the current era of planetary life dubbed “The Anthropocene,” where the material foundations of all biological life are put into question by human agency in the environment that makes all “life” possible. It is thus no longer an option to think progressive enfranchisements of orders of the living, for the very reason that the interconnectedness of the living in the present—and the interdependence of life—will in fact determine the contours of the future—its length and duration, its quality, its very possibility.

How, where, and why do wolves signify, and what are the material histories, cultures, and encounters that make lupine figures ubiquitous in human oral and scriptural cultures? This figural historiography follows twisted paths and sometimes denatures temporal chronologies and ideologies of reproductive futurism: it is a queer transpecies racial/civilizational narrative, a story about indigeneity and autochthony. The contradictory figuration of wolves throughout Western history and literature offers insight into the complexities and contradictions at work in cultural productions of species, sex, gender, and race, for each of these are bound up with animality. But it’s not enough to address the non-human animal merely for his or her representational value; I am thus also trying to find a way to think about and with wolf and wolf figures for (that is, in the interest of) wolves as living beings in themselves.

However fictionally and allegorically ubiquitous, material wolves—(I originally wrote “in their integrity,” but what could I have meant? Am I in search of the authentic wolf, the never-before-eradicated and re-seeded wolf, am I looking for “wild” wolves? Indeed, wolves are also asked to stand in for a nostalgia for the wholeness of the human and the natural, a nostalgia that is both spatial and temporal)—are largely absent from most peoples’ lives (not all, but most), except where they are protected or where, as in parts of Eastern Europe and Asia, there hasn’t been as much systematic eradication. There is thus a work of transpecies mourning to be done here that also seeks to come to terms with the spectral returns of lupine being within the cultures that have expelled and eradicated it. It is what Jacques Derrida calls a “hauntology,”—a way of thinking and responding ethically within history.⁴ For Derrida, spectrality describes a mode

4. See Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning, and The New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge,

of historical attentiveness that the living might have to what is not present but somehow appears as a figure, a “non-living present in the living present” that is no longer or not yet with the living, and hauntology is the practice of attending to the spectral.⁵ There is both a powerful analogy and a relation here—the indigeneity of the wolf and perceptions of the wolf’s competition for resources with humans (settler colonialists?) suggests, first, that—as Brian K. Hudson has argued—there are threads to be woven between first beings and first peoples;⁶ and second, that wolves may be privileged among first beings for understanding spectrality’s force, its ethical insistence, in the present.

I begin with a proverbial wolf; I am looking for the *lupus in fabula* (the wolf in the story), which is a way of saying “speaking of the devil” . . .

In the 1963 Warner Brothers’ cartoon featuring Ralph E. Wolf and Sam Sheepdog, a wolf and a sheepdog share a companionable dailiness and friendship involving coffee together in the morning and a return home arm in arm at the end of the day.⁷ In between they assume their role as enemies: the sheepdog guards the flock, while the wolf devises numerous stratagems to steal the sheep, foiled at every turn by a seemingly dopey yet powerful and alert guard dog. The cartoon, with its reference to the workaday world, cleverly points to the human cultural roles within which dog and wolf are forced to play out their opposed roles, and marks as capital the framework for their opposition: there is an invisible boss and a system within which they must perform: someone—presumably human—owns the flock, and both are employed in its maintenance and devastation. The cartoon is knowing and innovative in that it remarks on the “insiderness” to human culture of the wolf—he is *supposed* to try to steal the sheep,

1994). Originally published as *Spectres de Marx* (Paris: Galilée, 1993). For a beautiful application of hauntology that compellingly charts the subjective and collective effects of traumatic historical events, see Avery Gordon’s analysis of Toni Morrison’s *Beloved* in *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 137–92. See also Freccero, *Queer/Early/Modern* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 69–104.

5. *Specters of Marx*, 254.

6. Brian K. Hudson, “First Beings in American Indian Literatures,” in *Animal Studies*, ed. Brian K. Hudson and Dustin Gray, special issue, *Studies in American Indian Literatures* 25/4 (2013): 3–10.

7. “Woolen Under Where,” *Merrie Melodies*, dir. Phil Monroe and Richard Thompson (May 11, 1963; Burbank, CA: Warner Brothers Pictures), television.

although, in a fort-da of mastery and triumph over trauma, he will never succeed. Instead, his actions confirm and reconfirm the superior agency of the human creation: the sheepdog. No matter how much the thief tries to bring down the empire he is foiled.⁸ In its material realization—its production—one discerns the racial valences implicitly at work, from the whiteness of Sam Sheepdog to the brownness of Ralph E. Wolf, who is modeled on the cartoon image of Wiley Coyote and thus also carries with him the degraded and degrading spectral image of the Native American as companion/twin and competitor for resources of the land.

The cartoon suggests that the economic system of private property (and primitive accumulation) require an enemy. And “enemy” is most often what wolf is, especially in the economic arena. The archive of wolves and humans in intimate naturecultures is a record of economic competition, top-of-the-food-chain predators finding themselves side by side, the one in the *polis* (the city), the other on its borders (wolves in literary records are always in the forest, a wild space, the space of romance; wolves thus occupy the genre of romance, or they are *unheimlich*, uncanny, “home-like” yet not, and thus also occupy the genre of horror). Both parties—human and wolf—are interested in the flesh of ungulates, whether they be the domesticated sheep and cattle whose accumulation furnished primitive wealth, or the “wild” deer whose abundance furnished royalty with hunting grounds.⁹ And they do, or did, populate the world—of wolves, Garry Marvin says that they’re “the most widely distributed of all land mammals, apart from humans,” and Aleksander Pluskowski notes that they have adaptive success “in being able to survive in virtually any environment.”¹⁰ They were both (humans and wolves) found in

8. Given the historical moment of the cartoon, one can speculate about its allegory: does it reference the red evil at the heart of nineteen-fifties’ America? Is it a domestic racial threat? Or is it invoking the failure of World War II’s axis of evil (one of Mussolini’s fascist youth organizations was called the *figli della lupa*, children of the she-wolf)?

9. For an interesting discussion of aristocratic enclosure of forest land and the privatization of hunting rights, see Matt Cartmill, *A View to a Death in the Morning: Hunting and Nature Through History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, repr. 1996).

10. See Garry Marvin, “Wolves in Sheep’s (and Others’) Clothing,” in *Beastly Natures: Animals, Humans, and the Study of History*, ed. Dorothee Brantz (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2010), 66; and Aleksander Pluskowski, *Wolves and the Wilderness in the Middle Ages* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2006), 25.

almost every corner of the earth—and the fact that, now, the one is far more widespread than the other is related to their having shared so much territory. And if *homo homini lupus*—a man is a wolf to/for other men—a phrase whose originating context is economic, then wolves too are often wolves for other wolves, since in reserves and parks it would seem that half if not more of their fatalities are due to predation by other wolves . . . in territorial disputes.¹¹ Their sociability—both human and wolf—is the nuclear family, sometimes extended—clans, packs—and when rival children are born, it has been a customary strategy to kill them, wolves killing wolves, and humans humans. As Ferdinand, in a brilliant economy of phrasing, declares to the Duchess of Malfi concerning his murder of her children, “The death of young wolves is never to be pitied.”¹² Both humans and wolves also practice cross-species infanticide: one systematic practice for eradicating wolves in pre-modernity was to find the den and kill all the cubs in spring or summer, while wolf attacks on humans primarily target children.¹³ In “Little Red Riding Hood” there’s a specificity to the gender of the child—she’s female—which adds a dimension of genetic and reproductive competition to the fantasy of wolf/human competition—the transpecies miscegenation so sought after in other contexts (male human hybridized with male wolf), when posited as between male wolf and female human, is a threat.

Do wolves (and wolves and humans) have a history? And what have they learned? Like humans, wolves excel in visual observational learning. They have learned to fear firepower and know the distances they need to keep from guns.¹⁴ It also seems to be the case, from documenting human-wolf encounters, that there are “no examples of humans being incorporated into long-term predation strategies” on the part of wolves.¹⁵ The obverse is certainly not true, as the example of the *Luparii* attests. *Luparii* were designated wolf-hunting

11. “Gray Wolf,” *Wikipedia.org*, last modified June 2, 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gray_wolf.

12. John Webster, *The Duchess of Malfi*, ed. Leah S. Marcus (London: Methuen Drama, 2009).

13. Pluskowski, *Wolves and the Wilderness in the Middle Ages*.

14. Pluskowski makes the fascinating point that “modern wolves have had many generations of experience with firearms and their general timidity may be related to this. But this shyness is conditional and wolves have been known to overcome their fear of people in a number of situations . . . it is likely that wolves in medieval northern Europe were even more fearless,” *Wolves and the Wilderness in the Middle Ages*, 108.

15. *Ibid.*, 108.

royal officials receiving bounties for killed wolves, from the ninth century on in Europe. Wolves prefer wild ungulates to tame ones, given the choice, and they only kill tame ones in surplus (which has led, among humans, to their reputation as greedy, vindictive, and wantonly destructive). A longer cultural history would explore the many micro-decisions, genetically selective and conscious (as well as unconscious) that led eventually to dog for, as Donna Haraway and others have argued, dog is a naturecultural history of mutual domestication, wolf-for-human, human-for-wolf, the results being (for the wolf-become-dog) smaller brains, smaller teeth, neoteny, and an ability to read humans visually and vocally—a kind of language acquisition.¹⁶ Wolves, for the most part, recognize dogs and their human and wolf allegiances. There seems to be no wholesale strategy to become-dog on the part of wolves, while it is unclear, at least for most of this history, whether humans have practiced a systematic strategy of the becoming-dog of wolf. For a long time humans have intended genocide for wolves. Where wolves have survived, it is mostly because they found places to live that were inaccessible to human hunters.

The phrase *homo homini lupus*, man is a wolf to other men, is from Plautus's *Asinaria*, and it is the phrase the merchant in the text utters: "One man to another is a wolf, not a man, when he doesn't know what sort he is."¹⁷ But this phrase's more famous future is a political, not an economic one, and it takes out the qualifying phrase: Thomas Hobbes's *homo homini lupus* is the evil twin of the other Latin adage, commented on by Erasmus and Hobbes, *homo homini deus*. Man is wolf and god, god and wolf are man's possibilities, man is somewhere between wolf and god, if he is man. This is the subject of Jacques Derrida's 2001–2002 seminar, *The Beast and the Sovereign, La (feminine) bête et le (masculine) souverain*, which is also *The Beast is the Sovereign*.¹⁸ Derrida addresses both the feminiza-

16. Donna Haraway, *When Species Meet* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). See also *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003).

17. Titus Maccius Plautus, *Asinaria*, act 2, scene 4 in *The Comedies of Plautus*, trans. Henry Thomas Riley (London: George Bell and Sons, 1912), <http://data.perseus.org/catalog/urn:cts:latinLit:phi0119.phi002.opp-eng1>.

18. Jacques Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, Vol. I, ed. Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet, and Ginette Michaud, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2011). Originally published as *Séminaire, La bête et le souverain, Volume I: 2001–2002* (Paris: Galilée, 2008).

tion of the non-human animal in human schemes of representation and points out the identity/twinning between one kind of sovereign and another, both exceptions to the law of the *polis*. He performs a *genelycology* of sovereignty, noting the ways wolf and sovereign mirror each other, become each other, and raise questions of reason and force in government. In the long and ancient *genelycology* of political animals, and in the naturecultural formations that give rise to wolf-with/against/for-human and human-with/against/for-wolf, he finds many places where humans, most often male humans, derive their heroic, exceptional, savage, strong, noble, ferocious, status from the wolf beside them: 1) as their twin brother—Derrida cites an Ojibwe hero legend of fraternal rivalry between brothers, one human, one wolf; 2) as their wolf mother (the one who suckles Romulus and Remus), also invoked in the context of fraternal rivalry in the founding of the nation-state; 3) as their wolf father and brothers (Rudyard Kipling's Akela, the adoptive father of Mowgli the man-cub and Mowgli's brothers, the wolf pack); 4) as the wolf who is preserved in their names, nicknames, and totems.¹⁹

Derrida wants us to consider "this becoming-beast, this becoming-animal of a sovereign who is above all a war chief, and is determined as sovereign or as animal faced with the enemy. He is instituted as sovereign by the possibility of the enemy, by that hostility in which Schmitt claimed to recognize, along with the possibility of the political, the very possibility of the sovereign, of sovereign decision and exception."²⁰ He invokes Carl Schmitt's concept of the political, which bases the conceptual realm of state sovereignty and autonomy upon the distinction between friend and enemy.²¹ For Schmitt, an enemy establishes the very notion of the political. The enemy is a hostile equal, another like the self. As Derrida writes, of the interspecies twin hero legends:

His brother is the wolf, his next of kin is the wolf. For this man, the twin brother is a wolf: a friendly wolf, a friendly brother whose death leaves him inconsolable, beyond all possible work of mourning; or else an enemy wolf, an enemy brother, a twin brother he will have

19. Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, Vol. I, 9–11.

20. *Ibid.*, 10.

21. Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

killed, and whom he will not have mourned here either. Those close to me, brothers, friendly or enemy brothers are wolves who are my kind and my brothers.²²

In his study of Albanian shepherds, Marvin observes that the wolf is accorded the subjectivity of enemy in Schmittian terms, as a brother/other with agency and intention: "The wolf is a stranger, an Other, the wild outsider who continues to be wild and does not succumb to domestication and incorporation," he writes, and although apparently in Norway shepherds are economically compensated for wolf depredations, farmers, he argues, nevertheless want revenge, as from an enemy with purpose and intent.²³

This sovereign/tyrant who is a wolf lives in the literature of fables and popular stories as well, and he (for he is often if not always a male wolf) is also a noble animal, unlike the degraded servant, the dog, whose collar of servitude, famously in Aesop, Marie de France, and Jean La Fontaine, among others, will not be adopted by the wolf for an easier life. There is thus a contradiction in representations of the wolf's relationship to human social orders that also informs his racialized human counterpart: the wolf is wild, noble, possessing a primitive strength and natural dignity, and yet he is capable of an inhuman savagery that the human (sovereign) must suppress in himself. In the medieval *lai* "Bisclavret," Marie de France's knight-wolf demonstrates his civilized (and thus, ironically, his dog-like) nature through his recognition of and submission to the king.²⁴ For Marie, there must be two wolves, a bad one and a good one, in order to rehabilitate wolfish-ness: Bisclavret (Breton) is not a *loup garou/garwaf*, the Norman terms for werewolf, because "A werewolf is a savage beast;/ while his fury is on him/ he eats men, does much harm."²⁵ The difference in the two contradictory valences of the wolf-man hybrid is marked by a linguistic, which is also a racial/national, difference (England and France): "In Breton, the *lai*'s name is *Bisclavret*—the Normans call it *Garwaf*."²⁶ The medieval (were)wolf thus already exhibits the conflicting values of the nation-racial difference that this

22. Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, Vol. I, 10–11.

23. Marvin, "Wolves in Sheep's (and Others') Clothing," 70, 72.

24. Marie de France, *Lais de Marie de France*, trans. Alexandre Micha (Paris: Garnier Flammarion, 1994), 126–43.

25. *The Lais of Marie de France*, trans. Robert Hanning and Joan Ferrante (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1978), 92, ll. 9–11.

26. *The Lais of Marie de France*, 92, ll. 3–4.

species merger is thought to embody. And yet, in the story, the wolf is asked to stand in for something particularly “savage” about sovereign power—for Bisclavret uses his savagery righteously to punish his adulterous wife and her usurping husband (he attacks them both and tears off his former wife’s nose). The King, in turn, tortures the wife to elicit a confession. Peggy McCracken, analyzing this tale from the point of view of translation, notes that for Marie, translation frequently occurs at the site of an animal’s name, as here, thus signaling “a translatability between human and animal forms,” insofar as translation is a figure for the transformation that also occurs thematically between humans and animals in the *Lais*.²⁷ As the tale bears out, and the twinning of beast and sovereign suggest, the difference asserted between *Bisclavret* and *Garwaf* may be “merely” skin deep. The wolf is the sovereign turned tyrant or he is the tyrant in the sovereign. The beast is the sovereign, the sovereign is the beast.

Jean La Fontaine nicely encapsulates this “fabular” or “fabulous” dimension of the political when he comments on problems of power and subordination in the fable of the wolf and the lamb, whose first line serves as a refrain for Derrida’s seminar: “La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure” (the reason of the strongest is always the best, or “might makes right”).²⁸ The wolf, in an extravagant performance of resentment, feels wronged from the outset and seeks to blame the lamb, who very reasonably—that is, using rational faculties (La Fontaine knew—and disagreed with—Descartes’ theory of the animal machine)—explains that he could not possibly be the culprit (first, because he drinks downstream from the wolf, second, because he was not born when the wolf was insulted/slandered the year before). The lamb addresses him as “Your Majesty”: “‘Sire,’ répond l’Agneau, ‘que votre Majesté/Ne se mette pas en colère’” (“‘Let not, Sire,/Your Majesty feel so much ire,’” ll. 10–11), and it is clear that he is dealing with a powerful and arbitrary ruler. That ruler—both plaintiff and judge, as the explicitly juridical language suggests—feels wronged in advance and seeks vengeance. The story ends as one might expect, the wolf carrying off and eating the lamb, “sans autre forme de procès,” (l.29), which, in a literal translation, means without any (other) form of

27. Peggy McCracken, “Translation and Animals in Marie de France’s *Lais*,” *Australian Journal of French Studies* 46/3 (2009): 206–218.

28. “Le loup et l’agneau,” fable X in Jean de La Fontaine, *Fables*, ed. Antoine Adam (Paris: Garnier Flammarion, 1966), 59–60. See also *Selected Fables*, ed. Maya Slater, trans. Christopher Wood (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 18–20.

trial. It also points to the juridical context of sovereignty enshrined in the seventeenth-century writ of *habeas corpus* that sets the terms of both sovereignty and subjection in Giorgio Agamben's discussion of sovereignty.²⁹ Ultimately, this framing of wolf-lamb relations that pits an arbitrary, ruthless, and unjust power against innocence and reason will binaristically inform all future representations of savage and civilized in Western narratives of humans and of wolves and humans.

In Marie's *lais* the *bisclavret* (the name is both generic and proper), though a "bête" or beast and thus feminine when referred to in the third person, is nevertheless most often subjectively described through masculine pronouns (the name permitting this transition between feminine beast and masculine werewolf); in La Fontaine's tale, "majesté" and "bête" both feminize the wolf, while "loup" masculinizes him. Derrida's beast and sovereign thus also flicker between genders, the feminine beast and the masculine sovereign alternating sexual ontologies. The racialized/savage man, the beast in the man, and "woman" are, in the carnophallogocentric poetics of the West, conjoined by their proximity to the wolf. Anne Carson writes:

The wolf is a conventional symbol of marginality in Greek poetry. The wolf is an outlaw. He lives beyond the boundary of usefully cultivated and inhabited space marked off as the polis, in that blank no man's land called to apeiron ("the unbounded"). Women, in the ancient view, share this territory spiritually and metaphorically in virtue of a "natural" female affinity for all that is lawless, fornicous and in need of the civilizing hand of man.³⁰

This also proleptically informs Freud's argument that women incompletely sublimate and are thus more tied to the instinctual drives of animality than men; women are connected, like wolves, to the wild and to earth, and they are amoral. This is perhaps what motivates some of the postmodern twists in tales of Red Riding Hood, such as the television series' *Once Upon a Time's* "Red Handed," where there's a mere red cloak between Little Red Riding Hood and the

29. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, repr. 1998). Agamben also discusses "wolf" and Marie de France; for him, the metamorphosis of the knight into wolf signals the "state of exception," 104–111.

30. Anne Carson, "The Gender of Sound," in *Glass, Irony and God* (New York: New Directions Publishing Corporation, 1992), 119–42.

wolf.³¹ When wolves are gendered, maternal wolves confer salutary savagery.³² They figure importantly in fantasies of nation-building, for the heroes in the archives of *genelycology* will need the ferocity of a wolf for the future founding and ruling of their nations; like Marie's king, they will need wolf-ness at their side or within them to mete out punishment without weakness. True to the feminist observation that masculinist cultural fantasies consign women to the roles of mother and whore (the virgin occupies a special status in this wolf tale, as Angela Carter's reworkings of wolf stories suggest), the other female wolf, the "she-wolf," is rapacious, a sexual and economic predator. The medieval and early modern nickname for prostitutes was "*lupae*," (she-wolves), because they aggressively stripped their clients of wealth.³³

Do modern versions of the conjoining of human and wolf and the figuration of the human in wolfly terms forge alternatives to the traditional narratives that link wolves to primitive masculinity and tyrannical savagery? Can refigurations of the relationship between wolves and humans have an effect on—transform and refigure—the species, race, and sex nexus in which this relationship is knotted up? And what might this have to do with wolves?

Consider Stephenie Myers's *Twilight* series, where the werewolf is a Native American man. The wolf, like the racialized other of a white European cultural imagination, connotes sexual potency, vigor, a carnality that supplements—with sexualized embodiedness—civilization. But here, those values are positive (even if they can't compete with the effete sophistication and capitalist wealth of the extremely

31. "Red-Handed," *Once Upon a Time*, dir. Ron Underwood (March 11, 2012; Burbank, CA: ABC Studios), television.

32. I understand this fantasy as consonant with early modern (Italian) practices of sending children of the nobility to be wet-nursed by rural peasant women, in spite of the high rates of mortality thereby entailed. The wet-nurse was thought to confer the sturdiness and vigor of peasant rurality through her breast milk.

33. For Angela Carter's re-workings of Red Riding Hood, see *The Bloody Chamber and Other Stories* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979); see Kimberly Lau, "Erotic Infidelities: Angela Carter's Wolf Trilogy," *Marvels & Tales* 22/1 (2008): 77–94. "Shakira's song, "She-Wolf," builds on this conceit of the lustful she-wolf and at the same time disavows it. A sexually rapacious and predatory savagery is conferred on the woman and experienced by her as a form of liberation from the excessive docility required of her by her workaday life and boyfriend. See Shakira, "She-Wolf," *She-Wolf* (2009, Epic, CD). For "*lupae*" and "*lupanar*" (the ancient Roman term for a brothel, from wolf-den), see "Lupanar (Pompeii)," *Wikipedia.org*, last modified May 10, 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lupanar_%28Pompeii%29.

pale and sparkling vampire-husband).³⁴ It remains to be seen whether the refashioning of feminine agency and sexualized transpecies proximity to wolves—wolves of color, it seems, specifically—has any kind of subversive role to play in reworking cultural fantasies about the wolf in the man. Modern revisionist (and sometimes feminist) narratives of this species merger (popular film and TV adaptations, especially of *Red Riding Hood*) seem usually to reinscribe racialism by linking werewolfism to genetics.

Karen Russell's "St. Lucy's Home for Girls Raised by Wolves" presents a feminist way of valorizing the connection between women and race, gender and species that critiques masculinist racialized fantasies of culture and articulates wolf-women in their own terms.³⁵ Too often, even in their feminist incarnations, women and wolves co-exist in mutual relation to a now-positively valorized wildness and nature. Russell's story nevertheless offers a way to think about wolfiness that queers the stories of lone heroic or rapacious individualists. She describes a devastating rite of passage whereby young girls raised by wolves are taken from their packs to convent schools to learn to become human, an allegory for the boarding schools to which Native American children were forcibly taken to "educate and civilize" them into Western Christian North American values (thus troping, again, the connection between wolves and indigenous Americans). The process involves unlearning collectivity and solidarity, unlearning the Deleuzian pack or swarm in favor of the oedipalized individual.³⁶ Indeed, so many of the Western cultural fantasies of being-wolf exaggerate what is, in wolf land, an extreme exception: the lone wolf. Wolves live in packs, in collectivities, and a feminist Deleuzian becoming-wolf that refuses masculinist heroic or demonic individualism might offer a line of flight for both women and wolves.

This essay began by addressing wolves and humans, their similarities, their proximities within the naturecultures where they co-exist, their mutual relations, their difficult entanglements, and their cultural histories. But there is no means to address wolves "as such," just

34. Stephenie Meyer, *Twilight* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2005–2008).

35. Karen Russell, "St. Lucy's Home for Girls Raised by Wolves," in *St. Lucy's Home for Girls Raised by Wolves* (New York: Random House, Inc., 2006), 225–46.

36. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming Imperceptible . . .," in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 232–309.

as there is also no way to address “the human” as such. What such cultural analyses can do is to think through the material-semiotic—the meaningful enfleshment—of bodies, histories, and meanings called human and non-human animal. To forego any “representation” at all (in both the sense of figuration and the sense of political representation) is to risk relinquishing all responsibility (in the sense of responding and responding to) for the co-articulations of lives, histories, and cultures called human and animal. Wolves, even, perhaps especially the ones with which humans now choose to repopulate the wilderness, are, for human culture, spectral. The spectral wolf, which includes a long line, a *genelycology*, a multiplicity of wolves brutally and deliberately exterminated over centuries and centuries of human culture, haunts human myths, human stories, human psyches, and continues to haunt the figure of the human-as-animal in literature, political theory, and popular culture. This haunting also shows us the degree to which human and animal share not only a history of comparison and analogy—some humans are like animals, some humans have been animalized—but also a history of traumatic expulsion from the land in the name of certain “human” rights and property claims. It is for those who recognize the connection—not the analogy—of this relationship to forge alternatives to the story of competing rights and hierarchically differential valuations of “life.”