American Puritanism and the Defense of Mourning

Religion, Grief, and Ethnology in Mary White Rowlandson's Captivity Narrative

Mitchell Robert Breitwieser
other hand, to grant Tomashevsky his point, the event of experience does not amount to a discovery of an objective and final human totality thereafter impervious to intrusions of the real.

As my comment on Tomashevsky and emergent orders of convention will suggest, I will not in this book investigate the generic conventions of the captivity narrative, which achieves widespread popularity in North America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which in many cases seems to draw on Rowlandson's example. I have done an at best cursory reading in these books, and they do not enter my argument for the simple reason that the genre was not present to Rowlandson as a means of representation to be either affirmed or rejected. It may be that these works absorb what I see in Rowlandson's narrative in toto, or they may only select extrinsic and easily reproducible features. The question interests me, but it is outside what I have chosen to investigate here. Rather than looking at a genre that may or may not come out from Rowlandson's writing, I will look at the genres that she faces—conversion narratives, funeral sermons, and scriptural typology, primarily—to describe her narrative as a collision between the costs and potentialities of these genres on the one hand and the perplexing area of history that afflicted her on the other.

The Society of the Example

*When the Saints die let us mourn:* And there is no greater Argument to be found that we should excite ourselves to mourn by, than by the remembrance that they were *Saints:* it should more affect our hearts at the thoughts of this that they were *Saints,* than that they were our Father, or Mother, or Brethren, or nearest or dearest Friends, for this is that which makes their loss to be greater than any other Relation doth or can; others are natural, but these are pious Tears that are shed upon this account. Another man may be a private loss when he is gone, his Family or his Neighbours, or Consorts may miss him; but a *Saint,* though he be a private Christian, is yet, when he dies a publick loss and deserves the *tears of Israel.* . . . we should embalm the memory of the Saints with the sweet smelling Spices that grew in their own Gardens, and pick the chiefest Flowers out of those Beds to strew their Graves withal; we should remember and make mention of them with honourable thoughts and words: and though it be now grown a Nick-name of contempt among wicked and proflane Men, yet count it the most orient jewel in their Crown, the most odoriferous and pleasant Flower in their Garland, that we can say of them that they lived and died Saints; all other Escutcheons will either wear away, or be taken down, every other monument will become old, and grow over with the Moss of time, and their Titles, though cut in Brass, will be Canker-eaten and illegible: this only will endure and be fresh and Flourishing, when marble it self shall be turned into common dust.

—Samuel Willard

The saints, according to Samuel Willard, *"doo beware of irregular Mourning,"* carefully judging the difference between the remembrance that truly lasts, longer than stone, and other remembrances, natural rather than pious tears, garlands that are as transient as the inconsequential aspects of the dead that they mistake for the truth of the dead. This need for scrupulous discrimination
arises because pious and natural remembrances are easily confused in the intensity of grieving, an understandable but nonetheless dangerous confusion of a thing itself with its simulacrum. The long stretch of time will clear up the confusion because natural remembrance will drop away, but the meanwhile is too important to be sacrificed, there is too much urgent work at hand. The confusion would be prevented by a wholesale prohibition of mourning, but this would abandon a key aid to faith's efficacy during that meanwhile. So the saints resign themselves to sifting, a labor that is more than fancifully analogous to the attention they devote to women's writing.

Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, as well as Wendy Martin, have cited John Winthrop's attempt to join Anne Hopkins' desire to write to what he called "the loss of her reason and understanding" in order to posit an American Puritan hostility toward women's writing per se, as if the exorcizing duet between Silas Weir Mitchell and Charlotte Perkins Gilman had first been composed on the Arbella. However, though Winthrop's diagnosis is not based on purely personal opinions, neither is it the only formulation of the general Puritan mistrust of women's writing, a writing that was on other occasions cautiously celebrated when it was scrupulously confined to minor or supplementary genres, not meddling in the major modes of doctrine, theory, or collective history. Anne Bradstreet appeals to this nervous tolerance in her "Prologue," where she disingenuously promises that her modest verse will not venture into the great topics and petitions to be allowed her bare and unenviable discursive ground. Confinement to the minor, rather than complete exclusion, persists in New England culture, in the judgment that the women of the Abolitionist movement, like the ex-slave autobiographers, ought most properly to write narratives conferring appropriate sentiment on the abstract tenets developed by Abolitionist men, or later, in the tendency of women writers toward regional rather than cosmopolitan realism.

"Per Amicorum," probably Increase Mather, writing a preface to defend the composition and publication of Mary White Rowlandson's The Sovereignty and Goodness of God, together with the Faithfulness of His Promises Displayed, intimates that a total opposition to women's writing is too tight or precise, and contends that the text at hand is safe because it ventures no more than a concrete and vivid "display" or illustration of principles she has neither devised nor altered: "forasmuch as not the general but particular knowledge of things make deepest impression upon the affections, this narrative particularizing the several passages of this providence will not a little conduceth theunto" (321). Kathryn Zabelle Derouen reports that Rowlandson's publisher, Samuel Green, Jr., printer of one of the editions of the narrative, continued this citation of the narrative's emotionalism in an advertisement he placed in his edition of The Pilgrim's Progress:

This advertisement [for Rowlandson's narrative] not only provides facts about the book's publication, but also adds information to what a prospective reader's appetite: he will learn many details ("particular circumstances") about the experience; he will see how a mere woman and her children tried to survive; and he will read a first-person account written "pathetically," that is, according to seventeenth-century usage in OED, "movingly" and "earnestly." The emotionalism underlying the book advertisement should have helped sales, as should its inclusion in Bunyan's masterpiece, which quickly established itself as the single best-selling work in America and England, excluding the Bible and certain other devotional or popular works like Aesop's fables.

Her life having been an especially intense example of God's manner of operation, Rowlandson offers vicarious experience to supplement what Mather and others were declaring to have been the meaning of King Philip's War: "Of the thirty-seven persons who were in this one house, none either escaped present death, or a bitter captivity, save only one, who might say as he, Job 1. 15, And I only am escaped to tell the news" (325). She is not referring to herself at this point, because she was among those taken captive, but the captivity made her a storyteller of more profound news, of meaning rather than simple chronicle, of news on the order of Job's knowledge of deep cost rather than of the sole remaining herdmans's breathless report of the pillaging of Job's cattle by the Sabeans: "When we are in prosperity, oh the little that we think of such dreadful sights, and to see our dear friends, and relations lie bleeding out their heart's blood upon the ground" (325). If, as she later remarks, Rowlandson cannot stop returning to these sights, the Lord's purpose in bestowing this trauma may have been to move her to save others by supplying images that prove as arresting as experience itself and that lead to a more than curious or abstract memory of New England's terror. In both living and writing, Rowlandson seems to have been lifted out of ordinary wifeliness and to have been given a vocation.

Though Per Amicorum assures us that Rowlandson's book, like her captivity, is a pure and transparent medium, displaying God's message without addition, subtraction, or obfuscation, abstraction and the remembrance of experience in general tend not to converge exactly. Illustration, exemplification, and embodiment, for all of their rhetorical utility, are a risky business: the recollection of experience is apt to impart a certain extra that a normalizing rhetoric will have to either discard as dross or confine as nonsignifying ornament, the sugar on the pill, gestures of trivialization that, though more or less consciously forcible or tense, are not impossible for ordinary ideological purposes. Captivity narratives are in general rather congenially functional in their social environments, and "practical application" is, according to William Perkins' The Art of Prophecying, properly one of the most useful and regular parts of the sermon, as it presumably would not have been if such application were thought
to pose too great a danger to the homogeneity of the message. The dispersive potential of exemplification remains just that in most Puritan discourse. Only that, but always that: and in Rowlandson’s narrative, a version of “practical application”—the doctrinal parts being presented in other texts, male texts, such as Per Amicam’s preface or Increase Mather’s writings on the providential meaning of the war—burgeons into a distended or hypertrophied supplement, precisely because the doctrinal work is left to occur for the most part elsewhere.

If the ways of God are always enigmatic, and especially so to a woman cautious about trifling with major discourse, then the remaining duty would be to present accounts of episodes and experiences that were suggestive, that had the hum or aura of extraordinary significance, leaving it to reader-commentators to render the significances explicit. But the feeling of significance does not confine itself to what is amenable to orthodox signification, even less so for one brought up in a culture where every piece of minutia is thought to bear a possible message, so a resolute commitment to displaying the pretheoretical can say too much, despite best intentions.9

And here I may take occasion to mention one principal ground of my setting forth these lines: even as the Psalmist says, To declare the works of the Lord, and His wonderful power in carrying us along, preserving us in the wilderness, while under the enemy’s hand, and returning of us in safety again, and His goodness in bringing to my hand so many comfortable and suitable scriptures in my distress. (336)

Rowlandson’s diligent, modest, and generous inclusiveness evades ideological filtration, leaving the task of selecting among the recollections to those who come after but in the meanwhile allowing into Puritanism’s printed archive various nuances, implications, resistances, grievances, and daydreams whose feel of significance does not tend inevitably or sometimes even at all toward the sort of explanation she accepted as the destiny of her writing. The glorification of God is “one principal ground” of writing, a phrase that implies that there are other grounds, too, grounds that may include the desire to say that the “us” that is returned to normality is a diminished us, us minus (at least) one, the dead daughter Sarah, an us that is therefore not a return to or of what was, but a new thing. The present is a subtraction from rather than as well as an addition. Seeking to confine herself to serving as a kind of preconscious loam for Puritan theory, she makes available to us some of Puritan theory’s social unconscious, by which I mean thoughts, feelings, practical inclinations, and implicitly principled objections that were in the main purged from public discourse by an alert, imaginative, and scrupulous doctrinal exegesis in virtually full control of the means of textual production and social legitimation.

In this book I will argue that the unredeemed grief of which Willard is so wary is the wound over which dissonance congeals in Rowlandson’s narrative, but I want first in this chapter to explain why grief was dissonant in the field of Puritan social politics, rather than an ordinary member of the array of permissible feeling. In the seventeenth century, Anglo-American Protestantism was not yet sufficiently genteel to oppose emotional intensities per se, so its injunctions against grieving have to have more to do with grief’s content, its intrinsic thought, than with its amplitude. Unfortunately, Puritan writing is for the most part practical and militant, rather than theoretical and multisided, so no Puritan text I know of explains the origin of the hostility to mourning or registers mourning as other than a force haunting the periphery of thought, though there are many texts that express or deploy the hostility. Consequently, I will turn to Hegel for a defense of the Protestant objection to grief that is, first, explicit about its needs and axioms and, second, determined to apprehend its opponent as a countervailing form of ethical thought, rather than as an insurgent diabolism.10

Hegel’s writing differs from Puritan writing on these two related rhetorical grounds, but this is a difference within a larger affinity, a difference that allows us to hear from Hegel what Puritanism does not say about itself. Hegel maintains the Protestant commitment to opposing grief, but opens it to view, especially in his revisionary interpretation of Antigone midway through The Phenomenology of Spirit, where he represents Creon’s contest with Antigone as a tension between ethical orders and Creon’s bleak victory as the regrettable but necessary commencement of a spiritually whole human society. In this commitment to the installation of a total Christian society, transparent, permeated in all its parts by a single compository vision, Hegel takes up the quandary that ate away at and thereby defined American Puritanism: the arduous task of reconciling the “abrogation of externality”11 or extreme hostility toward institutional objectifications of devotion that instigates radical Protestantism, on the one hand, with the legitimation of a sociological apparatus on more than merely pragmatic grounds on the other. Puritan and Hegelian thought grow from this common problem: given that Protestantism has defined the negation of socially objectified form as an essential motion of true spirit, how can Protestantism be put to the task of legitimating a sociological order, since such legitimation requires specific positive codes, norms, and precepts, rather than a devout contemplation of the evanescence of codes? Despite important historical and theoretical differences—notably the insuperable segregation between the saved and the damned maintained in Puritan predestinarianism12—the crucial energy of both Puritan and Hegelian thought is generated by the challenge to Protestantism of entering social politics without losing its intrinsic character, a challenge that will encounter one of its major obstacles and resources in the human experience of grief.
A thread of connection might be traced on this quandary from Cotton Mather and Jonathan Edwards through the early Pietists to Kant and then to Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Along this line the crucial moment would perhaps be Hegel's dissatisfaction with Kant's attempt to mediate between the unavailable absolute and social practice by way of the chilly negativity of the categorical imperative (or by way of the aesthetic in _The Critique of Judgment_), a dissatisfaction that led Hegel to seek out the possibilities of actual and embodied morality, thus repriming in theory the New England experiment. Not simply a problem occupying philosophy, this intellectual affinity is grounded in a historical echo between seventeenth-century New England and the society in which Hegel was raised. Mary Fulbrook and Lawrence Dickey have suggested lines of common concern between early British Puritanism and the Pietist Lutheranism of areas such as the Old Württemberg of Hegel's youth, especially on the question of the politicization of the Protestant legacy. According to Dickey, Hegel's philosophy originates in the ideological situation of Old Württemberg, a relatively republican _ecclesia-mopolis_, dedicated to the practice of both devout inwardness and civic piety, driven to fortify and defend itself in the face of a suspicious Roman Catholic regent by developing an ideological reply both to its own doubts and to the doubts of the reigning powers—the notion of a community of saints in exemplary accord with virtue, rather than a heterogeneous aggregate of individuals regulated by custom and common law, and the notion of history as a sequence of exemplary partial prefigurations of the community's contemporary achievement. Such political and historical exemplarism resolves the quandary of Protestant politics with a reassignment of negativity to a preliminary rather than a final position in historical significa- tion: rather than an ultimate dissolution of all forms, iconoclasm is the work of history, clearing the ground of crude and fetish-ridden conceptions of socially embodied morality in order to make way for the _ecclesia-mopolis_. The dialectic of exemplary historiography thus at one blow answers both those who would call the community a dangerous innovation and those who would call it a betrayal of the genius of Protestantism. I am not arguing that Hegel's Germany and Puritan New England were substantially or essentially identical, only that their responses to their particular tasks of legitimation both took the form of a conception of history as the progressive refinement of the holy community through a series of increasingly perfected avatars. The "delay," as it were, may be attributed to the different rates of national unification, which kept German Protestantism from envisioning extended social administration until the eighteenth century, and then only in certain zones. Thus whereas Anglo-American philosophy during the second half of the century purveys the moderate pragmatic tranquillities of Hutcheson, Hume, and Scottish common sense, German philosophy during the same period grapples with the Calvinist turmoil around

the force of the negative: a turmoil to which Hegel, like Puritanism, responded by attempting to demonstrate the manner in which the Protestant legacy can pass into an explicit political culture without crucial self-loss, to demonstrate, he hoped, the inferiority of spirituality that held itself back from articulation for fear it would lose the purity it enjoyed while remaining in reserve: "But the absolute Being of faith is essentially not the abstract essence that would exist beyond the consciousness of the believer; on the contrary, it is the Spirit of the [religious] community, the unity of the abstract essence and self-consciousness. That it be the Spirit of the community, this requires as a necessary moment the action of the community." 14

Without for the most part inquiring into political motivations, American Puritan studies have for some time now recognized the central importance of exemplaristic typology, the exercise of perceiving persons and events not in terms of their singularity but as specimens of abstract spiritual types recurring through history. Puritanism challenged Augustine's belief that sacred history stopped with Christ, and asserted the extension of sacred history into the present: the Protestant critique of Catholic allegorism, in which the concrete vehicle seemed too easily to evaporate into abstraction, resulted not in what we would see as a realism but in a historical scheme that searched for abstraction realized or actualized in present circumstances such as Rowlandson's captivity. The abstract was concrete, it relinquished its nervous celibacy and organized the world. At its intensest moments, according to Sacvan Bercovitch, American Puritanism postulated that the present instance of the type was not merely a recurrence, but the abstraction's purest and least encumbered actualization, so that prior history amounted to a series of imperfect adumbrations: in the dual movement that also underlies Hegel's historicism, the past announces and legitimates the present, and the present renders explicit the hidden meaning of the past. 15

The sophistication and complexity of the typological connections developed by Puritan writers, especially Edward Taylor, have been taken as evidence that the American Puritans did not oppose or fail to feel the power of poetic figural- ity as such, 16 but instead set bounds within which the operation of figurality was not only permissible but desirable, although Taylor's concealment of his verse reveals the anxiety attendant upon setting and maintaining the border of permisibility. This fear of figurality's slippage into unregulated areas such as those opened in Rowlandson's narrative reveals that, for the Puritans themselves, there was an other-to-the-type that, though it could be labeled sin or error, was nonetheless a real factor in signification, and had considerable force. Responding to this Puritan fear of or worry over its other, literary criticism that moves beyond describing the internal structure of typology seems to encounter repeatedly the question of segments of experience to which the type (but not
representation as such) is inadequate. Unwilling to avail themselves of the Puritan thesis that such an apparent experience of the real is merely an illusion produced by sin, twentieth-century critics have clustered in three groups. First, an aesthetic historicism has claimed that the type seems to us to be a coercive representation of reality because we inhabit a wholly different notion of mimesis that we naively project back, faulting the type for failing to address our view of what is real. Second, the post-Coleridgean Christian existentialism of New Criticism admits the existence of a countervailing experience of the real in Puritan society, but sees it as the chaos of physical and social incoherence, which the type opposes with the clarifying redemptiveness of the symbol: the discord between the type and experience is, precisely, the type's intrinsic virtue.

Third, a post-sixties social criticism addressing ethnic and gender issues sees the type as a form of ideological slander, deploying images such as those of the diabolical Indian or licentious Woman, the Virtuous Savage or compliant Domestic Goodwife, to repress the idea that the other can be extratypological and still be a coherent subject—conscious, intentional, social, even if not assimilated to Puritanism's restricted view of the nature of subjectivity. Puritanism's uncontained other does not exist, because it is an anachronistic retraction; or it is redeemed by the type; or it is repressed by the type.

I do not want to adjudicate the relative merits of these critical positions here (because each has descriptively utility according to the text at hand), but rather to point out the regularity with which the question of the type raises the question of the inadequacy or antithesis between the type and some X. The recurrence of this question in critical studies of Puritanism indicates the intentional structure of the type, its crucial function as a manner of addressing experience by annihilating and then absorbing alternate representations of the real. Typology takes up a concrete experience of a person (including oneself), thing, or event, highlights a trait that reveals the referent's participation in a preordained and historically repetitive category, and then declares the referent's other traits (those that might make the referent's emblematic seem partial, unimportant, secondary, or derived) to be inconsequential for determining the referent's state of being—at best, pleasantly ornamental, at worst a blurring or obfuscation of the true. Thus typology is antithetical not to experience per se, but to those aspects of represented experience that do not confirm its representation that concerns itself with the other-than-exemplary is lost in the woods, wilderness being for Puritanism an emblem for what is outside emblematic; the type annuls wilderness thought in order to edify it, to teach the soul the path for which it has been searching. The discord criticism feels between the type and experience, therefore, results not from the type's unreality or lack of concreteness, its falsehood, but rather from its insistence on exclusivity and totality, on being the whole story, the only path through the forest of memory. The negational abstraction of the type does not accept the status of being one order of mimesis among others in a socially heterogeneous amalgam, but rather insists on its status as representation's final instance, with all the other modes either arrayed in proper subordination below it or improperly straying into forgetfulness, the autonomy of error. Rather than being one way of thinking among others in the seventeenth-century English repertoire, exemplarism and typology are assaults on other ways of thinking, tools for negating the autonomy of other paradigms and practices in order to claim that they should be enjoyed in purged versions as vestiges or avenues to the pure. Puritan theory is thus by design a hermeneutic violence directed against Puritanism's others, an assertion that would not be in the least shocking to the major Puritan thinkers, who believed that holy aggression was needed to clean the good of the various accretions that had come to encumber it, accretions that were unworthy of notice save in their power to interfere with or obscure that to which they affixed themselves. If the type were not intentionally antithetical in this manner, it would subside into being a mere member of a heteroglossic array; because it is intentionally antithetical to the other ways of formulating experience, it can bid for the sovereign power to be a Protestant version of Plato's science of sciences, to acquire the capacity to assemble discourse into a centered whole, and thereby to accomplish the dream Puritanism extracted from the Tudors, the Stuarts, and the fledgling British bourgeoisie—the creation of a homogeneous social space—but in the case of Puritanism grounded on manifested spirit rather than on sheer political power, staged personal charisma, or a developed commodity market.

Criticism's inquiry into the dialectical negativity of Puritan typologism follows almost inevitably from the work of Perry Miller, whose allegiance to the negative theology of Barth, Tillich, and Niebuhr led him away from what was in his time the prevailing view of Puritanism as a static body of dogmatic affect and into the dialectical energies that he called the marrow of Puritan divinity. Whether in praise or blame of Puritanism, the critics with whom he chose to disagree failed to perceive, according to Miller, its essential commitment to Calvin's unknown god. A presence manifested as inscrutable force, known by its turbulent impact on cognition and signification, this god demanded a fealty that in practical consequence resulted in taking all explicit formulations of truth to be flawed and inadequate, however useful for regulating the conduct of ordinary life. God is an interruption of sense, not a form but, according to Karl Barth, an "effulgence, or, rather, the crater made at the percussion point of an exploding shell, the void by which the point in the line of intersection makes itself known in the concrete world of history . . . " Cataclysm rather than code, Miller's unknown god lies beyond the possibility of adequate articulation in word or image—a god to be experienced in awe and dread, but not thought, spoken or translated into practice. Miller on this point captures the Puritan
disdain for Church of England procedures (but perhaps not the reformers’
nausea, a vertiginous anxiety as intense as Hamlet’s imaginations of Gertrude’s
nightly betrayals of the Father), captures the central insistence of early English
Puritanism, which used the idea of the unknown god as an ideological device
for delegitimizing the Arminianism and adiaphorism of thinkers such as Hooker
and Whitgift. When Puritanism moves to the New World, however, the reform-
ers find themselves in the position of sociopolitical administrators rather than
dissent radicals, a situation in which they desire to avail themselves of a
utopian view of their own exercises of power as right service to a monological
community organized around a clear and common spirituality. Biblical maxims
have only limited utility for legitimating such a project, so Scripture comes to be
supplemented by various schemes of typological and providential signification
that represent current political activity as a continuation of, or, as Bercovitch
argues, a perfection of that which is prefigured in the Bible. But for Miller this
ideological transformation is a matter less of triumph than of filial infidelity:
“Calvinism could no longer remain the relatively simple dogmatism of its
father. It needed amplification, it required concise explication, syllogistic proof,
intellectual as well as spiritual focus. It needed, in short, the one thing which, at
bottom, it could not admit—a rationale.”21 However much Miller may indi-
vidually admire the practical compromises made by these theologues caught in the
“coils” of present necessity, and however much he may insist that his heroes
never forgot the “leap” to the inscrutable, he nevertheless regards the move to
administration as the commencement of a decline into the dry rationalism of
the bourgeois Enlightenment. The social articulation of the Protestant genius
adolescents and betrays it, confining that genius to sporadic subsequent resur-
rections like those of Edwards and Emerson. Thus an administrator such as
Winthrop would be for Miller a melancholy figure, a beautiful soul compelled
by his concern for the world to betray his vision; and those critics who associate
the marrow of Puritanism with the surrounding bone—the body of eccle-
siosocial dogma—mistake a nobly tragic corruption of the thing for the thing
itself.

Miller’s work is therefore an appraisal of Puritanism from the point of view
of negative theology, rather than a summary restatement of the Puritans’ self-
conception. He does not himself, however, often draw this distinction. Identifi-
ing his own imaginative experience of Puritanism’s loss of its true force with the
rhetoric of the second-generation jeremiads, for instance, Miller obscures an
important difference: whereas for Increase Mather and his contemporaries
decension was a falling-away from what they considered the first generation’s
splendid institutionalization of spirit, for Miller that institutionalization is itself
a symptom of decension. Conceptually separate kinds of lamentation are
allowed to blend together, and the tone of the jeremiad is made to seem to arise
from a loss that the preachers of the jeremiad would in fact have seen as a
victory, the building of the city rather than the forgetting of the crater. I stress
this distinction between appraisals and exegesis first because Miller’s intimation
that American Puritanism was a negative theology represents the most serious
challenge to my proposed analogy between the Puritan and Hegelian views of
social history; and second because we must see the desire for positivity in
American Puritan thought if we are to understand the Puritans’ vigorous hostili-
ty to dissonances such as those they failed to discover in Rowlanson’s narrative.

The crucial difference between Miller’s dialectic and the Puritan dialectic
lies in their different understandings of the disruptive power of the negative.
From the perspective of Miller’s theologized existentialism, the negation of
political life is always and everywhere the summit of spiritual achievement.
Barth: “As an apostle—and only as an apostle—[Paul] stands in no organic
relationship with human society as it exists in history: seen from the point of
view of human society, he can be regarded only as an exception, nay, rather as an
impossibility.”22 Hence for Miller the eventual exiling of the two Puritans
about whom he chose to write books, Williams and Edwards, proves that their
opposition to the encroachments of pharisaism was an unalloyed devotion to
the knowledge of divinity as a crater in social being, rather than as a stage or
foundation for government.23 Proceeding from the sparse ethos of Fear and
Trembling, Miller’s commitment is decidedly post-Hegelian, taking the top off
Hegel’s system by removing the idea of social perfection through progressive
synteses and keeping only the restlessness and relentlessness of the antithesis,
the negation of the type, rather than the type as negation.

But the Puritans were not inclined to represent their institutions as a series of
more or less embarrassing capitulations to necessity. Though Miller’s elevation
of the antithesis may have the aura of the demystified or of a tough realism born
from the barbarism of history after Hegel, it leads us away from the Puritans’
own dominant conception of negation as the refinement of holy society through
the work of history rather than the incessant demolition of all attempts to
socialize the good. From Jewish tribalism through the underground enclaves of
the early Christians to the nonconforming congregations, history was the prog-
ress of an idea of positive community, and negations were the means rather than
the end, the expurgation of repellently alluring simulacra that mixed themselves
into truth:

My heart hath naturally detested four things: The standing of the Apocrypha in
the Bible; Forrainers dwelling in my Countray, to crow out native Subjects into
the corners of the Earth; Alchymized coines; Tolerations of divers Religions, or of
one Religion in segregant shapes; he that willingly assets to the last, he that
examines his heart by day-light, his conscience will tell him, he is either an Atheist,
or an Heretique, or an Hypocrize, or at best a captive to some Lust: Poly-piety is
the greatest impiety in the world. True Religion is ignis probationis, which doth congregare homogenea & segregare heterogenea. [True religion combines likenesses and separates differences in the same way as the fire used by goldsmiths to separate impurities from gold.] 

Thus, though Puritan theory may have continued to respect the sort of negation from above that Miller associates with the unknown god, for example in the dictum that belief in the completion of one's own conversion was an instance of pride rather than knowledge, such memories of the radical heritage subsided as the American Puritans' sense of political need emboldened their theological positivism. At that point negation was thought of less as a force that intervened into the coherences of the faithful than as a correction that the faithful visited upon what they considered to be the imperfect social and personal forms of others. I am not challenging Miller's argument that the theology of the unknown god was a durable factor in the ideology of the American Puritans, but rather contending that they chose to see positive institutionalization as a triumphal passage out of the interlude of the negative rather than as a regrettable accommodation to the practical demands of worldliness: they did not see themselves as he sees them, and their self-estimation was a crucial determinant of their discursive and political practice. Given their desire to see themselves as having passed out of the need for self-negation, the sort of theology Miller describes would in fact have functioned as a nagging and unspoken goad to supremacist demonstrations that appeared to obviate the need for self-criticism rather than as a revered creed or as an object of perfunctory acts of contrition. Miller's exclusive attention to the trace of negative theology prevented him from attending to Puritan exertions of power: a repeated and explicit experience of the vacuity of one's convictions about social propriety and a belief that such an experience was the essence of devotion are not likely to culminate in the sort of suppressiveness that punctuates and defines the history of seventeenth-century New England Calvinism; but a belief that negation has refined convictions by stripping away all the inmixed dross leads to confidence about the rightness of visiting such refinement on others not fortunate enough to have reached the summit yet. And if the memory of the radical legacy itches at the desire to see the city installed on a summit, then exposing and assaulting the inadequacy of another—becoming the milton of a god clear to oneself but unknown to others—will confer a reassuring feeling of successful achievement. Insofar as institutionalized American Puritanism was determined to view itself as having surpassed rather than merely suppressed the radical legacy that Miller calls its essence, it was bound to resort to violence for the sake of self-definition. If, then, as a generation of American Studies scholars suggested, Miller largely ignored the question of Puritan attitudes toward the frontier, and if, as a subsequent generation is beginning to argue, Miller failed to discuss the viol-

ence of Puritan racism and misogyny, these lapses result not from simple blindness, indifference, or approval, but rather from his sole focus on the issue that burned at the heart of his thinking, the introverted agony of the New England mind discarding obsolete commitments rather than the agony caused others by the torturous construction of the New England mind. (Insofar as the latter was often a palliative escape by means of projection from the former, Miller's thought can be said to probe critically the origin of violence he was not concerned to address directly.)

Of Puritanism's numerous opponents, the unassimilated and implacable grief that struggles to expression in Rowlandson's narrative is perhaps not the loudest or most conspicuous, or most confident, but it would have been among the most vexing because by its nature it challenges the fundamental premises of Puritan exemplaristic typology, and with them the social project they were intended to justify and sustain. And it is on the significance of the contest between grief and exemplarism that Hegel's tormented reading of Antigone is especially illuminating. The brevity of this chapter of The Phenomenology of Spirit belies its importance as an exploration of the elemental problems confronting Hegel's social and religious commitment. Protestantism's founding text, the Ninety-Five Theses, arose from a controversy over the proper attitude toward the dead, and a close look at the later theses suggests that Luther's quarrel with the doctrines of purgatory and indulgences was not limited to his objections to profiteering: he also objects to the spurious easing of the indulgence purchaser's discomfort at the thought of his own or others' deaths, to the Roman Church's reassuring implication that the negative can be placated by anything less than a total and meticulous reform of the self—self is the only adequate propitiation, money is like Cain's vegetables. The Theses instigate Protestantism's attempt to appropriate for its own purposes the terror of death in order to gain the authority and prestige required to assemble a total and single-handed administration of subjectivity. In this project, one of the major opponents may have been the quasi-autonomy of ancient mourning rituals that, according to John Bossy, were not during the late medieval period completely assimilated to ecclesiastical control:

In practice, there was a good deal more to dying than [legal arrangements and the priest's performance]; death may be an individual event for the dying, but it is a social event for those who remain behind. While the priest made his way to the bedside, the tolling of a bell alerted the neighbours in the same way that an ambulance siren does nowadays. There were rites of informing the neighbour-hood, for laying out the body in the house, for watching (the wake), mourning and reading the will; rites for carrying the body to church; rites of the funeral properly speaking, the office of the dead performed over the body placed before the altar; rites of burial; funeral baked-meats; obligations to be fulfilled towards the soul, commemoration and anniversaries individual and collective. This most elaborate
structure, which was at the close of the Middle Ages in a state of rapid enlargement, represented some kind of a compromise between divergent pieties, and between pietas itself in the proper sense (that is, family duty) and the bare skeleton of the liturgy. The natural religion of kinship and friendship, which the Church on the whole managed to keep at a distance from the bedside itself, entered into its element once the soul had departed from the body.26

If, then, as Bossy suggests, Protestantism was a "migration of the holy," a demolition of the diversity of pieties preparatory to a totalizing coordination of social practice under the aegis of a single notion of spirituality, then grieving practices, previously "things indifferent," may have proven to be major loci of resistance. Hegel's preoccupation with Antigone would in that case be primarily not an act of leaping to imagine the Greek past but an allegorization of present tension, and acts of insistence on mourning, such as that of Antigone in Hegel's imagination or of Rowlandson in seventeenth-century Massachusetts, however solitary or isolated, would not be at bottom private or personal, but rather individual remembrances of a social ethic under massive attack—an attack that, if Ariès's thesis concerning the redesigning of death in the bourgeois West is correct, was ultimately triumphant.27

But, for Hegel at least, the threat of mourning was not confined to its social force, the durability and extent of its hold on a general consciousness. In addition, the content of mourning, its intrinsic thought, presented Protestantism with a theoretical challenge to which a responsible apologist such as Hegel aspired to be would have to answer with more than an overwhelming tonnage of suppressive power. His sense of the importance of such a reply dictates the placement of the reading of Antigone at the midpoint of The Phenomenology of Spirit, where it facilitates a crucial transition in the book's argumentative development. In the course of the first half, Hegel develops a hypothetical biography or bildungsroman of individual consciousness, starting with sense certainty, moving to the discovery of deixis and abstraction, through the origin of unhappy self-consciousness in the battle for recognition, ending with the discovery of the objective identity of virtue and reason. Though this final position represents the apex of individual consciousness, the fact that individual consciousness rather than the collective social "I" of spirit occupies the center of the argument means that there will have to be a dialectical overturning, because the individual's specious occupancy of that position is deeply implicated in the fragmentation that Hegel saw reaching its gruesome nadir in the Reign of Terror, a fragmentation he is writing the book to help remedy. His decision to begin the book with the account of individual consciousness is therefore a pedagogical rather than a philosophical choice, an address to the reader's present condition, a condition from which he is to be freed free by successive displacements and reformatory identifications.

Therefore, having exhausted the potency of individual consciousness, Hegel now moves to the dialectically teleological chronicle of collective consciousness: a conversion narrative is replaced by a history of sacred community, though, as with Puritanism, there are structural rhymes between the two narratives. Unlike Puritanism, however, Hegel begins not with Hebraism but with what he considers the Greek ethical harmony, a zero degree of philosophical culture, in order to describe the cataclysm that split the simple whole, instigated open contradiction, and thereby began the deracinated community that will culminate in the Reign of Terror. The African and Asian communities on which he will present stridently Eurocentric lectures in the 1820s are not analyzed in the Phenomenology, not because they are inconsequential, perhaps, but because their tranquility does not seem to Hegel to break apart in a crisis of modernity. They are, however, present by surrogacy in the person of Antigone, who obeys an "underground" law, the ancient obligation of ritual grief that the city-state violates in creating its splendid future. Suppressing this prehistoric "nature" that is the secret source of its energy, the city in the person of Creon creates the ancient law as nature or unconscious: that is, legitimating his assault on Antigone by labeling her a feminine unreason, Creon devises a self-fulfilling prophecy, because exiling Antigone and what she stands for from social discursivity produces a muted area of opacity within the polis. But though he thus realizes his excuse, he does not win, because the mure is not without efficacy; rather it is a demonized noncompliance that will shadow the city's future course, first as a curse, then as the Christianity of the catacombs mourning for Christ and opposing Roman legalism, finally returning to the sunlight to fuse with the bourgeois state in a moral political community that is the denouement of history as it is understood in the Phenomenology.

Insofar as he stands for an explicitly codified state rather than a purely private spirituality, therefore, Hegel is an heir to Creon (and notably more sympathetic to Creon than most romantic and postromantic readers). Hegel's commitment, however, at least at this point in his career, is to an ideal and as yet unrealized political order, which means that some conditions have not yet been met. Insofar as he contends that from Creon through Rome to the Enlightenment Western political life has nervously leaped and excluded ancient fidelities, he is an heir to Antigone as well as to Creon; Hegel stipulates the circumstances under which she will permit her exhumation. Here as elsewhere, as Henry Sussman argues,28 Hegel's ethical commitment to imagining the cogency of alternate formations ends up diminishing (at least for some readers) the credibility of what he seeks to view as progression, rather than repression or suppression. Such a dramatic staging of the ascent of politics offers insights absent from the stark binarism of Puritan rhetoric—internal appreciations of the protagonist as (at least initially, before suppression) a form of reason rather than as an inchoate hostility to be assailed without hesitation, recognition, or self-
because, if he can persuade the citizens to venerate Eteocles (and vilify Polyneices), he will have devised a putatively dialectical ideology that can move between an abstract notion of right (defense of the city rather than clear genealogical claim to the throne as a source of virtue) and the memory of concrete experience. The example declares that the personal singularities of the brothers are only vehicles or vessels bearing their standings with respect to virtue; exemplification negates or annuls this extrinsic singularity in order to preserve in unobstructed form what is declared to have been the essence of their personal being. The example in this way implies that the negation of at least a portion of experience is an expression of experience, rather than a simple external opposite such as Kant’s categorical imperative. The example lays claim to being an immanent representation, an articulation of what is posited as the gist of a social whole rather than as an aggressive individual participant within a diverse community. If the battle between the brothers allegorizes the damage that ensues from attempting to unify a heterogeneous society under a single head (an issue of great concern in Hegel’s Germany, as in seventeenth-century England), Creon’s labor proves not to be a reconsideration of the project of forcible unification, but instead a search for a more sophisticated tool, Aufhebung rather than war—a dark version of William James’s moral equivalent of war. But public knowledge of the continuity between war and exemplification, the revelation that Creon’s legend is a forcible deduction driven by political interest rather than an adequate induction from fact, depends upon Antigone’s obstinacy, which is for Hegel a resistance to exemplification, more precisely, a tacit contention that exemplification, rather than a sufficient resumé of its material, is on the contrary a violent social epistemology that seeks a forgetting of the existential-historical actuality of what it claims to represent. The struggle between Creon and Antigone is for Hegel a struggle over exemplification per se, over the question of its function and its violence, rather than over the establishment of a proper content for exemplification.

The political situation of postwar Thebes is not nearly so clear as Creon’s legends would have it (their excessive simplicity being precisely their appeal), given the absence of a rule of primogeniture, the consequent ambiguity about Oedipus’ successor, and Eteocles’ violation of the misguided agreement to share the throne in annual rotation. The political problem that motivates the play’s movement arises from the question of the personal uniqueness of the person in whom power is embodied: the occupant of the throne is to be singular, not exchangeable or replaceable before his death without the destruction of the state. The war was therefore perhaps structurally inevitable once Eteocles and Polyneices had struck their ill-considered bargain. This devastating error reveals them to be the true sons of Oedipus, because it repeats the disaster that ensued after their father’s politicosexual replacement of Laius: seeking to con-
trol the chaos Oedipus caused, the sons ended up institutionalizing what the father had done in ignorance. History repeats tragedy as farce. One solution to the problem, as Hegel knew, is the bourgeois state, which enables the replaceability of the central human figure by emphasizing the singular sanctity of the constitution and by denying the impossibility of identity between the state and specific actual persons, a disjunction whose critical force mandates rotation in order to distinguish the state from simulacra. Unless, of course, a leader can successfully represent himself as one purged of personal singularity in order to emerge as a pure embodiment of the values of the polis, in which case the state is not debased to a specious pretense of identity with the birth, views, or talents of the leader, but rather the leader acquires the prestige of a mandate by having managed to seem to be not singly himself, but rather a selfless instance of the transcendent. Creon's recourse to the exemplary legend, and his claim to have dedicated his life to service—not to Eteocles but to what Eteocles stood for (stood in for, as the vehicle in a metaphor loses its essential specificity in order to stand in for the tenor)—is therefore at the heart of his endeavor to recompose society in a way that will not reproduce the causes of the initial catastrophe.

Like Hegel trying to envision an other-than-Napoleonic end to the Reign of Terror or to German incoherence, or like the Puritans seeking an other-than-Stuart resolution to the seventeenth-century English aparagmos, Creon reacts to social heterogeneity by designing and promoting the legend of a spiritual genealogy of the group at last rising from the wreckage, reaching its majority not in his person, but in his pure service.

In the process, Creon condemns himself to having to oppose ideological enemies as well as self-interested conspirators, those who would contend that he is not the purest embodiment of the values he proposes as the society's essence, those who would contend that other values are more fundamental, or enemies such as Antigone whose insistence on her right and duty to remember the reality of her experience of the dead person challenges the founding premise of exemplification, that persons are adequately remembered as positively or negatively admonitory specimens. The strife that Creon creates between himself and Antigone, then, is for Hegel based on a theoretical disagreement over the proper manner to construe the singularity of the dead.

For Creon, the perfect political virtue of Eteocles and the perfect villainy of Polyniceus do make them unique, but this uniqueness rests in their spectacular achievement, in their having made themselves into specimens so pure as to have transcended singularity completely—just as gold is uniquely suitable to be money by virtue of its ready conformity to the task of general representation rather than by virtue of its use value. For Antigone, though, this conception of uniqueness represents the annulment of what mourning aims to establish. She enters or is forced onto the political scene not to defend Polyniceus as hero, not even to promote a cynical relativism, but to defend a wholly different way of thinking about singularity. Her task is to stand for the memory of Polyniceus as person, rather than as exemplum—this is what one is commanded to do for the members of one's family (whether the cursed house of Oedipus or not). Family is, in Hegel's reading, not aristocratic lineage, nor is it the woman's domestic service and subordination, of which he may approve but which he considers subjunct to the state's need for citizens, and therefore not the crux of the family's vexing autonomy. Rather, family is at its heart the depth, intricacy, and proximity to completeness of its members' knowledge of each other—the closest thing to knowledge of another subject, not to be confused with the simplicity of sentimental love. Creon's inability to perceive Antigone's sense of obligation to preserve this knowledge is perhaps for Sophocles the essence of his tragic blindness, a blindness that eventually compels what might otherwise be an adjacent order of memory to become an adversary (thought it may also be that in Sophocles' universe there is no "otherwise"). But Hegel contends that Creon is jealous rather than blind, shrewdly mindful that establishing his legitimacy will require him to subordinate and appropriate all available social energy and that he therefore cannot allow adjacent or nonaligned energies to follow separate courses. In which case Hegel's Creon is less obtuse than Sophocles', but still blind in assuming that such autonomies can be broken and absorbed rather than demonized to the point where even greater disaster is inevitable ("fated").

Hegel's Creon, then, is concerned with the specific character of Antigone's defiance, rather than with its simple fact. Constituting the complexity of Polyniceus in her work of memory, a work that falls to her alone because the city is cowed by Creon and because everyone else in the family is dead save Ismene, whose temporary fear has compromised her in Antigone's eyes, Antigone insists that exemplification is a repressive force not unrelated to the shameful rot in public view to which Creon has condemned Polyniceus' body. Creon's refusal to oppose rot with ritual—to retire the overwhelming and noxious evidence of Polyniceus' now-complete thingness, the ungoverned corrupting meat that irresistibly testifies that there is no subject here—is itself a kind of rot that dissolves Polyniceus into an impersonal typological ground that has only an extrinsic or hyperpartial relation to what the sister will someday say the brother was.

Antigone inhabits what Creon's symbolic typology would see as the movement of memory toward the clear sunlight of political signification, the sunlight that beats down on Polyniceus' vacant residue, and she thereby stands apart from Creon's drive to close the wound of war, ignoring desperate political therapy in order to insist on the all too easily forgotten anomaly of the person. She refuses the logic of ideological memory (remember the hero, remember the traitor as one who should be forgotten) in order to reveal that logic critically, as a repressive amnesia seeking to override another memory (remember Polyniceus)—in
order to recover the obligation from the threat of expedient sublimation. The contest between Creon and Antigone is for Hegel over the nature of memory's reparations, over the difference between adventitious patriotism and mourning.

Hegel frequently invokes the play's symbolic verticality to refer to Antigone's mournfulness as a feminine underground or nature opposed to the solar law of the explicit state. Though this mythological emblemization undoubtedly persists in Sophocles' writing as a survival formation, the central dramatic place he gives to Creon's inhumation of Antigone resists the innuendoes of myth: she is not auctothonous from the start, but rather is made so.30 Hegel correctly discerns the distinction Sophocles draws between the discovery of an underground and the construction of an underground, a distinction ignored by Creon's desire to use myth to portray Antigone as an ignorant force rather than as a coherent ethical alternative. I believe that is why Hegel's commitment to calling Antigone an underground in herself rather than by Creon's fiat is uneven and imperfect, wavering from paragraph to paragraph between a critical dramatic impersonation of Creon (one of the Phenomenology's prime rhetorical devices) and a simple identification with Creon. These vicissitudes of tone result from the fact that, though Hegel may identify with Creon's feeling that Antigone is a threat to social totality, his recourse to a naturalizing vilification is blocked by three of his own commitments. First, he believes that women are associated more closely with mourning than men not by virtue of women's natural proclivity to sorrow, but because of the more socially normal passage of men into state logic as a result of the need to conduct war. Position within the social structure, rather than the intrinsic characters of the sexes, accounts for gender differentiation in the question of mourning. Mourning is left to women, as it is left to Antigone alone after what she perceives as Ismene's defection from the obligation: it is theirs by default rather than special aptitude, and testifies to a willingness to shoulder an ethical burden otherwise in danger of extinction, rather than an inclination to emotional extremism. Exclusion from political life results in women's more comprehensive observance of manners of thought superseded or repressed in the political sphere. A domestic ideology that assigns a ritually circumscribed mourning to women in a gendered division of social labor and that prohibits participation in the kinds of representation that attend political action misfires in cases such as Antigone's, opening the critical potential of a mournfulness not subdued to exemplarity's measure. Being confined to work a spare terrain, as Hegel had argued in his investigation of the consciousness of the Slave earlier in the book, one is more apt to come across hidden or derivied resources than is the Master who only gazes at the map of his domain.31 But this does not mean that those who make such discoveries are intrinsically more suitable to do so. If, therefore, Hegel's partial and troubled allegiance to Antigone's resolve amounts to a kind of feminism (however anachronistic that term might be with respect to either Sophocles or Hegel), this would be a feminism that is historicist rather than essentialist, and that consequently neither celebrates nor calls for the elimination of the distinction between genders, but rather explains the need to attend to the voice of the excluded in terms other than those of liberal Christian magnanimity: rather than a vaunting of the intrinsic value of the difference or a denunciation of its exclusionary intent, Hegel's defense of Antigone entails a measured dialectical judgment that exclusion enhances the likelihood of the survival of overridden or superseded kinds of memory. Hegel's vexed suspicion that we should listen to Antigone's critical truth celebrates not the fact that the task of mourning falls to her alone, but rather the fact that there is someone for it to fall to, despite the price for her, because her misery ensures that something other-than-Creon survives. Second, as I will argue below, mourning is for Hegel not an inchoate or animal drive but instead a rigorous teleological labor that opposes nature's proclivity to indiscriminate rot, and thus it cannot be nature. And third, if for Hegel women are not nature and mourning is not nature, neither is nature itself really nature, in the sense of an extrahuman alien. As Derrida contends, the Phenomenology is devoted to challenging the absolute otherness of a nature with the proposition that the word nature is a repressive term devised to stifle areas of human commitment that are found intolerable by thought that is inadequate to the whole: "nature is spirit outside itself."32 When Hegel sounds as if he is joining his voice to Creon's without dispute or irony, therefore, the fusion is shocking, precisely because the trend of his own argument works...
as traitor, his "ethical self" liberated from "every existential form," in Hegel's words—a liberation that will seem abrasive from Antigone's position, because for her the "existential forms" Creon considers so much obscurity to be dissolved constitute the intricacies of Polynices' "personality," a term that echoes with but is for Hegel much more complex and even painful than our common usage. Creon's abrasions, consequently, are for Hegel the result not solely or even primarily of his personal character but rather of the character of the social epistemology he enforces, which has little use for fine measurements and discriminations. (We might just as well ask whether the administration of exemplarism produces brusque functionaries: the difference between Sophocles and Hegel may well be that Hegel is more "structuralist," more inclined to derive character and behavior from functional participation in one of the moments of Geist.) Subtle representations of Polynices' personality would only blur or diffuse the effect sought by civic reason: what Antigone sees as a reductive stripping of essence Creon sees as a necessary dismissal of consequential but potentially obfuscatory and therefore dangerous detail. This difference belongs to the asymmetry between their tasks—though both seem to bring a ready aptitude, by contrast with the initial hesitations of Ismene and Haemon. The epistemological violence of Creon's technique, then, comes into view for us because we can see or hear from what is violated: Antigone exposes Creon as a despot in the administration of memory. Only the expression of another view, even that of the little boy who says that the emperor has no clothes on, can reveal (if not triumph over) coercion as such, and for that reason small voices are dangerous despite their lack of magnitude. In this contention, Hegel moves past a sentimentalization of the play that would cast it as an opposition between spontaneous or unreflective fondness and the cruelty of expedient realpolitik by distinguishing between Antigone and Creon in terms of a difference between orientations within a field of possibility bounded on one end by the density of experience and on the other by the thinning of experience for the sake of a social agenda. Neither is more emotive; and neither is less theoretical, though Creon's inability or unwillingness to countenance the simultaneous operation of both his and Antigone's orientations toward the dead will eventually render him the vastly more ethically impoverished (and, for the teleological Hegel, historically necessary) of the two, however much he considers himself to be laboring in service to the ethical good of the devastated city.

The difference between their positions is a matter of the pace of the work as well as of the kind of representation sought. Creon's order of remembrance is ready-made before the brothers' death, and it would exist even had they never lived. The categories traitor and hero did not come into being through a process of thinking about Etocles and Polynices; they predated their contents, awaiting the brothers or some convenient others as receptacles. And, again, Creon is not concerned with making delicate adjustments between the vessel and what it contains, since that would smear the sharp outline he desires. Creon's representation is thus ready to go, and he need only defend it against competitors, rather than spend time compiling it in the first place. Antigone, however, does not have a satisfying representation of Polynices ready to hand. Rather, she has only the destruction of her subject world due to the abrupt exit of one of that world's crucial constitutive elements, an element rendered astonishing—rendered real—by the sudden vacancy in the midst of the familiar. The remediation of such a loss requires painstaking incremental work, the summoning of innumerable minute memories, each of which must be dismembered from the habitual contexts and fugitive sentiments that attached themselves to the event during initial experience, then appraised for what it tells of Polynices, then added to the accumulating structure of what will, at some unpredictable and un governable future point, be accepted by the mourner as a satisfactory representation of him-who-was. No less than Creon, Antigone is using exemplificatory refinement to transcend the data of ordinary life: but rather than establishing the manner in which Polynices was an example of a type, she is striving to establish the manner in which the items of memory were examples of Polynices. The question of her mourning: who was he? If at the end she produces who he was for Antigone, rather than objectively, a cynical judgment that this result is no different from the representation Creon constructs for himself is invalid, because the infinitesimal laborious fidelity of the mourner's work is qualitatively different from what it shows to be the debt facility of an opportunism. The fact that neither is identical with the real, and that neither is therefore an empirical realism, does not prove their equally arbitrary status, because one is composed around the touch of the real; and, since there is no more proximate mimesis than that, cynicism cannot claim a ground from which to assess relative adequacies. Mourning is the most mimetic area of thought and feeling because its ineluctable premise is representation's total dispossession of its object and consequent inability to control the unknown with the taken-for-granted.

For Hegel as for Freud, mourning is an intrinsically progressive work because it produces its end in the course of its action rather than beginning with a predetermined end to which it fits fact. Freud:

[The final representation of the lost object] is made up of innumerable single impressions (or unconscious traces of them) and this withdrawal of libido is not a process that can be accomplished in a moment, but must certainly, as in mourning, be one in which progress is long-drawn-out and gradual. Whether it begins simultaneously at several points or follows some sort of fixed sequence is not easy to decide; in analyses it often becomes evident that first one and then another memory is activated, and that the laments which always sound the same and are wearisome in their monotony nevertheless take their rise each time in some different unconscious source.35
Hegel:

The deed [of familial obligation] no longer concerns the living but the dead, the individual who, after a long succession of separate disconnected experiences, concentrates himself into a single completed shape, and has raised himself out of the unrest of the accidents of life into the calm of simple universality. . . . The duty of the member of the Family is on that account to add to this aspect, in order that the individual's ultimate being, too, shall not belong solely to nature and remain something irrational, but shall be something done, and the right of consciousness be asserted in it.36

"Simple universality" here means decomposition, a blending-into-the-whole that must be supplemented by the doinmg of mourning, which concerns itself, according to Jean Hyppolite, with "what individuality becomes as a shadow, when it is freed from all the accidents of life."37 The death of the family member is a forcible initial negation of ordinary life, which is not otherwise characterized by self-interrogation for meaning. Mourning takes up and continues this negation, not in service to oblivion, and not at bottom in service to mastery or aggression, but to defamiliarize memory's former reliance on the context of the ordinary to commence constructing a representation that will exist as a thought and felt-being—one that is contemplated rather than one that haunts. As mourner, Antigone initially apprehends only the surviving ego's ruination, the self as crater, and must construct in slow memory a portrait of Polyneices that is adequate to her extensive experience of her brother. Such a portrait would honor Polyneices by preserving him, translating him from the shame of being unable to control the exhibition and corruption of his body, a labor begun in the attempted burial, which does not remove him from thought but on the contrary covers his unbounded shame with what Hegel calls the assertion of the "right of consciousness" and thereby begins to bring him into thought. And, in so honoring Polyneices, she begins to restore herself, not by recovering wholeness, but by transforming the place-that-was-Polyneices from being a ruination of representation to being an object of representation. The area of zero or space left by Polyneices' departure is not closed in postmourning subjectivity, but neither is it an impossible obstacle to the capacity to form representations and engage in purposeful living.

The transfer of the dead zone from destruction-of-representation to object-of-representation is not a linear or tranquil process. At the moment of death, the survivor's ego supposes itself to know what has been lost. But this tender image, hastily organized by the survivor's experience of his or her own ruined self, is in reality a preliminary draft to be filled out and transformed by the subsequent surging of numerous memories, each of which will contribute to a vastly more complex and ornate notion of the dead. As Stuart Schneiderman contends, the "image of the beloved is not the same as the trace of that person's passage [through the mourner's life]. Someone who has been buried leaves a mark behind, a trace of his passage through our world. And that trace is inscribed indelibly in the unconscious—assuming that the object-choice and object-investment was made during early childhood."38 The initial image is faithful to a coherence the survivor is desperate to preserve, but it is unfaithful to the dead, in the sense that a bad work of fiction is said not to be faithful to what it depicts. It must therefore be rejected. But the overthrow of the first image seems to the ego to be what Lacan calls "second death,"39 a repetition of the first blow. Losing the dead again (and again and again) with each uprisng bit of memory, the ego seeks to cling to the initial memory and to resist each reformulation, calling this a fidelity to the dead rather than to its own desire. In the process it comes to fantasize an omnipotence: if clinging to the image repels what feels like death again, then such clinging seems to have the power to immunize the lover and the loved and to refute the ego's putative impotence against the loss of its objects. But such "triumph," as Melanie Klein argues, however provisionally useful during the time of bleak discouragement and depressed helplessness, ultimately "impedes the work of early mourning."40 The fortification of the draft image becomes, according to Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, a "crypt" or inert area within the self with which memory cannot communicate, against which it crashes without effect in the commencement of melancholia. Only by refusing such fantasies and by experiencing the incursions of the traces does the mourner prove herself faithful to the dead, does she render the proper homage and secure the right to pass on, out of the museum. Even if neither omnipotent nor whole, she is alive again, herself, rather than a broken ruin or residue performing adamant obsessive repetitions after the crucial life has been torn from her. In coming to know the track the dead made through them, the living honor what Lacan calls "the unique value / valor of the dead's being"41 and distinguish themselves from what they have constructed as an object of representation: at the completion of mourning, the dead are honorably dead, that is, adequately assigned to being something symbolized, a carefully measured and internally described area of zero in the real / that is the real, rather than a crippling defect in a survivor who would otherwise be whole. At this point grief will have modulated into sorrow, compulsion into revery. But the procedure is prolonged and exclusive with respect to other commitments, certainly not completed with the alacrity of Creon's civic exempla. Antigone therefore cannot oppose Creon's representation with a more adequate representation at the early point of mourning depicted in the play, only with her enduring attention to the sudden astonishment of Polyneices, which is enough to reveal Creon's reductiveness, but not enough to say
what would not be reductive. Like Hamlet, she can only insist on her time and feel that public time is awry. Unlike certain dissidents who might be ready to proclaim Polyneices the hero, she cannot combat representation with representation, only stay separate from an irrelevant expediency. But if among the undue clarities of the public sphere her position thus seems weak, in the context of Hegel's conception of responsible philosophy it should seem strong: her apparent torpor is the external manifestation of the long process of memory challenging image, compelling it to respond to the real with self-revisions, a procedure that is much closer to what Hegel defines as dialectic than is Creon's untroubled tailoring of evidence to fit the image with which he commences. Mourning may be dialectic's purest case.42

But for Antigone, keeping expediency at a distance suffices only so long as that expediency does not become invasive, does not insist that there be no competitors or alternatives in its domain, in which case ignoring would have to become resisting. There is a third ground for the opposition between Creon and Antigone in addition to the kind of representation sought and the pace of the seeking, and that is the kind of renewal sought—and it is on this ground that the theoretical difference between the two orders of memory becomes political conflict. Antigone is attempting to return to some competence in her own life, to her marriage to Haemon among other things, but Creon is attempting to wrest personal power and political legitimacy from the postwar instability, an end he believes will require the full participation of the citizens. Mourning, however, is not simply one of any number of alternate pursuits that would distract from allegiance, such as reestablishing trade and so on; rather, mourning is in particular for Creon the major energy or resource necessary to fuel his machine, and Antigone's noncompliance is especially threatening to him. In suggesting this, Hegel is bringing forward his major addition to Sophocles, his contention that the exemplary state depends on a sublimation of mourning, rather than on the sublimation of erōs that Freud will describe in Civilization and Its Discontents and The Future of an Illusion. In a sublimation of mourning, the negation of desire is performed by the death of the beloved rather than by self-discipline or primary repression, a situation to which exemplification can respond soliciously, as a generous provision of a ready and complete image of the dead. This ideological maneuver includes a promise that the repeated second deaths of mourning are unnecessary, that the work is done, the product delivered. The intense desire that this be so, a version of the compulsive clinging to the first image of the dead in order to avoid the work, renders the traumatized postwar population eager to emulate and thereby resurrect what is said to have been the essence of the dead—to make the dead live in memory rather than die in memory—rather than weary and inclined to subside into private work. The Hegelian and Freudian theories of sublimation are of course not mutually exclusive, but a putatively sympathetic response to negation represented as having happened in the course of things is intrinsically different from a justification of negation as necessary to the cause of civilization. Sublimation of the sort Hegel analyzes is more alert to desire's malleability and less vulnerable to skepticism, and therefore often the preeminently useful item in the ideological toolbox, because it seems to preserve rather than impose value. The sentimental state advertises a friendliness that its self-righteous counterpart lacks.43

Hegel argues that Creon learned the utility of sublimation during the recent war, when the urgency of preserving the city preempted and absorbed other uses of social energy:

The Spirit of universal assembly and association is the simple and negative essence of those systems [such as the family] which tend to isolate themselves. In order not to let them become rooted and set in this isolation, thereby breaking up the whole and letting the [communal] spirit evaporate, government has from time to time to shake them to their core by war. By this means the government upsets their established order, and violates their right to independence, while the individuals who, absorbed in their own way of life, break loose from the whole and strive after the invariable independence and security of the person, are made to feel in the task laid on them their lord and master, death. Spirit, by thus throwing into the melting-pot the stable existence of those systems, checks their tendency to fall away from the ethical order, and to be submerged in natural existence; and it preserves and raises conscious self into freedom and its own power.44

This is Hegel at his most Creonic, returning family to the category nature, outside "the" ethical order, and vaunting the destruction of autonomies, even suggesting that the nullification of internal disparity is a proper purpose for rather than simply a happy by-product of war. For my purpose here, the most important point in this passage is the discovery of sublimation, of the way in which the war machine negates the separateness of the energies it then absorbs, the figuration of death not as termination but as preparation for the transformation of nonaligned affection into love for the cause. At the time of the drama, Creon lacks the intensity of war to sustain sublimation, but he has not forgotten death's force and he realizes that grief can be exploited too, by a certain way of defining the nature of peace. Creon apprehends that private grief, if it is encouraged to misapprehend that to which it is obligated, can be converted into a supply source, a longing to reconstitute the dead, to close quickly the mortal wounds of destroyed survivor selves rather than to have to go through the ungovernably prolonged time of remembering. To tap this longing, Creon insists that Eteocles did not die in the pursuit of his own interest, but instead that he put civic virtue above his own life. This supposed gesture would
suggest two things: that Eteocles held his own singularity—that way of knowing him that the family had—to be inconsequential, not a crucial loss, and not in need of mourning; and that what Eteocles considered his essence—political loyalty—has not disappeared but remains in potentia, to be revived or resurrected in the Theban survivor’s deeds of emulation. Conversely, in Creon’s logic, Polynices’ traitorous selfishness left nothing to be emulated, but again nothing to mourn, because Eteocles’ heroism has expelled singularity from significance. Honoring Eteocles’ death means honoring it as statement, which means remembering Polynices as meat lying on the ground, the visible and offactory figuration of what is left over after honor sanctified by death has defined the canon of memorability. The genius of this rhetoric lies not primarily in its declaration that mourning is impertinent or blasphemous, but rather in its assurance that mourning is unnecessary, that solidarity with the postwar regime based on emulation of the virtues Creon stipulates can obviate the night of incoherence. A brief interlude of sorrow, then group renewal: would that it were so. Mourning is thus not simply discouraged, but instead discouraged from following an intrinsic unfolding so that it might be diverted into the state’s bank account. Hegel’s historic-teo-logical inclination sees this sublimation of grieving as an instance of aufheben, the cancellation of a crude formulation of spirit necessary to lift it into higher form, and at those points where Hegel’s ventri-loquiation of Creon tends toward plain identification, as in the passage celebrating the social therapy conferred by war, political rectitude emerges as a refinement of grieving. But, insofar as there is an element of Hegel that is also Antigone, Creon’s appropriation seems at other moments less a refinement than a repressive sublimation.

A repressive sublimation that fails. Rather than controlling Antigone, Hegel contends, Creon drives her to articulate explicitly the implicit tenets of her devotion, to become directly political: her grief for Eteocles does not emerge into the domain of dramatic representation because it is not challenged by Creon (although it would not be the same as Creon’s heroization of Eteocles), and her grief for Polynices goes public only because its most elementary right to be has been insulted. Exemplification per se does not incite her resistance, but rather a demand that exemplification be the sole order of memory: had the burial of Polynices been permitted, had private emotion met with the tolerant nonintervention of public respect rather than the predatory intrusion of public preemption, Antigone might have contended herself with a milder disdain or indifference for the legend and its “violence of human caprice.” However, her hand forced by Creon’s exploitive jealousy (thou shalt have no other memory before mine), Antigone’s disdain or indifference becomes explicit rebellion and critique based on an open defense of the law that binds her; and the fact that she does not oppose exemplification per se (an opposition that is in any case theoretically impossible) becomes clear in her willingness to become an example of one who heeds the obligation, to become the small voice that reveals the despot. It is this willingness to become an example for which we remember her, though Ismene would in turn have to go past the contemplation of her sister as an example of fidelity to mourning if she were to heed Antigone’s lesson in mourning for her, to remember a complexity in which her sister’s noble commitment was embedded as a vibrant participant. But whatever Ismene will have to do, not only after the dramatic action of this play but also outside of the public space that is the Greek drama’s site, this familial obligation is not our obligation because we are witnesses not to Antigone’s excruciating reversion but to her forced exit from the practice of mourning into the defense of mourning, from private reflection into public statement, a transition that implies an interruption of her mourning but not a violation of its principles: she is not our sister but an example of sisterliness, a role she chooses, and can choose without contradicting herself because mourning opposes not political exemplarity in itself, but rather the attempt to extend it into a nonnomnmonic supremacy.

Left to itself, mourning may therefore seem apolitical or even passive, content to pursue its course and let Creon have his way. But that which is not directly political is not necessarily without political consequence: if mourning does not of itself challenge Creon but does its private business, it nonetheless maintains a reservoir of preserved human fact upon which counter exemplifications such as folk legends can draw where there might otherwise be only the newspeak of the ruling party’s legend. Though not subordinate to antithetical ideologies (vilifications of Eteocles/heroizations of Polynices), and perhaps even discordant with them in turn should they aspire to Creonic supremacism, the material that Antigone is striving to remember would be an element in the heterogeneous and nonsynchronized collective archive that is an ineluctable precondition for antithetical formations competent to break through the smooth surface of what has been constructed as the true.

Such an eventual politicization of the legacy of mourning is not, however, at issue in Antigone, because Creon’s encroachment on the obligation provokes immediate and direct politicization, Antigone’s defense of mourning rather than her own or someone else’s subsequent use of mourning’s result in service to a new definition of political virtue. Needing mourning’s energy and learing its perhaps distant consequences, Creon assaults it directly, but, according to Hegel, thereby precipitates what otherwise only might have been, an enemy whose cogency opposes him on the public stage: “The community, however, can only maintain itself by suppressing this spirit of individualism, and because [mournfulness] is an essential moment, all the same creates it, and moreover, creates it by its repressive attitude toward it as a hostile principle”; “[Creon’s] action is itself this splitting into two, [his] explicit self-affirmation and the
establishing over against itself of an alien external reality; that there is such a reality, this stems from the action itself and results from it." Hegel does not mean that without the repression there would be no repressed, as a certain contemporary cultural solipsism operating in the wake of Foucault would have it, but that without the repression mourning would not emerge directly as an antithetical player on the stage, as a reality alien and external to government.

As a vehement antithesis brought into being by Creon’s jealousy, therefore, Antigone’s defense of mourning poses crucial problems for the Hegelian system. The prewar harmony, according to Hegel, was ethically heterogeneous: it depended on inner disparities remaining latent or demotic, in the form of both and rather than either/or. Reconstruction after the war, however, brings disparity into view by contrast with the unity forged during wartime and thereby instigates the work of history’s mediating unifications, which will replace harmony on a higher level. But the events of the play—which constrain Hegel precisely because he knows that he feels himself responding to them strongly—lead to questions about the inevitability of seeing disparity as contradiction rather than as what Paul Zweig calls “a broad miscellaneous esthetic”. Creon forces disparity into contradiction in pursuit of his desire to preside over a unity with nothing outside itself. Thus the contradiction that seems to call for the arrival of social unification turns out to have been precipitated by the desire for social unification, a monomaniac induction that seriously compromises Hegel’s assertion of the necessity and inevitability of the progression. Creon produces conditions he calls crisis and then uses them as a mandate, the violence of desirous power making a wreckage then said to be acute enough to demand submission to its initial plan, a ploy that suggests that it might have been otherwise. The harmony of ethical heterogeneity is not intrinsically or dialectically flawed, not in itself in need of remedial supplementation from above, only vulnerable to the insurgent and intransigent exclusivism of one of its members, the semiosis of the legend. The social heterogeneity of prewar Thebes, therefore, does not fail due to some inadequate theorization that calls for transcendental reformulation, but rather is only destroyed.

But not, for Hegel, destroyed without a trace. Creon creates his articulate political adversary and, burying her in the silence of earth, creates then a mute insistance, melancholia, an interminable, demonized, and meanful grieving. When the avenues of exit from grief and reentry to life seem all to have been so clogged or polluted by political interest that there is no therapeutic path not complicit in the cause, grief remains immobile and poisonous, an infinite subverting rumination, and an infinite contagion. Seeking to stifle Antigone’s grieving, Creon creates Haemon’s grief by preventing the marriage, then doubles Haemon’s grief when Antigone kills herself, then creates not only his own but also his wife’s grief when Haemon kills himself, then doubles his own grief when Eurydice kills herself—though “doubling” can only be a figure here, given the incommensurabilities that loom over grief. The steps of nemesis come in his direction without fail; he is left with his hands full of exempla—refinements of life, according to his own logic—but little else. Now in the tragic anagnorisis Creon recognizes the power of the ancient law of which Antigone attempted to inform him, too late for him as a person, as a member of a family, concepts with little meaning in the system he has successfully promoted to dominance. Whatever recognition Creon may reach at this moment has little meaning for Hegel besides a slight tone of pathos, because this recognition cannot presage a restoration of the order that was. History must press forward to discovery, so nemesis is not the avatar of revival but instead a haunting, a miasmatic medium in which designs result in their opposites and all is confused. By burying Antigone, Creon exiles the inevitable obligation she stands for from the city, even from the surface of the earth, commits it (he hopes) to oblivion, to a deep and unbreachable privatization and exclusion from public discourse that will leave exemplification as the sole standing order of remembrance. But Antigone is buried alive, which for Hegel means that Creon cannot eliminate an Antigone effect from the polis, only transform that effect from a dialogical ethical contestant into a mute virulent contagion that haunts public logic without respite or relief. Now he understands what mourning was, but too late, because it is that no longer, because he has transformed it into an area of sullen darkness impenetrable by and unresponsive to any ethical lucidity. Rather than dialogue between his project and another, there is now only his project and a purely destructive and relentless force of adulterating resistance, irony:

Since the community only gets an existence through its interference with the happiness of the Family and by dissolving [individual] self-consciousness into the universal, it creates for itself in what it suppresses and what is at the same time essential to it an internal enemy—womankind in general. Womankind, the everlasting irony [in the life of the community]—changes by intrigue the universal end of government into a private end, transforms its universal activity into the work of some particular individual, and perverts the universal property of the state into a possession and ornament of the family.

Hegel’s essentializing equation [mourning = ironic perversity = nature = woman] is not at this point in his argument necessarily a retraction of his earlier view of mourning as a human and ethical act because the equation of woman with mourning with irrationality is Creon’s creation, the result of his violence, a demonization of womankind rather than their phenomenologically original condition. Once it is posited that the community can exist only by interfering with the family, that a community that is not universal and totalized
is not a community at all, then any perception of individuals as anything other than the state’s universal property will necessarily seem selfish, cloven, frivolous, and perverted; as with the American Puritans, anything even simply alongside the errand is a force of declension. With the ascendency of such reasoning to full power at the end of Hegel’s Antigone, all who spoke for mourning are gone, so the undone work manifests itself only as the sociosemiological terror of vindictive deformation, odd slants of black light that introduce unaccountable fractures into meaning but no longer issue from a discernible ethical source.

But, though the passage is not a contradiction of earlier statements when it calls mourning and women nature, its tone does turn toward Creon, in its decision not to mention the etiology of deformation, and in its misogynist horrification. Whatever one Hegel thought about the ethics of mourning and its demonization is here usurped by what another Hegel considers necessary in order to move on with the historical mission of the universal community that Creon has initiated, an eagerness that mandates a repression of the knowledge of repression, a hiding of evidence to make even the dead seem to have been satisfied and to have grown irritated with the petty intrusiveness of women. To be sure, this second Hegel promises that there will be a moral state that accounts for or makes reparation to the ironic underground, that sublimates without ironic residue: but insofar as the reader is asked to wait patiently, insofar as a reunion between Antigone’s vehement ghost and a Creon enhanced and edified by his progression through history is not yet, the resentment of melancholia is presently unappeased, and all the second Hegel can do is perform uncomfortable closures that fail to satisfy precisely because they transcend by a force of anxious denial rather than by the sovereign competence of Aufhebung, failing to appease a remainder that Hegel has himself brought forward. Hegel’s suppression of his own insight into the ethics of mourning therefore jars with the putatively dispassionate contemplation of history’s tribulations that he claims for himself in the preface to the Phenomenology: “The individual whose substance is the more advanced Spirit runs through this past just as one who takes up a higher science goes through the preparatory studies he has long since absorbed, in order to bring their content to mind: he recalls them to the inward mind, but has no lasting interest in them.” 31 When Hegel returns to Antigone in The Philosophy of Right, his conflict will have been almost entirely remedied by a scrupulous avoidance of the topic of mourning. 32

Hegel’s reading of Antigone is not an exegesis for its own sake, but rather an employment of the play as an allegorical premonition of his own historical situation as he understood it, so the issue of fidelity to the text is not for him of primary concern. Consequently, though he does make some rather striking exegetical discoveries, he also interpolates meanings that are not Sophocles’,

most importantly, the view of Creon as functionary heeding the logic of a representational system rather than as an anxious despot seeking self-aggrandizement (though the two are not completely incompatible), and the emphasis on Creon’s drive to sublimate rather than simply oppose Antigone and her mournfulness. These two innovations tend to divinize the state and thus to downplay Sophocles’ contrast between the sacredness of mourning and political expediency in favor of an opposition between two orders of sacralization. These departures from Sophocles are precisely what makes Hegel’s Antigone useful here, as a Protestant political view closer to the relation between American Puritanism and Rowlandson’s narrative than the original would be. Hegel’s Antigone provides a framework for viewing the tension between, on the one hand, a precarious and anxious political culture seeking legitimation through the promotion of a canon of exemplary human types evolving through history, a political culture that in the wake of King Philip’s War takes the residual sorrow and fright to be an occasion for a still fuller consolidation of its prestige, and on the other hand Rowlandson’s emergent insistence on the propriety of the work of mourning, an insistence that is prodded toward becoming an at least partial or implicit refusal of that culture. The connection I propose is neither between Sophocles and Rowlandson nor between Antigone and Rowlandson, but between Hegel and Rowlandson, not Hegel in toto, but the Hegel of the Antigone reading, a Hegel who is an experience of both the allure of exemplarism and the violence with which it confronts mourning—the Hegel who in his writing lives out the knot of divided loyalty, suppression, seductive sublimation, resistance, and coercive closure. This Hegel throws into visibility both the satisfaction and the price of American Puritanism, of a regime that attempts to purge itself of all appearance of self-interest, an austere Protestant Creon whose public persona is servant to a collective cause, a cause—the convergence of the City of God and the City of Man rather than the maintenance of order in one city among others, an ontopatriotism—that would drastically intensify the pressure to see noncompliant nonexemplarism as an outbreak of a purely incoherent underground rather than as an alternate formulation of the nature of the good.

Energized by the desire to believe themselves to be on the verge of such a culmination of history, exhilarated by the patently binaristic difference they saw between their towns and the terrain, the American Puritans produced a discourse that is remarkable first for its volume and second for its coherent general commitment to establishing and elaborating a system of exemplaristic representation. The amount of writing produced is astonishing, given the size of the population and the urgencies and dangers of establishing the New England colonies’ physical and social infrastructures. Not all of the colonial writers’ œuvres complètes have the girth of Cotton Mather’s four-hundred-item bibliography, and not all of their publications have the length of his unpublished
mean that the 'real facts' become means to a higher end, a vehicle for laying bare the soul—or more accurately, the essential landmarks in the soul's journey to God.”

Exemplification, then, was Puritanism's focal project (rather than simply an ingrained way of seeing), pervading not only the consortium of the intelligentsia but even the lower social levels, and concerning itself with the moral significance of activities from the most vast, such as war, to the most trivial. Exemplification is a collective scrutiny of the whole of collective experience, a group work that staves off and regulates the anomalies of the real, strenuously lifting the bewildermments and dissonances of actual historicity toward the certitude of readily recognizable abstractions that clarified at the same time that they coerced and legitimated—that were able to legitimate precisely because they could deliver the boon of clarity. Though legislators and magistrates often complied with ministerial wishes, especially during the first half century, Puritanism in the main pursued social power not through the development of explicit and direct legal means for enforcing piety (a technique that had not worked on them in England, and that they therefore viewed as a measure of last resort), but through the deployment of a capacious way of thinking. They devised an ideological rather than a primarily bureaucratic theocracy, in which power could seem impersonal and immanent, rather than external, coercive, or brutal.

In order to describe Rowlandson's textual confrontation with the Puritan hermeneutic of exemplification, I will be assuming that for her Puritanism was essentially a single and coherent entity, a collective subjectivity speaking through different voices, but not really with different voices, an assumption (on her part or on mine) that runs contrary to the challenge of the idea of a collective American Puritanism that has come out of the history departments of American universities in recent years. According to T. H. Breen, historians of early America have for some time now disagreed with Perry Miller's notion that there was a New England Mind, pointing to significant disparities between diverse groups included under the rubric American Puritanism. Their point is that a close look reveals seventeenth-century New England to be a plurality of minds, rather than a Mind. A close look, for example at the ordinary life of late-17th century Salem Village, will always tend to uncover specificities and differences, the trees one has not been able to see for having looked too long at the forest. But the close look does not refute the existence of general coherences at a more abstract level, because a general idea necessarily takes on particular and hybrid forms in its local realization—especially in the case of a society such as New England where abstract unity is pursued through a deliberate and explicit social hermeneutic, rather than simply being present by virtue of a pervasive general mentality. There is a certain intellectual gain in taking on Miller's holism with its heroization of uniformitarianism, but to dispel the idea of a
meaningful abstract coherence, his critics would have to demonstrate two things:
first, that the disparities that they discover are not differences within a field of
possibility that for Miller was the New England Mind; and second, that the
disparities were not arguments over how to apply certain consensually assumed
programs—for instance, whether American Indian culture was to be erased by
war or by Christian education—however much the participants may have so
taken consensual assumptions for granted as not to mention them, or however
much they may have lost sight of unchallenged consensual assumptions during
the heat of controversy and in the peculiar federations that actual politics
produce. The movement away from Miller, which Bercovitch calls “a patricidal
totem feast,” where “a swarm of social and literary historians rushed to pick
apart the corpus of his work,” enables a fuller historical knowledge, but,
insofar as a heuristic concentration on the specific becomes a theoretical state-
ment that the abstract is only an imaginative or retrospective imposition on
historical reality, it forecloses other knowledge—the astonishing labor expended
creating and maintaining coherence around certain axioms, and the success of
that labor, across social strata, spanning distances with tenuous communica-
tion networks bearing quite intricate and sophisticated ideological messages,
reaching forward historically to the point where it is revealing to use, say, John
Cotton’s writing to contextualize Emily Dickinson’s explorations of the quan-
daries with which her society surrounded her. Those who challenge the idea of
an American Puritanism should consider Bercovitch’s distinction: “By organic I
do not mean monolithic. Recent demographic work has demonstrated both the
diversity of American social patterns and the overlays, even in colonial New
England, of various Old World forms. I see no conflict whatever between their
conclusions and my own. My argument concerns an ideological consensus—
not a quantitatively measured “social reality” but a series of (equally ‘real’) rituals
of socialization, and a comprehensive, officially endorsed cultural myth
that became entrenched in New England and subsequently spread across the
western territories and the South.” Only by treating the abstract entity American
Puritanism alongside the inflections performed by particular persons,
groups, and circumstances and the hybridizations included by other cultural
infusions (such as those of Tituba in Salem Village) can the historically real be
grasped in its complexity; if American Puritanism does not emerge in its pure
form in its specific manifestations, neither are those manifestations fully intel-
ligible without some description of the “webs of significance” that interlink
them, producing an “astonishing cultural hegemony,” the “tremendous vitality
of the colonial church-state, from Winthrop’s political achievements to Cotton
Mather’s gargantuan literary productiveness.”

With Bercovitch I agree that American Puritanism was not a mystically
uniform sensibility but a collective project and a largely accomplished feat—at
least, this is the form in which it appears to writers from Rowlandson and
Bradstreet through Dickinson and even to Gaddis and Pynchon, where it pre-
seats itself directly, as voice or subject abstracted from the intrinsic singularity
of the persons who bear its message, like its god immanent without ever being
deeply local, a pervasive, elusive, impersonal, sustaining, intrusive, and crushing
intelligence. Its real political achievement lent credibility to the cosmologi-
ical axiom, a credibility that could then be reinvested for the dividend of further
social legitimation. For each such writer, personal experience is represented as a
concrete experience of abstraction. Rowlandson’s violent and unchoked experi-
ence of radical cultural dislocation and transposition, for instance, would
have enhanced her vision of Puritanism as a whole, and diminished her sense of
the significance of, say, the difference between the two parties in the argument
over the Halfway Covenant; and it may often be that the alienated experience of
those who are marginalized—those who are least integrated into the whole—is
proportionately more likely to lead to a view of the whole as such. Those who
were least symptomatic of the New England Mind as Miller saw it may therefore
be most inclined toward understanding the New England Mind as Bercovitch
sees it; and those who see only the richness of variations and modula-
tions rather than the enclosing consensual entity may fail to apprehend that
entity’s distinct political impact on lives. If, as Dickinson remarked in several
poems, the historian of the ordinary must gaze through specificity to overarch-
ing cultural intentions in order to apprehend the concrete effect of those inten-
tions on the lives of persons, then a historicism that derides theoretical attempts
to describe the large formations that contribute to the determination of social
phenomena will have the not really paradoxical effect of swerving away from
an extensive description of the multiformity of actual experience.

Much of the success of the American Puritan synthesis derives from the
versatile rhetorical structure of its major ideological tool, exemplification: by
negating the specific significances of its objects in order to absorb them in
transsumptive representation, exemplification deracinated consciousness from
immediate daily involvements—from the pressure to be of the world rather than
simply in it—and readied consciousness for allegiance to transcendental com-
mittments without requiring consciousness to forego attention to the daily in
favor of a mysticism or monasticism; by challenging the “forgetfulness” of
nonaligned involvement in what was at hand, exemplification provoked a cen-
tripetal “remembrance” of the cause that extended itself into the farthest-flung
crannies of actual social life. Exemplification was not only, however, Puritan-
ism’s implicit means of representation: it was also a constant object of repre-
sentation, symbolized by/as death, which was discursively constructed in such a
way as to signify the cancellation of potentially confusing or diversionary
aspects of the dead person’s individuality in order to reveal his standing with
respected to the absolute, his status as example, whether pious or abominable, his instantiation of type. Death clarified: for Puritanism as for Hegel, the “absolute lord and master” was not an enemy to humanity but rather an ally to the state's ideology, being both an analogy for and an aid to properly oriented meditative remembrance, which nullifies appearance in order to distill truth. Such an appropriate symbolization is of course endemic to all religious exercises operating under the signs of the cross and the broken seal of the tomb, but American Puritanism’s peculiar inflection lies in two factors. First, the magnitude of the American Puritans’ experience of deprivation—the loss of agrarian stabilities due to mercantile urbanization, then the loss of financial stability due to market fluctuation during the early decades of the seventeenth century, the general loss of what was perceived to be British social coherence, the loss of congregational peace due to the Laudian persecutions, then the loss of England itself, then epidemics, the grinding adversity of wilderness life, a minimally developed infrastructure, repeated relocation, war, dispersion, and the pervasive eeriness of the New World—constituted a ubiquitous and incessant cross. Second, American Puritanism developed a coherent ideological machine that, recognizing the sheer volume of griefing affect, discouraged mournful representation outside or alongside officially sanctioned exemplarism, and that insisted that demise not only be accepted gracefully but also introjected as a constant anti-affective bearing toward life—a ubiquitous breaking of the seal on the tomb.

The essence of “practical piety,” according to Cotton Mather, was to “die daily.” Self-disciplinary meditation, the Puritan’s constant obligation, would be a form of self-killing, not a suicidal termination of consciousness, but a surveillance and detection aimed at identifying and eradicating episodes of the self, the Puritan word for the amalgam of inclinations that went contrary to, or even merely did not participate in, the practice of virtue, nonparticipation being, if not vice, a standing invitation to it. Mather’s defense of self-mortifying meditation would not let one rest with the hope of having turned out to have been exemplary at the end, in the eyes of God or of those saddened mourners who remain after. Rather, one must produce and maintain his own exemplarity, extirpating not only sin but the apostasy of any singularity that was more than superficial or ornamental, of anything that would jar with or blur the project of becoming a living emblem. Were this accomplished, one would be in essence a perfect duplicate of others renowned for achievement: like Puritan biography, Puritan identity is rigorously generic. One would of course differ in the extrinsic traits collected under the term particular calling, the talents one used as the vehicle or body for practical and expressive devotion—some were made to govern, some to preach, and so on in a divinely articulated social body; and, as Bercovitch contends in The Puritan Origins of the American Self, one could aspire to differ from predecessors by being a still-purer specimen of virtue, less encumbered by involvements with the distractions of particular identity, closer to a consummate disclosure of his tenor. But, again, one’s central luminosity would not, strictly speaking, be his own, but instead a generic trait, and his particular noteworthiness would lie in eliminating any traits that rendered him significantly disparate from others who broadcast the same light. At the end, of course, one would turn out to have been exemplary no matter what, because those who fail to exemplify luminosity will be revealed as having been specimens of darkness, examples of nonexemplarity, worthy of being remembered as worthy of being forgotten, like Polyneices in Creon’s eyes. Properly speaking, therefore, singularity did not exist save as an illusion to be dispelled by death’s firm hand, whether throughout life by means of meditation or by default at the final clarification.

But illusion was for the Puritans potent, and its extinction was not to be awaited passively but instead vigorously pursued: the fact of a person’s death prompted a search for his or her meaning, but it did not necessarily ensure a correct discovery of that meaning. Actual physical death encouraged but did not guarantee the passage to exemplary lucidity, so genericity had to be combative, intensively so in the affective zone surrounding the gravesite, in order that the profoundest opportunity in the career of the type would not be blown, the afflicted participants wandering off into pointless ruminations that only diverted funds from the collective account. The zone of the grave was Puritanism’s area both of greatest bonanza and of greatest risk, a circle of human ground needing to be mapped and developed with the most sophisticated care to ensure that actual deaths became aids to composition, first by a waiver of close attention to the dead person’s illusory singularities in favor of a measuring appraisal of where he or she stood with respect to the types of virtue and vice, and then by a call for those who survived to duplicate his or her achievement (or shun it, if the result of the moral calculus was bad). Death, that is, was not to be perceived as loss, as the human world’s hemorrhage, but rather as transpositional or liminal event, the moment of the tenor’s molting, when the type was suddenly no longer shadowy and the soul returned to its light or dark. Brief and constrained sorrow in response, a sensation of increased obligation, return to practice.

Hence perhaps the meagerness or even nonexistence of burial rituals during the first half century of American Puritan civilization. Doctrinally, this seeming indifference can be explained as a Puritan opposition to nonscriptural ceremony, like the relegation of marriage to civil procedure or like the antipathy to Christmas. However, the specific hostility to mournfulness is sufficiently intense to suggest that there is more than doctrinal fastidiousness at work here, that the group experience of the dead body—the bolt of trauma that commences what grieving has to do—was discouraged because it was an obstacle to
the carefully directed transference of affection from the person to the mandated representation of person. The omission of burial ceremony relegates grief, to the status of insufficient reaction, but also, insofar as grief might entrench itself as an adamant attitude, represents grief as a blasphemous competitor to piety, a selfish insistence on affection that retards death's proper effect, the proliferation of clear truth; or, expressed from a non-Puritan perspective, that reserves or incarcerates energy that might otherwise lead to flow into the coffers of ideological fortification. This tension between improper and proper flow can be illustrated by the difference between Thomas Shepard's diary reflection on his wife's death, where only the most resolute and stalwart denial puts a halter on the sharpness of broken love become fury and weeping, and Edward Johnson's account of the death of Isaac Johnson, where the flow of tears becomes the flow of people to the south side of the river, to build Charlestown, a deed that preserves Isaac Johnson, that realizes what Edward Johnson's elegy promises: "Johnson's turned dust, and yet hee's crown'd and strengthen'd."62 The differences between love for a wife and love for a leader and between diary and historical narrative of course account for the difference of tone between Shepard and Johnson in these selections, but my point is that this difference of tone illustrates the range between grief itself and the sublimation of grief. Johnson is an intensely feeling writer, but the feeling he expresses in the publicity of his writing flows in a sanctioned channel, something Shepard is laboring to find precisely because he apprehends the danger in what grips him, laboring to compel the vortex to be a stream. Restricting the survivor's encounter with the implacable sight of the corpse would help with such a labor, and the more elaborate burial ceremonies that arise in late century, at which the survivor distributed rather expensive gifts to the participants, might be less the abrupt reversal they appear to be than a different strategy for securing the same end, because the survivor's self-signification as geyer would also tend to repress the contemplation of the crator called the coffin. The practice of munificence exorcises the suspicion of poverty.

Allan I. Ludwig and David H. Watters observe that Puritan culture, commonly thought to be relentlessly opposed to the image, permitted itself a great exception in the rich visuality expressed on its gravestones. Watters contends that the Puritan hostility to sensory mediation between the earthly and the divine was not so thoroughgoing as has been believed, a point echoed in Ann Kibby's contention that Puritan iconoclasm was directed not against images per se but against the possibility of the sensory becoming interesting in itself, rather than beyond itself in its meaning: the regulation of contemplation rather than the destruction of art became the essential task. If, as Watters contends, the hostility of the British Protestants toward the power of images to mislead was expressed figuratively as a diatribe against erotic promiscuity, the opposite term

for the American Puritans came to be marriage, not the celibacy that would be suggested by Perry Miller's insistence on the Puritans' thorough negativism. And, if the major difficulty in permitting images lay in the ease with which they could subside into the false, funerary art would promote a relatively more secure kind of looking, because the decay of the human body beneath the aesthetic figure would render an infatuation with the sensible less likely. By physical necessity a kind of literally self-consuming artifact, the significative unit of grave-and-stone had the highest chance of escaping the entropy that threatened all images, the tendency of mediation between the low and the high to become a reduction of the high to the low. But for the mourner the low is not yet nothing, it is still present though in the mode of the uncanny. As a result, mourning could instigate a collapse of meaning, so stone figures of abundance—fruit, cherubs, pendulous breasts, their stillness emphasizing the figurality of their sensuousness—were accompanied by neomedieval images of the chancel zero below and by explicitly stylized (deindividualized) representations of him or her who is dead. (Only with the commencement of sentimentalism in the eighteenth century would the stone portraits of the dead begin to heed a mimesis of the specific person.) Recognizing that there are two orders of remembering, mourning and exemplarism, the art of the gravestone is enlisted to demonstrate the vacancy and shamefulness of the former, and then to carry its vigor to the latter.

This manipulation of mourning is more clear in the funeral sermon because the sermon is a verbal medium. According to Watters, stone markers became common only during the 1670s, a phenomenon he attributes to the deaths of the members of the first generation, to the deaths in King Philip's War, to the political incursions of the refurbished monarchy, and to what was perceived to be a general subsiding of piety—the second two of which were taken to be symptoms of a loss of control that might be reversed by an artful appropriation of the first two. Ronald Bosco and Harry S. Stout see the funeral sermon proliferating during the same period, along with more opulent burial practices, and, though Bosco sees this as a "liberalization" because it pays more attention to death than had the earlier terseness, I am inclined to agree with Stout's judgment that the growing discursive figuration of death during this period—the period of Bowlandson's captivity—had more to do with using the emotional valence of death to aid in fortifying the imperiled charisma of the old way.

To commemorate the faith of New England's first native-born generation, ministers began giving funeral sermons, which had as their overriding theme the enduring piety of the deceased. In the 1690s, examples of this genre constituted the most numerous printed sermons in New England. Like the printed final sermons of the
founders, funeral sermons used death to underscore the passage of generations and the covenant's continuity. Above all, they urged the rising generation to remember their predecessors and imitate their piety.64

The new loquacity in the dead zone, then, was not primarily a solicitous address to the condition of the mourner, but rather a deeper development of a neglected resource: if piety was growing scarce, death was abundant at the end of the war; in time of crisis, a frugality arises, an unwillingness to leave veins unmined, especially if those veins are so rich as to invite competitive development. A culture that speaks at length about grief is not necessarily less oppressive than one that keeps silent, though what it promises, a sufficient culmination for grieving, can make it an alluring oppression.

The technique of the Protestant funeral sermon is plainly and decisively outlined in The Practice of Preaching by Andreas Hyperius, "Englished" and printed in London in 1577.65 Hyperius divides the sermon into its major genres and lists the "places" and rhetorical attitudes appropriate to each: the minister will never be at a loss in responding to his congregation's recurring experiences "according to the capacite of the vulgar people," and the sermon will be a member of a genre by virtue of a deliberate replication of a model. As one reads through Hyperius' manual, it becomes clear that the imitation of generic models is not simply a convenience for overworked or uninspired preachers because the task of the sermon is to reduce the angularity of experience down to the contour of timeless proprieties: the formal regularity of the genre reflects and promotes the emotional resolutions the genre exists to create, reflects and promotes genres of experience. The task is perhaps most vigorously advanced in chapter 13, "Of the kind Consolatory, or Comfortative," which delineates the manner for addressing those vulgar who have suffered disaster. This sort of sermon, according to Hyperius, is "peculiarly ordeyned to the easeing and asswaging of sorrowe and grieue." To this end, he tells the preacher, you must show that you are not cold, that you know the feel or bite of loss:

Hee that is determined to comfort others, must of necessitie so frame himselfe in all things, that he make them believe that he is earenestly touched with the grieue of the common calamitie, & that he is in the meane time ready bent to confirme and establish the minde of others. I know not how it commeth to passe, he talketh a good deale better to our contentation, whom we perceve to be endued with the lyke affection, that we are endued withall.

A pragmatist rather than a theorist, Hyperius does not look into why things work, but instead tells you what does work; your task is not primarily to feel, but to make them believe that you feel, because the echo they hear will bring emotion out of privacy, into the public circle of a congregational community at worship. Privacy, then, is this rhetoric's enemy (but a privacy Hyperius construes as feeling and reflection that lie outside the congregational circle, rather than outside society and discourse as such).

Once such access to grieving is gained, the emotions made available should be discouraged, rather than allowed to follow their native course. To this end, try shame: "It becommeth men chiefly to imbrace all manhood and prowessse, but especially constancye." Constancy, therefore, is not mourning, fidelity to the memory of love, but adamantly adherence to norms of conduct even in arduous times: "All [that] be of a sound judgement, doe think it very uncomly and womannishe to lament without measure, & to take so impatiently the chaunce that happeneth." A manly constancy or Christian stoicism measures grief, that is, confines or delimits grief to a defined interval and a well-bounded area in the terrain of resolve, and the act of delimiting implies the capacity to do so, which in turn implies a transcendent consciousness that looks down on grief as object, rather than allows it to be the tone of subjectivity, by relegating destruction to its abstract category, vicissitude, "the chaunce that happeneth." If mourning aims eventually at competence to measure the loss, constancy aims immediately to measure mourning, and this ability to measure mourning, rather than the simple absence of mourning, constitutes manliness. In fact, the emotions assigned to the demarcated zone must be in the first place if grieving is to be in public, and so to be of use. But Pandora's Protestant teacher (or her Maxwell's demon) must supervise the opening of the area strictly if he is to prevent the flood that covers the land and renders the map pointless. The most famous practitioner of such surveillance is perhaps Claudius:

'Tis sweet and commendable in your nature, Hamlet,
To give these mourning duties to your father,
But you must know that your father lost a father,
That father lost, lost his, and the survivor bound
In filial obligation for some term
To do obsequious sorrow. But to persever
In obstinate condeloment is a course
Of impious stubbornness. 'Tis unmanly grief.
It shows a will most incorrect to heaven,
A heart unfortified, a mind impatient,
An understanding simple and unschooled.

(1.2. 87–97)

Claudius' fear at this point may be less that Hamlet will uncover the crime than that he will sequester affections that might otherwise be invested in the fledgling regime: "think of us as of a father . . ."
Such a fear would be well placed, because grief may reply to the attempt to shame it by contending that the mandated term is a "wicked speed," an infidelity rather than a constancy: "a beast that wants discourse of reason would have mourned longer . . . " (I.2. 150–52). Accordingly, Hyperius' strategy is not limited to shaming. He also recommends an appeal to self-interest, to the easing of misery that comes with relinquishing grief: "What profiteth it thee to lye tumbling in deformeity, to wast and consume thy selfe with sorrowe? Thou art grievous both to thee and thine, thou diseasest both thy body and minde in vaine." Remind them that grief is not a single sorrow but a self-renewing string of fresh mortalities: "Of the easiness. Thou so oft procurest to thy selfe a freshe newe heaviness, as oft as thou procedest to bewaye thy case." Hyperius is an acute analyst of grief—knowledge of the enemy must be precise if practical edification is to succeed.

Having publicized the emotion, then discouraged its freedom by appeals to decency and comfort, you must then provide specific instructions on meditations upon the image of the enemy that is to svgd into sanctity. First, encourage them to view their grief typologically—-as a modern example of a historically repeating pattern: the application of biblical commonplaces "shall most conveniently bee done, by comparinge the things that have happened unto us, with those that in times past befell unto the Jewes." The immediate advantage of this is that it will introduce abatement into grief by making it into something looked at rather than a way of looking, an object of rather than a manner of contemplation. Not all biblical lamentations are as restrained asHyperius might like, however, so he specifies the pertinent predecessors, the example of Christ, "a Captaine to be followed in humbleness, mortification, &c.," and the examples of "holy men, whose wonderfull patience hath appeard, but yet more marvelous seemed their deliverance accomplished by the power and goodness of God." The preliminary emancipation afforded by contemplation, which reduces loss to the status of that which happens to the saintly, is properly followed by a disciplinary suppression of grief: tell them to do what was done by those who had experiences like theirs. Typological meditation, therefore, repeats the pattern of opening for-appropriation you have established with your sympathy: as your profession of fellow feeling brings grief into the public light, where it is rendered available to the norms of restraint you promote, so identification with the afflictions of predecessors can be converted to emulation of those predecessors' responses to affliction—the discovery of similarity can become the construction of similarity. In both cases, preliminary relief provides the incentive for subsequent acquiescence if the acquiescence can be made to seem a continuation of rather than a disparate successor to the relief.

In the process, you associate your own normative pronouncements with the prestige of the scriptural tradition. This enhancement of your own power will also follow from a second meditative technique, rumination on what sins caused the affliction. You must be cautious in such blame laying:

If we take upon us at any time to render and declare, any causes, proceeding either of the providence, or of the justice of G O D or of any other occasion, for which God scourgeth and punisheth us, we must not be over bold in judging and determining of them, neither must we alledge any, except such as the holy Scripture without any ambiguities hath set forth, as general and correspondent to the state of our times.

You may fortify your own authority by claiming to know God's motives in visiting them with affliction, but walk carefully here, make sure that the convergence between specific case and general type is easily credible, because otherwise you may seem to have strayed into pride, into inventing additions to Scripture, in which case your words will lose the charisma of impersonal transmission, and invite refusal or contest on ethical or moral grounds. As with the attempt to instill shame for excessive grief, the attempt to instill a sense of guilt for having brought on the cause of the grief confronts an Antigone, an alternate formulation of goodness always on the verge of discovering itself, risks losing the rhetorical advantage of representing the other as a chaos to the emergence of a dialogue. Despite such risk, though, the technique of blame is worth promoting because it promises the mourner a measure of control and thus relieves the sensation of helplessness in the face of devastation: however much he may not wish to take the blame for his own misery, he will nonetheless welcome the assertion that, had he had the knowledge you have, he might have avoided the present catastrophe; and that, acquiring the knowledge you have to confer, he can prevent the sequel. Though the bite of loss is not reduced by such contemplation, remorse reduces the sensation of utter victimage—-unless you overdo it, convincing him that his sin is so intrinsic to his being as to render future catastrophes endless and inevitable: "It is lawful sometimes to acknowledge the sorrow or grief to be justly inflicted, yet must wee in any wise take heed, least in acknowledging it occasion been given, that it take increasement, and become unmeasurable." Having brought him out of "womanish" intemperance, you may lead him to that demon again if you induce despair, an anticipation of infinite affliction, and a conviction that all means of remedy are futile. Grief is a wily adversary: even if you overcome its gravitation toward speaking a contrary ethic, it can exploit your ethic by convincing the mourners that he is his sin, rather than that his sin is a flesh that consciousness can shed in the act of emulation. This is a great danger for a theology insistent on original sin, as Jonathan Edwards revealed in his accounts of the suicides (including his uncle's) that exploded in the first stages of awakening to a perception of per-
sonal apostasy, a danger that requires careful distinctions such as Willard made in the funeral sermon from which I quoted in the epigraph to this chapter: "It is true that there is none so holy as to live without sin, but there are some that are so pure, as to be undefiled in God's eye and esteem, Numb. 23. 21. God hath seen no iniquity in Jacob. Psal. 119. x. Blessed are the undefiled." Rowlandson's husband Joseph displayed a similar concern for warding off the sin of despair, for warding off melancholia that uses moral nomenclature, in what turned out to have been his final sermon, "The Possibility of Gods Forsaking a people." Having told the congregation that they deserve no more than to be cast into permanent misery, and having intimated that this outcome is likely, Rowlandson pivots at the last moment:

Let Gods dear ones take heed of concluding against themselves, that they are under this judgement. They are readiest to conclude against themselves, and yet really in the least danger. . . . God will not forsake them as he forsakes others not utterly forsake them: His forsaking of his is but temporary, and partial . . . . They retain good thoughts of him in his withdrawnment or absence [abeyance?]. As the Spouse in the Canticles, she calls him her beloved still.

One spouse come out from the jaws of temporary judgment, from an abeyance of decent ordinarieness that opened an abyss of pain, may have heard this blending of a promise of safety with a claim on wifely loyalty and responded with her own mixture of sentiments. She might also have suspected that, had her husband presented this reassurance in response to durable anxieties not of his making, his rhetoric would have been kindly, but that, insofar as the preceding part of his sermon had strenuously conjured the monsters, summoned them in the first place and ordered them to walk about the room, his goal was not to soothe but to maintain a measured fear that fueled allegiance to the values he promoted, a middle way between peace and the despair of those who know they will never be safe again.

Having reduced the specificity of loss with the category of saints’ afflictions, having made grief an object of imaginative representation, and having adumbrated a means of control, you should now promise that future compliance will bring not only safety but also more than adequate surrogates for what has been lost. You should assure them that the evils they suffer are “recompensed with other commodities”: “The Prophets doe in their consolations enterlace promises of divers things to come, of the coming of Christ, of deliverance by the same from spirituall tiranny and thraldome, and then of restoring the common-wealth of the Jewes, &c.” The promise of recompense is, however, a dangerous technique, as is the imputation of guilt, because if you promise specific or concrete remunerations that do not arrive, you will be rendered ludicrous:

In like maner, when we promise that certayne and assured remedy of deliveraunce will follow, we must never prescribe any one singular meane, whereby the same may be accomplished. And that truly for this cause, lest it fallet out otherwise, then we saye, we become laughing stockes: as wee know some, which coveting to be taken for Prophetes and Soothsayers, when they promised all things prosperous, and all things happened cleane contrary, were openly laughed to scorne for their labours, and truely in my judgement not unworthy.

Specification of recompense is here discouraged not primarily out of respect for the mystery of God’s ways, but rather because whatever short-term enhancement of prestige you may get from the euphoria that follows a promise is liable to be proportionately dissipated by eventual disappointments; the prudent preacher looks to an accumulation of prestige that is modest in the short term but more dependable over the extended course of time.

However, even if new happiness or pleasure did arrive, it would not necessarily be taken as recompense. In its meticulous and intense commitment to the singularity of the lost object of love, mourning is apt to refuse the entire notion of commensurability or equivalent replacement, of payment in kind, because there is nothing else of the lost object’s kind: the more exactly the contour and dimension of the crater are surveyed, the more likely it is that any new thing will seem at best a very crude fit—not that it will not be pleasurable or satisfying, but that it will not be a compensation, only a new thing, a point I take from Emily Dickinson:

To fill a Gap
Insert the Thing that caused it—
Block it up
With Other—and 'twill yawn the more—
You cannot solder an Abyss
With Air.  
(#546)

Aware of this mode of refusal, Hyperius does not propose that we remedy the problem of specific promises that fail to come true with vague promises of concrete happiness: eventually, some pleasant novelty is likely to (or at least may) arrive, an event you might be tempted to point at and say, see, this is it, but which the mourner may consider to be at best an attenuated echo of what is lost; at which point, you are once again in a position of dialogic contest rather than rhetorical dominance.

The solution is to make transcendental promises rather than vague concrete promises. Tell them that both the lost object and all subsequent objects are revealed as of a kind when they are viewed as emblems or adumbrations of
spiritual value. Like the emotion that explodes from its loss, the object should be made to subside into category: "As well those that teach as those that learn or heare, shall regard more the internall consolation and quiet, which is seted in the minde and conscience, then the externall and that which consisteth in corporal and earthly things." A Christian stoic decathexis that views corporal things as bodies or figures for transcendental meaning will view the specific differences among such things as inconsequential, as extrinsic and ornamental disparities apposite to an underlying sameness. From such a perspective, replacement becomes credible, as one commodity seen as a bearer of exchange value is a credible replacement for another seen in the same way so long as there is quantitative equivalence. Therefore, persuade them that both what is gone and what arrives in any future are best treated as occasions for edification through meditative contemplation, which rehabilitates is:

Albeit [internal consolation] may out of the prophets more perspicuously be perceived, which if at any time they entertaine (by way of comfort) promises touching corporall benefits, especially in the kingdom of the true Messiah our saviour Christ to be received, yet nevertheless will the selfe same to be understood only of things spyttyall and internall. For certes it is a familiar and as ye would saye a peculiar matter with them, to bring in and flourish over spyttyall things, under a certayne coollour or shadowe of thinges corporall, & that verily to the intent they might even by this means the more easily lifte up the rude minds of men from grose and earthly commodities, to the contemplation of heavenly and celestiall graces.

Death, then, is to be a lesson in the protocols of perception: it teaches that the gross is really a shadow, that the lost object is not in itself of note, an embodiment of value, but rather an accommodation (commodity) of a transcendental value, a luminescence, certainly, to the rude mind, but, from the highest perspective, a color laid over truth. In this association of figularity with funereality you will certainly have assaulted the prerogative of the grieving heart, but you will have installed a credible theory of compensation (credible once the axioms are accepted), and so provided an incentive to relinquish misery.

Hyperius' brilliance lies in his recognition that religion can successfully simulate what mourning would eventually have arrived at: an ability to survey the chaos of grieving emotion, rather than simply governed by it (typological emulatiom); a sensation of a measure of potential control (inquiry into cause); and a disengagement from fixation on the past and a receptivity to hope (compensation). Theology is a bargain because these things can be had without having "to lye tumbling in deformity, to wast and consume thy selfe with sorrow." But the semblance of bargain depends upon hiding a cost: the stark freedom that would be eventually achieved by the minute memorial solicitudes of mourning is here sought through a cultivated derision—for the singularity of what was loved, for the love itself, and for the emotions that broke out when the love was broken; and the derisive self that is constructed above the corpse of mourning is not a freed self, but one carefully bound to imposed specifications of proper self-image, proper means of seeking, and proper things to seek. If such phantasmal gratification leaves the work of mourning undone, even unbegun, this is perhaps the desired end, because the deranged and subterraneanized misery of grief is now constituted as a perpetual reservoir continually provoking the phantasmal typic self to renewed derision and renewed acceptance of the introjected value system. To accomplish this, the sermon must walk a fine line, preventing the mourner from subsiding into his grief, but also discouraging an overzealous detachment from the energy of grief: "In comfortinge, eyther to increase sorrowe, as that a womanish kinde of wayling and shrieking should follow, or so to induce gladness that a childlishe rejoycement and exultation should thereupon ensue, both these poynates doe indifferently incurre reprehension." The brilliance of the type requires a somber background against which to show itself, a somberness that might at this point be called melancholia rather than mourning.

If Hyperius does not invent the Protestant funeral sermon, his meticulous attention to laying out a duplicable technique to aid preachers lacking strong rhetorical intuitions defines the genre's skeleton with the pragmatic candor verging on cynicism that is appropriate for an effective manual, though I probably push him too far toward Chaucer's Pardoner. When the funeral sermon emerges in New England in the 1670s, there are few essential modifications, save perhaps in the final attitude sought. Rather than a generally pious disposition, the Puritan sermon seeks a more concrete allegiance to the moral-civic code of the holy nation, an end that could hardly have been advanced by Hyperius, himself wavering between Luther and Calvin amid the religious and political heterogeneity of sixteenth-century Germany. Hyperius does present a brief vision of social service as desirable outcome: "afflictions doe minister charge unto us of humbling ourselves, of calling upon God, of exercising the duties of love towards our neighbour..." The Puritan sermon amplifies the "duties of love" in two ways: first, the transcendental consolations proffered by the sermon lie less in inward peace and postmortem reward than in the contemplation of the future greatness (or the future reclamation of the past greatness) of the New England errand; and second, typological emulatiom and transcendental compensation are combined in service to such spiritual nationalism by asserting that the dead person's life is properly seen as a vehicle for displaying exemplary virtue. His memorability lies in this having made himself a vehicle for value that can still be enjoyed by the living if they in turn make themselves
vehicles, imitating what he imitated, in which case what was alive in him is still so. His sociospiritual representativity was his essence; emulating that representativity refutes the finality of death; and widespread emulation tends toward social consensus. "There never was death," as Whitman would argue in "Song of Myself," albeit with a different notion of representativity, "but it led forward life." (Such affectual fusion over the grave would prove more difficult when, as in Rowlandson's case, the dead person was an infant or young child, or—most intensely—when a child dies before being born, in which case imaginative conceptions of emulation and recompense would have to be generated without reference to concrete experience, and the raw fact of death would be proportionately more resistant to the typological reduction. This gap demands the sentimentalization of infant perfection to complete the system of sublimation, a project already commenced in Puritanism's "instances of early piety" literature, for instance Jonathan Edwards' portrait of Phebe Bartlett.) Otherwise, Hyperius' perception of the genre was duplicated in New England. According to Gordon E. Geddes, "the goal was not repression but control." Geddes quotes Willard's pronouncement that mourning must be converted to "Godly Sorrow," an event that occurs "when our Mourning for any outward Loss or bereavement is accompanied with or diverted into the current of Contrition or Mourning for Sin." Seeking "to confine and direct the grief and mourning of the bereaved," Geddes contends, Willard allowed that the deaths of loved ones were "a proper occasion for the excitation of grief in us," but insisted that this feeling was apt to lapse into a refusal of comfort, such as that of Rachel in the Bible. Even Jesus wept when Lazarus died, so Christians should not be "over-rigorous in censoring displays of sorrow and mourning in others." But to allow permissible grief to take its own channel would be too permissive. Geddes suggests that the early Puritan hostility toward funeral sermons may have been based upon a feeling that such performances, "commonly fill'd with Immoderate and Untrue Praises of the Dead," invited a loss of control and so were thought best banned altogether. In his preface to James Fitch's sermon after the death of Anne Mason, for example, Joshua Scottow denounced the "Abusive, and justly to be condemned practice of too many, who in preaching Funeral sermons, by misrepresenting the Dead, have dangerously miled the living, and by flatteries corrupted many...." But this denunciation prefaces a funeral sermon Scottow considers permissible: the issue is not (or is no longer) the propriety of publicly representing the dead per se, but rather the strict discrimination between correct memory and misrepresentation, in order to sift out immixtures of the Puritan social unconscious, often present despite best intentions. To this end, Geddes suggests, remembrances of the dead person's singularity were kept brief: "in the sermon itself, the deceased was usually mentioned only as the occasion for the sermon, or in the concluding para-

graph. Such containment was reinforced by the practice of preaching the sermon at regular service rather than at the time of the burial. When the sermon was later published, "a brief biographical sketch would be appended, at least to the published sermon. By the second half of the century, these sketches tended to grow into lengthy biographies." Such extended attention to the life of the dead was not, however, a recognition of the utterly lost personality, a token of what Bosco calls liberalization. On the contrary, punctilious commentary on the minutiae of exemplary conduct (as in most of the biographies in Mather's 

Magnalia) bespeaks a heightened opposition to mourning, a sensation that everyday life is diverging from pattern and therefore requires detailed modeling rather than just abstract precept, a dedication to leaving no recollected event open to contrary or nonaligned interpretation. The life in all its moments becomes a single sign. Extended treatment, then, more completely emblematized "the lesson that death should have for the living," and functioned as a supplement of vividness in the cultural ambience that also supported the involved fidelities of Rowlandson's narrative. Only by forgetting the singularity of the dead and heeding what was posited as his or her example can one escape the immoderate flow. As Willard put it, "If you can swim ashoar upon this plank you will not need to fear drowning in the torrent of sorrow."

Fitch's sermon, which appears to have been the first to have been published in New England, is typical, though Scottow's brief preface betrays a lingering nervousness about the revival of the genre, about what door is being opened. Only pages 10, 11, and 12 out of the total thirteen mention Anne Mason, and then only as a type, for instance, as a reminder of Dorcas who as "full of good works and acts of charity" and who was raised from the dead by Peter (Acts 9.36-42)—as Anne Mason will be raised from the dead by those who remember her in imitation. Fitch's inclination to stereotype is not simply a different order of mimetic convention from our own, because, as will those preachers who follow him, he is attempting to stave off the pressure of forms of memory that we might call realistic. [I am not contending that our notions of mimesis are not conventional, though the task of grief, if not the content of grief, seems to me to approach the status of the sort of universal convention that Levi-Strauss describes in his analyses of the incest prohibition, but that they are present-by-exclusionary-absence from Puritan discourse, rather than just absent.) Among this modern Dorcas' many virtues, in fact, was her transcendence of grief, a virtue to be emulated by those attending the present service: "I have personally seen her weep in her speaking of, and lamenting after Communion with Christ, but it was a rare thing for her to weep because of any outward loss or cross whatsoever."

In accord with Anne Mason's example, therefore, Fitch discusses Anne Mason herself only briefly, devoting the rest of the sermon (pp. 1-9, 13) to a
treatise on correct memory. Quoting Psalms 37:37, "Mark the blameless man, and behold the upright," Fitch takes to mark to mean to remember, to lift a thing out of vicissitude, as in mark my words. The way to mark is to apprehend the marks of piety the dead woman displayed: the mourner should be exclusively concerned with the question "What are the Observable things in the Life and Death of the Godly?" Observable here means worthy of being observed, rather than capable of being observed. Such marking, after it has prevented less befitting markings, is still not adequate if it remains thought and feeling without becoming conduct:

We should mark the Upright by way of imitation; if we do not in this sense mark them we mark them in vain, and behold them to no good purpose; the Lord requireth us to mark the life of the Upright as a living example, that may live with us, and that when they are dead; and to consider the end of their conversation, that we may live and die as they.

Such imitation will ensure that nothing worthy of mark has died:

If you would have comfort against your loss, lament after the Lord Christ his Spiritual presence; this Upright one makes the Upright such and keeps them such to their end: are they so precious, Oh how precious is Jesus, the savour of whose Ointment is such that the Virgins love him, and his love is better than wine, therefore the Upright lose him, Cant. r. 3. 4. Oh pour out thy heart to Christ, and say, I lament my loss of an Upright servant of thine: Oh thou canst make up my loss by thy presence.

Preserve the memory of the Upright by imitating of them; It's a pleasing thing to love when it can no longer enjoy the presence of the Beloved, yet to preserve the memory of the Upright by imitating them . . . would you show love indeed to her. Oh preserve her memory, and that must be by imitating her, think and speak of, Oh weep and pray over the observable things in her Life and Death, that you prize Communion with God as she did, that you may love Prayer and Self-Examination as she did, and abound in good work: Thus shall her memory be blessed to you, Prov. 10. 7 and you shall be blessed at your latter end.

Christ is the first adequate vehicle for or mimesis of the undying divine, revealing clearly the marks of the meaning he bears, revealing them most clearly in the clarificatory act of dying; others such as Anne Mason are mimesis of his mimesis, as we may be in turn, and so on. Vehicles drop away, but the Upright is always so; compensation is not really compensation—since nothing is lost or falls away—but rather a revelation of the fact of this sempiternal erection. Nothing is missing. A Christian homily, certainly, but one that Fitch is putting to nearly unprecedented use in the Massachusetts of 1672.

I have represented the Puritan symbolization of death as coercive in order to open a critical area apart from the rather considerable body of commentary that would see such an address to grief to be an abundant consolation. Contemplating the imposition of typological significance in Puritan self-conception, for example, John Owen King believes such imposition relieved melancholy because it resolved or conferred form: "It is not a question of choosing between words and experience, or between a language of conversion and conversion itself; prescription is a language with which to order and craft experience." If it were a matter of a single order of representation set over against an otherwise inarticulate experience of suffering, then the exemplary scheme would be a relief. But my contention is that such an ennobling of exemplification depends upon maintaining the bicontrast disseminated by Puritan ideology—us versus chaos—and thereby perpetuates the repression of other orders of representation that were extruded from permissible discourse so that their intrinsic energy could be appropriated. The category nature, that which is beyond the pale, is ideologically repressive because it is constructed to include "womanish" or "immeasurable" or "irresponsible" grief (among other things) as a kind of beast's howling, rather than as a competitor ethic.

But to the extent that I have represented Puritan funerary discourse as repressive, I have perhaps not directly enough presented its desirability, its aura of solicitude, an aura so cogent that many of the practitioners of this discourse (like their heirs and exegetes in the centuries to come) may have gone to the work with a sincere desire to annul disaster. Failing to see the desirability of this structuration of feeling would leave us unable to comprehend its success: no ideological system of such social generality maintains itself in such an extent of space and time without being able to seem to gratify the emotional needs of its proponents and adherents. At the most basic level, the exemplary representation of the dead person's virtues is not necessarily opposed to what conclusion the mourner might eventually reach: Anne Mason probably was the paragon Fitch said she was, and those who stayed on after her might have been proud to have been like her; even Antigone might have felt that ambition and lack of concern for peace were dark sides of Polynices' boldness. Add to this the fact that the funeral sermon offers a simulation of the end of grief, a coherent image of the dead person where there is otherwise only pain, that the funeral sermon proposes that that which the dead essentially was endures, that only the extrinsic lies in the ground; and that it delineates a course of engagement with the world through emulation rather than a prolonged and seemingly aimless wandering among memory traces. To all of this add the frequency of death in seventeenth-century New England, a world where, to borrow from David Stannard, "the nights were blacker, the days more silent, the winters more horrifying and cold than most men [and women] of the twentieth century can.
imagine," a world that, focused by his wife's suffering, produced Joseph Rowlandson's horrified vision of abandonment and victimage:

God's forsaking a people is a sore judgement, in that it exposes them to all judgements. Sin is a great evil in that it exposes to all evil, this is a great evil of punishment, in that it exposes to all punishments. If God be gone, our guard is gone, and we are as a City, in the midst of Enemies, whose walls are broken down. Our strength to make resistance, that's Gone, for God is our strength, as a carcass without life, to beasts of prey, so are a people forsaken of their God . . .

There is God and there is rotting meat and there is nothing in between.

Imagine the dread of commencing mourning again, the last task not complete, the two or more losses mingling and compounding the labor exponentially: such incentive would have rendered the sublimation of mourning irresistible. But gratifications are not always adequate, and the sermons' vigilant, alert, and anxious attention to griefs that threaten to refuse the consolation the sermons propose suggests that grief endured as a continual furtive presence—in need of vilification, as a wildness, a desecration of civility. Hence the importance of Mary White Rowlandson's innocent narrative, where countermemory emerges from the silence of being an eternal irony in the heart of the community and teaches those who come after what was really down below.

Lot's Wife: Looking Back

She is a mother ensnared in God's Plan. She has witnessed the destruction of Lancaster/Sion. She and her children are commodities between two hostile armies. What is their legality? What are they worth?

Other to other we are all functions in a system of war . . .

A Sovereign thinks the sun. Form and force begin with Him. If there is evil in the Universe it is good and therefore marvelous. Law scans the grammar of liberty and surrender. Catastrophe is a matter of fact. Who can open the door of God's face?

Love is a trajectory across the hollow of history . . .

—Susan Howe

In the work of mourning, it is not grief that works: grief keeps watch . . . Grief, incising, dissecting, exposing a hurt which can no longer be endured, or even remembered.

—Maurice Blanchot

And in his earnest address concerning the Last day, [Christ] says (Luke 17:32): "Remember Lot's Wife." From this we readily understand what it means to look back, namely, to depart from God's command and to be occupied with other matters—matters outside one's calling—like the man who has been commanded to follow Christ and wants to bury his dead first (Matt. 8:24). . . .

Therefore one must hold fast to this teaching—that the saintly woman is compelled to suffer this punishment—in order that it may reach all succeeding generations.

—Martin Luther

Now, if we weigh all the circumstances, it is clear that her fault was not light. First, the desire of looking back proceeded from incredulity; and no greater
9. Ibid., pp. 7, 1.

2. The Society of the Example

6. Slotkin and Folsom report that the pseudonymous author of the preface calls himself "Per Amicam," "thy threefold friend." According to Kathryn Zabelle Derouinian, however, he calls himself "Per Amicam" ("For a Friend") or "Per Amicum" ("By a Friend"). "The Publication, Promotion, and Distribution of Mary White Rowlandson's Captivity Narrative in the Seventeenth Century," Early American Literature, 23.3 (1988), 240. The difference may derive from different editions, or from different typefaces.
8. Here and at several subsequent points in my argument, I draw on an unpublished essay by Anne Lackey, "The A and the Public Eye." Lackey contends that Hester Prynne decides to return to her scene of trial at the end of The Scarlet Letter because the stigma of the letter brought her from social nonexistence into the harsh light of public actuality, from invisibility into perceptible historical existence, however repellant that mode of existence is. For the woman in Puritan society, according to Lackey's reading, conspicuous ostracization is the sole and ineluctable avenue to being, a dilemma demonstrated by the fact that virtually the only public woman's words we have from the Puritan period are Anne Hutchinson's. Hester's acceptance of the letter, therefore, is not simply a matter of contrition or masochism, but rather it stems from her acknowledgment of the narrow conditions under which her society is willing to allow her to become visible and from her determination to accept those conditions in hopes of being able to use that visibility to some historically positive end. Rowlandson says little about what her celebrity means to her, but all of her remarks about having been singled out probably carry with them a premonition that she will not soon recede into the background she inhabited before the attack.
9. This idea began in a conversation I had with Arthur Riss.
10. A glance below will reveal some long notes. In these notes, I attempt to situate the theory of mourning I derive from Hegel with respect to other theories of mourning and other readings of Hegel. These notes detail the axioms of my argument, rather than advancing it toward Rowlandson's narrative. I have therefore put these deliberations over axioms in notes to make them available to those who wish to turn aside without trying the patience of those who wish to move on to Rowlandson without digression in the body of my text.
17. In its most contemporary expression, this stance reappears as American Foucaulitanism, with a similarly dismissive contention that the contemporary reader's identificatory involvement with books from periods other than his or her own is a naive obstacle to be surpassed on the way to a scientific historicism. The antinomy to this new historian is a new pragmatism that claims that identificatory involvement is the only possibility, that reading cannot even be said to exercise a reductive force against the text because there is no text except as far as it is construed in its readings. The perfect symmetry of these positions, stressing the impotence and omnipotence of the reader's identification, suggests that they are partners in a system designed to appear to exhaust the field of possibility—to repress the notion of interchange between reader and text, of identification gratified but also blocked, the reader changed by the encounter with the blockage, then returning for a different kind of identification, in a cycle whose repetition is not necessarily terminable. The mutual exclusivity of the two poles in the antimony
seems to sterilize the possibility of reading as dialectical education, a process with several points of resemblance to mourning.

18. My typology of critics of typology is overly simplistic. I hope only heuristically: individual critical works mix the three stances, and assert by way of tone and emphasis rather than polemical announcement. For a sample of position 1, see Cecilia Tichi, "Spiritual Biography and the 'Lord's Remembrancers,'" in The American Puritan Imagination: Essays in Resurrection, ed. Sacaan Bercovitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 66–76: "Indeed, neglect by subsequent generations of a form once so popular as to be anthologized probably indicates how little attuned have been post-seventeenth-century sensibilities to the rigid formula of spiritual biography. But aesthetic alienation ought not to prevent an intellectual understanding of the generic grounds from which the 'Lord's remembrancers' worked, albeit unconsciously." (p. 69). In an essay in the same volume, after several concessive gestures to position 3, David Minter, echoing the last page of The Great Gateway, concludes with position 2: "In their own way, however, the latter-day Puritans were true, though very imperfect and partial, poets: they followed, if not to the bottom, at least into the darkness of their night, there to order words of themselves and of their origins, there to seek a basis of renewal; in their tales of pleasing woe, they sang, as best they could, 'of human unsuccess / In a rapture of distress.' Their characteristic decision was, to be sure, rather to skirt than fully to explore the incongruity first between the intent of the design and the result of the actions of their fathers, and second between the purposes to which they had been dedicated as children and the causes to which they were giving themselves as men. But in their jeremiads they acknowledge and, in their most interesting moments, attempt even to master these incongruities: they attempt, that is, to reconcile, by proclaiming them one, the intent and the achievement of their fathers and they attempt, while going about their business, to remain loyal to the purposes to which their fathers had dedicated them" (p. 55). Or see Mason I. Lowance, Jr., The Language of Canaan: Metaphor and Symbol in New England from the Puritans to the Transcendentalists (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 295: "The secular transformations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have given new meaning to terms like 'type' and 'fulfillment,' but the original organizing principle of the language of Canaan remains clear. America's deepest rhetorical impulse has always been the expression of future promise, an articulation of imminent fulfillment that will no doubt characterize the literature throughout the centuries to come." For a systematic statement of position 3, see Ann Kibbee, The Interpretation of Material Shapes in Puritanism: A Study of Rhetoric, Prejudice, and Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), which fuses ethnohistory, women's studies, and literary theory to map out an important new area in Early American studies.


23. One might speculate about the personal and historical motivations for Miller's bleak faith. And also ascertain its political consequences: on the one hand, such a bleak negativism would probably always involve a distaste for the fundamentalist jingoism that so often grips American politics; on the other hand, the decision to confine divinity to a status of an irrevocably remote Ding-an-sich effectively removes the question of ought from social deliberations and tends to relinquish the field to pure pragmatism. I am here drawing on Lukács' critique of twentieth-century German neo-Kantianism in History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 132–40, 160–68, and on Carolyn Porter, "Are We Being Historical Yet?" in The States of 'Theory': History, Art, and Critical Discourse, ed. David Carroll (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. 27–62.
28. Henry Sussman, The Hegelian Aftermath: Readings in Hegel, Kierkegaard, Freud, Prout, and James (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). Sussman is for the most part concerned with the first half of The Phenomenology of Spirit, whereas my argument in this essay concentrates on the reading of Antigone that begins the second half. Consequently, he focuses on questions of a less directly social nature, and sees "a world whose only principles are indeterminacy and linguistic copulation" as the major source of resistance to Hegel's design, whereas I will emphasize a specifically social form of resistance. Despite this difference, I agree with Sussman's general judgment that "Hegel may place his forced twists and leanings at the service of a smooth-running machine of logic and abstraction, but the blunt force involved in this application points in the direction of another, less domesticated realm..." (p. 2)—though, of course, Antigone's threat to Creon originates in a more domesticated realm.

31. Cf. "Independence and dependence of self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage," Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 111–19, and Alexandre Kojève's revisionary explication in Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr., ed. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1969). See also Georg Lukács, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), p. 166: "Thus for the worker the reified character of the immediate manifestations of capitalist society receives the most extreme definition possible. It is true: for the capitalist also there is the same doubling of personality, the same splitting up of man into an element of the movement of commodities and an (objective and impotent) observer of that movement. But for his consciousness it necessarily appears as an activity (albeit this activity is objectively an illusion) in which effects emanate from himself. This illusion blinds him to the true state of affairs, whereas the worker, who is denied the scope for such illusory activity, perceives the split in his being preserved in the brutish form of what is in its whole tendency a slavery without limits." Hegel, Kojève and Lukács do not argue that those consigned to the slave position are better off, but that they are more likely loci of insight because they are denied participation in fantasies of mastery as well as basic social and material rights. In the consignment of stereotyped mourning to women, the purpose is presumably to effect a specular localization in one gender of the powerlessness that mourning necessarily implies, so that the other gender can enjoy a deluded feel of final competence. The Slave's lucidity is however not inevitable, because exclusion can prompt an intense energetic quest for surveillance mastery, or access to the heavenly heart of whiteness, as in The Great Gatsby or Native Son before Bigger's imprisonment.

32. Derrida, Glas, p. 103, left column.

33. The fact that Antigone's remembrance, however different from Creon's, is aimed at constructing a representation that will be judged for adequacy and put to use, and is thus teleological, may account for Derrida's decision to contend that biological decay, rather than Antigone's opposition to decay, is Hegel's greatest nightmare. Whatever dread Antigone may inspire in Creon pales for Derrida before a certain inability that matter prompts in Hegel. As a result, the tension between Creon and Antigone tends to wane as an important topic in the relevant sections of Glas. This waning seems to me to be a specimen of the way in which the abstraction of Derrida's thought, like that of Adorno, tends toward superseding distinctions such as Creon/Antigone on the ground that, for all of the parties' apparent antagonism, they are in the last instance engaged in analogous pursuits, in this case teleological memory. I will throughout this book simply bracket Derrida's argument because his search for what Hegel finds unassimilable by spirit tends to dwarf differences within modes of spirit, between forms of ethics, whereas I am using Hegel to define the consequences of the difference between Rowlandson and Puritan ideology, and thus need to keep Antigone/Creon at the center of focus. Luce Irigaray's reading of Hegel's Antigone ("The Eternal Irony of the Community,") Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 214–27) is closer to my own in that it concentrates on the battle between Creon and Antigone. However, Irigaray's feminist-deconstructive suspicion of the notion of law leads her to characterize Antigone's commitment as a "passion of the red blood," thereby neglecting Antigone's high moral tone, recasting it as a primitive compulsion or nature, and favoring the melancholic derangement of mourning that is produced by Creon's violence over Antigone's argument. Irigaray thus accepts Creon's description of the difference between himself and Antigone as a difference between law and nature, but reverses Creon's valorization of the former—in effect, she takes the alterity-to-ethics that Derrida locates in matter, and relocates it (with a certain elation) in Antigone. In both Derrida's and Irigaray's arguments, the locus of a rigorous critique cannot be an ethics (cannot in fact even be a locus) because it would in that case circle back into complicity with what it opposes, but the effect of this vigilance toward complicity is liable to be a derogation of positive ethical stances as mystified or crude, and a vanishing of the sort of attributes Creon uses to insult Antigone. My own position is closest to that of Page duBois: "The Greeks saw women not as castrated, nor as exemplifying absence, or the ethically abnormal, but represented them as inseparable from political and economic struggle. They are presented and used ideologically in the theater, to speculate about contesting forms of law and justice . . . ." ("Antigone and the Feminist Critic, Genre, 19 (Winter 1986), 372–83.) All of the things that duBois says the Greeks did not see women as were of course in effect by Hegel's time: but Antigone seems to have helped him to imagine another ethic, rather than what is now called The Other. If the exclusion of alternate formations from discourse results in a certain conspicuous but powerful silence, then castration, absence, and ethical abjuration may be taken as effects of silencing, rather than intractable traits; if derangement is taken to be an intract trait rather than an effect of repression, the repression is liable to be inadvertently perpetuated by a failure to imagine or remember the object of its violence. Cf. Carolyn Porter, "Are We Being Historical Yet?" and Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth Century Miller, trans. John and Anne Tedeschi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. xiii–xvi.

34. Those familiar with Hegel's reading will notice that I am ignoring Hegel's emphasis on the special status of a sister's grief for a brother as the essential form of mourning. Hegel contends that this relation is a love that bridges the gender line but does not involve subordination (father/daughter) or heterosexual desire (husband/wife). In a moment of rare dismissiveness, Jean Hyppolite calls this argument merely ingenious; Irigaray accepts it as a mystified explanation of the affinity of the red blood; Derrida ruminates over Hegel's letters to his sister Christianne; and George Steiner points to a general fixation on the brother/sister relation in European romanticism. My own opinion is that Hegel's valorization of the brother/sister relation depends upon a misreading of one of Antigone's speeches. In itself, this is not for me a flaw, because his revision of Sophocles is what makes him relevant to the Protestant objection to mourning. In this case, however, the misreading is worthy of note, because Hegel's emphasis on Antigone as sister arises from a speech in which she delivers a chilling and withering ironic indictment of Creon's assumptions. Hegel can believe in her apparent emphasis on the brother/sister bond only by missing the irony—and missing the irony may be his mission here. In a confused and violent passage that comes near the end of the chapter (quoted on my p. 47), he will announce that the suppression of women and mourning condemns them to irony as their
sole discursive mode; his failure to consider this speech as irony, therefore, seems to me more a matter of deliberate avoidance than tone deafness, a possibility enhanced by the fact that as irony the speech would be an intransigent, inescapable, and utterly unanswerable denunciation of the assumptions Hegel considers necessary if spiritual history is to commence and progress. Hegel desires that Antigone be ingenuous rather than ironic:

Polyneices knows the price I pay for doing final service to his corpse. And yet the wise will know my choice is right. Had I children or their father dead, I’d let them moulder. I should not have chosen in such a case to cross a state’s decree. What is the law that lies behind these words? One husband gone, I might have found another, or a child from a new man in the first child’s place, but with my parents hid away in death, no brother, ever, could spring up for me. Such was the law by which I honored you. (902-13)

(ANTIGONE, trans. Elizabeth Wyckoff, in Sophocles I: Three Tragedies, ed. David Grene and Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 190. These are shocking lines, displaying a blithe acceptance of the substitutability of lives that outdoes Creon for coldness. Many readers have been appalled by this passage, and it has been periodically suggested that it is a post-Sophoclean interpolation. But we should take the near echo of Creon seriously, and consider the possibility that Antigone is voicing a bitterly acerbic parody of Creon’s inclination to reduce persons to exemplary functions. Earlier, when Ismene asked Creon if condemning Antigone would not also destroy his son’s marital happiness, Creon replied, in a line that duBois cites as the essence of his callousness, “there are other furrows for his plow” (569). When Antigone speaks her cold lines, she is unaware that Haemon has separated himself from his father’s expediency. If, then, she believes Haemon to be complicit, her assertion that “one husband gone, I might have found another” seems more like a vindictively sarcastic rejoinder than a credo of intrinsic attitude. Ismene having deferred to Creon’s authority at the beginning of the play, the Antigone of lines 902-13 considers herself completely alone in her commitment, and her contention that “the wise will know my choice is right” expresses the depth of her experience of betrayal and isolation. She does not hope to communicate with anyone on the basis of a shared commitment to the obligation of mourning. Standing alone and inert in the midst of what discourse is permitted, her only ways to speak are silence or acid mimicry of the attitudes that govern Thebes. We can only follow Hegel in taking these lines at face value by failing to notice that elsewhere in the speech Antigone expresses multiple griefs that are by no means limited to Polyneices: “I come as dear friend to my dear father, / to you, my mother, and my brother too.” (898-99); “No marriage bed, no marriage-song for me, / and since no wedding, no child to rear” (917-18). Such griefs, however, she thinks, are expressed to no hearing ears: “I go, without a friend, struck down by fate, / live to the hollow chambers of the dead” (919-20). Unable to speak and be heard on her terms, she can only speak his brutality pushed to an extremity where the brutality is put on view—but again, with no one to hear, though, in their shock, readers have heard, often without realizing she is showing them Creon. The utter suppression of her speech so corrupts discourse that she can only participate in the circulation of utterance through introducing ironic perturbation into the heart of ethical prevarication. I would like to add one more observation, that even taking the passage at face value we cannot accept Hegel’s implication of the primacy of the brother/sister bond. Antigone asserts Polyneices’ uniqueness not for the reasons Hegel puts forward, but because the parents are dead. In Antigone’s ironic lampooning of Creon’s commodification of love, Polyneices is rare in the way that a commodity manufactured from since-depleted raw materials is rare, but a commodity nevertheless. Though Hegel may have wished to impose the brother/sister bond on this passage owing to its allure for him, he may also have devised that cumbersome apparatus in order to bury the truth of the passage, its unrestrained assault on the reduction of persons to the convenience of function. But again, there are two Hegels here, one telling the other that he will have to go to great length if he is to get past this. (See Philosophy of Right, pp. 101-3, for Hegel’s denunciation of irony that does not give way to an expression of truth.)


42. See Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 8: “In being reflected in and by that piece of the world, the subject learns that it shares a common structure with that piece of the world, that a prior and constituting relation conditions the possibility of reflection, and that the object of reflection is nothing other than the relation itself. Hence, the subject that encounters an object or Other, or some feature of the world as external and ontologically disparate, is not identical with the subject that discovers itself
reflected in and by those ostensibly external phenomena. In other words, before mediated self-reflection is achieved, the subject knows itself to be a more limited, less autonomous being than it potentially is. In discovering that reflection is possible, and that every reflection reveals a relation constitutive of the subject, a way in which it is integrally related to the world that it previously did not understand, the subject cultivates a more expanded conception of its place. Importantly, the Hegelian subject is not a self-identical subject who travels smugly from one ontological place to another; it is its travels, and is every place in which it finds itself. Though, as Rowlandson implies, mourning is less a grand tour than a forced march, its repeated encounters with alien objects, the surging memories, compel transformations of the image of the dead, and with them corresponding transformations of the survivor’s understanding of her structuring relation to the dead. If at the end the mourner does not discover herself to be an “adventurer of the Spirit who turns out, after a series of surprises, to be all that he encounters along his dialectical way” (6), but rather a wanderer aware of what she was and how little she is, the metamorphoses of her knowledge are nonetheless more dialectical than the exemplifications of Creon, who is, until his final anagnorisis, “a self-identical subject who travels smugly from one ontological place to another.” Hence both his apparently greater efficacy and acrality and her greater reflectivity; hence also, perhaps, the deepest reason why Hegel is so disturbed by his renunciation of Antigone in favor of the historical sequence Creon begins, and why he promises that the end of history will allow Antigone back into the light, into the Spirit “who turns out, after a series of surprises, to be all that he encounters along his dialectical way”—turns out to be even mourning, at some promised future point.

43. Freud perhaps comes closest to Hegel’s idea in Totem and Taboo when he has the rival sons repress the knowledge of their murder of their father and dedicate themselves to service to his memory. This opposition between oedipal homicide and sentimental preservation does not, however, take note that sentimental preservation would also have to repress the sort of mournful memory Freud would describe five years later in “Mourning and Melancholia.” Freud would have approximated Hegel’s theory if he had included the insight of Totem and Taboo in “Mourning and Melancholia” by suggesting that the construction of socially utilitarian memories of the dead preempts and deranges the course of ordinary mourning, resulting in melancholia (or depression). His argument that this derangement originates in a certain fixed or intransigent incorporation of the dead seems to me to invite supplementation by Hegel’s theory: if mourning ceases prematurely owing to an incorporation of an image of the dead advanced by a scheme of social exemplarity, the residue of undone work becomes melancholia. The missing factor in Freud’s theory is a consideration of the preemptive intrusion of ideology into the course of mourning, an absence he attempts to remedy with the incomplete thesis that fond memory is used to shield against aggressional memory, rather than that exemplaristic memory is used to shield against full memory. In his introduction to the work of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, Derrida claims that for Freud mourning accomplishes an introjection of the dead whereas melancholia is stalled by having incorporated the dead: introjection brings the image of the dead into full assimilation with the self, but incorporation assimilates the dead as an alien presence, a crypt in the midst of the self with which the self does not communicate. This distinction is useful, but also does not seem to me complete: in the case of the sort of prolonged and intimate contact that exists between family members, the dead does not need to be introjected into the self because that self is in large measure already determined by the history of the relation. The task is not to bring the dead in, but to convert the dead from being an element of life taken for granted to being an object of representation, to being an inner image with which the self can communicate to the limit of all the messages that memory proposes. Derrida, Abraham, and Torok’s concept of melancholia and incorporation might therefore also be enriched by a consideration of ideological intrusion into mourning: if the mourner takes in an image of the dead that seems adequate, but that in fact only simulates the dead, then the image will not communicate adequately with memory, but will remain as an encrypted alien body, like the apple embedded in Gregor Samsa’s flesh in Kafka’s Metamorphosis, a flesh rendered insectivorous by its unrepresenting alienation from what it surrounds. Derrida’s implication that “so-called normal mourning” is a totalizing and therefore repressive process is based on two related assumptions that carry him away from my own view of mourning, first that the self that “introjects” retains its initial character through the process, and second that the dead is elementally other to the self, and thus can be “introjected” only at the price of a Creonic reduction-to-measure. For Derrida, then, again, “normal” mourning does not escape the curse of exemplarism. If mourning is thus also encrypted, what remains, and where is a credible notion of recovery to be found? Derrida, “Fors: The Englisch Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok,” in Abraham and Torok, The Wolf Man’s Magic Word, Derrida trans. by Barbara Johnson, Abraham and Torok trans. by Nicholas Rand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. xiv–xxi.

44. Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 272–73.

45. The continuing utility of the sublimation of grief is manifest in Ronald Reagan’s speech after the Challenger disaster, which constructed the exemplarity of the victims in such a way as to fortify a national commitment to the renewed militarization of space so that their deaths would not have been in vain. On October 2, 1988, Rick Hauck, commander of the first manned space mission after the disaster, responded to Reagan’s speech in a manner that displayed a full comprehension of the technique of sublimating mourning through emulative exemplification: “Today, up here where the blue sky turns to black, we can say at long last, to Dick, Mike, Judy, to Ron and El, and to Christa and Greg: Dear friends, we have resumed the journey that we promised to continue for you; dear friends, your loss has meant that we could confidently begin anew; dear friends, your spirit and your dream are still alive in our hearts.” San Francisco Chronicle, October 3, 1988, pp. A1 and A18. Hauck implies that the Challenger mission was Christic (Christa): that the death of the O-rings was a lurking danger or dark necessity that the earlier mission brought forward and thereby purged, enabling a confident new beginning; that this is how we are to remember them, as those who died for us; and that the proper form of remembrance is emulation of what are designated as their values, which ensures that they are not really dead—only the vehicle has dropped away. It has since been reported that NASA may have suppressed evidence that the Challenger victims survived for some minutes after the explosion, the thought of which would tend to impede an easy passage into symbolic remembrance. The American public’s abiding desire to know about those awful moments may betoken a survival of mourning, as may
the curious decision to name the next space shuttle Atlantis, after the splendid civilization that disappeared beneath the ocean. One might follow Robert L. Ryman's comments on post-Vietnam America in his preface to Alexander with Margaret Fischer's diagnosis of the psychological stagnation of America after World War II (The Inability to Mourn, trans. Beverley R. Placek [New York: Grove Press, 1975], p. viii-xiv) to consider whether Reaganism in toto may have been a sublimation of grief, a deployment of vigorous images in place of mourning's severe appraisal of those persons, self-conceptions, and ideas that have perished during the last twenty-six years of U.S. history. This speculation is supported by George Bush's inaugural address, which identified Vietnam as the destruction of a whole America, and called for an end to rumination over that event in the interest of moving on, something that the persistent concern over M.I.A. remains suggests that Americans are not yet willing to do. Though he does not discuss mournfulness, Stuart Hall engages quite persuasively with the question of desirable ideology in "The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism among the Therorists," in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp. 78-74.

46. Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 280.
47. Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 288 and 289.

49. Hegel's theory supplements the explanation of the connection between simulative ideology and intransigent unresponsiveness in Jean Baudrillard, In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities . . . Or the End of the Social, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and John Johnston (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983). "The mass absorbs all the social energy, but no longer refracts it. It absorbs every sign and every meaning, but no longer reflects it. It absorbs all messages and digests them. For every question put to it, it sends back a tautological and circular response. It never participates. Imbued by flows or tests, it forms a mass or earth. . ." (p. 28). Baudrillard acknowledges the connection between this nonparticipation and Hegel's description of melancholia, but shows little interest in the etiology of melancholia, in describing what melancholia is a deranged form of: "There would thus be a fantastic irony about 'matter,' and every object of science, just as there is a fantastic irony about the massings in their muteness, or in their statistical discourse so conforming to the questions put to them, akin to the eternal irony of femininity of which Hegel speaks—the irony of a false fidelity, of an excessive fidelity to the law, an ultimately impenetrable simulation of passivity and obedience, and which annuls in return the law governing them, in accordance with the immoral example of the Soldier Schweik (p. 33; the quotation from Hegel to which Baudrillard refers appears in the text below).

51. Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 16.
52. Philosophy of Right, pp. 105-12. This discussion of Antigone was brought to my attention by Joseph Kronick.

54. This use of minuets to fortify authority is nowhere more evident than in the careful note that Puritan writers from Winthrop through Cotton Mather took of reports that Anne Hutchinson and her friend Mary Dyer conceived deformed fetuses, and in their imaginative exegeses of the isomorphism between the details of the deformities and the tenets of the heresies that they had entertained before and during the pregnancies. The fetuses, therefore, were "emblems of the two women's invisible spiritual states; their bodies told an exemplary truth that their mouths were laboring to disguise, but the truth will out." Cf. Thomas Weld, preface to John Winthrop, A Short Story of the Rise, reign, and ruine of the Antinomians, Familist & Libertines, in The Antinomian Controversy, 1635-1638, ed. David D. Hall (Middlebury, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968), pp. 214-215: "for look as she had vested mishapen opinions, so she must bring forth deformed monsters; and as about 30. Opinions in number, so many monsters; and as those were publique, and not in corner mentioned, so this is now come to be known and famous over all these Churches, and a great part of the world." This intrusion of divinely composed exemplification, "as clearly as if he had pointed with his finger," must have gratified Weld, Winthrop, and others in part because the antinomians had denied that the emulation of examples was of any worth to the soul: "Error 6: The example of Christ's life, is not a pattern according to which men ought to act." (p. 220).


57. Because of Puritanism's attention to the small, triviality may be the only concept with less prominence in Puritan theory than humor, however much the attention some one such as Cotton Mather devoted to what we might call the trivial constitues the essence of what we might find humorous about him: the readiness of all phenomena to bear meaning tended to problematize judgments concerning the triviality of anything. The fact that we continue to find Mather's hyperzealous vigilance, like his earnest extravagance in general, funny, suggests to me that it is for us either liberating, freeing us from a certain bondage to putatively self-evident discriminations between the important and the trivial, or vicariously anxiogenic, staging in a distanced and embarrassedly unabashed form our abiding latent worry over what may lie beneath the next stone we happen to kick over. Or both: if the temperate reasonableness with which the age of Franklin replaces the age of Mather amounts to a modernization rather than an easing of constraint, then Mather's "neurotically" exuberant excessiveness explodes in advance Enlightenment protocols that lie historically between him and us, freeing us to romp about in a golden age of repression, of an innocent unfreedom that did not know better than to say its name.

65. Andreas Hyperius, *The Practise of preaching, otherwise called the Pathway to the Pulpit: Contayning an excellent Method how to frame Divine Sermons, & to interpret the holy Scriptures according to the capacite of the vulgar people. First written in Latin by the learned pastor of Christes Church, D. Andreas Hyperius: and now lately (to the profit of the same Church) Englishe by John Ludham, vicar of Wetherfield. Whereunto is added an Oration concerning the lyfe and death of the same Hyperius; which may serve for a president to all the learned men of his calling in our tyme* (London: Thomas East, 1577). All of the quotations I use in the paragraphs below are from pp. 170–75. My attention was brought to Hyperius by Bercovitch’s *Puritan Origins*, where it is mentioned on p. 20.
66. Hamlet’s implication that there is an objectively proper period violated by Claudius’ and Gertrude’s practice, however, represents his attempt to posit a contrary “manliness,” rather than attention to the demands of grieving. He believes that, but for lust and ambition, there would be a time that is in joint, and he is therefore incompetent to see the anomalous time of the grieving as other than delay—cowardice and indecision, “womanliness.” Grief itself, therefore, is extruded as melancholia—as Ophelia—because Hamlet reaches the wrong conclusion about the meaning of his objection to Claudius’ mandatory alacrities, because his insuperable allegiance to patrilinearity entails a duty to act that requires him to swerve from the lesson. See Lacan, “Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet,” on time.

3. Lot’s Wife: Looking Back

2. My discussion of Rowlandson’s contradictory velocities in this chapter is derived from Kristin Ross’s analysis of adolescent velocities in *The Emergence of Social Space: Rimbaud and the Paris Commune* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). Citing Lukács and Sartre, Ross claims that a regulated subjective calm is a generic trait of voice in the bourgeois novel, and then argues that “what distinguishes the adolescent body, then, as it is figured in Rimbaud’s work, is a particular corporeal relation to speed: the body is both too slow and too fast. Periods of apparent lulls are broken by violent, spasmodically unbridled explosions, but even this is something of an optical illusion: the heavy torpor or seeming somnambulism of the body qualified by paresse hides a body that is in fact moving too fast . . . Laziness for Rimbaud is a kind of absolute motion, absolute speed that escapes the pull of gravity” (p. 54). I am not claiming here that Rowlandson is an adolescent, but rather borrowing Ross’s startling phenomenological insight first that disiddence or disaffection can express itself as the pace of subjectivity—rather than simply as the contents of consciousness—and second her suggestion that the seeming paradox of high velocity and inaction may be an optical illusion, the way a disidence appears within an ideologically specific definition of proper pace.