

VISIBLE EVIDENCE, VOLUME 24

*Recording Reality,
Desiring the Real*

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[3] *Documentary Desire: Seeing for Ourselves and Identifying in Reality*

The identifications that, in the fiction film, are dismissed as vicarious, illusory, and ideologically dangerous are, in documentary, both permitted and proper to its project. Explored here are the ways in which the documentary film, no less than the fiction feature film, offers mise-en-scènes of desire and of imagining that enable identification even while, or rather because, it asserts itself as real. As spectators of documentary, we bring with us not only an understanding of the conventions of the novelistic, as well as of the “factual,” but also a desire for reality represented and a desire to find that moment that is not only real and factual but also “true.” Indeed, the demand for the distinction these terms imply itself constitutes a *desire* for a certainty of the knowable, of the world as testable, producing a split between two domains: one of proper, true, knowledge and a second domain of improper, untrue fabrications. Such a “wish to know” (epistophilia) the truth of the world both seeks an answer and is a questioning: is this really so, is it really true? The splitting produced by this opposition between true and false inaugurates an uncertainty and becomes the locus of anxiety in which another question is posed, one that is addressed to the other from whom we seek and desire a response in relation to not only the truth of the other or the world but also the truth of ourselves as subjects. This chapter draws on the understanding offered by psychoanalysis to explore the specific ways that documentary engages this questioning address and the interrelation that thereby arises of desire, knowledge, and identification in the sounds and images of the documentary with the ethics of desiring, knowing, and identifying.

Knowledge, as Foucault articulated so clearly, is not just there; rather, it is what is recognized as knowledge by a community, that is, as having a specific or specified use value for a community, such as the

knowledge of the effects of different plants, or of the understanding of light, or the knowledge of poetry, or of politics. As the way a society knows and organizes its knowing, its ordering of knowledge institutes a discursive regime by which the kinds of statements that count as knowledge are determined. Knowledge is independent of the subject as an objective understanding of the world, while at the same time, paradoxically, it is always for a subject, since it only exists insofar as it is known by someone, in the same way that Peirce defined the sign as always implying an addressee. The knowing of knowledge, which we speak of as something we possess, is both instrumental—we know how to change a flat tire—and something that has value and currency as a commodity that, for example, I trade in as an academic, for it is acquired only by learning. The coming to know of knowledge is, by contrast, a process. The world as a knowable entity, “reality,” is constructed by the subject through its encounter with externality in a mastering that is also an acknowledgement of its mastery over us or as something we submit to. The tools humanity has fashioned are honed not just to fit “reality” but also to transform it in an imagining of the world otherwise.¹ Knowledge, by making the material world “make sense,” is at the same time a construct that wards off the emptiness of meaning of contingent reality. Science declares the knowability of the world, foreclosing the real as meaninglessness, and as such is, for Lacan, a form of sublimation.²

What is our fascination with facts? How does documentary address us with its facts and with its desire to represent true reality? Merton and Lazerfeld, in their analysis of responses to government propaganda, note, “We observed at once an interest in detailed circumstantial facts. Facts are in the saddle . . . Facts, not the propagandist, speak.” They suggest that “the concrete incident, rich in circumstantial detail, serves as a prototype or model which helps orient people toward a part of the world in which they live. It has orientation value.”³ Their example is a radio program on merchant-shipping convoys that explained in great technical detail how the speed of the convoy is determined by the slowest boat, thereby implying a further, and subjective, meaning, that the merchant marine willingly place the collective good over individual good. The sequence was most effective because “the facts, not the propagandist, speak,” and they conclude, “The voluntary drawing of conclusions has little likelihood of the disillusionment which so often follows the propaganda of exhortation.”⁴ Audiences are engaged by the facts and become agents in relation to this knowledge, drawing further inferences, such as “surely my sacrifices do not match theirs,”⁵ but in film, this is a *showing* rather than telling.

Documentaries invoke and require identification; this is a cognitive process and a matter of knowledge, for we must identify their facts and recognize their meanings. In this we are positioned by the documentary's discourse of reality, identifying as the subject addressed, as one who knows and comes to know, which involves both seeing for oneself the truth of reality and identifying with the seen and with the objects of knowledge and of the camera's observation—other people and other subjects. Our relationship to knowing is as rational and objective persons, while also involving an emotional engagement with the seen and heard that is often also called identification. Such identification is not all of a piece, however. Rather, it involves a number of distinct psychical and, for documentary film, cinematic processes that engage us as both knowing and desiring subjects. Indeed it might seem that the term refers to processes either too multiple or too vague to be useful, and both philosophers and many film theorists prefer to talk of emotional response rather than identification. This gives rise to new problems concerning the concept of emotion or of affect as a feeling or experience and in the opposition implied between emotion and rational understanding. While identification is a contested concept and process, it is nevertheless the term most of us use to refer to the way we feel for and about other people and ourselves.⁶ It is also a concept that has been central to both psychoanalysis and theories of ideology, for we are our identifications. The approach I adopt here is to view identification as naming a number of processes that are both interdependent and singular, which may also be, at the same time, contradictory.

How does documentary engage us in identifying? Documentary informs us of the world, offering us identities in the images and stories of other lives that it presents that become fixed as known and knowable through its account and explanation of the world it shows. It thereby reassures us that our own, different identities are equally knowable, engaging our desire for the certainty of our knowable and known identities. Our identities are both visible attributes (e.g., red hair, brown eyes) and our personal characteristics (e.g., shy, proud, clever, insightful, gay, black); these are distinctions that are both social and psychological. It is this intermixing that I am exploring here.

Identity arises in relation to two distinct cognitive events centered on the senses but that are also an imaginative engagement: The first is the recognition of the self as an entity, a bodily differentiation between what is me and what is not me, and thus other, which Lacan describes in his account of what he termed "the mirror stage" as the acquisition of an image.⁷ The second is the recognition of attributes and qualities of the

thingness of the separate self and the other that arises through the address of others and becomes the experience of “me-ness,” of an identity as son or daughter, child or adult, or as naughty or nice that one embodies, and in recognizing this one also comes to enact this identity for these others.⁸ Identity is experienced subjectively as a feeling that “I am this,” where “this” might be shyness, but it is also inextricably an identification, for shyness is a quality objectively recognized by me as mine.⁹ It is a quality that I may also identify in other people, giving rise to the sense of being like or the same as others, but this is distinct from becoming the other.

Identifying, and the identity it makes possible, never ceases as we transfer to others our relations to the emotional figures of our childhood and seek new ways of becoming the image of ourselves given to us by those figures. What is the role of our encounters with the imaged and explained lives of others in documentary, and is it distinct from fiction? In documentary, people speak to us, and we are engaged by their address, that is, by how their speech positions us as addressees. Through its stories, documentary presents *mise-en-scènes* of desire and of possible outcomes hoped for in the contingent reality shown that engage us as desiring subjects. Storytelling, whether in literature, theater, or film, is also one of the discursive practices of imagination through which we may envision ourselves as subjects of desire and feeling. Whether in Freud’s language as the fetish, or in that of Proust as the *madeleine* of his memory, or in the imagery of Hitchcock’s Madeleine and her coiled lock of hair and her poise of red rose buds in *Vertigo* (1958)—obsession and desire are *figured*, performed, and given substance in gesture, action, and objects in *mise-en-scènes* of fantasy. Identification, however, is with the place occupied by the character, or the person participating in the documentary, in relation to another object or person; it is a relation of desire, of wishing, not as but as if. One’s own desires are played out through these figures of “identification” and not as them.

The pleasure of the “information” documentary film arises with an identification with the other of knowledge, understood as taking the place of the other in relation to knowing, and the pleasure of coming to know as a mastering the world. There is a desire for knowledge, a wish to know, founded in the wish to know the desire of the other. A further pleasure arises from the recognition that the other knows and thus I can know, the inverse of which is the pleasure of the reassurance that, for example, science or scientists know, and they know for me.¹¹ Similarly, the charity worker is helping others “for me,” and the emergency services are rescuing “for me”; they are invested magically as “doing it” for me, not as a gift to me, but as a separated part of me “over there,” an idealized

self who would fulfill my ego ideal demands as I might wish to help and rescue others. Equally they fulfill the wish to be helped and rescued. It is such pleasurable reassurance that documentary *narration* makes possible, in contrast to the images and sound bites of the news report. This is, of course, a matter of imagining and of fantasy in the sense understood by psychoanalysis of the world available to be mastered, to become what we want it to be, and of the contingent real made over into knowable reality and thus available to change, to desire. It is a matter of believing—because the other does—that the world can be mastered. “The other who knows/does it for me” is part of “magical” thinking, or fetishism, in the understanding given to this by Marx as an alienation, or in Freud’s terms, the splitting of the ego arising with *disavowal*.¹⁰ Žižek asks, “Is the primordial version of this substitution by means of which ‘somebody else does it for me,’ not the very substitution of a signifier for the subject? In such a substitution resides the basic, constitutive feature of the symbolic order: a signifier is precisely an object-thing which substitutes me, which acts in my place.”¹² A certain disavowal is involved in this relation to documentary in which, as Freud showed, two knowledges or beliefs are held at the same time.

In documentary, we also encounter behaviors by which we may be recognized by ourselves and by others as subjects of (as well as subject to) an imaging and imagining through which we enact being and our being for, that is, our desiring, whether as ambitious or erotic. It is a form of discourse through which we undertake that “care of the self” Foucault explored in his third volume of *The History of Sexuality*, of performing oneself within the world of one’s others.

▶
Vision

Cinema produces both a subjection of objects to its gaze and a subjection of the spectator to a gazing that is separate from her and has gone before to organize the space and the seen for the spectator’s look. This mechanical record stands in for the look of the filmmakers, but functioning prosthetically, its images will offer both more and less than the human eye it replaces. In 1936, Walter Benjamin commented, “The audience’s identification with the actor is really an identification with the camera. Consequently the audience takes the position of the camera.”¹³ Such a looking appears in fiction film to be no one’s, that is, it is “objective,” only becoming subjective when it is marked as someone’s (e.g., the camera’s place of viewing is shown in the following, reverse shot, to be that of

a character). The camera operator's look is not part of the fictional world imaged, however, and it carries no moral responsibility; everything is staged, play-acted, for the camera.

The documentary camera's gaze allows us to "see for ourselves" in an identification with the camera as objective and disembodied. We take the camera's look as our own in a wish to see.¹⁴ But if we are brought to remember that this is also the filming subject's look and he or she is a participant in real events unfolding in historical time, then it becomes understood as embodied and can no longer be an "objective" gaze when our knowledge of the context of filming gives rise to moral questioning. Instead, the uncanniness of our prosthetic devices becomes palpable. In Alain Resnais's *Nuit et brouillard* (1955), for example, we see the transport wagons and the many people being herded aboard—the young, the old, the sick, the families and friends—among whom we may discern anxious faces. This is real, but also partial, for there are no images of the horror of the journey endured by these involuntary travelers or of the terror they will shortly experience in the gas chambers. The camera's look as objective observer with which the viewer so readily aligns herself is here the optical viewpoint of a Nazi cameraman, perhaps an officer overseeing their inhuman transportation. Understood as such, it becomes an embodied gaze and subjective point of view that, we may surmise, takes pleasure and satisfaction in them as evidence of the Nazis' successful achievement of their obscene desire for a "Final Solution" and the Third Reich's inglorious aim of a cleansed race. It is a look that we will want nothing to do with. Instead, the objectivity of these images as found reality now seems profoundly compromised.¹⁵

Yet these images also record living people doomed, each recognizable; among those faces boarding the trains, behind the camp wires, or in the ghettos, there might be found friends, neighbors, and most hauntingly of all, relatives who could be recognized—or imagined—not only as parents or brothers and sisters but also as the grandparents or great-grandparents of children born long after. Objectivity opens onto a subjectivity through our imaginative capacity as we slip between identification and disidentification and, perhaps, back again.

Is it not the face, shown in extreme close-up, that breaks into the documentary's observing gaze, foreclosing its distance? Without even the speech of the social actors as a "character," the close-up can draw us to identify on the basis of being what we see, in a confusion of self and other that has been termed infantile transitivity, from the observation that a small child, seeing another fall and, hurt, start to cry, will itself also start to cry though not in any pain. Lacan took this term from the work

of Charlotte Bühler in order to describe the process of what he termed the mirror stage when the child takes others as its imagoes, giving rise to the formation of the ego as such and the emergence of subjectivity in the human animal. The transivist identification with the image of the face supports the adoption of the social actors in the documentary as stand-ins for ourselves within the scene.¹⁶ But, whether fiction or documentary, the movement of the camera and thus of the narrative in the shift from close-up to medium shot of the figure, for example, or to the object of her glance, breaks the viewer's absorption in the image of the other and opens her to the chain of signification, of causality, and to the movement of desire for the next, different image. Meanwhile, the face is something that gives rise to meaning, but when we interpret a face as expressing sadness or happiness, it is the person and not the face we understand as experiencing these emotions. Our faces communicate, yet our bodily expressions are not straightforwardly readable, for is the expression a smile or a grimace? Is the laugh an expression of merriment or terror? The eruption of a laugh that is incongruous—that is, out of sympathy with—the context is both very common and disturbing to those who hear it, becoming read as a levity that denigrates the response of pain and sadness that is experienced and recognized by others as appropriate. The body responds here not to symbolic reality and conventional readability but to a real that is outside signification. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have questioned the assumption of a transparent, or fixed, meaning in facial expression, describing this as the construction of a “facial machine” and instead they ask not what a face *means* but what it *does*. It is as virtual or thought, Deleuze argues, that the face engages us: “There is, at some moment, a calm and restful world. Suddenly a frightened face looms up that looks at something out of field. The other person here neither as subject nor object but as something very different: a possible world. This possible world is not real, or not yet, but exists nonetheless: it is an expressed that exists only in its expression—the face, or the equivalent of the face.”¹⁷ Through the other's face I become aware of a world experienced by the other, which thus becomes a realm of possibilities and of a virtuality, whether this is “a world” of fiction, or “the world” of contingent actuality. Deleuze's example here is what he distinguishes as an “intensive” face, a term he draws from Bergson, which experiences or feels something intensely, implying a change from calmness to an agitation, whether delighted or terrified, infusing the face momentarily. It is a response to the world “out there.” What is introduced is the domain of the other, and a third joins the two of the gazer and the face. We may then not only speculate as to the possible world that the face registers in its change but

also identify as “that’s me,” experiencing a horror or a pleasure that we recognize—or misrecognize—in the face we see as well as anticipating the actualization of the world invoked, whether as fictional or documentary actuality. In contrast, Deleuze distinguishes the “reflective” face: not strongly marked in its physical manner of expression and even bland or enigmatic, it does not refer me to a possible outward world that acts upon the face but to an inner “world” of thought and of reflection that is continuing (rather than fleeting) and inaccessible to our view and our independent confirmation of it. Seeing the face—intensive or reflective—we imagine. Reflection for Deleuze is something in the world that forces us to think, not of an object of recognition, “but of a fundamental encounter . . . It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering.”¹⁸ Encountering the face as a reflective face is to be brought to think about the other’s thinking. In cinema, a film will show the reverse field of the social actor’s look or cut to a new image that “answers” our questions, and her face resumes its individuation, filling up the meaning to produce what Deleuze has called the “movement-image.” But if the reverse field is withheld, delayed, or itself ambiguous, it becomes a “time-image.” Joan Copjec writes, “The close-up discloses a de-predication of the subject, an emptying out of personality. The face, then, withdraws from the represented space, retreats into an ‘other dimension,’ as Deleuze says.”¹⁹ Richard Rushton thus argues, “When confronted by a face, whether reflective or intensive, we must re-coordinate our view of the world and subsequently our actions in that world . . . The face, more than anything, makes us approach the world anew.”²⁰

In his account of the face in close-up²¹ Deleuze draws on Bela Belázy’s discussion to argue that “the close-up does *not* tear away its object from a set of which it would form part, of which it would be part, but on the contrary, *it abstracts it from all spatio-temporal co-ordinates*, that is to say it raises it to the state of Entity.”²² It is “de-territorialized,” Deleuze insists, but is this separating out not also part of those processes of fetishization, of a certain sublimation, and of an imagining—projection—onto the other whose face I encounter, in a re-territorializing? For if, as Deleuze suggests, the face as an affection-image has the qualities of Peirce’s concept of “firstness,” in being experienced as a positive qualitative possibility in the natural world, we must inquire as to how this becomes actualized as thought. Peirce writes,

The idea of the absolutely first must be entirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second to that second. The first must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old

it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else . . . Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it.²³

A subjectivity remains in our encounter with the face and with the world that exceeds the “reflection” Deleuze appeals to, for our encounter always produces an unassimilable remainder in our response of something apprehended but for which every description is always insufficient.

In documentary, the face extracted by the telephoto lens or zoom is observed: exemplary and enigmatic, it must be held long enough to set in train an engagement that might entail the ecstasy of Eisenstein, the “feeling-thing” of Epstein, and the affection-image of Deleuze, as it is in certain shots in Wiseman’s films or in *The Nightcleaners Part One* (1975), discussed in chapter 6. But what of the long-held shot taken close up of the *speaking* face encountered as documentary interview or direct-to-camera speech? Do we not respond at one and the same time to the face extracted and to the person’s story? The face and the voice each address us, but these are not identical and engage us in different ways.

Together with the image, the speech of social actors in the documentary, whether direct to camera or in relation to an interlocutor within the film, is central to producing identification. It is an engagement that is sensual and cognitive, for voice is experienced as sound, in an embodied voicing of tone, cadence, and rhythm that produces both a haptic and cognitive relation to the heard, as well as speech and thus language as a conceptual system.²⁴ In the documentary film, there are two different times of address: the present of the recording with its interactive address between the participants themselves and between them and the filmmakers, and the future of the re-presentation of the recording and its—unknown—listeners. For all the “you knows” interjected by the speaker, the spectator’s questioning “what do you mean” is never heard. In documentary we overhear and oversee the world we are shown, addressed indirectly by the participants and by the particular selection and organization of the overseen and overheard—an observational cinema—or we are addressed directly. The speaking subject, whether as overheard, as voiceover, or as the embodied voice in close-up—the “talking head”—introduces questions of authority, authorship, and of agency and interlocution.

Addressed directly, we are invoked as spectators for the world

shown—whether through the voice of a narrator off-screen (voice-over), or by a presentor or interviewer who is seen as well as heard—and by the participants interviewed, where it is made apparent that the speaker is addressing statements to be heard by a future anticipated audience. Indeed, most interviewees are preinterviewed and often rehearsed.²⁵ However, the speakers will often forget this as they become caught up in their telling, and even in their re-telling, of their story in a transferential relation with their interlocutor. The narrator addressing us directly may appear onscreen, as in diary films, and in testimony, and investigative documentaries (also termed “performative” in a reference to the role of the filmmaker investigator), or be heard as a voice off-screen, unseen. Where the interaction of the interviewer or filmmaker with the participants on-screen is heard, she is not always seen, while a speaker we see may become an off-screen voice (e.g., as the camera follows an exchange of views among a group, or when the speech of an interviewee is edited as voice-over to photographs or archive footage related to the subjective account being given).²⁶ Trinh T. Minh-ha observes that “interviews which occupy a dominant role in documentary practices—in terms of authenticating information; validating the voices recruited for the sake of the argument the film advances (claiming to ‘give voice’ to the people); and legitimizing an exclusionary system of representation based on the dominant ideology of presence and authenticity—are actually sophisticated devices of fiction.”²⁷ Speech is thus not only a matter of the said and of the statement itself but also of the authenticity and authority of the speaker. The disembodied, expository voice-over narrator of classical documentary is simply there; often unnamed and unexplained, it has become referred to as a “voice of god,” yet its authority and objectivity as our guide is not authorized within the documentary (e.g., through being an expert, or authoritative figure within the social context, such as a doctor). Documentary direct address therefore involves a hierarchy of voice whereby the disembodied, unauthorized, expository voice-over has authority over the seen and heard within the film, in contrast to the subjective and embodied personal telling of “experts” and of the “ordinary people” interviewed. The voice-over is also a voice-off, better termed, Michel Chion suggests, as the “acousmatic,” where the source of the voice is not shown or known, and it is this possible indeterminacy of the voice from elsewhere that can haunt documentary.²⁸ Untied to a body, the voice-over penetrates us as both of the image and more than the seen. Minh-ha introduces such an indeterminacy when she says, in her film *Reassemblage* (1983), “I do not intend to speak about, Just to speak nearby.”

Overheard speech between the social actors appearing on screen in documentary engages us, Bill Nichols argues, as observers in a relation to the seen and heard similar to that of fiction film.²⁹ Such overheard speech is not performed for the documentary as an address to the film's future audience, although if the speakers are aware that it is being recorded, they may try to tailor and shape their speech in relation to this dual address. Overheard speech may be partial, just snatches of conversation—perhaps because of difficult filming conditions that are thus indexed by the incompleteness of the recording—but it is more usually the result of editing. In observational documentary, the images can be an equal partner with the overheard speech, or even dominant, whereas when direct address is dominant, the image becomes subordinate to speech, inverting the image track's privileged position as the discourse of truth and reality that both observational documentary and the fiction film assert. Of course, in observational filming, the overheard of direct life is subordinated to the process of editorial selection by the sound recordist and editor, under the direction of the filmmaker and her anticipation of the likely events and actions that may arise. Nevertheless, the fiction is that in *Hospital* (Frederick Wiseman, 1970), we see it as Wiseman saw it, just as Robert Montgomery, in the part of Marlowe, claims we will see it as it happened to him at the opening of his film of Raymond Chandler's *Lady in the Lake* (1947). Our relation as addressee changes with each form of speech, the implications of which is explored later in this chapter in relation to Lacan's account of the four discourses.

▶ **Documentary Novelizing: Being Seen and Heard**

The emplacement of the viewing subject is also secured by the devices—and pleasures—of the “novelistic,” discussed earlier in chapter 1. In presenting a narrative of cause and effect, the documentary creates the certainty of a knowable world, centering the spectator as subject of (but also thereby subject to) this certainty. The world presented must, nevertheless, be believable: to sustain our belief in its claim to reality, it must be like what we expect the world to be. It must conform to the way in which we conventionally see and understand the world and human actions within the it. The “believability” of the documentary world—its verisimilitude—is produced when it is recognizably familiar, thus it is in some sense the same as the world we already know. The documentary film, therefore, presents the knowable world not only, or necessarily in order, to enable us to know the world as the new but also, and as often,

to enable us to know the world as familiar and to find again our known objects. As Heath and Skirrow observed, "The novelistic is a veritable process of identification in a quite simple sense of finding, reviewing, staging, voicing *identifying* in terms of lives, multiple times fused in that basic vision which supports the whole viewpoint definition: viewpoints, people, the world seen sympathetically—the novel, initial apparatus for the novelistic, knows its major development in the nineteenth century as a vehicle of sympathy—as it happens, seen for you and I, as you and I, the fictions of this world, see it."³⁰ The participants in documentary become "characters" through its dramatic narration, not as spoken by a voice-over but instead as "found" by the camera, such as Jackie Kennedy's anxious glove twisting in *Primary* (Albert Maysles and D. A. Pennebaker, 1960). Through interviews or moments of speech direct to camera, we are given character "point of view," that is, we are given the subjective and internal thoughts and feelings of its social actors. Such sequences, I argued in chapter 2, however scripted and selected they may be, enable real people as social actors to tell their own stories and to give their own account. Through their speech, we can be brought to share their view of the events and to put ourselves in their place in the world that the film is showing us. We become involved with the lives and problems of the social actors we see and hear so that we are moved by their stories.³¹

Our engagement might engender a feeling of pity, arousing our sympathy *for* their suffering, yet such a response also firmly separates us from the misfortune they endure. Sympathy is conventionally seen as a more rational emotion that involves judgments about the people whose plight is revealed to us.³² Empathy is taken to be a stronger emotional engagement, where we are drawn to feel *as* the victims and not simply for them, and thus it is often valued as a more ethical response. The *identification* it bears witness to, however, is not straightforwardly—or perhaps at all—altruistic. Kaja Silverman, in her account of her dilemma when confronted by the pleas of homeless beggars, analyzes her distress as specular, that is, as a problem of identification and not of reasonable distribution of charity. With great honesty, she confesses, "What I feel myself being asked to do, and what I resist with every fiber of my being, is to locate myself within bodies which would, quite simply, be ruinous of my middle-class self—within bodies that are callused from sleeping on the pavement, chapped from their exposure to sun and rain, and grimy from weeks without access to a shower."³³ Such bodies, she avers, cannot pass for "ideality" in our culture; they are, in Kristeva's terms, abject, and it is such an abject identification that Silverman finds herself rejecting here. The specular of identification Silverman refers to is one described by

Freud as identification with the idealized image I am or have been—the ideal ego. At the same time, there is an identification with the ideal image I could or should be—the ego ideal—which is an image addressed to me by the other, and thus voice is equally important. Indeed, the difficulty Silverman identifies here is also that of address and of what the other wants of me, namely, to be the other to his or her wanting, the one who can give, yet whose giving will never assuage the wanting. In identifying with Silverman's account, I come to recognize my own similar resistance, but it arises from an earlier identification that I also resist. It is an identification as lacking, as wanting, producing an irruption of the real. For this reason, most cultures establish a decorum around begging involving proprieties of appeal and response. Silverman's account relates her embodied encounter with the other, whereas documentary offers us mediated encounters, raising the question of what decorum and what resistances these might engage.

In a British news broadcast on the war in former Yugoslavia in 1992, a short documentary item was included showing an interview with a refugee. In the film, a Croatian housewife, describing her experiences, speaks tearfully about the freezer full of food—her homegrown or homemade produce—that was abandoned as she and her family fled their home. This detail draws us to identify, to have the same feeling of loss, not because we are the same or have had the same experience, but because we can take up the same position as her in relation to loss. The full freezer is a sign of plenty and of her role as provider, a role we might identify with, whether housewives or not, but its provisions are now spoiled or stolen, and the sign that supported that identity is lost. Moreover, in its place there arises the image of a usurper enjoying what is rightfully hers (or ours). Identification as empathy arises, rather than simply pity or sympathy, for we become engaged on our own behalf in the injustice, with all the grief and anger we might feel if we had lost what sustains our identity as providers. Identification is with a position in a narrative of loss, and our feelings are not only for the Croatian housewife but also for ourselves and our own losses, whether for those already experienced or those that might happen and are feared as a potential threat. Identification here engages the trauma, the real of subjectivity, of the possibility of overwhelming loss, not of one's life simply, but of what makes life worth living. Such events presented as unmediated, as "news breaking," are traumatic, as demonstrated by tragedies such as the Hillsborough soccer disaster, discussed later, or the terrifying sight and sound of the attacks on the New York World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, or on London's subway and buses in 2005. What is required is an account

of the “why,” that can make sense of the events or, as in the latter, the displacement onto the heroism of the rescuers, and the stories of escape, of how overwhelming loss can be contained as just *this* loss, which they—al-Qaeda—caused.

The identification arising here is not the result of a judgment, but in order to be sustained, it will require the support of evidence of the believability of the social actor (e.g., that the housewife was unjustly deprived) in order to accord with conventional expectations (verisimilitude). The people in the documentary must appear properly deserving and to be properly, that is, fully, innocent victims insofar as their poverty or starvation is not caused by themselves, and their need must be justified for empathy to arise, that is, so that we can have such a wish for them. The woman who is seeking in vitro fertilization treatment may seem less deserving if she is unmarried or already the mother of five children. *Their* wish, in order to become *our* wish, that is, for us to identify, must be “reasonable.”

Documentaries afford us another pleasure in identifying, for through them we can engage in situations in which we feel for others in order to assure or reassure ourselves that we are caring people. We thus fulfill a certain ego ideal demand that we are “nice” and that we can be touched by human suffering and by the causes and claims of others.³⁴ For this we require victims, the less fortunate, for whom we can feel.³⁵ Again, they must be properly helpless as well as voiceless, or at least voicing only their plight and suffering, and must not make an overt demand for help. Nor should they be able to provide a sophisticated analysis of their circumstances and its causes, or else they will rival the film and its spectator as knowing subject.

The documentary novelizing that is central in reality television docusoaps such as *Airport* or *Hotel* enables us to “dwell with” the space of a contingent real time of others’ lives as they act and react to the people and events around them. That these are like a fictional soap opera serial should not, however, deceive us into supposing that audiences see no difference, nor is this difference guaranteed as one of reality and truth versus fictional unreality. Each can be a time and place for imagining the nonactual. Hill cites a viewer’s comment that “I think I get more passive . . . when I watch news . . . while I watch more actively when I watch docusoaps, that is I try to think more about what the relationships between the participants are like . . . while the news is like taken in, worked on.”³⁶ The reality, whether in *Big Brother*, *Wife Swap*, or *Would Like to Meet*, is contrived through a preset format and by the criteria for selection of the participants, so that the “spark of reality” sought is provoked rather than found, and thus it is plotted. Nevertheless, the reactions

remain contingent rather than scripted, and a specific drama of suspense arises (e.g., in the 2007 series of *Celebrity Big Brother*, the question of how Jade Goody will react to the negative press she is receiving when she emerges from the house after being evicted for her references to race). What becomes demonstrated to us is the messiness of human action and reaction provoking the question “what would I do?” Where shows such as *Supernanny* instruct, *Wife Swap*, in contrast, puts its social actors in situations where they may—or may not—learn for themselves from their swapped roles.³⁷ We may recognize our own behavior and see the problems it may cause, or what we see and hear begs as many questions for us as it answers, challenging us in our assumptions (e.g., about racism, and our choices in relation to gender roles in the family).

Reality television engages spectators to encounter their fears and anxieties through identification with its stories but, while they may be resolved for the child in, for example, *Children's Hospital*, they might not be for another, different child—*your* child. Such anxiety is produced neither by neoliberalism nor by capitalism as such, though modernity with its emphasis on progress through the control of the physical world and the application of science has presented the fantasy of managing “risk.” This, however, has only made us more acutely aware of “free-floating anxieties,” that is, fear that is held to be unjustified.

The willingness of members of the public to be filmed—whether in more ostensibly serious observational films, or in docusoaps and daytime talk shows, and reality show contests—attests to a wish not only to see and hear but also to be heard and seen. The desire to “have one’s say” is to address an other both present—the talk show host and the studio audience—but also the imagined, though unseen, spectators of the broadcast program. Here might also be involved that process that psychoanalysis understands as transference, in the confessing to the other as one who can forgive, as priest, or understand, as therapist or judge. The other here is both a fantasized and powerful other and the fickle other of the media and television audience. The reality game shows thus satisfy an exhibitionism in being subject to a look from the other that thereby recognizes the participant with all the possible *valuing* this might give rise to, namely, the lure of celebrity. This satisfaction may arise not only for the contestant herself but also for spectators identifying with the other as heard and as seen in place of ourselves. As one viewer comments to Hill, “It’s very ambiguous . . . I see it as a bad side of me that I enjoy watching people getting exposed to difficult things . . . Somehow I don’t think they should take advantage of my bad side, because it’s in all of us in some way, some little bit of malicious pleasure.”³⁸ That shows such as *You’ve*

Been Framed and talk shows are enjoyed for the confessions and humiliations revealed certainly makes us sadistic voyeurs, though this may also include a certain masochism to the extent that we identify with the exhibitionist victim. Hill, drawing on her data, suggests that, for viewers, “the experience of watching a factual program can feel like being in a dream, working through what is real or not, occupying a space between fact and fiction, participating in the constructed real world of the program, and also reflecting on the nature of this real world and how it has been recreated for us to watch.”³⁹

The Temporality of Identification

Our identifications constitute a palimpsest of our interactions with others, sedimented over time, for new identifications never erase earlier ones but continue, disorderly and often in disagreement. They remain copresent, yet not necessarily consciously “felt.” Freud placed these temporally as archaic and to which we might regress in his concept of disavowal, of two knowledges that are opposed but continue to be held at one and the same time, and thus offers a different way to view this copresentness. Henri Bergson also addressed the issue of our experience of the world—the immediate data of consciousness—which he defines as duration, a temporality characterized not by measured quantity but by the quality of the succeeding elements “each permeating the other and organizing themselves like the notes of a tune, so as to form what we shall call a continuous or qualitative multiplicity with no resemblance to number.”⁴⁰ Each note might be differentiated, one coming after another, thus temporally spatialized, but the music heard has qualities not of the *sum* of the elements but of their experience. This contrasts with quantitative multiplicities, such as a herd of goats, which are homogenous, being all the same thing, and yet distinct in being differentiated spatially. Qualitative multiplicities are heterogeneous and continuous, that is, without the juxtaposition of “before” and “after,” except retrospectively in memory. One example given by Bergson is especially pertinent to my discussion here for it involves the feeling of pity that, Bergson argues, begins with our putting ourselves in the place of others and feeling their pain. This sets in motion a series of other responses, such as a feeling of horror at being drawn to experience the other’s pain, that might lead to us avoiding such situations or to helping—since we might find ourselves in the same situation. Bergson concludes, “The increasing intensity of pity thus consists in a qualitative progress, in a transition from repugnance to fear,

from fear to sympathy, and from sympathy itself to humility.”⁴¹ While the account of the emotions suggested by Bergson is not without difficulties, what he describes here is a heterogeneity of feelings producing an intensification, from pity to a complex response of sympathy, but this is neither a juxtaposition that implies causality nor a negation of one feeling by the other. The feelings are continuous with one another; they interpenetrate one another, and there is even an opposition between the feelings.⁴²

It is such a “qualitative multiplicity” in our experience of the world that documentary can present us with. Neither fixed nor unfixed but continuing and interpenetrating, since, as Bergson notes, “We instinctively tend to solidify our impressions in order to express them in language. Hence we confuse the feeling itself, which is in a perpetual state of becoming, with its permanent external object, and especially with the word which expresses this object.”⁴³ We actualize our responses, as “this,” and then as another “this.”

Identifying is thus an encounter with the world and its representations that becomes an identity, as a “this” arising from an experience of duration. This encounter is experienced in relation to an externality that addresses me, such as the other who is the object of my pity and through whom I know myself in my feelings. In speech, we encounter both the measured time of pasts and futures and duration in the continuing moment of speech that engages us. We are not only addressed but also are addressing the other and thereby anticipating—imagining—an interlocutor.



The Address of Documentary


Documentary film is associated with the serious, and what is seen and heard is taken to be knowledge and its spectator is posited as a subject of knowledge who will come to know. Aligned with the controlling discourse of the titles or voice-over within the documentary film, or with the documentary investigator who may figure directly in the film, we identify with the “other” of knowledge, a position of mastery, and are interpellated as members of the community of knowledge. The spectator, however, may take up the position not only of the discovery of knowledge, in an identification *with* the scientist, but also of coming into the knowledge *of* the scientist and thereby to know what has already been organized as knowledge, so that through the documentary I become, or am affirmed as, a member of the knowledgeable culture, identifying with the place of address as the site of a coming to know of knowledge. As one

viewer explained, "I think if you watch documentary, you kind of put yourself in a kind of ignorant point of view, you know, you kind of believe in the documentary. You're ready to believe in everything."⁴⁴

In documentary, therefore, identification is not only with the seen and heard but also with the position of addressee of the documentary as a narration, a telling, through the speech it presents, both on-screen and off-screen, as voice-over. At the same time, as spectators, we address the documentary with our desire, demanding knowledge: we want it to know the world for me and, therefore, know me. It is a demand for identity. Knowledge is sexy. What is involved is a communication act, but for the sender the addressee is the place of the other in which the addresser is heard and, therefore, finds herself known in her discourse, in her subjectivity. Identity is always outside, with the other, and it is in my relation with the other that I learn who I am and what I should be. In speaking, my discourse constitutes me as a subject for another, whom I address. Lacan describes this encounter as involving one of four discourses, each producing a specific subject position and a social bond and thus a certain "becoming." The schema of the four discourses that Lacan presented in his 1969–1970 seminar enables us to understand address as not only a one-way interpellation—being "hailed"—but also a relation that is an interdependency of the kind Hegel describes in the master–slave relation, an account to which Lacan continually returns.⁴⁵

Each of the four forms of discourse—the hysteric, the master, the university, and the analyst—involves the same set of terms but played in a different relation to each other.⁴⁶ The schema enables Lacan to describe the relation of knowledge as well as desire in subjectivity. It is a highly abstract but dynamical account of the *production* of subjectivity as a social bond, both of the subject to itself and to its others, which Lacan also calls love. Being abstract, the schema can be deployed in relation to any kind of discursive statement, and here I will draw on it to understand the production of effects of subjectivity by documentary that, with its hierarchy of knowledge, its centering of the reality of social intercourse and asserted certainty of "facts" and "truth" seems to offer itself in relation to Lacan's first pair of terms: the master and the university. The second pair, of analyst and hysteric, are, however, no less important in the understanding they enable of the complexity of our interaction with the knowledge—the discourse of the university and of the master—that documentary engages us in. What Lacan emphasized is not only that these four discourses always implicate each other—hence the analogy with the master–slave relation—but also that subjects move between them and, indeed, are a palimpsest of these shiftings.

In speaking, Freud showed, we are driven by a truth, even if it remains unknown to us. In “hearing” we seek to know what “you really mean.” The starting point of speech is a subject who has something to say, but in what is said there is always a certain failure to truly say what we mean, which keeps us talking. There is also always something more in what we say than what we mean, a “truth” that we are not conscious of but is also part of our messages. The four discourses articulate this something more and this failure in speech, but as a form and not a content for speech and thus, in the words of Paul Verhaeghe, an “empty vessel.”⁴⁷ Each discourse is a communication whereby an *agent* addresses an *other* to a certain effect, a *product*, in the addressee—an understanding, which might produce a responding action. If one tells one’s child to work hard at school, and she produces good reports, one’s message appears to have been successful. If, however, the child produces a series of failures, one might say the message has failed. Psychoanalysis, on the contrary, sees this as equally the product of the message, and indeed as an answer. Moreover it is an answer to a truth in the message that the addresser can never fully know and therefore verbalize, namely, the truth of her desire, which Lacan characterizes as a certain *impossibility* in our communications. As a result, the *product* is always in some manner “off the mark,” in an *inability* to “get it right” because the truth of the other’s desire remains enigmatic.⁴⁸ This unknowable truth is the motor and starting point of each discourse




Impossibility and inability in communication.

The same four terms are found in each discourse, always occurring in the same order, but which starts from a different position within this communication model: S_1 = master signifier; S_2 = knowledge; $\$$ = divided subject; a = the object cause of desire, *objet petit a* (this is the object in its lostness to the subject, the concept is explored further in chapter 4).⁴⁹

The discourse of the master is the starting point, founding the symbolic order (i.e., the possibility of speech and the constitution of the speaking subject as such).⁵⁰ There is no simple hierarchy here; Lacan writes, “We are dealing with a relationship of weaving, of text—of

fabric” and thus the final discourse, of the analyst, neither completes nor resolves the structure.⁵¹ The agency each discourse refers to is not a person but a subject position in relation to another subject. Each of the following three discourses effects a 90-degree turning of the elements in the master discourse in a relation that is circular that rebounds and returns to this point.



The four discourses.

The discourse of the master is of a subject without division, a performance of coincidence between the saying and the said in a performative speech act: “I am (master of) myself,” as the master signifier and the commanding dimension of language. As such, it is a disavowal of the division, underneath which is the truth of the subject of this discourse, namely, the desire to be undivided.⁵² The slave’s master of classical antiquity, like the absolute monarch of early modernity, such as Louis XIV, each exemplify for Lacan the signifier as master insofar as it signifies itself.⁵³ The master signifier S_1 tries to join with S_2 , knowledge, but this, as another signifier, itself divides the subject, and the product is the object lost—the *objet petit a*, which is inaccessible to the master, but truth as §, under S_1 , is of her subjectivity as necessarily divided. Here, knowledge is the other of the agent’s address, the knowledge that the master knows, sustaining the master’s masquerade as the “one who knows.” It is the doctor’s patient, the professor’s students, or the master’s slave—in Hegel’s analysis—who confirms by their own lack the master as knowing, but the knowledge inheres in the other. Thus, “the university has an extremely precise function . . . with respect to the master’s discourse—namely, it’s elucidation.”⁵⁴ Moreover, “the master’s knowledge is produced as knowledge that is entirely autonomous with respect to mythical knowledge, and this is what we call science.”⁵⁵ Lacan acknowledges the specificity of his account here when he notes, “In societies that we call primitive, insofar as I describe them

as not being dominated by the master's discourse . . . it is quite likely that the master can be located by means of a more complex economy."⁵⁶ The documentary, in reducing the world to an object of its knowledge, is the discourse of the Master, addressing us as knowing the facts of reality and of reality as factual and thus incontrovertible. As spectators, we lack the knowledge we will come to know, thus affirming the documentary as knowing for us, that is, as the master.

When the schema is shifted 90 degrees counterclockwise, the divided subject is in the place of the agent, and the other is the master signifier S_1 , producing underneath knowledge as its effect, namely, knowledge of the master as divided. This is the discourse of the hysteric, where in the position of truth is lack, *objet petit a*, that is, the truth of her desire as unsatisfiable desire. The discourse of the hysteric addresses the other as the master, as the one supposed to know, demanding an answer to the truth of her being. It is a demand for that "master signifier" that might fix meaning and identity. Knowledge here is enjoyed by the master, who is supposed to know, but S_2 , knowledge, or the product, is inaccessible (//) in relation to *objet petit a*. The discourse of the hysteric addressed to the master as the one-supposed-to-know both makes and also breaks the master in that, desiring unsatisfaction, it is the desire to *not* know, and thus for the Master not to really know. The master as other knows, but he does so *for* another, but the hysteric always questions this, thereby finding him wanting and insufficient—in a word, castrated. The hysteric reveals to the master his division for what the hysteric demands is the knowing, which is an enjoying—*jouissance*—but this is "impossible," and she becomes the motor of knowledge's, and the master's, failure. Thus her address, rather than supporting an authoritarian logic of the "subject supposed to know" as the subject who knows on my behalf, is on the contrary, as Žižek notes, "productive of new knowledge: the hysterical subject who incessantly probes the Master's knowledge is the very model of the emergence of new knowledge."⁵⁷ For the hysteric, in declaring "this is not it," "any particular configuration of objectivity and knowledge is inadequate."⁵⁸ Each discourse is at the same time a *defense* against an enjoyment—in the sense of possession without lack—which would otherwise undo the agent's very subjectness as always divided by lack and thereby keeps desire intact: the desire not for something but to go on desiring.

The only way to avoid the "castrating" discourse of the hysteric is to change one's game by stepping back from the discourse of the master in a ninety-degree shift clockwise in favor of the discourse of the university, a qualified form of discourse of the master in which one can deploy logical argument as a knowledge that does not appear to be one's own but

is there for anyone. Knowledge is the agent, addressing an other as *objet petit a*, producing underneath the divided subject $\$$, while the truth, S_1 , is inaccessible. Take, for example, the form of argument that proposes that if x is true then y is true. Here, a social discourse—logical argument—authorizes the truth of the statement. In medicine, as a discourse of the university, the doctor may, on the one hand, speak as the master: “ x will cure you,” as undivided and incontrovertible, and, on the other hand, as the university, for medicine does not yet have all the answers. In mastering the discourse of the university, one may seem to speak as if the master, but this remains conditional insofar as new forms of logical arguing and knowledge may arise. Lacan, however, points to the difficulties that are now arising for the discourse of the university: “By virtue of the increasingly extreme denudation of the master’s discourse”⁵⁹ and in that the university’s knowledge is increasingly becoming a performative, “know this,” as an absolute of the demonstrable factual. It thus places itself in the discourse of the master while disavowing this, since it is simply “facts” that the university speaks.⁶⁰ However, such “factuality” is an effect of the discourse of the university and thus must remain liable to question.

Documentary asserts the world as knowable, but its audiovisual discourse also presents the question of how to know, and therefore it deploys the discourse of the university, of logical argument, evidence, and “facts” rather than asserting a truth. Yet in this it also avers to another discourse, that of the master, which might guarantee its own. But it cannot defend itself against the skeptical spectator who, addressing in the discourse of the hysteric, will find the discourse of the master as always wanting. Claiming to offer the truth about reality, documentary suffers the anxiety of failure and of being found wanting in its answers and in its truths. Its very persuasions are evidence of its own insufficiency. Any failure to be “properly” documentary—too much fiction in reenactment, creative editing, or a lack of perceived “balance” and impartiality—places all documentary at risk of rejection as faked or as “propaganda.” The appetite of audiences for reality television, the contemporary form of “qualified reality,” for example, is frequently described as regressive, as indicating audience gullibility, or as a morally reprehensible preference for illusion over true reality, for the prisoners should *want* to be freed from Plato’s cave. But the viewer of programs like *Big Brother* does know it is a performance and not a discourse of truth, of the master, but nevertheless things happen that we may interpret as unintended and unacted (e.g., Jade Goody’s angry, bullying, responses to fellow contestant and Bollywood actress Shilpa Shetty that made reference to her as Indian).⁶¹ In such moments what is produced is a kernel of the real, and this is not the same

as or the sum of the documentary's many statements or the reality show's avowed claims. For Jade Goody, was it not that something in her experience of Shilpa Shetty's difference in the context of this *Big Brother* series was unassimilable and inexpressible?

The fourth discourse is arrived at by a 90-degree shift clockwise from the terms from the discourse of the university. This is the discourse of the analyst, and here the abstraction of Lacan's schema is apparent, for the agent in the discourse of the analyst is not the embodied voice, the person or personality, whom one visits with costly regularity and who is too often, Lacan points out, the discourse of the master or the university. The agent is *objet petit a*, the lost object and cause of desire, and the other it addresses is the divided subject $\$$, which produces, unconsciously, the master signifier S_1 , with knowledge as the truth inaccessible as such to the subject addressed. It is the discourse that obliges the other to take her own divided being into account. Verhaeghe writes, "This impossible relationship from *a* to divided subject is the basis for the development of the transference, through which the subject will be able to circumscribe his object. This is one of the goals of analysis. It is what Lacan has called 'la traversée du fantasme,'" the traversing of the fundamental fantasy.⁶² The analyst within the analytic relation does not function as an agent in the discourse of the analyst, for as object cause of desire, signifying lack, it eliminates her as a subject. She can only function as such for someone, her analysand, in the time—as duration—she is sustained in as addressing the other as lacking. Knowledge is in the place of truth; it is the knowledge of the subject's relation to lack, her enjoyment, but this is inaccessible as such to the subject addressed, although its effects are what the analytic relation can explore. It is here that the person of the analyst comes into the picture. The agency of the analyst as cause of desire may also, therefore, be undertaken by a work of representation—art or documentary—if its address to the viewing subject thereby confronts her in her division as a subject.

The discourses, moreover, as Verhaeghe emphasizes, do not produce fixed positions of subjectivity; instead there is an interchanging as agent and other through the different interrelationships of the four terms and their disjunctions. The teacher, for example, may move between the discourse not only of the master and of the university but also of the hysteric in addressing another as master, all within a few breaths. But, confronted by her students' demand to know, she may retort, "What are you asking to know?" thereby engaging the other's lack and, therefore, desire. Her address becomes the discourse of the analyst. Indeed, it is this moving from one discourse to another that makes possible the discourse of the

analyst for, Lacan says, "there is an emergence of analytic discourse at every passage of what the analytic discourse allows us to highlight as *the break through from one discourse to another*."⁶³ It is a knowing, though not necessarily consciously, of that which determines the fundamental fantasy that organizes one's desire, a knowing that shuns sense—the discourse of science that, Lacan says, "leaves no place for man."⁶⁴

What contribution to our understanding of documentary does an analysis of its forms of address within Lacan's schema enable? Documentary presents an array of speaking, which may be more or less contained, and containable, by its narration, its framing, of its speech. Such speaking involves statements, discourses about the world, which the documentary might present in a hierarchy or in a dialogic relation of interaction. We remain here in the realm of the signified, of argument, and of knowledge debated. What must be considered, in addition, is how we are engaged by the address of the discourse and in the movement between forms of address, including our own address in our demand to know, which asserts the hysteric's skepticism.

Documentary addresses us in its images and sounds as "coming to know" through a showing that is always also a telling that asserts its truth as master; but as spectacle, it may confront us with movement untied from causality, as a contingent real in the discourse of the analyst. Documentary also presents speaking subjects who may address us as one who knows (master, which here is a speaking of the symbolic institution of state, law, etc), who can present us with the facts (the university), or who is demanding to know (the hysteric). The shiftings between these might, however, give rise to that emptying out of signification that is the discourse of the analyst, *objet petit a*, as cause of desire. Here, while the spectator is addressed as the other, there is no subject or agent of the discourse.


Lacan's schema thus sidesteps the power relation in Foucault's concept of discursive formations, in which the discourse of medicine or psychiatry subjectifies persons, making them known and knowable to themselves and to its institutions through its categories. Lacan's schema addresses the formal relation instituted by communication and the social bond thereby arising not through what is said but through the agency and interpellation of saying. Yet is not such a social bond found precisely in the "reciprocity" Foucault saw arising in what he termed "classical" observing, "since the sane man could read in the madman, as in a mirror, the imminent movement of his downfall"?⁶⁵ The medicalization of madness thus defends the scientist against the real of the other's *objet petit a*.

The radical potential of documentary does not, therefore, lie only


in the knowledge presented, in formal strategies such as the overthrow of the dominant, master discourse of the classical voice-over in a democratic dispersal of address among many voices, or in the presentation of a hesitation or undecidability regarding what is presented. Rather, something radical is made possible in insofar as a circulation between the forms of discourse and their address, including that of the spectator, arises. A temporality other than that of the time of the documentary is thus introduced.

In the classic British documentary *Enough to Eat?*, the discourse of the university, of objective, scientific, knowledge, explains nutrition, but a different voice is introduced through the account by an “ordinary housewife,” who explains what she buys for her family and what she would buy more of if she could afford it. The housewife knows, the voice-over tells us, the right foods to give her children, but she does not address us in the discourse of the university; she just tells us what she does. The film’s assertion of her knowledge thus begs the question of how she knows, introducing the discourse of the hysteric and, in this shift, the discourse of the analyst. In *Housing Problems*, the tenants also speak for themselves, but here, I argued in chapter 2, the voice-over never fully frames their speech and its images, which thus escape the film’s organizing discourse. Instead, we may ask, you’re telling me this, but what do you really mean by your story told three times or your tale of the rat? What are you asking of me? Their speech hystericizes. Each film’s statement—of good nutrition or of housing—as a necessary social requirement for citizens is the discourse of the university, but as argument and not as truth and thus as questionable. For one might identify with the position of knowledge, of the film and its experts, or with the citizens deserving of help—as I might be. Or one might reject the demand to recognize the other as like oneself, that is, deserving.

Disaster at Hillsborough (made by Yorkshire Television, United Kingdom, and broadcast in the documentary series *First Tuesday*, 1990)⁶⁶ focuses on the question “how did it happen?” and, its correlative, “who is to blame?” It examines the sequence of events that led to the terrible deaths of ninety-six people—children and adults—and the many injured from suffocation and crushing in Sheffield, England, at a soccer match in 1989. This occurred as a result of a surge of supporters entering the already full area for standing spectators—the “pen”—pushing those at the front against the wire fence that had been erected to prevent pitch invasions by separating them from the players. The documentary addresses us in the discourse of the university, presenting the forensic analysis undertaken by the inquiry team to determine the truth of how




Disaster at Hillsborough (1990). The position of each person in the “pen” is identified, recorded, and analyzed, and the data was then mapped to produce a digital schema of the death trap produced by the extreme overcrowding.




Disaster at Hillsborough (1990). Detail of the board on which information is recorded about each fatality and injured person.

and why it happened. The scientific investigation establishes the time line of the disaster, mapping in detail the placement and movement of spectators, which the film presents through animated diagrams of the stadium and the path taken by the supporters, edited together with shots of the now-empty stadium entrances and archive film of both the supporters anxiously waiting to get in before the start of the game and the subsequent chaos as those inside become crushed as the area filled to 50 percent more than its capacity. We also hear archive recordings showing the confused response of the police on the pitch, who cannot reach the victims behind the barrier, while the police chief at the stadium continued to believe he was watching a pitch invasion. These are juxtaposed with the scientific evidence from the analysis of the inquiry team, including calculations of the pressure created by the surge of incoming fans in relation to the numbers of persons in the pen—those who died and those who were injured. The visual and auditory evidence indexes a “truth” of the fatal errors of judgment, while the failure of the senior police officers to realize what would happen when the fans waiting outside were finally allowed to enter the stadium or understand what was happening to those in the “pen” constitutes the key dramatic arc of the film. This thereby also shifts its discourse to that of the hysteric, for the film questions not the evidence but its meaning, in the question as to how the event could have been allowed to happen. The film was made following the inquest, at which a jury returned a verdict of accidental death for the victims after being warned by the coroner against a verdict of unlawful killing unless they were satisfied that individuals (i.e., the police) were recklessly negligent in their actions. The question of the culpability of the police in their failure to manage the crowds coming to the soccer match remained for the victim’s families, however, and is presented in the film through the accounts from survivors talking not so much of their own survival but of those that they could not save, and we understand the disaster no longer as a series of facts about a stadium and the policing of crowds but as a scene of human action and reaction and of unbearable tragedy. A police officer (in medium close-up), having stated earlier that the events had been preventable, now—and ostensibly without emotion—describes what he saw: people’s faces turned blue, their tongues hanging out as they are pinned against the fences. There follows the account of Brian Doyle, who survived by climbing the fence and then tried to pull others out of the pen but “it was hopeless, it was like they were stuck together, just screaming for help.” He then describes when a woman’s hands he was grasping went limp: “It’s the feeling of watching the life and color going out of them and you can’t do nothing about it—helplessness, helplessness—and anger”




Disaster at Hillsborough (1990). Television news footage of fans beginning to escape over the fence as others are crushed, while the game continues to be played.



Disaster at Hillsborough (1990). Brian Doyle speaks of his anguish at failing in his struggle to pull a woman to safety up and over the fence.

(the camera cutting from medium to extreme close-up). To the police responsible for the crowd management at Hillsborough stadium in 1989, the soccer fans were a dangerous other liable to riot and thus requiring control, and it was this desire on the part of the police that brought about the disaster, notwithstanding that they did not desire the disaster itself. The scientific evidence presented only makes more terrifying the failure of the symbolic order, for there is no master signifier that holds meaning in place, and we are confronted with the inability of rational knowledge to defend against the real. This movement between discourses also opens us to the discourse of the analyst, in an acknowledgment of the real made possible by the film's own work of mourning through memorializing those lost on the stands at Hillsborough.

Spike Lee's *When the Levees Broke* similarly centers on trauma in the question it addresses to Americans as to why New Orleans was abandoned to the destructive aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The film does not explore this through scientific evidence, however, and focuses instead on personal accounts from its interviewees juxtaposed with archive and contemporary still and video footage. These are powerfully edited with a carefully constructed music track that adds an emotional "voice." The film's enunciation "knows" for us the truth of what happened, namely, the abandonment of the poor—both black and white—of New Orleans in the chaos of the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, for which its images and words are evidence. It is only when this discourse is interrupted that we are engaged by a real of impossible trauma in the—hysteric's—question "what am I, for you?" The issue the film engages is not the why but the meaning of the "when" the levees broke and thus not why there was no proper preparation for the evacuation or shelter for those without the means—the ill, the disabled, the old, and the citizens without transportation—in the city but a truth: you are not citizens worthy of protective measures by your government. This traumatic real of the other's desire is made palpable by the film's devices of melodrama in its heightening of tension, its contrasts, and its reversals insofar as it can never bring about the catharsis of an ending. The stories of rescue never fully displace other stories of those for whom it did not come, or for whom it came too late, and the impassioned testimony of survivors contrasts with the descriptive, and often defensive, accounts of the journalists, academics, police, and politicians. Montages of still images of the devastation and its victims fix and memorialize in the manner made familiar by the powerful photographs of Dorothea Lange, Walker Evans, and colleagues working for the U.S. Farm Security Administration in the 1930s, while archive video functions as the evidential for the



When the Levees Broke (2006). "Day Three": The observing camera captures a woman's distress.



When the Levees Broke (2006). "Day Three": Our position is reversed when a woman addresses us and the camera reporter.

interviewees' descriptive and factual accounts. In the sequence "Day Three," the voice-over of Eddie Compass (former New Orleans chief of police) introduces the next three shots showing the vast number of homeless residents gathering at the Convention Center, accompanied by quiet piano music, conveying a "then" time as the camera zooms, pans, and tilts to capture the objectified abjection of victim-survivors who never address the camera. The film cuts back to Compass, and then to New Orleans newspaper editor David Meeks, who reports the desperate plight of a disabled former employee he came across there, before cutting again to archive footage but now, in the next five shots, the camera operator or the news reporter is addressed directly, first by a man (five seconds) shouting "no food, no water," then in three brief shots: of a woman; a man; a man and woman (one second each). The following shot (fifteen seconds) is of another a woman, seen in medium close-up who articulates the unfolding tragedy of many when she demands for her mother, who is eighty-three years old and lying on the floor with a heart condition, that "she needs help to get out of here." The film here effects a rapid tempo of editing and then a longer shot as it changes to a "now" time of action with her speech and its discourse shifts from descriptive—as knowledge, thus of the university—to the direct address it remediates of a demand for help that we know is not being answered, hence challenging us with the question "what are we to you that you do not help us?" Here erupts the real. Is it not the very melodrama of *When the Levees Broke* that enables us to approach this?⁶⁷

Capturing the Friedmans, discussed earlier in chapter 1, presents statements by the family, lawyers, policeman, and purported victims, presenting alternative views that enable different versions of the guilt or innocence of Arnold Friedman and his son Jesse. The evidential here begs further questions, or it in some way appears questionable, prompting us to ask, "You are telling me this, but is it really so?" Thus we take up the position of the hysteric in relation to different speakers who address us as master or the university. The certainties avowed by Arnold's brother and by his sons Jesse and David, and their unconditional acceptance of Arnold's declaration that "nothing happened" in the computing classes, are opposed by Arnold's wife. But is she wrong? She tells Jarecki that her sons have idealized their father, as she had her own father, despite each father's betrayal, for they were each, she now says, "a rat," concluding that "peoples' visions are distorted." Her sons saw her as abandoning their father, while she felt betrayed by his deception and could no longer trust his word. If Arnold was a victim of prejudice against homosexuality, then in marrying Elaine she became another of his victims who, like

the young boys he writes of, was never acknowledged as such by him or her sons. How far was Arnold still in denial? David says that his father spoke of it all being over in a year, of how crazy it would seem later, and Jesse recalls feeling he had no idea of what they were doing. We see in David's home movie footage the family discussing the trial, then next Arnold, embracing Elaine, saying, "Here's Mommy and Daddy, showing affection," but Elaine pulls away, asking, "I should have affection for you—why? *Tsuris* [trouble] is all I ever got from you," to which Arnold retorts, "That's not all, you've got other things." Is he not demanding here that she continue to support his self-image as the good provider, husband, and father to which his sons subscribe? David, instead, will accuse his mother of "manipulating my father" and calls her "crazy." When their lawyer suggests that Arnold plead guilty to help Jesse, Elaine insists he do so, even though Arnold continues to vehemently assert that he is not guilty of the crimes for which he is indicted. Yet he is not simply innocent, for his standing as a father and teacher rests on the lie of his sexuality—his homosexual pedophilia—that first brought the police investigation. Jesse is, I suggest, as much as Elaine, a victim of his father's lies and his father's inability to take responsibility for his actions, most poignantly demonstrated when, as Jesse recounts, Arnold turned to him and asked what he should do. "I wanted him to make the decision . . . I remember feeling like a really young kid kinda looking up to him saying, 'You know, Dad, I want you to be my Daddy.' I would have been really, really proud of him if he had said he would have gone to trial and decided to plead 'not guilty.'"

The film "speaks" in its assemblage of these different voices and their discursive address, presenting us with a discourse that is desubjectivized and that fails to act as an agent whether of truth, knowledge, or doubt. Rather, it functions as the analyst, in an emptying out of meaning that poses to the spectator the issue of her desire in relation to the truth of the desire of the other, whether this is Arnold, David, Jesse, Elaine, the police officers, or the various boys who testify in the film.⁶⁸

In each of these documentaries we are opened to the discourse of the analyst insofar as what is at issue is not only "what happened" but also the truth of the desire of the participants, the social actors and the filmmakers, and its meaning for those engaged by their actions. In the next two chapters, this real of desire that is an unspoken and unspeakable in speech is explored in relation to trauma and its documentary representation, while the imperative of the nonsense of the real that was the focus of the surrealists is considered through the documentary work of Jean Rouch.

95. John Corner, *The Art of Record* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 68. He rightly concludes, "The effect is one of powerful immediacy and engagement." Corner refers here to the "access project" of the film (69) and its "reportorial naturalism" that has made it be recognized as a forerunner of much contemporary television documentary (56).
96. Drawing on Mass-Observation's project, in 1993, Chris Mohr and Mandy Rose of the Community Programmes Unit, BBC, started the TV series *Video Nation* using a series of cameras distributed across the United Kingdom. The contributors were given their Hi-8 camera for one year, during which time they filmed their everyday lives. See these at BBC's *Video Nation* Web site (<http://www.bbc.co.uk/videoaction/archive>).

3. Documentary Desire

1. For Freud, the "reality principle" is not primarily the imposition of material external exigencies that must be recognized by the subject. Rather it is what opposes the pleasure principle as something the subject must accede to as a result of an external imperative, not only a voiced account of the world as a material, but also as an internal moral exigency, a voice of the super ego or conscience. See *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis* (1938), in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. and trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1974), 23:139–208. Hereafter cited in text as *SE*. Lacan replaces this binary opposition with his tripartite characterization of the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic, where "reality" is constructed in our imaginary or symbolic relations to the other.
2. Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959–1960: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Porter (London: Routledge, 1992), 131–32.
3. Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, "The Psychological Analysis of Propaganda," in *Writers' Congress: The Proceedings of the Conference Held in October, 1943 under the Sponsorship of the Hollywood Writers' Mobilization and the University of California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943), 377. Propaganda here, as for Grierson, is a neutral term, though the authors note that such a tool, like any medium, can be abused, and "the pseudo fact may supplant the fact" (380).
4. *Ibid.*, 378, and 380.
5. *Ibid.*, 378.
6. Character identification is often termed a "folk theory" in cognitive and analytic philosophy approaches, thus the affectual impetus of the commonsense idea of identification is set against a "proper" knowledge and understanding. Noël Carroll writes that "identification . . . is not the correct model for describing the emotional responses of spectators," in *The Philosophy of Horror, or Paradoxes of the Heart* (London: Routledge, 1990), 96. Berys Gaut, summarizing these debates in "Identification and Emotion in Narrative Film," draws on Richard Wolheim to defend the concept of identification as sympathy or empathy. In *Passionate Views*, ed. Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 200–216.
7. Lacan, "The mirror stage as formation of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience," in *Écrits, A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock Publications, 1977), 1–7. See chapter 1 on this. Here arises what Freud termed the ideal ego, as well as, Lacan argues, aggressivity.
8. We identify with the desire of the other, to be what the other wants (us to be), which corresponds to Freud's ego ideal, as the image the other desires. See Elizabeth Cowie, *Representing the Woman: Cinema and Psychoanalysis* (London: Macmillan, 1997), 166–221.
9. John Corner has discussed the self that is displayed in documentary and reality television as a process of "selving," performing, or becoming a self, as well as the recognition of a "true self" by the participant and the viewer. "Performing the Real: Documentary Diversions," *Television and New Media* 3, no. 3 (August 2002), 261.
10. Freud characterized the disavowal central to fetishism as a splitting of the ego, and one that is merely "an exceptional case" of a process of warding off unacceptable demands of reality. In *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, SE*, 23:203–4.
11. In Lacanian terms, this is an affirmation that the Big Other knows and thus that it does not lack; this is termed by Lacan an imaginary relation, whereby lack in the other, though not in the subject herself or himself, is disavowed. This is discussed more fully shortly.
12. Slavoj Žižek, "The Interpassive Subject," *The Symptom*, no. 3 (2002), <http://www.lacan.com/zizek-pompidou.htm>. Žižek develops here the idea of an "interpassivity" as the "other side" of the spectator's interactive engagement with media, whereby "it is the object itself which 'enjoys the show' instead of me, relieving me of the superego duty to enjoy myself." The processes of splitting and projection that arise are themselves a very interactive engagement with the medium as object, made into an agent that "takes from me" or "endures for me." Žižek shows that interpassivity is a form of interacting with the other and distinguishes

between the belief, knowledge, or enjoyment that the other is supposed to undertake "for me."

13. Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn (London: Fontana, 1968), 230. This view has also been adopted by later theorists, including Laura Mulvey and Christian Metz.
14. Two psychical processes are in play that are distinct: We see as if we were there ourselves, with the same view, eliding the camera as agency of our view separate from us. In addition, our active drive to see is satisfied in our identification with the all-powerful inquisitorial look of the camera, which is thus separate from our own limited access of sight.
15. I've drawn here on Frances Guerin's work in *Through Amateur Eyes: Film and Photography in World War II Germany* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming).
16. Jacques Lacan, "The Mirror Stage," 5. More recently the phenomenon has been identified as a specific neurological process, termed the "mirror neurone."
17. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), 17.
18. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 139.
19. Joan Copjec, *Imagine There's No Woman* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), 76. This, however, presents a trap for our reading of the face Copjec suggests, namely, of "believing in a world that is elsewhere, in a place to which one can withdraw in solitude to safeguard the precious core of one's being," (78), the space of narcissism, as might seem the case for Elisabeth in Deleuze's example of *Persona* (Ingmar Bergman, 1966).
20. Richard Rushton, "What Can a Face Do? On Deleuze and Faces," *Cultural Critique* 51 (Spring 2002): 234.
21. Deleuze, *Cinema 1: the Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 87. Deleuze discusses the face as an "affection-image" that arises between the "perception-image" and "action-image" in the interval as "what occupies it without filling it in or filling it up," but that involves a certain indeterminacy. It is the way the subject "feels itself 'from the inside'" as a qualitative experience (65).
22. For Bela Belázs, in a film, "the precipice over which someone leans may perhaps explain his expression of fright, but it does not create it. For the expression exists even without justification." In *Theory of the Film: Character and Growth of a New Art*, trans. Edith Bone (New York: Dover, 1970), 136; cited in Deleuze, *ibid.*, 102. The close-up for Deleuze is not part of the scene, an enlarged detail within its narrative account, but rather, as Copjec emphasizes, "it opens onto a different dimension . . . that is not of the spatiotemporal order" (*Imagine There's No Woman*, 75).
23. Peirce, "A Guess at the Riddle," *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur Burks (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932), vol. 1, 356-57) and Commens Peirce Dictionary <http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html>.
24. Language is also encountered within the image-track as writing, where, disembodied but nevertheless material, it signifies as words as such: in their physical appearance as subtitles over the image; or as documents and letters presented for view; or as found elements within documentary footage, such as posters, store signs, and so on.
25. For *The Life and Times of Rosie the Riveter*, for example, Connie Fields refers to having talked to seven hundred women on the phone and two hundred in person; thirty-five were video-taped and five were eventually filmed. In Barbara Zheutlin, "The Politics of Documentary: A Symposium," in *New Challenges for Documentary*, ed. John Corner and Alan Rosenthal, *New Challenges for Documentary* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 160.
26. Leger Grindon explores this further in "Q & A: Poetics of the Documentary Film Interview," *The Velvet Light Trap* 60 (Fall 2007), 4-12.
27. Trinh T. Minh-ha further comments, "Direct speech does not transcend representation. To a certain extent, interviewees choose how they want to be represented in what they say as well as in the way they speak, dress, and perform their daily activities." In *Framer Framed: Film Scripts and Interviews* (London: Routledge, 1992), 193-94.
28. Michel Chion, *The Voice in Cinema*, trans. Claudia Gorbman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 18.
29. Nichols, *Representing Reality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 43. While the term "observational cinema" is associated with the development of direct sound recording in documentary in 1960, the camera as unseen onlooker was already part of silent classical cinema, and these conventions were adopted by Robert Flaherty in his early documentaries, particularly *Moana* (1926).

30. Heath and Skirrow, "Television, a World in Action," *Screen* 18, no 2 (Summer 1977), 58–59.
31. Manuals on documentary filmmaking emphasize the importance of this: for example, Sheila Curran Bernard's *Documentary Storytelling for Video and Filmmakers* (Oxford: Focal Press, 2004).
32. Berys Gaut, "Identification and Emotion in Narrative Film," in *Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and Emotion*, ed. Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 206–7.
33. Kaja Silverman, *The Threshold of the Visible World* (London: Routledge, 1996), 26.
34. The ego ideal is that image of the self that one should be or become in order to be likeable and valued. Renata Salecl has described this aspect of caring as the "second tear," drawing on Milan Kundera's discussion of kitsch in *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*: "Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first tear says: How nice to see children running on the grass! The second tear says: How nice to be moved, together with all mankind, by children running on the grass! It is this second tear which makes kitsch kitsch." (London: Faber, 1986), 250–51. Salecl comments, "To paraphrase Kundera, in the case of the Bosnian refugee girl, one could say that the first tear runs when we see the picture of the poor girl and the second tear runs when we, together with all mankind, are moved by the fact that we are compassionate." *The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis and Feminism after the Fall of Socialism* (London: Routledge, 1994), 139.
35. Brian Winston has addressed the "victim" tradition in documentary in "Documentary: I Think We Are in Trouble," in *New Challenges for Documentary*, ed. Alan Rosenthal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 30.
36. Hill, *Restyling Factual TV: Audiences and News, Documentary and Reality Genres* (London: Routledge, 2007), 142.
37. This point is made by Hill's interviewees, and Hill argues: "A grammar for citizenship can be located in the spaces in-between the public and private" (*ibid.*, 166–67).
38. *Ibid.*, 108.
39. *Ibid.*, 110.
40. Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, trans. F. L. Pogson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), 105.
41. *Ibid.*, 19. Bergson suggests here a very complex view of "true pity" as consisting not in a fear of suffering but in a desire for it by which one both avoids complicity in causing it and feels raised in one's self-estimation.
42. Deleuze draws on Bergson's account here and develops a further elaboration of duration and the form our encounter of duration in representation in his concept of the rhizome or the crystalline, considered further in chapter 6.
43. Bergson, "The Idea of Duration," in *Henri Bergson: Key Writings*, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson and John Muillarkey, trans. Melissa McMahon (London: Continuum, 2002), 73.
44. Hill, *Restyling Factual TV*, 137.
45. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVII*, trans. Russel Grigg (New York: Norton, 2007). Lacan introduced this theory in the seminar of 1969 to 1970, "L'envers de la psychanalyse," developing these points in "Radiophonie," *Scilicet*, nos. 2–3 (1970): 55–99, and in his following seminar, "Du'un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant." A further elaboration is given in *Encore*, the seminar of 1972 to 1973 (Paris: Seuil, 1975).
46. *Ibid.*, 29.
47. Paul Verhaeghe, "From Impossibility to Inability: Lacan's Theory on the Four Discourses," *The Letter: Lacanian Perspectives on Psychoanalysis* (Spring 1995): 82. I am indebted here to Verhaeghe's valuable account of the "Four Discourses," which he describes as "a condensation of Lacan's evolution" of his theoretical intervention in psychoanalysis" (80). He has developed this account in *Does the Woman Exist?* (London: Rebus Press, 1997), 95–122.
48. Verhaeghe observes that these two disjunctions "condense a major Freudian discovery, namely the ever-present failure of the pleasure principle . . . Man can never return to what Freud called 'die primäre Befriedigungserlebnis,' (in *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, SE 1:317–20) the primary experience of satisfaction. He is unable to operate this return because of the primary Spaltung, the division of the subject due to language. Nevertheless, he keeps on trying, and during this process he gets stuck on the road, and that's where he experiences the impossibility" (86).
49. In *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan designates the *objet petit a* as an enjoyment or jouissance that is "extra," or "plus-de-jouir," because it is marked by lack (19). A further account of the *objet petit a* is given in chapter 4.
50. *Ibid.*, 5.
51. *Ibid.*, 34.
52. Slavoj Žižek, *Cogito and the Unconscious* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998), 76.

53. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 90. Lacan suggests that mathematics similarly "represents the master's knowledge insofar as it is constituted on the basis of other laws than those of mythical knowledge" (ibid.).
54. Ibid., 148.
55. Ibid., 90.
56. Ibid., 90.
57. Slavoj Žižek, "The Interpassive Subject."
58. Mladen Dolar, "Hegel as the Other Side of Psychoanalysis," in *Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. Justin Clemens and Russel Grigg (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006), 148.
59. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 148.
60. Alenka Zupančič, "When Surplus Enjoyment Meets Surplus Value," in Clemens and Grigg, *Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 168.
61. This was a bullying participated in by Jo O'Meara and Danielle Lloyd as well. Goody appeared on *Big Brother* in 2003, initially receiving considerable media derision as a result of her lack of knowledge of Britain, which led to her being seen as ignorant (she had in fact trained as a dental assistant), but she became a celebrity as a result of public fascination with her, as well as successful and wealthy through a later television show and other appearances. The 2007 *Big Brother* house sought to promote tension between the participants, playing on the features that had drawn public interest in Goody: her impoverished background, her difficult relationship with her mother, and so on. Goody vigorously denied that she was a racist, and it was on a visit to India shortly afterward to redeem her image that she learned she had cervical cancer. She died in 2009.
62. Verhaeghe, *Does the Woman Exist?*, 113.
63. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan XX: Encore* (1992), trans. Cormac Gallagher (London: Karnac, 2004), 3:5. This is, Verhaeghe writes, "the possibility for grasping the determination from object a to $\$$ " (*The Letter*, 99).
64. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 147.
65. Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Michael Howard (New York: Vintage, 1973), 248. See also my earlier discussion in chapter 2. Foucault introduced his concept of discourse in December 1970 during his inaugural speech at the Collège de France.
66. Produced by Chris Bryer and Roger Finnigan. A DVD version is available from Films Media Group: Films for the Humanities & Sciences, USA, <http://ffh.films.com/ContactUs.aspx>.
67. Another example is the melodramatic use of radio host and New Orleans resident Garland Robinette, who breaks down, unable to continue, as he covers his face, crying, when he recalls Mayor Ray Nagin's interview with him and his outburst regarding the failure of state and federal help to arrive. This contrasts with Nagin's bland composure in the next shot.
68. Documentary autobiography, such as Jonathan Caouette's *Tarnation* (2003), similarly presents a repetitive returning in its attempt to say through the documenting of his filming who he is, which also leads to questions of what he is for his mother and what she was for her parents, his grandparents. It is to ask what they want, the question of their desire. Michael Renov explores the film as "domestic ethnography" in "First-person Films: Some Theses on Self-inscription," in *Re-thinking Documentary*, ed. Thomas Austin and Wilma de Jong (Maidenhead, U.K.: Open University Press, 2008).

4. Documenting the Real

1. Max Hernandez, "Winnicott's 'Fear of Breakdown': On and beyond Trauma," *Diacritics* 28, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 139 and 140. Hernandez is referring here to the work of Alvin Frank in "The Unrememberable and the Unforgettable: Passive Primal Repression," *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* 24 (1969): 48–77.
2. Available to view on line at the website of British Pathé at <http://www.britishpathe.com/results.php?search=war+neuroses>.
3. I am drawing here on Martin Stone's excellent reevaluation of British psychiatry and the development of modern psychiatric practices as a result of the unprecedented medical requirements of the war neuroses of soldiers in his chapter "Shellshock and the Psychologists," in *The Anatomy of Madness: Essays in the History of Psychiatry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 242–71.
4. Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle, The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 8, ed. and trans. James Strachey (1920; London: Hogarth Press, 1974). Hereafter cited in text as *SE*. See especially Freud's discussion of the *fort-da* game (14–17). This is addressed by Lacan in his re-consideration of the death drive in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 2006), 262.