RACE
AND
REUNION

THE CIVIL WAR IN
AMERICAN MEMORY

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FOUR

Reconstruction and Reconciliation

If war among the whites brought peace and liberty to blacks, what will peace among the whites bring?
—Frederick Douglass, July 5, 1875

In the American elections from 1868 to 1876, the vast majority of voters were participants, survivors, or freedmen whose adult lives and political sensibilities had been shaped by the war and the struggle over Reconstruction. Hence even as the reunion took root during the years surrounding these elections, each campaign served as a referendum on both the sectional and the racial meanings of the war. Bloody shirts still waved everywhere as politicians sought to permanently bury the issues of the war and simultaneously used those very issues to fan the flames of political difference. The differences were real, and the issues could not yet be buried, at least until the mid-1870s. The nation was healing, but not yet healed.

Some historians have argued that postwar elections in America were driven by a "partisan imperative"—the deep-seated political habits and loyalties (forged since the crises of the 1850s) vested in the Democratic and Republican parties. According to this argument, habitual party connections, with their institutional and communal relationships, especially locally, were more important than events or ideas in shaping voter behavior. Conservative Republicans, disenchantment with their own party's radicalism by 1868, just could not abide mingling with Democrats. More so, the party on the defensive, the Democrats, especially moderates seeking a new legitimacy, could not abide the antiradical elements of the party of Lincoln. With intense partisanship, both parties waged political warfare that replaced real warfare. But if the aim of both parties "was to reinvigorate the memories of these party relations," perhaps it is worth examining what the memories were all about.¹

On May 20, 1868, only a week after President Andrew Johnson had been acquitted in his impeachment trial in the U.S. Senate, the Republican Party gathered in Chicago to nominate Ulysses S. Grant for President. Although inexperienced in formal politics, Grant was the principal war hero of the Union cause. Republican managers put his name forward as the candidate of harmony in a season of bitter political discord. The week before the Republican convention, a soldiers and sailors gathering of Civil War veterans had met in Chicago, endorsing Grant and providing an exuberant welcome to delegates and politicos. Grant, who remained appropriately aloof from convention affairs, was in Washington, D.C., on May 29, when he received delegations informing him of the nomination. Reaching for unity, and trying to sidestep all controversy, especially the unpopular issue of black suffrage, Grant issued a statement: "I shall have no policy of my own to interfere against the will of the people." More enduring, if no more direct, was his concluding passage, which became the splendidly ambiguous slogan of his campaign: "Let us have Peace."²

Grant had committed himself to Congressional control of Reconstruction policy, and in vague terms at least, he supported black voting rights. But as Thaddeus Stevens lay dying that summer, the historical moment of the radical Republicans was passing just as it had triumphed. In 1868, the Republican Party retracted on its platform of order and stability; they would now be protectors of a status quo rather than innovators. Yet Republicans were pilloried with the charge of "radicalism" by Democrats, as well as by white Southerners generally, some of whom sat out this election willfully, and others because they were still disfranchised. After the Democrats made startling gains in the off-year elections of 1867, the authors of the 1868 Republican platform struck conservative chords. Black suffrage was necessary in the South for the purposes "of public safety, of gratitude, and of justice." Black voting rights in the North were left to the whims of each state. Reconstruction would continue, and the Southern states would be restored to the Union. But with the general at its helm, the Republican Party had a new image. They were now the party of sound money, economic growth and prosperity, and eventual reunion.³ It all depended on how "Let us have peace" was interpreted, and that slogan had very different meanings across the political landscape.

The Democrats held their convention in July, and instead of reaching for a
new, moderate coalition that might accommodate some realities of Reconstruction, they nominated candidates Horatio Seymour and Frank Blair, who represented the opposite. Seymour, New York's former governor, had openly supported the draft rioters in New York City in 1863, whose actions led to the murder of many blacks; his record of opposition to the war gave the Republicans a perfect target. Blair, a Missourian and an avowed white supremacist, announced that a Democratic administration would declare the Reconstruction Acts "null and void" and turn the clock back to white Southern home rule. Although many Democrats professed their loyalty and sacrifice in the war, rhetoric from the top of the Democratic ticket seemed to threaten a second civil war. The Democrats opposed every element of Congressional Reconstruction and favored immediate reunions based on white Southern autonomy.

In rhetoric and reality, the stakes of the election of 1868 were the essential results of the war. Republicans may have been hasty and "unwise," at times, concluded the Nation, "but we more firmly believe that if the positions of the Democratic party are adopted, the war for national unity will have been turned into a farce." Even more directly, blacks saw their freedom and their future at stake; their own partisan imperative required only short-term memory. Benjamin Tanner, editor of the Christian Recorder, called on black men as voters to exercise a stern parsimony. In an imaginary dialogue with Democrats, Tanner gave that charged term "Negro manhood" deep political meaning:

Negro manhood says, "I am an American citizen." Modern Democracy says, "You are not." Negro manhood says, "I demand all my rights, civil and political." Modern Democracy says: "You have no rights except what I choose to give you." Negro manhood says, "I must build churches for myself, and school houses for my children." Modern Democracy says, "If you do I will burn them down." Negro manhood says, "I will exercise the rights vouchsafed." Modern Democracy says, "If you do I will mob and murder you."

Blacks prepared to vote their hopes and interests as self-evident truths in spite of, and as part of, the rhetoric about "peace."

The memory-laden peace in 1868 was still the creation of the war. As some Democratic newspapers threatened repeal of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and denounced the Reconstruction Acts, one among them, the

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New York Herald, worried about its own party's extremism. At stake, the Herald made clear, "was what the war has written into the Constitution." But "what Constitution?" it asked in August. "The Constitution as it was or the Constitution as it is?" In the deep South, newspapers made clear the grounds on which whites would support the Democrats (and they had plenty of Northern allies on this question). "Let us have the Constitution as it was," proclaimed the Milledgeville, Georgia, Federal Union. "Let us stand square up to the old Constitution and we can conquer." From this election forward, the enduring political character of Civil War memory thrived on this sort of contest over just who had won the war and what had been its verdict.

Many Northerners wondered about the level of forgiveness and forgetting they would be expected to extend to the South. One Republican paper bristled at the South's audacity to portray itself as "a wronged and outraged people." "It has forgotten all that has happened since 1860," declared the New York Tribune. Another paper captured the way ex-Confederates were already seeking control over the nation's memory, "There is something ineffably cool in the way the extremists of the Democracy have of saying they are willing to let by-gones be by-gone," complained the Cincinnati Commercial. "It is like one convicted of an 'unpleasantness' in business, asking to be placed in a situation of trust, and, when his past character is inquired into, drawing himself up with dignity and saying that he... will not insist upon a discussion of such old events." As yet, the table for the banquet of sectional reconciliation could not be set.

White supremacy was the cornerstone of the Democrats' strategy in 1868, and with vice-presidential candidate Blair leading the offensive, they conducted one of the most explicitly racist presidential campaigns in American history. Republicans had oppressed the South, claimed Blair in one speech, by subjecting it to the rule of a "semi-barbarous race of blacks who are... poligamists... and destined to 'subject the white women to their unbridled lust.'" The specter of black equality animated the Democratic press across the land. "Let white men rule America!" screamed an editorial in the Louisville Daily Courier, arguing that Republicans preferred "native negroes to native whites." In the minds of many Democratic editors, race theory and racial fear worked hand in hand with antiradical politics. Republican misrule, went the argument, had stolen the rights of whites and disrupted the natural place of blacks in society. Fear of the "amalgamation of the races," combined with the "monstrous... negro equality doctrine," as the Louisville editor put it, provided the Democrats a potent political ideology.
election and others to follow, the road to reunion would pass through endless miles in the dangerous wilderness of American racial thought.

Mingling honor, state rights, and racism, Southern Democrats initiated the arguments and tactics that eventually led to the “redemption” of their states in the 1870s. In July 1868 in Atlanta, a former Confederate senator from Georgia, Benjamin H. Hill, portrayed a South under tyrannical, oppressive rule by a “foreign power,” driven by “hate” and determined to “dis-honor an unarmed people.” Amidst all the South had lost—property, cities, loved ones—Hill admonished his fellow Georgians never to surrender their “honor as a people.” In language understood across white class lines, he declared that any Georgians who acquiesced in radical Reconstruction were rendered “slaves” to the Republican Congress, and among their fellow Southerners, they were simply “becoming a negro.” The presidential election of 1868, Hill insisted, turned “upon the glorious ancestral doctrine that the States are equal and that white blood is superior.” Memories rooted in such creeds of blood, soil, state equality, and honor (products of both defeat in war and a developing sense of victory over Reconstruction) provided the political fuel for the white South's long struggle to win the peace.

White Southern editors used the election of 1868 to advance the image of the beknighted South—conquered, violated, but unbowed. “We had hoped,” said the Athens, Georgia, Southern Watchman, “that after the surrender we would have peace.” Southerners quietly submitted to the harsh terms . . . although a violation of the proudest heritage of the United States Government, and . . . humiliating to their pride and ruinous to their interests.” The Southern bloody shirt was a populist weapon of white solidarity. “Radicalism,” announced another Southern Watchman editorial, “has murdered your sons, brothers, husbands and fathers” and “proposes to elevate the negro above the white race.” According to some Southern editors, the coming election and Republican rule threatened race war, and such a prospect united former foes in racial solidarity. “When a war of races commences,” declared the Savannah Daily News and Herald, “the ‘rebels’ who under Lee were victorious on many a hard-fought field and the soldiers under Grant who received their surrender at Appomattox . . . the veterans of Sherman and the heroes of Beauregard . . . will march shoulder to shoulder in battle array in defense of their race and kindred.” In this language, the bloody shirt became a white man's talisman, not merely a Yankee politician's appeal to stay in office.

But no one surpassed the bloody shirt rhetoric of Republican orators and editors in 1868. If war is politics by other means, then postwar American politics was still war by other means. At the beginning of the campaign, George William Curtis wrote a public letter in which he likened Grant's campaign to a Union army still in the field. “Grant will enter the White House next year as surely as he entered Richmond three years ago,” announced Curtis, “and against the same opposition.” Curtis asked voters to remember “the bloody years from Sumter to Appomattox, to reflect [on] who and what made those years,” and then “bring the rebellion at the polls, as it had already brought it in the field, to unconditional surrender.” Near the end of the campaign, the abolitionist Wendell Phillips gave a speech in Boston in which he demanded an ideological focus to the Republican cause. “We have just finished a war between two ideas,” said Phillips. “We sent our armies to South Carolina to carry our ideas. If we had no right to carry our ideas we had no right to send our armies.” Only Republican victory could hold together the revolution in ideas (racial equality, public schools) just begun in the South. “Seymour's election,” declared Phillips, “is Lee's triumphing at Appomattox.” The New York Tribune kept the theme of war memories on a personal level for Northern voters, declaring that across the North, "empty sleeves" blew in the wind "against broken ribs" and "about crippled bodies."

Black spokesmen as well could wave the bloody shirt. Black voters should throw themselves into the canvass, argued the Christian Recorder, with their own memories of "their brothers' lifeless and mutilated bodies piled a hundred deep upon the body of their brave and noble leader before the walls of bloody Wagner." Black Republicans took special exception at ex-Confederate Democrats "stalking abroad throughout the country, before the widows of their murdered and starved victims have left off their habiliments of mourning." The black bloody shirt included "remembering the prayers of the poor slaves down in the cotton fields . . . in the canebrakes, and in the rebel trenches." But at the heart of such rhetoric was the realization, on all sides, that at stake in these elections was just who and what had triumphed in the war.

The role of most ex-Confederates in the Democratic campaign, especially those who came North as speakers, was to build a line of defiance against radical Republicanism and to turn the country away from Reconstruction. But some Democrats tried to use the election of 1868 to forge reconciliation through the prestige of former generals from both sides. In August 1868, former Union general and Democrat William S. Rosecrans went to White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, for an orchestrated meeting with Robert E. Lee and some thirty other ex-Confederates. Rosecrans came, he said, with his
heart in his hand to forge a soldiers' peace. But his aims were thoroughly political. At stake in the struggle over Reconstruction, he claimed, was "credit and currency," the "vast business and commerce of the country." Control over race relations in the postwar South should be left to the former Confederate leaders, who "have the interest and the power to employ, protect, educate, and elevate the poor freedmen." Rosecrans's gesture was an appeal for Lee's imprimatur in the new campaign against Grant, an argument for rapid reconciliation as good business, and an embrace of state rights and white supremacy.

Lee's public letter of response, signed by three dozen Southerners on holiday, including P. G. T. Beauregard and Alexander H. Stephens, was an expression of national peace and healing on Southern terms. Lee admitted that secession and "African slavery" were "questions ... decided by the war." Were it not for certain radical policies, namely black suffrage and the "oppressive misrule" of Northern occupation during the previous three years, Lee contended, "this old irritation would have passed away, and the wounds inflicted by the war would have been in great measure healed." With a paternalistic grace that vast numbers of Americans found appealing, Lee described Southern blacks as "the important part of our laboring population." The "two races" were "necessary to each other," and "relations ... would soon adjust themselves on a basis of mutual kindness and advantage." The two generals seemed almost to be writing from the same script; they postured as though above politics, while participating in a strategy of intersectional cooperation to abruptly end Reconstruction.

Such a strategy did not win at the polls in 1868, but it was a harbinger of things to come. Many Southern newspapers were disappointed with the White Sulphur Springs meeting. The Columbus Sun (Georgia) declared it a "nine days wonder for newspaperdom." The Sun's editor was especially contemptuous of the "apostasy" of former Confederate general James Longstreet, who, though he attended the gathering, refused to sign Lee's letter. Instead, Longstreet embraced the "twaddle of radicalism" by going to New York to participate in a Republican meeting. He was lured, said the Georgia paper, by "a pimp of the New York Tribune." Republican newspapers ridiculed the Rosecrans-Lee exchange. Rosecrans wanted to achieve a "true and enduring peace," said the New York Tribune, "by disfranchising the Blacks and giving all power to the Rebels." The image of the South as victimized and blameless did not wash with Northern voters in 1868. Northerners who had sacrificed loved ones to the Union cause were not yet ready, declared the Cincinnati Commercial, to allow any level of soldiers' mutual sentiment to "put the hands of the dial back a few years." Reconstruction as reconciliation, a process already latent in the postwar culture, was not yet politically acceptable. The Cincinnati editor captured the stakes of the 1868 election: "recognizing the citizenship of all the people of the United States ... and lodging in the Constitution other results growing out of the conflict of arms." Within a decade or so, however, soldiers' memories profoundly influenced political affairs and helped forge a level of popular forgetting that enabled the Rosecrans-Lee script for reconciliation to reach a new consensus.

Grant's election victory in 1868 gave Republicans an unwarranted sense of permanence and optimism. Especially with the passage in February 1869 of the Fifteenth Amendment (declaring the right to vote regardless of race, but not outlawing qualification tests), Northern Republicans seemed ready to declare Reconstruction over. In April 1869, Henry Adams wrote that Reconstruction, due to Southern acquiescence in the election results as well as to a growing prosperity, "has lost much of its old prominence in politics." In the aftermath of the election, Republicans felt released to engage in triumphant retrospection. According to Greeley in the New York Tribune, all the issues of the war—the permanence of the Union, black freedom, and equal civil and political rights—were "settled forever by the election of Grant." The Christian Recorder celebrated Grant's election as the "day of burial" not only for slavery, treason, but also for the doctrine of State Rights, which like a demon has vexed the nation more than all these, the burial of the demon of American prejudice against the negro." Given the strong belief in America that the solutions to all problems are essentially political, such faith in the doctrine of guaranteed rights before law is understandable in 1869-69. Moreover, the sheer power of religious faith in black communities, bolstered now by experience, reinforced African American optimism. The sense of finality about Reconstruction by the end of the 1860s was a combination of wish fulfillment and a reasonable summing up of a decade of profound change. At the very least, many Republicans, black and white, seemed to breathe a sigh of relief; they took a victors' holiday of celebration and thanksgiving.

But voices of caution and alarm also joined the celebration, and soon their warnings assumed an angry tone. At a speech in Boston in December 1869, Wendell Phillips rejoiced in the creation of black citizenship but demanded federal enforcement of all Reconstruction measures in the South. Phillips called for "a squad of soldiers in every voting district in the thirty-eight States," regardless of the risks. "Better despotism than anarchy." Most of all,
Phillips warned against the new mood overtaking national memory. "We have got an idea that forgiveness of everybody," said Phillips, "is a virtue. We have got an idea that Christianity consists in putting our own eyes out, not knowing good from bad . . . just from unjust." Phillips's urgent demand of the new Congress was that they "fortify against the coming magnanimity."17

In 1870, as he began to edit the New National Era in Washington, D.C., Frederick Douglass tried to build an ideological fire wall against the new magnanimity. With the resurgence of the Democratic Party in the South, and the waning of radicalism in the Republican Party, Douglass described the American people as "destitute of political memory." If Republicans would stand as the party of memory, Douglass was happy to carry their banner. He comprehended Reconstruction as a political and moral challenge to save the emancipationist results of the war. Like so many others in the South and North, Douglass understood that, as time passed, those who controlled the political legacies of the war could shape America. On Memorial Day, 1871, Douglass delivered a speech in the newly created Arlington Cemetery, just across the Potomac River from Washington, D.C. Standing at the mass grave of the unknown Union dead, on the former property of Robert E. Lee, the old abolitionist raged against forgetfulness:

We are sometimes asked in the name of patriotism to . . . remember with equal admiration those who struck at the nation's life, and those who struck to save it—those who fought for slavery and those who fought for liberty and justice. I am no minister of malice . . . I would not repel the repentant, but . . . may my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth if I forget the difference between the parties to that . . . bloody conflict . . . I may say if this war is to be forgotten, I ask in the name of all things sacred what shall men remember?18

By 1870, most white Southerners viewed Reconstruction as a hated, imposed regime. In an editorial taking stock of the decade of the 1860s, the Louisville Courier-Journal never mentioned the end of slavery. The Louisville editor glorified state rights, on the ruins of which "this thing called Reconstruction" had been built. The "peace" that reigned was "only that . . . which is a cessation of actual hostilities . . . the peace of the empire." The suffering South, he said, was ruled by bayonets and "obnoxious constitutional amendments." An exchange between the Louisville paper and the Cleveland Herald demonstrated the raw animosity out of which an unstable peace grew.

The Ohio paper rejoiced in the election of the African American Hiram Revels from Mississippi to the U.S. Senate. Revels's appearance in the Senate, said the Herald, provided the "exclamation point of the rebellion." Definitions of war guilt and causation were at stake. "The origin of our 'late unpleasantness'—way back in the past," declared the Cleveland paper, "was a determination on the part of the slaveowners to humanize slave bondage." But in the Louisville editor's understanding, "the war originated in nothing the slaveowners did . . . or desired to do." The war's cause was the "destruction . . . the moral gangrene which curses every community in which New England's influence is felt."19 In such venomous differences over the causes of the war, one can see why the most vigorous advocates of reconciliation believed they had to banish slavery and race from the discussion. The bitter experiences of Reconstruction, and the impossibility of a postwar consensus on the war's causes, all but guaranteed the irresolution deep at the heart of Civil War memory.

As military Reconstruction neared its end, and as most ex-Confederate states were restored to the Union, many radicals acquiesced in the limited character of the Fifteenth Amendment (its lack of restrictions against voter qualification tests, and its avoidance of black suffrage rights in the North). With its ratification in spring 1870, the voting rights amendment absorbed a quick reputation as the final act of Reconstruction. Even Wendell Phillips rejoiced in April that blacks were now "panoplied in all the rights of citizenship." Republicans had provided blacks with an "ample shield" for their political security, even if more had to be done for their economic security. "Ploughing its laborious, but no longer doubtful, course through heavy seas," Phillips concluded, "the bark of that race nears a safe harbor."20 Such optimism from radicals soon seemed strangely out of place as violence and fraud began to crush black political liberty in much of the South.

African American spokesmen uttered many warnings during these years about declining radicalism, the ascendant white counter-revolution in the South, and the need for black forbearance. In a public letter to the "National Convention of Colored Citizens of the United States," held in Washington, D.C., in 1869, AME bishop Daniel Alexander Payne called blacks to political vigilance and moral and material uplift all at once. "In no portion of the Southern States where the whites are in majority," wrote Payne, "is the life of a colored person safe, unless he or she exhibits both in word, and deed, the spirit of a slave . . . the heel of the oppressor is still upon the neck of the colored American." A few months earlier, Benjamin Tanner had answered his
own headline question, "After Emancipation and Enfranchisement, What?" by reminding blacks of their "special . . . history," in which slavery had given them a different cultural and educational starting line than whites. Anticipating Phillips's "ship" metaphor, Tanner suggested that only the earliest chapters of black destiny in America had been written. "A ship beating about the shore," he wrote, "with bow and stern inverted, cannot be said to have begun its voyage."

Yet black political optimism and self-assertion in these transforming years had to coexist with fear of white reaction. As blacks adjusted their collective and individual memories to the new age, they did what all peoples have done while undergoing revolutionary change—they marched ahead, seizing new hopes and skills as they could and worrying about the weight of their past. The new dawn of freedom was on one side of the scale of their destiny, and slavery's many legacies occupied the other side. As they looked backward and forward and imagined their "ship" of fate, most probably saw it in midcourse, neither floundering on its original shore nor anchored in a safe harbor. Theirs was an ongoing struggle for which they were newly equipped and uniquely burdened.

In many areas of the South, part of the burden that blacks carried was living with violence, both real and threatened. Terror, organized and random, was a persistent part of politics in the postwar South. Black folklore, fiction, and reminiscence have reflected the legacy of violence that began during Reconstruction. Many ex-slaves remembered the Ku Klux Klan as part of a continuum from former slave patrols to Lynchings to numerous forms of vigilante violence in the South well into the twentieth century. "They used to be the Ku Klux Klan organization," recollected Charles Anderson in the 1930s. "That was the pat-rollers, then they called them the Night Riders, and at one time the Regulators." South Carolinian Frances Andrews told of how "after the war, the 'bush-whackers,' called Ku Klux, rode there [Wallace plantation, Newberry, South Carolina]. Preacher Pitts' brother was one. They went to negro houses and killed the people. They wore caps over their head and eyes." Klan lawlessness and black vulnerability were so ubiquitous for periods in South Carolina that eighty-seven-year-old Anderson Bates answered an interviewer's query: "Does I 'member anything 'bout de Ku Kluxes? Jesus yes! My old master, de doctor, in goin' round, say out loud to people dat Ku Kluxes was doin' some things they ought not do, by 'stortin money out of
	niggers just 'cause they could." In that phrase, "just 'cause they could," Bates captured one of the meanings violence attained as an integral part of Reconstruction. Protection of freedmen's rights and safety was so lacking that attacks and intimidation became an all too regular element of Southern life.

Mob violence and eventually lynching were so deeply embedded in black folk memory that virtually every major African American writer since emancipation has made these subjects central to his or her work in poetry and prose. The sheer persistence of themes of ritualized violence in black writing indicates, as one critic has argued, that a form of "racial memory" took hold, that the black writer has served as a "kind of ritual priest in ever keeping before his black audience the essence of one of the forces that have shaped their lives." Such a literary tradition began at least as early as William Wells Brown's novel Clotel (1853), in which an "impudent" slave is ritually executed, indeed burned, before a crowd of four thousand slaves brought from nearby plantations to witness the spectacle. Such stories were repeated time and again in numerous novels such as Charles Chesnutt's The Marrow of Tradition (1901), which retells in fiction the story of the 1898 racial massacre in Wilmington, North Carolina, and Pauline Hopkins's Contending Forces (1900), which made central themes of mob violence, the rape of black women, and the intergenerational transmission of such a history. Walter White's The Fire in the Flint (1924) ends with a ritualized burning of a mutilated lynching victim in the public square of a Southern town, in front of the local Confederate monument.

Most poignantly, James Weldon Johnson's The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man (1912) recounts the story of a young black intellectual passing for white and traveling through the South. The ex-colored man's journey ends shockingly as he witnesses a lynching in a Southern railroad yard. As though he spoke for the black post-Reconstruction generation's inescapable memory of such violence, both real and threatened, Johnson's protagonist describes the scene:

A railroad tie was sunk into the ground, the rope was removed, and a chain brought and securely coiled round the victim and the stake. There he stood, a man only in form and stature . . . His eyes were full and vacant, indicating not a single ray of thought. Fuel was brought from everywhere, oil, the torch; the flames crouched for an instant as though to gather strength, then leaped up as high as their victim's head. He squirmed, he writhed, strained at his
chains, then gave out cries and groans that I shall always hear... his eyes, bulging from their sockets, rolled from side to side, appealing in vain for help... I was fixed to the spot where I stood, powerless to take my eyes from what I did not want to see. (emphasis added).

In black folk memory over time, the violence of slavery, the mob terror of the Reconstruction years, and the long history of lynching that took on highly ritualized forms by the 1890s had to be remembered and exorcised all at once. As Johnson's character says, these were stories people did "not want to see" but could "always hear."

The bulk of white Southerners had experienced the psychological trauma of defeat; their world had been turned upside down, and they simply could not abide the presence of assertive blacks wearing uniforms and carrying guns, organizing Union Leagues, or voting and serving in the legislature and on the judicial bench. Most white Southerners found intolerable the collective and individual demonstrations by blacks of their public identities as citizens during the years of radical Reconstruction. White rage led quickly to individual and organized violence against the churches, schools, homes, farmsteads, and bodies of black citizens, as well as against their white Republican allies. As historian George Rable has written, altering Clausewitz's famous dictum, "for the South, peace became war carried on by other means."

Violence left Reconstruction's most difficult and twisted legacy. Few white Southern intellectuals wrote as directly, if defensively, about the peculiar Southern proclivity to violence as Wilbur Cash. In *The Mind of the South* (1941), Cash maintained that the South of Reconstruction became the new "frontier the Yankee made." White Southerners, even the "better men," unleashed on emancipated blacks a fury born of lost battles, lost mastery, alleged political repression, and the necessity of finding the "scapegoat" through which to "strike at Yankeedom." Stranded in time and circumstances seemingly created by the conquerors, white Southerners, in Cash's terms, "let their own hate run." Evil almost always has a historical logic, and therefore an explanation. Historian Sheldon Hackney has suggested that the source of Southern violence rests in "a Southern world view that defines the social, political, and physical environment as hostile and casts the white Southerner in the role of passive victim of malevolent forces." To locate the significance of Reconstruction violence in American memory, we must seek it not only in the darkness of evil, but as Hackney says, in "the sense of grievance that is at the heart of the Southern identity," however mythical that grievance's origins or horrible its outcomes.

In Southern lore, in formal history, and eventually in popular culture, the Klan, as the saviors of Southern society, racial order, and white womanhood, attained a heroic image in American memory, a place from which the organization could be dislodged only during the latter half of the twentieth century. As Primo Levi has written of the memory of genocidal violence, "the end point of the deformation of the memory of a committed fault is its complete suppression." Such suppressions of memory and responsibility can be the result of a "deliberate intent to lie, but in other cases we are faced with a fossilized lie, an ancient lie frozen into a formula." Nothing in the popular Southern and national image of Reconstruction by the turn of the century caused more spirited defense or aggressive evasion than the role of the Klan and violence in the white South's overthrow of Reconstruction.

In two widely popular books, *The Leopard's Spots* (1902) and *The Clansman* (1905), Thomas Dixon Jr., a North Carolinian born during the war, provided the Klan and its violence with its most enduring romantic mythology. *The Clansman* became a popular success as a stage production as well as a novel, and provided the basis for D. W. Griffith's epic film *Birth of a Nation* (a collaboration with Dixon) in 1915. Dixon's vicious version of the idea that blacks had caused the Civil War by their very presence, and that Northern radicalism during Reconstruction failed to understand that freedom had ushered blacks as a race into barbarism, neatly framed the story of the rise of heroic vigilantism in the South. Reluctantly, Klansmen—white men—had to take the law into their own hands in order to save Southern white womanhood from the sexual brutality of black men. Dixon's vision captured the attitudes of thousands and forged in story form a collective memory of how the war may have been lost but Reconstruction was won—by the South and by a reconciled nation. Riding as masked cavalry, the Klan stopped corrupt government, prevented the anarchy of "Negro rule," and most of all, saved white supremacy. They were the noble founders of a new, reunited nation, the white Lancelots of the American reunion. The Klan thus found a place as a frozen formula (Levi's "fossilized lie") in the mainstream of American historical consciousness.

With time Dixon's brand of radical racism became an embarrassment within the genteel South. But at the turn of the century, the theory of black retrogression and the sympathetic explanation of Southern violence during
Reconstruction were widely held assumptions about American history. Dixie after the War (1906), a popular history of the Reconstruction era by a Virginian, Myrtle Lockett Avary, nurtured the popular legends of Reconstruction. “With freedom,” she announced, “the negro, en masse, relapsed promptly into the voodooism of Africa. Emotional extravaganzas, which for the sake of his health and sanity, if for nothing else, had been held in check by his owners, were indulged without restraint.” Avary derided the political activity of blacks in Union Leagues, claiming that these “secret” societies committed acts of oppression against white Southerners far worse than anything the Klan ever did. According to Avary, “the swing back to savagery the instant the master-hand was removed” provided the “inflammable material upon which political sharps played without scruple” upon Southern blacks.29

Avary plied the Southern imagination about Reconstruction with an indiscriminate use of quotation marks from her personal sources and with a flood of alleged “facts” about black rapists and white female victims. According to Avary, Southern white women lived during the postwar years as “prisoners of fear.” She detailed one story of an 1870 lynching where a heroic mob followed strict orders not to drink liquor and not to mutilate the body of the executed. Avary took pride in writing dialect. After the black man pleaded for his life, saying “But fo’ Gawd, gent’man, ef a white man fom de Norf hadn’t purt in my hede dat a white ‘oman warn’ none too good fu,” Avary clinically describes how “word was given, and he dropped into eternity.” Avary depicted the pattern of lynching in more recent times when the “moderation” of the Reconstruction era had collapsed into “orgies of vengeance.” But she felt assured of the legacy of the earlier era, and portrayed the original Klan as a necessary, if unfortunate, outcome of social chaos and an arm of community justice. In the spirit of reconciliation, Avary placed the racial violence of Reconstruction in the comfort zone of national progress. “Informed Northerners,” she opined, “will concede that the evils of the day justified or excused the Klan’s existence. For my part, I believe that this country owes a heavy debt to its noiseless white horsemen, shades of a troubled past.”30

Troubled indeed. The vision of Dixon, Avary, and other Klan apologists deformed the reality of the white counterrevolution during Reconstruction. The Ku Klux Klan was founded as a social club composed of young Confederate veterans looking for amusement in their small town of Pulaski, in Giles County, Tennessee, in 1866. It took root, though, in the social chaos and bitterness of the immediate postwar years in many regions in the South. Within a year, its rituals and initiation ceremonies gave way to more systematic acts of abuse against the independence of the freedpeople. In August 1866, the Giles County Freedmen’s Bureau agent, Captain George E. Judd, reported a heightened hostility toward Yankees and the freedmen. “The people do all they can to degrade them [blacks],” said Judd, and keep them down to what they see fit to call their proper place.” “The consequence,” the agent continued, was that blacks had to fight their way against the abuse of the whites and from being cheated out of the proceeds of their labor.” The fight had only begun. When a black saloonkeeper in Pulaski hung out a sign on the front of his place that read “Equal Rights,” it was torn down the same day by a group of local whites. Such encounters and abuses escalated into much worse “outrages” in 1867–68, as the Klan spread to virtually every Southern state.31

The Klan was never a well-organized conspiracy; it tended to be largely rural and local in character. It thrived where the Democratic and Republican parties, as well as the two races, were in relative balance. The Klan’s purposes were essentially political; it sought to maintain white supremacy and to restore labor discipline and economic dependency among the freedpeople. Klansmen, and their thousands of silent supporters, aimed to destroy the Republican Party, serve the resurgence of the Democratic Party, and overthrow Radical Reconstruction. Although the Klan by itself did not succeed in overthrowing a Reconstruction government in any Southern state per se, it launched a pattern of counterrevolutionary violence and political intimidation that helped accomplish that end in the 1870s. By whippings, rapes, the burning of houses, schools, and churches, and hundreds of murders and lynchings, the Klan wanted to win back as much of a status quo ante bellum as they could achieve. Their victims were teachers, black students, white and black politicians, and uncounted numbers of freedmen and their families who participated in Republican politics or gained some economic autonomy.32

Black politicians and delegates to conventions were especially vulnerable to Klan violence. At least 10 percent of the black members of constitutional conventions in the South in 1867–68 became victims, including seven who were murdered. The Klan often attacked only individuals. Sometimes, however, it launched wholesale attacks on communities or broke up Republican rallies. These attacks occasionally resulted in large casualties, such as one in October 1870 in Greene County, Alabama, where four blacks were killed and fifty-four wounded, or another in 1870 in Laurens County, South Carolina, where after Republicans won a local election, some 150 blacks were chased from their homes and thirteen murdered. In South Carolina alone, from the
fall elections of 1870 to April 1871, formal testimony recorded some thirty-eight murders and hundreds of whippings. In Meridian, Mississippi, in 1871, local black orators were arrested for delivering "incendiary speeches." At a court hearing, gunfire erupted, and the white Republican judge and two defendants were killed. In a day-long riot that followed in Meridian, some thirty blacks were slaughtered by mobs.

The majority of Southern counties did not experience Klan violence, but in those many that did, selective political assassinations destroyed the Republican Party and rendered independent black political and economic life untenable. As many as 150 people, mostly black, may have died in political violence in Jackson County, Florida, between 1868 and 1871. In some counties of northern Alabama (especially Madison, including the town of Huntsville), Klan beatings and hangings became weekly and even daily events during the election months from the presidential contest in the fall of 1868 to the Congressional canvass in August 1869. One scholar has estimated that approximately four hundred lynchings were committed by the Klan in the period 1868–71 alone across the South. Lynching is usually associated with the 1890s and the first decades of the twentieth century. But in Kentucky alone, one estimate suggests that in the first ten years after the war, at least three hundred people, mostly black, perished at the hands of lynch mobs, and that during the period 1867–71 in rural counties of central Kentucky, as many as twenty-five lynchings occurred per year.

Fortunately, state governments and the U.S. Congress launched investigations of Klan violence during Reconstruction, leaving thousands of pages of testimony from which to imagine the fate and hear the voices of the victims as well as some of the perpetrators of this reign of terror. In widespread hearings, an initial collective memory of violence emerges from the interstices of fact, fable, denial, and grief. Some Southern states held hearings to determine the extent of Klan activity. In Tennessee, many freedmen, as well as Union army veterans and white schoolteachers, testified about beatings and murders. Several gave accounts of a particularly bad rampage by Klansmen on the Fourth of July, 1868, in Giles County. Among the victims was John Dunlap, a white principal of a black school who was dragged from his home in the dark of night by a mob of fifty. Dunlap described his ritual whipping: "They then stood me in the middle of the road, and ordered me to let down my pants; then turned my shirt up over my head, and fastened it. They then struck me each five licks." From Maury County, Tennessee, a black former Union soldier, Charles Belefont, testified for hundreds of others with similar nightmare
experiences: "They came to my house one Saturday night... and took me out... about one hundred yards and stripped me. There were nine in this gang: each one of them whipped me." Asked the reason for his beating, Belefont replied: "They said I was a damned nigger and had been a Yankee soldier." Many witnesses at the Tennessee commission hearings described the elaborate costumes and masks of the Klan, with red and white gowns, drapings over their horses, and special flags. Some blacks testified to resistance as well as their own humiliation. Lewis Stegall, from Marshall County, described himself laid out on a rock, blindfolded, his shirt pulled over his head, and his drawers ripped down. Just as Klansmen began to administer five lashes apiece, they were fired upon from the woods by his black rescuers; the mob dispersed but not before shooting and wounding Stegall. Stegall escaped and went to live in Nashville; his loss was immense. "I left half interest in thirty-six acres of cotton," said Stegall, "about twenty acres of corn, and one third of about twenty acres of wheat." Expressing a pattern that would recur again and again in such hearings over the next three years, Stegall declared: "I fear to return to my home, in consequence of the state of feeling against me, which is common to all colored men who voted the Radical ticket."99

In a series of Enforcement Acts in 1870-71, Congress moved to protect the rights of citizens against intimidation and terror in the South. The third, and most sweeping enactment, the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 1871, made private acts of violence, as well as any offenses against the political rights of individuals and their right to equal protection of the laws, punishable under federal law and enforceable by federal troops. The Klan Act even authorized the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and thus launched a bitter partisan struggle over the idea of jurisdiction and Constitutional authority. Democrats never accepted any of the Enforcement Acts and devoted much energy to their repeal. Republicans exhibited considerable hesitation about such an extension of federal power, but in the end, the sheer necessity of a forceful response to Klan violence compelled them to act. As part of this effort to stop the Klan, Congress decided to organize the KKK Hearings, the largest investigation of its kind ever attempted by the U.S. government.96

Composed of seven senators and fourteen representatives, the Joint Select Committee to Inquire into the Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States first assembled in Washington, D.C., in March 1871. The first hearings, which began in May 1871, investigated only North Carolina. As those hearings ensued through the summer, other subcommittees, consisting of Congressmen of both parties and utilizing detectives hired to assemble detailed evidence on Klan atrocities, opened hearings in South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi. The hearings were often highly partisan, with Republican majority and Democratic minority representatives producing witnesses designed to contradict the other side. The hearings also faced enormous hostility from the Democratic Southern press, some of which conducted campaigns of misinformation. Many Southern newspapers and politicians labored hard in 1871 to convince voters that the Klan hearings were nothing more than an elaborate Republican effort to fabricate "outrage" stories as preparation for the 1872 presidential campaign. The notions of Yankee "despotism" and "bayonet rule," so crucial to the developing legend of Reconstruction that would eventually freeze Southern and national memory of the period, were widely aired during the nearly nine months of KKK investigations.97

These public hearings are a unique testament of how law and order collapsed in many areas of the South, and to the shuddering brutality of many white Southerners toward blacks and any whites judged to be complicitous with the Yankee conqueror. They are America's first public record where ordinary freedmen, public officials, poor white farmers, Klansmen, and former Confederate generals came before federal officials and described, or evaded, what the war had wrought—a revolutionary society that attempted forms of racial equality without the means or ultimate will to enforce them against a counterrevolutionary political impulse determined to destroy the new order. The hearings were designed to produce prosecution and justice. Some justice was achieved, but the reconciliation that the country ultimately reached ironically emerged through avoidance and denunciation of the mountain of ugly truths recorded in those hearings.98

Klan violence against blacks in the Reconstruction South succeeded especially in its uses of fear. For so many victims of the violence, the emotional and ideological legacies of their experiences endured as part of individual and community memories. These dangerous and painful memories undoubtedly caused conflicted emotions of guilt and rage, humiliation and vengeance, and profound distrust. If raw memories and bitter hostilities still drove the national political discourse during at least the decade of Reconstruction, how could it have been any different in the hearts and minds of black and white Southerners? Mob violence injected poisons into Civil War memory that only resistance, decades of time, and turns in history could begin to eradicate.
Torture, almost by definition, drives human beings beyond their limits of endurance and understanding. "Whoever was tortured, stays tortured," wrote Auschwitz survivor Jean Amery; "whoever has succumbed to torture can no longer feel at home in the world. Trust in the world ... will not be regained." Klan violence was never so systematic as the Nazi Holocaust; the death of freedmen or white Republicans was never its sole aim. But in their testimonies many victims left clues to the burdens with which the survivors of Klan terror lived. Dragged from his house in the dark of the night in Rutherfordton, North Carolina, white Republican state legislator James Justice was pistol-whipped, forced to run through streets with "nothing in the world on but the loose shirt that I wear at night," and then beaten. Before telling his own gruesome tale, Justice described the results he had seen of Klan outrages on the bodies of black folk. "I have seen a great many persons in Raleigh," declared Justice, "who have come there and exhibited their persons to anyone who might wish to see them, with their backs lashed, and with wounds from gun and pistol-shots ... I remember to have seen one colored man whose body presented quite a mangled appearance." 30

Klan tortures knew no limits and sometimes collapsed into sadism and rape. In South Carolina, a white schoolteacher was dragged into a clearing, blindfolded, and forced to kiss the naked bodies of a group of assembled blacks. "They made me kiss the negro man's posterior, and held it open and made me kiss it," said the teacher, "and as well as I remember now a negro woman's too, and also her private parts, and then told me to have sexual connection with her." He refused and was beaten. The mob leader then "asked me how I liked that for nigger equality." In his judicial district of North Carolina's central piedmont, Albion Tourgée reported twelve murders, nine rapes, fourteen arsons, and over seven hundred whippings (including one of a woman 103 years old). Asked if he knew of other rapes than the one he reported, North Carolina freedman Essic Harris replied: "Oh yes, several times. That has been very common ... it has got to be an old saying." Harris spoke of a woman named Miss Sally who remarked that when the Yankees came (during the war) "she saw a heap of trouble; but she said the Yankees were gentlemen compared to these Ku Klux." 40

In many sections of the South there were communities of the scarred as well as many mourners for the dead victims. Freedman James Beckwith testified in Columbus, Mississippi, in November 1871, that he had been attacked in his own house by a white-robed mob looking for money. Hanged twice from tree limbs, with his feet apparently dangling just close enough to
the night; men, women, children, and old people of both genders trapped in a psychology of sleepless fright; and people dragged in their nightclothes into fields and ritually whipped, we can only conclude that thousands of black folk in many regions of the South, especially in the period 1868–71, reaped a long-lasting harvest of torture and fear. They became witnesses of terror for their families and communities for generations to come.

Expressions of fear permeate the Klan hearings held in 1871, and this fear constitutes perhaps the deepest layer of the memories that blacks took into the future from the experience of violence. Statements such as "I have not felt safe," or "I was afraid they might come and whip me . . . again," and many other such passages ring through again and again from the testimony of the hearings. After being whipped while "stark naked" by two men he knew well and had been "raised with," Mervin Givens was asked why he did not bring suit against his tormentors. His answer spoke of common sense and the logic of terror: "For fear they would shoot me. If I was to bring them up here and could not prove the thing exactly on them, and they were to get out of it, I would not expect to live much longer." Essie Harris described his area of North Carolina as one where fear governed the daily lives of black folk. Asked if blacks were in a "worse condition now than when in slavery," Harris unreservedly declared, "Of course they must be. They must keep their doors barred up . . . Pretty much all the colored people have their doors barred; they are afraid to keep them any other way." Thousands of blacks simply took to the woods in regions of North and South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, afraid to stay in their homes after they or their neighbors had been attacked, and sometimes their homes burned. "I had laid out in the woods for months," reported a South Carolina freedman, "like I was a dromedary or a hog or a cow afraid to go in to the house; that was hard, I think, for poor negroes." None who experienced these deprivations could have remained unaffected in the long term by such cruelty. Fantasies of revenge or escape must have mixed in the psyches of many blacks with a fear-struck and anguished silence.

The final, 632-page report of the Congressional subcommittees, submitted in February 1872, demonstrates not only the severe partisanship through which Americans interpreted Reconstruction violence, but also the dangerously divided memories that such terror had produced. In the majority report, Republicans may have exaggerated the extent of Klan organization and conspiracy, but they did so with little vindictiveness and a remarkable degree of understanding about the social and economic plight of the South in 1871.

The majority report also left no doubt about the horror of individual acts of atrocity. The authors reprinted the lengthy testimony of South Carolinian Elias Hill. Hill had been stricken since age seven with a disease that had rendered him crippled in both arms and legs. Unable to walk or even feed himself, Hill's freedom had been purchased by his father during slavery. He became a self-taught teacher and Baptist preacher, and after emancipation, he taught in a freedmen's school and wrote business correspondence for other blacks. For his work in a Union League and his alleged "political sermons," Klansmen carried Hill out of his cabin in May 1871, threw him into the yard, beat his deformed body with a horseshoe, and threatened to kill him if he would not send a public disavowal of the Republican Party to the local newspaper. Cringing on the ground, Hill was accused by his attackers of lying. "Upon honor," he cried in response. But "they said I had no honor, and hit me again" (emphasis added). From his experience of abuse, Hill lost any hope of living peacefully in America and made written application to emigrate to Liberia. In highlighting this story of cruelty to a crippled yet literate and publicly active man, the Republicans sought "to put the story of his wrongs in his own language" and demonstrate that Klan violence was an integral part of real politics.

Although the Republican authors of the majority report exercised "forbearance and conciliation" while understanding that "reluctant obedience is all that is to be hoped for" from white Southerners, they were adamant about the need for federal enforcement and prosecution. The "list of men murdered and maltreated" in the nine South Carolina counties where the Klan ruled for months, the report argued, required "the strong arm of the government both to protect its citizens in the enjoyment of their rights" and to stave off an already "initiated war of races." The "experiment of Reconstruction needed more time to succeed, declared the majority report in a combination of passive and active voices, and the freedpeople needed "protection."

The Democratic authors of the minority report fashioned an elaborate version of the victimized and oppressed South, and argued vehemently that most of the alleged Klan violence simply had not occurred. A full-throated appeal to the tragic legend of Reconstruction informed the entire minority report. "History, till now," declared the Democrats, "gives no account of a conqueror so cruel as to place his vanquished foes under the dominion of their former slaves." The Reconstruction Acts, the Freedmen's Bureau, and the radical constitutions had all been "framed by venal adventurers and illiterate negroes." Offices in state governments were "filled with ignorance, vice,
and unblushing corruption." And the South swarmed with carpetbaggers "seizing everything moveable." Thus the "oppressed" (a word used repeatedly) South, "gorged with plunder," endured the cruelties of an imperial conqueror and collected its grievances in the storehouse of memory.46

The minority report from the Klan hearings could have served as an initial script for Dixon's and Griffith's Birth of a Nation. The struggle to control the memory, as well as the politics of Reconstruction, is everywhere apparent in the report. Democrats were fond of quoting Nathan Bedford Forrest, the former Confederate cavalry general and one of the founders of the Klan in Tennessee, whose evasive language in his testimony before the hearings left little doubt of the organization's purpose. "It had no political purpose," claimed Forrest. "I think it was for self-protection." Forging the Klan apologetics that would endure well into the twentieth century, the report declared that "Ku-Kluxism . . . was the legitimate offspring of misrule; it follows and disappears with its parent."47 The vigilante war carried on by the Klan and its minions during Reconstruction left an indelible and voluminously documented legacy. North and South would yet find a way to sentimentalize and reconcile even this element of the war's aftermath. But the failure of racial reconciliation, so crucial to any ultimate working through of the meaning of the Civil War, took root in the Klan's reign of terror in 1868–71. The contested legacy of Klan violence deformed understandings of history, unsettled black memories for decades, inspired white Southerners in their struggle for self-determination and local rule, and most immediately, played a pivotal role in the electoral politics of the 1870s.

The election of 1872 pitted increasingly incompatible memories of war, emancipation, and Reconstruction against one another. Throughout the Ku Klux crises of 1871 and into the election year of 1872, Frederick Douglass remained a vigilant voice for the emancipationist legacy of the war. As the Republican Party prepared to renominate President Grant in June 1872 and fend off the insurgency in its own ranks known as the Liberal Republican movement, Douglass described what he saw as the gravity of the coming election. "The fruits of ten years of labor, suffering, and loss are at stake," wrote the former slave. What hung in the balance in the coming election was the "freedom, equality, and national harmony" forged by the "suppression of a gigantic slaveholding rebellion." Disgusted by what he perceived as the "deceitful cry that all the questions raised by the war . . . are now settled," Douglass warned that "the slave demon still rides the southern gale, and breathes out fire and wrath." Douglass had long interpreted the Klan, Democrats, and the survival of Southern rebellion as a unified political force. While black life and human rights were so insecure, Douglass could not stomach the drumbeats for reconciliation. Douglass resented what he called "this cry of peace! peace! where there is no peace."44 To him, the election of 1872 was still a referendum on the meaning of the war and the survival of Reconstruction.

In 1872, the first Grant administration listed under the weight of corruption and cronyism. Although Grant had stood up to the Klan and used federal authority to put it out of business in the South, the Republican Party under his leadership had become a formalized organization ruled by patronage and ridden with scandal. For much of the party, the wartime idealism and the egalitarian vision of the radical Republicans survived without passion as so many slogans on old banners. By 1871, a "reform" insurgency, led by the German-born Carl Schurz, a former Union general, and by influential intellectuals and editors such as E. L. Godkin of the Nation, had developed within the Republican ranks (it eventually grew into a formidable coalition). At heart, these were men who had always been contemptuous of the activist state that radicals such as Thaddeus Stevens had fashioned out of the war. They were proponents of classical financial liberalism: laissez-faire government, free trade, and the gold standard as moral principles. They believed deeply in the ideas of tradition and progress. The reformers were middle-class and well educated, fearful of class conflict, and determined to curb what they perceived as the dangers of mass politics and universal suffrage.49

One of the liberal reformers' targets, therefore, was the very existence of Reconstruction in the South. These "best men," as they fashioned themselves, wanted governments, North and South, led by each region's "natural leaders." They tended to oppose federal action against the Klan on Constitutional grounds, and favored universal amnesty for ex-Confederates. Godkin led this rhetorical retreat from Reconstruction just as the new order had taken a foothold in the South. "Reconstruction and slavery we have done with," he declared in March 1872, "for administrative and revenue reform we are eager." Demonstrating the stark differences in how the legacies of the war were defined within the old Republican coalition, the Nation's editor answered Douglass's condemnations of "rebels," old and new. "Reconstruction" concluded Godkin, "seems to be morally a more disastrous process than rebellion."50
At the national level, Liberal Republicanism emerged out of alliances of reform Democrats and Republicans in at least three upper South states: Virginia, Tennessee, and Missouri. In speeches in St. Louis in September 1870, and a year later in Nashville, Carl Schurz launched a crusade for civil service reform, tariff reduction, and various other economic measures such as land grants to railroads. But the South, Reconstruction, and a swelling chorus of reconciliation were primary themes of Schurz’s speeches. “Every sensible man knows that the Civil War is over,” he told the faithful in St. Louis. Any “necessity for exceptional measures for . . . the protection of loyal people” [enforcement of Reconstruction] had “ceased to exist.” To Southern blacks, Schurz gave direct advice: “repel those who . . . strive to seduce and make tools of you, as your most dangerous enemies [carpetbaggers].” In Nashville, Schurz demanded that the Civil War Constitutional Amendments be upheld, but advocated amnesty for all ex-Confederates, cessation of all federal intervention, and “local self-government” in the South by leaders of “property and enterprise.” His call for “fraternal feeling” between the sections and the races seemed hollow at best to blacks while Klan violence continued unabated and the Klan hearings received widespread press coverage.31

During the Liberal Republicans’ ill-fated convention in Cincinnati, held in May 1872, this collection of strange political bedfellows (all alienated from Grant, but of very different persuasions on tariffs, corruption, black rights, and other issues) nominated the quixotic Horace Greeley. Divided and without discipline, the Liberal Republicans woke up after three days of a convention with a candidate that most of the leading lights of their movement opposed, even despised. Greeley’s protectionism was at odds with one of the new party’s founding principles, and the former abolitionist and advocate of black rights now sounded more like a Democrat when he addressed any Reconstruction issue. The central cause around which a reform coalition could be held together was the contest between Reconstruction and reconciliation.

Since his role in paying Jefferson Davis’s bail in 1867, Greeley had been a crusader for sectional reunion. In 1871, Greeley fashioned himself an agricultural reformer and embarked on a lengthy speaking tour of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, ostensibly to speak on farming improvements for the Southwest. But at nearly every stop, he addressed Southerners about the need of reconciliation for agricultural and business growth, and for the development of railroads. In his letters back to the Tribune, Greeley began to carve out an eventual campaign strategy. From Memphis, he observed that perhaps two-thirds of former slaveholders, complaining about labor discipline, would gladly “have their slaves back again.” Greeley wrote of the planter class with genuine sympathy and declared that “years must pass before they can be reconciled” to the new regime. From Vicksburg, Mississippi, he offered many observations on the conditions of the freedmen and claimed that he had “conversed with no black who was not hopeful and confident as to the future of his race.” When Greeley returned to New York, he spoke to a reception at the Lincoln Club-Rooms in Union Square. All the death and sacrifice of the war could have been avoided, Greeley now believed, if Northerners and Southerners had simply traveled and communicated more directly with one another. Half a million men had died, the old editor claimed, simply “because the North and South had failed to understand each other.” While assuring the New Yorkers that the Klan was “no myth,” Greeley believed that if universal amnesty had been instituted right after the war, “there would have been no Ku Klux in 1871.” But Greeley was ready for new issues. “Gentlemen,” he proclaimed, “the past is past . . . I am weary of fighting over issues that ought to be dead.” Thus Greeley readied himself for a run against Grant and Reconstruction. Greeley seemed to believe that all the nation needed to attain from the travails of Reconstruction was a bad memory.

Greeley the reconciliationist was popular in the provinces. Many white Southerners and Democrats across the country signed on early to the idea of a Greeley-led third party. Although the Liberal Republican campaign failed, it is a compelling measure of the degree and character of the reconciliationist impulse in America during Reconstruction. For many, the Greeley candidacy represented a racial, class, and sectional resurgence all at once. Cassius M. Clay wrote to Greeley from Kentucky in February 1872, condemning “the continued persecution of the South by not granting amnesty and by continually decrying them as rebels.” The editor of the Weekly Caucasian in Lexington, Missouri, calling himself an “out and out unreconstructed rebel,” urged Greeley to run for President as a means of ending Grant’s “reckless, corrupt, debauched . . . administration.” This mixture of sincerity, unholy alliance, and opportunism produced a potent force for sectional reunion that could not yet fully crystallize electorally. But in time, it provided a base for other kinds of political and cultural victories.

For many white Southerners it made good sense to suspend the function of the Democratic Party for an election, to join all the apparent anti-Grant, anti-corruption sentiment as a means of achieving their goals of local autonomy and white supremacy. An Arkansan informed Schurz that the “most extreme and prominent Rebels here consider you [Schurz] as the Redeemer of
the country." H. S. Foote of Mississippi endorsed the Liberal Republicans because they promised "future fraternal relations between Northern and Southern men" and an end to the "grinding oppression of carpetbag governments." And a Kentuckian, declaring himself a "friend to the colored race," offered support to the new movement because he felt comfortable that the Liberal Republicans would restore Southerners to "equality" and return blacks to their proper place. The American reunion ultimately grew in many fertile soils—pure sentiment, genuine fervor for healing, white racial solidarity, the mutuality of soldiers' valor, and business interests. But here in 1872, even Yankee moral reformers posed as redeemers of the South.

When Greeley accepted the Liberal Republican nomination in 1872, he put into play one of the longest lasting slogans in the history of the American reunion. He embraced the "New Departure from jealousies, strife, and hate" and declared his confidence that "the masses of our countrymen, North and South, are eager to clasp hands across the bloody chasm which has too long divided them" (emphasis added). In July, the Democratic Party endorsed, or rather accepted, Greeley as its candidate. Many Democrats found Greeley's bizarre campaign hard to champion. But in the end the combined themes of "honesty and peace," code words for many different aims, kept large numbers of Democrats under the Liberal Republican banner. Although a failure at the polls, the appeal to reconciliation drew Democrats like a beguiling siren song. Humiliated by the blunder in nominating Greeley, and eager for an alternative, Schurz may have put it best in his own admission of why he felt "no escape" from his movement's odd creation. He would support Greeley, Schurz told Godkin, because reunion rhetoric could appeal "strongly to those who are in contact with the South and feel the full importance of...the pacification and regeneration of that part of the country."

Hence, in one disjointed address after another, especially on a campaign tour of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky during September 17–29, when he delivered some two hundred speeches, Greeley beat the only drum he and his strange coalition possessed. In Pittsburgh, Greeley offended Union veterans who had just recently held a large convention in that city to endorse Grant. He chastized the soldiers for their continued loyalty to their former general, calling their stand "pseudo-heroic." Greeley paid dearly for that blunder at the polls. In Erie, Pennsylvania, Greeley was met by a local black delegation seeking to shake his hand; he offended them as well, appearing "as though he would gladly forgo the pleasure of the meeting." And in Jeffersonville, Indiana, in an apparent appeal to Democrats, the candidate declared that his long past as an "enemy of slavery," and his advocacy of "the rights, the dignity...of free labor...might have been a mistake." Greeley kept trying to bridge the "bloody chasm," harping on what the New York Times called his "old hobby of reconciliation."

For their part in 1872, the Republicans responded by flogging the Liberal Republicans and their new friends, the Democrats, with the "bloody shirt." When the Greeley campaign resorted to sending former Confederate generals such as John B. Gordon (a Georgia Democrat and Klan operative) into Northern states like Indiana to preach the gospel of the white "superior race" and the "trampled, bleeding, impoverished South," Republicans responded with their own tales of oppression. Imagery of Ku Klux violence filled Republican speeches. "Go vote to burn school houses, desecrate churches and violate women," Benjamin Butler proclaimed in Massachusetts, "or vote for Horace Greeley, which means the same thing." To lose this rhetorical battle about the terms of reconciliation would be tantamount to reversing the battlefield verdicts of 1865 and denouncing the relative success of the federal counterattack on the Klan.

The elitist persuasion of reform liberalism had very little appeal among blacks. Frederick Douglass stumped for Grant everywhere the Republicans would unleash him. Sickened by the "hand clapping across the bloody chasm business," Douglass pilloried the Greeley-led Democrats as the party that had "murdered half a million loyal men to destroy the government and perpetuate slavery." No Republican orator clarified the stakes in 1872 quite like Douglass. The opposition served up a "great love feast of reconciliation cooked by Mr. Greeley" where "Southern brethren are indirectly promised the first seats at the common table." Such a political meal was premature and simply could not be served to the majority in 1872. The Greeley campaign stumbled early and never regained its feet. Grant, running on a platform that still pledged enforcement of the Civil War Amendments, won decisively with 55 percent of the popular vote and by carrying every Northern state. The "bloody chasm" was still both meaningful and politically useful. Within weeks of the election, exhausted and humiliated, Greeley died.

But something else died as well in that election. The 1872 campaign spelled the final collapse of Republican radicalism. Because he loathed Grant and wanted to find other moral paths to protect civil rights, even Charles Sumner, as faithful a champion of black equality as the U.S. Senate had ever seen, had joined the Liberal Republican movement. In July 1872, Sumner responded to a request by black citizens in Washington, D.C., for his counsel.
on the election. Sumner vehemently endorsed Greeley over Grant, reaching into the past to portray the editor as the “life-long abolitionist” and the President as the offender of black equality who, “except as a soldier summoned by the accident of war, never did anything against Slavery.” Sumner urged blacks not to worry about the Democrats joining the Liberals; they had “changed” and had signed on to a “sacred covenant” led by an old abolitionist. Sumner wanted the “two sections and the two races... lifted from the rungs and grooves in which they are now fastened, and instead of irritating antagonism without end, there shall be sympathetic cooperation.” In this strange political year, Sumner suspended judgment about the price of forgetting. That such language of reconciliation was directed at black voters by one of their champions is indicative of how inexorable the process of reunification would be in America. “I am against the policy of hate,” concluded Sumner. “Pile up the ashes; extinguish the flames; abolish the hate.” Sumner enjoyed enormous respect among blacks, but his “just say no to hate” impulse did not make sense to most blacks. The price of suspending memory was just too great to follow a reconciliationist agenda less than a decade after emancipation.

What Douglass called the “peculiar” election left much confusion about just what the Republican Party had come to represent. Under the heat of the third party challenge, Republicans in Congress cut tariffs and passed an amnesty bill, returning citizenship and the franchise to some twenty thousand ex-Confederates. Perhaps most importantly, while defeating the “clasping hands” strategy of the Greeley campaign, Republicans had themselves participated in a vast airing of the idea of reconciliation. Most Republicans were not opposed to reunion; most did not share Douglass’s desire to thwart the reconciliationist legacy until the emancipationist legacy could be permanently secured. In the 1872 election, Reconstruction (meaning federal enforcement of the new regime of black civil and political liberty) had been thrown on the defensive; it was a cause served by memory more than by active commitment. In his classic Reconstruction novel A Fool’s Errand, Albion Tourgée captured with wry insight the waning of radicalism among aging abolitionists: “I don’t wonder,” says the carpetbagger-hero Comfort Servosse to his oldest friend, “that men who had been in what our modern slang denounces the ‘racket’ of the antislavery reform should be tired. I fully realize that a lifetime of struggle takes away a man’s relish for a fight. Old men never become missionaries.” In the spring of 1873, after Grant’s second inauguration, Douglass worried about the “fatigue” and “repose” of the Republican Party.

He summed up much recent political history and looked clear-eyed at the future. “The apparent powerlessness of the enemy,” said Douglass in one of the last editorials in his failing newspaper, “makes us careless about the use of our strength.”

In that same spring, 1873, an economic depression hit America and ravaged the economy. The Panic of 1873 permanently shifted the relationship between labor and capital, and opened fissures of class and labor conflict in ways that Americans had never experienced. If Democrats and racial violence had not put Reconstruction into permanent retreat, economic crises surely did over the ensuing four years. The yearnings for peace and reconciliation (which were often equated with better business growth and relations) now went hand in hand with economic fear, with financial and intellectual elites entrenching themselves ideologically in order to protect private property against the challenges of workers organized in unions and western farmers gathered in Granges. Memories of the war and struggles over the unfinished business of Reconstruction now merged with daily emergencies of economic survival or ruin. These persistent economic agonies of the Gilded Age, coupled with labor violence and farmers’ revolts, eventually made soldiers’ reunions and monument building attractive for their essential “respectability.” Old soldiers were to serve as the people’s equivalent of the “best men” who ran newspapers, magazines, and companies and who increasingly denounced labor unionism and other forms of political democracy. Speaking forcefully for his class, E. L. Godkin identified the “labor question” as the “disease of which this Christian civilization of ours is to perish.” Unchecked, workers’ pursuit of “equality of conditions,” argued Godkin, “will eventually prove fatal to art, to science, to literature, and to law.”

As widespread joblessness swept through America’s major cities in 1874–75, giving rise to a desperate “Work or Bread” movement among the thousands of unemployed, Northerners began to celebrate Memorial Day by routinely decorating Confederate graves like those of the Union dead. This “same attention” to the Confederate dead, said the reconciliationist New York Tribune, now under the editorship of staunch Liberal Republican Whitelaw Reid, showed “that time is softening the asperities growing out of a long civil war.” The whole social fabric needed healing and rebuilding; somehow, confidence had to be secured from the past, since it did not exist in the present. Modes of military memory served as a bulwark against all manner of social disorder that might rise up from the laboring masses. The war and black freedom were slowly but surely becoming the history transferred to memory.
to be invoked as occasions and political imperatives demanded. Civil War memory was the nation’s sectional and racial baggage, hauled into the future; in the final years of Reconstruction, the weight of that baggage, continually laden with the debris of newer conflicts, got only heavier.

Despite its debacle in 1872, the Democratic Party’s role in carrying the weight of Civil War memory shifted startlingly in its electoral victories in the off-year Congressional elections of 1874. Due to the depression, and to widespread distaste for the Grant administration’s scandals, the 1874 elections took on more drama than ordinary Congressional contests. Attacking the new civil rights bill pending in Congress, fanning the flames of white supremacy, and generally benefiting from Republican disaffection from Grantism, Democrats pulled off one of the biggest political upsets in American history. “The Republican Party Struck by Lightning,” shouted a headline in one of that party’s own papers in Buffalo; “Busted. The Radical Machine Gone to Smash,” announced the gleeful Louisville Courier-Journal. The Democrats not only captured the House of Representatives for the first time since before the war, but they did so by turning overnight a Republican majority of 158-88 into Democratic control by 169-109. Democrats won nineteen of twenty-five governors’ races, and in state after state overturned the Civil War era’s political landscape. Even in Massachusetts, the governorship was lost to a Democrat for the first time since 1858. In the South, the Democratic victory meant the destruction of many state Republican parties for the rest of the century; it also restored to Democrats the statehouses and governorships of Arkansas, Alabama, and Florida, leaving only four remaining ex-Confederate states to be “redeemed” from Reconstruction.

Riding economic discontent, the appeal of home rule, and in some states the continued use of terror, Southern “Redeemers” (white Democrats) carried on a counterrevolution that by 1875 eventually had returned them to power in every Southern state but three (Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida). Mississippi joined the ranks of the “redeemed” in 1875 through the infamous “shotgun policy,” an especially violent campaign of abuse and intimidation of black voters that was stopped by federal intervention. In these years of Southern redemption and the steady Northern retreat from Reconstruction, Republicans paid dearly for their recent history of support for black liberty and equality. White fears of an imagined racial equality, coupled

with economic insecurity and increasing hostility toward the activist state, drove Reconstruction into the ground. The black writer and historian William Wells Brown put it succinctly in 1874: “There is a feeling all over this country that the Negro has got about as much as he ought to have.” Most Northern whites retreated to the legal doctrine of “guaranteed rights” and considered the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to be all the nation ever owed the freedpeople.64 Millions of white Southerners, joined by large numbers of white Northerners, now targeted those very Constitutional changes for either destruction or neglect.

With dire consequences for the emancipationist legacy of the war, the Republican Party had become by 1875-76 the party of memory, and the Democrats the party of the future. Politically, a decade after Appomattox, the meaning and memory of the revolution of 1863 faltered in the face of the counterrevolution of 1874. Republican Congressman James Garfield acknowledged that his party’s disaster in 1874 had resulted from “a general apathy among the people concerning the war and the negro.” And in the winter of 1875, at a meeting in Faneuil Hall in Boston about federal intervention in the violent and chaotic politics of Louisiana, Wendell Phillips was shouted down when he spoke up for protection of black rights, prompting the New York Times to conclude that “Wendell Phillips and William Lloyd Garrison are not exactly extinct from American politics, but they represent ideas in regard to the South which the majority of the Republican party have outgrown.”64

Indeed, many Northern papers ran increasingly derisive stories about blacks and Republican rule in the South, many of which served the creation of the tragic legend of Reconstruction. The New York Tribune correspondent interviewed South Carolina black legislator Beverly Nash in May 1875. Nash is portrayed as shrewdly corrupt and enriching himself while ignorant of public policy. “Reputed to have $100,000 laid up,” Nash babbles in dialect during an evasive interview. On only one issue does he seem direct and certain. Asked if he thinks Grant should run for a third term in 1876, Nash demonstrates that Republicans stand for nothing but organizational loyalty supported by ignorant freedmen in office. “It ain’t no use talkin’, Sah,” says Nash, “ef Grant gets de nomination, we’re guine for him. South Carolina’ll vote for de Devil ef he runs on de Republican ticket.... We’d go for Grant, I reckon, ’cause he’s de Boss Devil!” The interview ends with Nash portrayed as a false “High Churchman” who urges people to attend services while he
bills money from the "pockets of the oppressed people of South Carolina." In such widely circulated racist parodies of Southern black politicians, the myth of carpetbag rule gained long-lasting legitimacy.

As America prepared to celebrate the centennial of its independence in 1875–76, African Americans confronted a complex dilemma of allegiance, hope, and memory. Their liberty and rights were the result of the Second American Revolution, although they had always appropriated the ideology of the first. Black freedom was the child of civil war; black rights were the products of blood, destruction, and fierce political conflict. No true national consensus ever gathered around the cause of black liberty and equality except as it was necessary to restoring and reimagining the republic itself. But Americans generally had run low on imagination about racial matters by the time of the centennial. Whether the nation's "new birth" of freedom would be sustained was an unsettled question. Egalitarianism and humanitarianism were tired traditions, and black freedom itself now depended for survival on a ripening sectional reconciliation. The situation was cause for worry and celebration.

On July 5, 1875, Frederick Douglass gave an oration at Hillsdale, outside of Washington, D.C., entitled "The Color Question." Douglass reflected in racialized terms on the impending American Centennial. He fiercely claimed the historical birthright of blacks in America; they "had never forsaken the white man in any great emergency." But at this hundredth anniversary of the founding, the nation, Douglass feared, would "lift to the sky its million voices in one grand Centennial hosanna of peace and good will to all the white race." As a black citizen, he dreaded the day when "this great white race has renewed its vows of patriotism and flowed back into its accustomed channels." Douglass, worried about the hold of white supremacy on America's historical consciousness, looked back upon fifteen years of unparalleled change for his people and asked the core question in the nation's struggle over the memory of the Civil War: "If war among the whites brought peace and liberty to the blacks, what will peace among the whites bring?" (emphasis added). For more than a century since Reconstruction, through cycles of great advancement and periods of cynical reaction in American race relations, Douglass's question has echoed through American political culture.

At that celebration on July 5 outside Washington, John Mercer Langston, the black former abolitionist and now Howard University law professor, also spoke. Both orators mixed their appeals to a beleaguered African American patriotism and citizenship rights with an insistence on black self-reliance. In
day's political battle on the ground, but perhaps they could organize, create their own conditions, and still win the war over memory. They were quite right to ask loudly, as Douglass did, "in what position will this stupendous reconciliation leave the colored people?"

That very same day in Vicksburg, Mississippi, an answer to such a question rang out with terrible clarity. In conjunction with the centennial, and anticipating what a black observer called the "general feeling of amity and fraternity . . . settling in on all sides, both south and north," some two hundred to three hundred black folk from the countryside joined as many from the city for a ceremony at the Vicksburg courthouse. The event was led by white Republican circuit court judge George F. Brown, and two of the most prominent black politicians in Mississippi, superintendent of state public education T. W. Cardozo, and Secretary of State James Hill. A black minister delivered a reading of the Declaration of Independence. Judge Brown spoke with moderation about the "progress of the country." Hill gave more of a political speech, one that was "not ultra," said the correspondent of the Christian Recorder, but "not so guarded and discreet" either. Then a white mob entered the courthouse, ordered the meeting dispersed, and began to beat the black participants as they rushed to the doors and widows in a "panic." Within twenty minutes, some fifty white men had gathered in the courthouse yard, and after a pistol shot signal, the mob opened up with rifles on the remainder of the black crowd, killing two immediately and mortally wounding several others. "Thus ended the ninety-ninth anniversary of American freedom (9)," wrote an eyewitness. The observer, identifying himself only as "Veni Vidi" ("I came, I saw"), laid the blame for this particular massacre at the feet of the "now generous and forgetful northern yankee," and on the New York Tribune for its "continually feasting these red-handed gentry." Veni Vidi saw the very meaning of national reconciliation in the Vicksburg killings at the Fourth of July celebration. "Boston . . . and Ohio," he wrote, "hold the coats of Georgia and Mississippi, while they slay the common victim of northern prejudice and southern hate." The correspondent's recourse was to appeal to future justice, and most poignantly, to the memory of the pivotal passage in Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address: "If it please God that every drop of blood drawn by the lash shall be compensated by another drawn with the sword before this war shall close . . . the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether." From the perspective of the emancipationist legacy, the Declaration of Independence lay shredded on the ground along with the dead victims in Vicksburg and a dozen other Mississippi towns. By 1875, the use of Lincoln's 1865 final call to arms to crush slavery seemed only a sad remnant of a glorious past.

By 1875-76, there were no federal swords of retribution authorized for use in Mississippi or any other Southern state. The will for federal intervention to stop violence and intimidation by "white liners" against blacks and white Republicans had all but vanished. General William T. Sherman summed up and endorsed this loss of will in 1875. "Outside help sooner or later must cease," he wrote to his brother John, "for our army is ridiculously small, in case of actual collision. It is only the Memory of our War Power that operates on the Rebel Element now. They have the votes, the will, and will in the End prevail." Sherman's summation reminds us that the complex drama of Reconstruction—the test of political wills, ideologies, and the durability of revolutions—in the end turned on which memory might prevail: the revolution named and enforced in Lincoln's Second Inaugural, or the Southern Democrats' counterrevolution of the mid-1870s? The freedman casting his ballots and serving in office, or the same freedman shot dead on the ground? The revolution of black freedom or the redemption of white supremacy?

If 1874 was a "referendum on Reconstruction," then the 1876 presidential election gave the country a referendum on reunion. The Republican and Democratic parties faced each other for the first time since before the war as relative equals, represented in both sections. Given the sordid record of scandal of the outgoing Grant administration, the Republicans needed a perceived reformer and an uncontroversial figure at the top of their ticket. They found him by going to their geographical strength in the Midwest, and nominated Rutherford B. Hayes, a Civil War veteran, conservative, and three-term governor of Ohio. Hayes was the first choice of few Republicans, but he was acceptable to all. Importantly, he was a reconciliationist: he wrote carefully in his letter of acceptance that he believed in "honest and capable local self-government" for the South. In such codes, Hayes signaled a Republican abandonment of the last vestiges of Reconstruction.

The Democrats nominated one of the richest men in America, the New York corporate lawyer Samuel J. Tilden. In addition to serving as counsel to railroad kings and bankers, Tilden had helped prosecute and dislodge the Tweed Ring in New York; he therefore carried superb "reform" credentials (in the common use of the term in those years). Tilden's nomination by a party with such commitments to the South, white supremacy, and Reconstruction
is yet another measure of the extent to which sectional reconciliation had come to define the Democrats. The character of the reunion they had sought in 1868, and the one they achieved in 1876, were variations on the same themes.

In the North in 1876 the Democrats ran against the depression and corruption. Thrown on the defensive, Republicans resorted to a habitual, if still useful, rhetoric of the bloody shirt. In the South, Democrats faced determined, although desperate campaigns by Republicans to survive in the three "unredeemed" states. Democrats responded with their own tried and true tactics of violence and intimidation. During 1876, a widespread reign of terror swept over South Carolina, and black voters and Republican politicians in Louisiana, Mississippi, and other states endured economic and physical pressures—and were sometimes murdered. So effective was Democratic intimidation of Republicans in Mississippi that a federal official there called the white population "one vast mob." Cowed Republicans in several states begged the Congress and Grant for protection. Several hundred deputy marshals were dispatched to precincts across the South for the November elections, but their presence turned out to be only symbolic and wholly ineffective against the abuse they encountered. In many largely Republican (meaning black) precincts, few votes were cast.23

The election itself ended in a celebrated, if sordid, dispute; it was so close in the electoral college that when returns in the three pivotal states of Louisiana, Florida, and South Carolina were challenged by both sides, the contest could only be settled constitutionally in the U.S. Congress. So much fraud and intimidation took place in the disputed states that no one may ever know who really won those elections. Undoubtedly, Tilden won the popular vote, and in the weeks and months following the election great tension enveloped the country. Democrats threatened war and promised militias to a cause of "Tilden or Fight." Republicans believed with equal fervor that in a completely fair election Hayes would have won. Rumors spread that in the South, fear and confusion had set in among the freedpeople, many of whom believed that a Democratic victory would mean the reestablishment of slavery. Without the votes counted (or settled) for the three disputed elections, Tilden held a margin in the electoral college of 184–166, one vote short of the necessary number for victory. The nineteen electoral votes in the three states, if penciled into Hayes's column, would give him the White House by 185–184. In the count at least, this is precisely what happened. But the disputed election of 1876 was not really settled by numbers; it ended in an elab-

orate process of deal making at a series of conferences between Democrats and Republicans.

During the tense winter months of 1876–77, as the House of Representatives assembled a returning board to try to "count" the ballots from the disputed states, the politics of fear and blood memory seemed to rule over newspaper rhetoric. The Chicago Tribune ran columns about "Confederate mobs" rising up in Southern cities. Even the reconciliationist New York Tribune, which held out for Hayes, tried to drive a sectional wedge between Northern and Southern Democrats. Honoring the "high courage" of white Southerners, the Tribune put the deaths of "half a million men" at the feet of "Northern Copperheads" (Democrats). "Memories are yet longer, when sealed with blood," proclaimed an editorial. "Perhaps the Northern Democrat fancied that the South had forgotten. But graves last longer than monuments; the South can forget everything sooner than it forgets its dead." The Atlanta Constitution, while advocating peace, printed rumors of semisecret militias drilling in upstate New York under names such as "Sons of Liberty" and the "Phalanx of Loyal Brotherhood." The Constitution also condemned Republican radicals like Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, whom it labeled a "revolutionist," eager to "precipitate a war in which" he might "officiate in bomb-proof positions."24 But in 1877 the bloody shirt, waved in both North and South, did not prevent the two political parties from fashioning an agreement that preserved the Union, promoted economic expansion, and concluded the final chapter of Reconstruction.

The Compromise of 1877 was, indeed, about interests, the desires and needs of Southerners and Northerners as they bargained a divided election result into a plan for political reunion and economic development. Southerners wanted "home rule" and all federal troops removed from their states, demands that Republican managers had promised early in the crisis. Indeed, in February 1877 Congress eliminated the appropriation that would have kept soldiers stationed in the South. Many Southern politicians also wanted major subsidies for internal improvements—new levees, dredged harbors, and at least one transcontinental railroad with a Southern terminus. Manufacturing companies, railroads, and financial firms all wanted a sectional settlement and feared the rhetoric of war. A reunion and an end to agitation over black rights and Reconstruction would be good for business, and many companies flooded Congressmen with petitions urging peace and support of a bill to establish an independent commission to count the votes in the disputed states. In the end, the commission, which consisted of eight Republi-
cans and seven Democrats, voted 8–7 for Hayes as the victor in each disputed state.75

Throughout most of the winter of 1877, Democrats sustained an exasperating filibuster against the possibility of Hayes taking office. But for two days in late February, four Southern Democrats and five Ohio Republicans met secretly at the Wormley Hotel in Washington and reached the final arrangements of a sectional and partisan compromise. The Democrats promised no reprisals against Southern Republicans, and agreed to end their filibuster and allow Hayes to be peacefully inaugurated as President. The Republicans pledged at least one and possibly two cabinet posts to Democrats in Hayes’s administration, gave assurance of money to build the Texas-Pacific Railroad, and agreed to help Democrats take control of the governments in the remaining unredeemed states. On March 4, with much of the nation breathing a sigh of confused relief, Hayes was privately inaugurated at an indoor ceremony in the White House, thus avoiding any possible violence or disruption. At the heart of the Compromise of 1877 was the understanding that Hayes would institute a “new Southern policy,” one that would leave the South alone to deal with all questions of governance and race relations. As for black voting rights, even Grant himself had told his cabinet that he had come to see the Fifteenth Amendment as a mistake, a law that “had done the Negro no good.” By April, Godkin’s Nation had rejoiced in the compromise and announced that the “negro will disappear from the field of national politics. Henceforth, the nation as a nation, will have nothing more to do with him.”76 A reconciliationist vision mixed with racism stood triumphant, ushering the emancipation vision of the Civil War into an increasingly blurred past.

Southern conservative redeemers now increasingly had much in common with those Northern Republicans who sought to further the ends of commerce and thwart labor activism. These two former enemy persuasions were already becoming an odd sort of political coalition, a strange but effective memory community devoted to the ends of national reconciliation and good business. But the compromise, and the version of memory upon which it was based, had enormous stakes. In a section entitled “Memories of Reconstruction” in An American Dilemma (1944), Gunnar Myrdal examined the place of the tragic legend of Reconstruction in American memory. “These memories” (the story of black domination, carpetbagger corruption, and federal tyranny), wrote Myrdal, served the South as “cherished . . . symbols of regional allegiance.” For Northerners and the nation as a whole, he wrote, “playing up the venality . . . of the Reconstruction governments and touching lightly the pride and prejudices of the revolting South is . . . a means of reconciling the wounds of the Civil War.” Peering back through the decades, Myrdal observed a historical “popular demand of the American whites for rationalization and national comfort” in their collective memory of the Civil War and Reconstruction. Myrdal understood that all important matters of collective memory serve deep social needs. The Southerner, said Myrdal, “needs to believe that when the Negro voted, life was unbearable.” Myrdal captured with remarkable insight the meaning and character of the Civil War’s aftermath in American memory. “The myth of the horrors of Reconstruction,” he concluded, had become with time a set of “false beliefs with a purpose.”77 That purpose was the American reunion, achievable in the end only through new regimes of racial subjugation, a fated and tragic struggle still only in its formative years. The sections needed one another, almost as polar opposites that made the center hold and kept both an industrial economy humming and a New South on the course of revival. Some of the war’s greatest results, the civil and political liberties of African Americans, were slowly becoming sacrificial offerings on the altar of reunion.
And let that stone an altar be,
Whereon thanksgivings we may lay,
Where we in deep humility,
For faith and strength renewed may pray . . .

For never let the thought arise
That we are here on sufferance bare;
Outcasts, asylumed 'neath these skies,
And aliens without part or share.

This land is ours by right of birth,
This land is ours by right of toil;
We helped to turn its virgin earth,
Our sweat is in its fruitful soil.

Johnson claims the center of America’s historical memory by right of birth and by right of labor. In the poem’s middle he claims it by right of soldiering, of “blood” and devotion to the “flag”: “We’ve bought a rightful sonship here, / And we have more than paid the price.” As the poem reaches its hopeful ending, Johnson celebrates the abolitionist tradition as America’s national destiny and rejects any shame for blacks in the legacies of slavery. Like the freedpeople in Charleston who marched around the planters’ Race Course and created Memorial Day in 1865, demonstrating their freedom as the true meaning of the Civil War, at the fiftieth anniversary of emancipation Johnson converted that same meaning into the war’s core memory. The assertion and coexistence of this emancipationist memory with all the forces arrayed against it in 1913 demonstrate just how vital it remained. And yet it also testified how divided Civil War memory had become in fifty years and the extent to which blacks had become alienated from the national community’s remembrance of its most defining event.

Epilogue

Only fools forget the causes of war.
—ALBION W. TOURGEE, An Appeal to Caesar, 1884

THE SEMICENTENNIAL of the Civil War stimulated a flood of memories and commemorative activities. In the years that brought Americans to the eve of World War I, the press was full of retrospective consciousness about the Civil War; newspapers and magazines ran special features and series about leaders and battles, and avidly reported reunions and exhibitions. In the spring of 1911, the New York Times urged its readers to “avoid needless celebration” of Civil War anniversaries. “All the battles of the civil war were won by American soldiers,” declared the Times. “All the heroes of that war were Americans.” These sentiments did not stop the paper, however, from running many lengthy commemorative sections on one fifty-year anniversary after another, from Fort Sumter in 1911 through to Appomattox and Lincoln’s assassination in 1915.

Understandably, the dominant mode of memory was reconciliation. In admiring the “love feast” between soldiers of both sections about to occur at Manassas in 1911 on the fiftieth anniversary of the first battle of Bull Run, the Nation acknowledged that the “Civil War day by day” features of many newspapers might annoy the South. But its editor felt confident that when remembrance emphasized “reconciliation rather than conflict,” Americans on all sides would embrace their Civil War as a “triumph of brotherhood.” Still, the occasional white writer in a Northern journal urged caution in probing issues such as race and slavery in relation to the war. In a 1912 essay in the Atlantic Monthly, “The Slave Plantation in Retrospect,” Winthrop Daniels
warned that "despite the lapse of almost half a century, the embers of the great conflict in which slavery perished are still hot, if one but deeply stir the ashes." From pulpits on Lincoln's birthday, Sunday, February 12, 1911, some rabbis and ministers in New York called their congregations to vigilance about the legacy of emancipation. Joseph Silverman reminded an interracial audience at Temple Emanu-El that "though the war is ended and the slaves are freed . . . there are many white Americans carrying on a war as bitter and unjust as that carried on against the Negroes fifty years ago." And the Free Synagogue invited Reverdy Ransom, pastor of the Bethel AME Church, to address its congregation. Ransom celebrated black progress since emancipation, and then called on Jews and blacks to join as "co-partners" against the "veritable inferno" of racial prejudice that both groups faced in forgetful America. The reunion at the semicentennial emerged triumphant, in great part because American culture had succeeded in keeping considerable distance between those who stirred and those who doused the embers of conflict.

In January 1913, Dudley Miles, a French literature professor at Columbia University, published "The Civil War as Unifier," an essay that fashioned a master narrative of reunion. The Civil War's "true significance," wrote Miles, was the rapidity of sectional reconciliation afterward. Contrary to the aftermath of so many other civil wars and revolutions, the American conflict "deepened and spread the sense of nationality" across the land. Miles pointed to several "episodes" of public reconciliation during the fifty years since the war, from Mississippian L. Q. C. Lamar's eulogy of Massachusetts senator Charles Sumner in 1874 to Southern poet Sidney Lanier's nationalistic verses at the Philadelphia centennial celebration in 1876, from Grant's death and funeral in 1885 to Henry Grady's "New South" speech to the New England Society of New York in 1886. He stressed the new "scientific history" that had come of age by the 1890s and served the ends of reunion, and in Southern historical fiction, especially the North's embrace of it, he found the most influential bond of "love" between the former foes. The Spanish-American War of 1898, mutual grief over President McKinley's assassination in 1901, and the return of Confederate battle flags in 1905 all gave Miles confidence that "what makes our Civil War unique is this remarkable sequel . . . an unexampled obliteration of sectional animosities."

In a Southern journal, Miles seemed to speak for the country itself as he declared a "very easy explanation" for such an outcome to fratricidal war. "Electricity . . . industry . . . and commerce" had knit the nation back togeth(geth)er. The "torrent" of a "swifter age" had "swep[ted] away the bitter memories" in favor of trade and economic growth. Miles also stressed a special "restraint" and "political temper" in the American people that helped them forget the past and cement a new nation. In this vision, the Civil War was the good war, a necessary sacrifice, a noble mutual experience that in the long run solidified the nation. In a piece published on the fiftieth anniversary of black emancipation, Miles steadfastly avoided even mentioning slavery, except to acknowledge that the triumph of reunion had been made possible, in part, by the North's recognition of the South's need to overcome the "burden of a crushing social problem" in its own ways. These code words had become so common in American writing that in national memory, the Civil War was now the glorious fated event in which slavery and racial division were "removed," banished from the national story. In this collective victory narrative, the Civil War, followed by an interlude of bitterness and wrongheaded policy during Reconstruction, became the heroic crisis survived, a source of pride that Americans solve their problems and redeem themselves in unity. Much of the emancipationist vision of Civil War memory was so ill-fitted to this reunion narrative that during the semicentennial it simply had to coexist in isolation from national remembrance of an epic fight and an intersectional inheritance of reunion.

At Gettysburg, July 1-4, 1913, an extraordinary festival of reconciliation provided the exclamation mark of the American reunion at its fiftieth anniversary. Behind the enormous tent city, President Wilson's flying appearance, and all the scenes of Blue-Gray fraternalism was a tremendous organizational effort. Public money paid for the transportation and care of the more than fifty thousand veterans who came to the Pennsylvania town as honored guests from every corner of the country. Some one hundred veterans arrived from California, ten of them Confederates. Vermont sent 669 men, four of them listed as Confederates. Nevada and Wyoming were the only states not accounted for at the reunion. The whole event was a logistical and financial triumph. Not only did a small army of souvenir salesmen flood the streets of the town of Gettysburg, but no fewer than forty-seven railroad companies operating in and through Pennsylvania alone were paid a total of $442,282 for the transportation of veterans. One hundred and fifty-five reporters from the national and international press covered the event, which was headlined (along with stunning photographs) during the week of the reunion.5
Where Wilson came to declare the "quarrel forgotten," the nation also witnessed a marvel of efficiency. The Great Camp, covering 280 acres and serving 688,000 meals prepared by 2,170 cooks, laborers, and bakers using 130,048 pounds of flour, warmed the hearts of even the most compulsive advocates of Taylorism, the popular theory of industrial and management efficiency. Frederick W. Taylor's popular Principles of Scientific Management had just been published in 1911, and the Taylor Society had been founded in the same year as the Civil War centennial began. The forty-seven miles of "avenues" completed on the battlefield, lighted by five hundred electric arc lights, provided a perfect model of military mobilization and mass production. Some thirty-two automatic "bubbling ice water fountains" throughout the veterans' quarters offered a delightful example of American technical prowess. Efficiency advocates warmly approved the extraordinary "preparedness" of the Red Cross and the army medical corps in their efforts to provide first-class hospital care for the veterans during the encampment. The average age of veterans at the event was seventy-four, and the Pennsylvania Commission's report celebrated the fact that only nine of the old fellows died during the reunion, a statistic many times lower than the national average for a

group of that age and number. Efficiency enthusiasts could marvel at the ninety modern latrines (men's and women's) constructed all over the encampment. The press was full of celebration of such efficiency. The Philadelphia Inquirer marveled at the "more painstaking care, more scientific preparation and a better discipline than has ever before been known on such an occasion... there never was anything better done in our history." To many, the reunion seemed as much rooted in technological progress, the unity implied in electrification and mass organization, as in the Blue and Gray clasping hands.

The theme of the reunion from its earliest conception in 1909 was national harmony and patriotism—a "Peace Jubilee" as the planning commission announced. Fifty years after Pickett's Charge (and the Emancipation Proclamation, which was utterly ignored during the week's ceremonies), Frederick Douglass's haunting question from 1875—"what will peace among the whites bring?"—received a full-throated answer. Only obscure references exist of the attendance of any black veterans at the 1913 reunion. In a travel memoir, New Jersey veteran Walter H. Blake compiled a reminiscence of his journey to Gettysburg for the event. Blake claimed that "there were colored men on both sides of the lines." The Pennsylvania Commission "had made arrangements only for negroes from the Union side," lamented the New Jersey veteran, "forgetful of the fact that there were many faithful slaves who fought against their own interests in their intense loyalty to their Southern masters." The idea of the faithful slave had penetrated deep into the Northern imagination; Thomas Nelson Page still hovered above even Yankee remembrance.

Numerous black men worked as camp laborers, building the tent city and distributing mess kits and blankets. But nowhere in its published report does the Pennsylvania Commission indicate how many black veterans, if any, attended the reunion. By the commission's rules, black GAR members with documented honorable discharges were eligible to participate. But research has turned up no evidence that any did attend. It may have been especially difficult for black veterans to respond to the reunion's tone and purpose. One of Walter Blake's anecdotes is what he calls a "very pretty little incident" in which "a giant of an old negro, Samuel Thompson," was resting under a shade tree. Some Confederate veterans came up to shake hands with "the old darky" and exchange greetings. It is not made clear whether Thompson was a veteran or not. Blake declares this incident another triumph for kindness and concludes without the slightest sense of irony: "no color line here."
out beyond the throngs of beautiful, if old and frail, men, beyond the spectacle of the tent city and smells of campfires, was a society riven with racial strife. It was a white man’s experience and a white nation that the veterans and the spectators came to celebrate in July 1913. Any discussion of the war’s extended meanings in America’s omnipresent “race problem” was simply out of place. Wilson’s “righteous peace” was far more the theme than Lincoln’s “rebirth of freedom.” At this remarkable moment when Americans looked backward with deepening nostalgia and ahead with modern excitement and fear, Jim Crow, only half-hidden, stalked the dirt paths of the veterans’ tent city at Gettysburg. He delivered supplies, cleaned the latrines, and may even have played the tunes at the nation’s feast of national memory. Jim Crow stalked the streets and backroads of the larger nation as well, and he had recently arrived with a new mandate in the bureaucracies of the federal government. The Civil War had become the nation’s inheritance of glory, Reconstruction the legacy of folly, and the race problem a matter of efficient schemes of segregation.

Reconciliation is, of course, a noble and essential human impulse. But it must be understood within historical time, and as similar to any other political process that results from contests of human wills. Press reports and editorials about the Gettysburg reunion indicate that much a combination of white supremacist and reconciliation memories had conquered all others by 1913. The issues of slavery and secession, rejoiced the Washington Post, were “no longer discussed argumentatively. They are scarcely mentioned at all, except in connection with the great war to which they led, and by which they were disposed of for all time.” To the extent that slavery involved a “moral principle,” argued the Post, “no particular part of the people was responsible unless, indeed, the burden of responsibility should be shouldered by the North for its introduction” (emphasis added). The New York Times hired Helen D. Longstreet (widow of Confederate general James Longstreet) to write daily columns about the Gettysburg reunion. She entertained Times readers with her dialogues with Southern veterans about the value of Confederate defeat and the beauty of “Old Glory.” She also challenged readers to remember the sufferings of women during the Civil War and to consider an intersectional tribute to them as the theme of the next Blue-Gray reunion. The nation’s historical memory, concluded the Times, had become so “balanced” that it could never again be “disturbed.”

The editors of the liberal magazine Outlook were overwhelmed by the spirit of nationalism at the Gettysburg reunion and declared it a reconcilia-
tion of "two conceptions of human right and human freedom." The war, said
the Outlook, had been fought over differing notions of "idealism": "sovereign-
ity of the state" versus "sovereignty of the nation." Demonstrating the de-
gree to which slavery had vanished from understandings of Civil War cau-
sation in serious intellectual circles, the Outlook announced that "it was slavery
that raised the question of State sovereignty; but it was not on behalf of slav-
ery, but on behalf of State sovereignty and all that it implied, that these men
fought." So normative was this viewpoint that the Outlook's special corre-
spondent at the reunion, Herbert Francis Sherwood, could conclude that the
veterans' "fraternity . . . showed that no longer need men preach a reunited
land, for there were no separated people." Such was the state of historical
consciousness in Jim Crow America. Slavery (and the whole black experi-
ence) had no place in the formulas by which most Americans found mean-
ings in the Civil War. The Outlook was both accurate and oblivious in its in-
terpretation of the reunion; thus it could conclude without blinking that
"both sides" had fought for "the same ideal—the ideal of civil liberty." This
is, of course, the equality of motive in Civil War memory for which Southern
advocates had pleaded for decades. In both romance and reality, the Lost
Cause had become the desideratum of national reunion.

Reporters from every section of the country registered their sense of awe at
the symbolism of the Gettysburg celebration. The San Francisco Examiner
declared the "jubilee" to be the "supreme justification of war and battle." Now
"we know that the great war had to be fought, that it is well that it was
fought," announced the Examiner: "a necessary, useful, splendid sacrifice
whereby the whole race of men has been unified." Such martial spirit and
claims of ritual purging were answered (albeit by a minority voice) in the
Charleston News and Courier. The newspaper in the city where secession be-
gan urged readers not to glorify the "battle itself," for it was a "frightful and
abominable thing." If war "thrills us," declared the News and Courier, "we
lose a vitally important part of the lesson." But the Brooklyn Daily Eagle kept
the discussion on a higher plane, allowing simultaneously for a recognition
of Northern victory, Southern respect, and faith in American providential
destiny:

Two civilizations met at Gettysburg and fought out the issue be-
tween them under the broad blue sky, in noble, honorable battle
... In one... the family was the social unit—the family in the old
Roman sense, possibly inclusive of hundreds of slaves. In the other,
acy, not by subterfuge alone, did white supremacist memory combine with reconciliation to dominate how most Americans viewed the war. This result emerged from the process of history itself, from all the ways that public and private memories evolve. Thus the Gettysburg reunion took place as a national ritual in which the ghost of slavery, the very questions of cause and consequence, might be exorcised once and for all—and an epic conflict among whites elevated into national mythology. That mythology was the product of fifty years of cultural evolution, of the growth and erosion of memories in response to events and social tensions. But it also grew in carefully cultivated soil, the harvest of human choices made by powerful leaders and ordinary folk. Collective memories are the source of group self-definition, but they are never solely the result of unthinking decisions.

Black newspapers of the era were wary, even resentful, of the celebration at Gettysburg in 1913. As segregation deepened and lynching persisted, many black opinion leaders observed history and memory wielded in such a way as to write blacks out of the story. “We are wondering,” declared the Baltimore Afro-American Ledger, “whether Mr. Lincoln had the slightest idea in his mind that the time would ever come when the people of this country would come to the conclusion that by the ‘People’ he meant only white people.” The Afro-American identified the stakes of this contest for America’s national memory: “Today the South is in the saddle, and with the single exception of slavery, everything it fought for during the days of the Civil War, it has gained by repression of the Negro within its borders. And the North has quietly allowed it to have its own way.” The Afro-American asserted the historic loyalty of blacks to the nation and pointed to President Wilson’s recent forced segregation of federal workers. The “blood” of black soldiers and lynched citizens, it argued, was “crying from the ground” in the South, unheard and strangely unknown at the Blue-Gray reunion.\textsuperscript{13}

These reactions in the black press are especially telling given the Wilson administration’s increasingly aggressive program of racial segregation in federal agencies, enacted that summer of 1913. Federal departments in Washington were large employers of African Americans. On the day after Decoration Day, the official segregation of black clerks in the Post Office began. And on July 12, only a week after Wilson spoke at Gettysburg, orders were issued to create separate lavatories for blacks and whites working in the Treasury Department. These and other segregation policies, stemming in part from the many white Southerners who had come to Washington with the Wilson administration, caused deep resentment and protest among blacks, led largely by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Such policies, and the sense of betrayal they caused among blacks, prompted Booker T. Washington, no friend of the NAACP, to declare that he had “never seen the colored people so discouraged and bitter” as they were in the summer of 1913. That summer, the NAACP launched a campaign against segregation practices in the federal government.\textsuperscript{14}

By 1913 racism in America had become a cultural industry, and twisted history a commodity. A segregated society required a segregated historical memory and a national mythology that could blunt or contain the conflict at the root of that segregation. Most Americans embraced an unblinking celebration of reunion and accepted segregation as a natural condition of the races. Just such a celebration is what one finds in the Atlanta Constitution’s coverage of the Gettysburg reunion. The Constitution declared that “as never before in its history the nation is united in demanding that justice and equal rights be given all of its citizens.” No doubt these sentiments reflected genuinely held beliefs among white Southerners that Jim Crow meant “progress” and “reform.” The Constitution gushed about the “drama” and “scale” of the symbolism at the Gettysburg reunion, even its “poetry and its fragrance.” But most important was “the thing for which it stands—the world’s mightiest republic purged of hate and unworthiness, seared clean of dross by the most fiery ordeal in any nation’s history.”\textsuperscript{15} Such were the fruits of America’s segregated historical consciousness after fifty years. Racial legacies, conflict itself, the bitter consequences of Reconstruction’s failure to make good on the promises of emancipation, and the war as America’s second revolution in the meaning of liberty and equality had been seared clean from the nation’s master narrative. But that clean narrative of a Civil War between two foes struggling nobly for equally honorable notions of liberty, of a sentimentalized plantation South to which Americans of the hectic industrial age could escape, of soldiers’ devotion in epic proportions to causes that mattered not, could not rest uncontested forever across American culture.

\textbf{THE CIVIL WAR’S} fiftieth anniversary season left countless examples of Americans looking backward and forward. A young George S. Patton, a captain in the U.S. Army and the grandson of a Confederate officer in Lee’s army, was part of the detachment of troops sent to Gettysburg to help “police” the 1913 reunion. The brash Patton loved to visit Gettysburg and confessed to a “strange fascination” for the place, as well as a desire to “have been
there" in 1865. But in 1913, with his duty confined to distributing blankets to veterans, Patton expressed only contempt for the old Civil War soldiers: "They are a disgusting bunch dirty and old and of the people who 'God loves.'" The nation may have seemed at peace, but the generations were not. Patton was eager for his own war.16

Contrasts of new and old, modernity and tradition, were everywhere in American culture. For one month in February and March 1913 in New York City, the celebrated and controversial Armory Show of modern art caused an enormous stir. Its 1,600 works of art, often treated with irreverence in the press, attracted one hundred thousand viewers and enduring attention. "To be afraid of what is different or unfamiliar, is to be afraid of life," read a typical line in one of the Armory Show's catalogs.17 But this casting off of tradition and innocence was a far stretch from the deeply conservative aims of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, who had reached the peak of their influence in 1913—through their funding of monuments, efforts to control Southern textbooks, lobbying of Congressmen, and their ubiquitous essay contests whereby Southern youth could exhibit the "truth" of the Lost Cause. As guardians of culture and memory, the UDC led those who saw modernity itself as their principal enemy.

In the fall of 1913, a seventy-one-year-old Ambrose Bierce made a last tour of his old battlefields in Tennessee; he lumbered fifteen miles around the Chickamauga and Chattanooga landscapes and at Shiloh found the graves of some former comrades in his Indiana regiment. He wrote his last letter in December 1913, en route to Mexico, where he vanished in a mysterious death. In 1913, the eighteen-volume Plantation edition of Thomas Nelson Page's collected works had just been published, and President Wilson appointed the writer the U.S. ambassador to Italy. Page's universe of sentimental and racist abstractions were now available in one well-marketed set. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who kept his Civil War uniform hanging in his closet, sat prominently on the Supreme Court, and was not yet halfway through his thirty-year presence there in 1913. Holmes had converted his unsentimental view of life as governed by conflict and fate into a judicial philosophy that understood law as the product of "experience" and the "felt necessities of the time." Holmes's "soldiers' faith" had directed him forever away from root causes and premises about law, life, or history. AME bishop Henry McNeal Turner and the ever-powerful Booker T. Washington, his influence now openly defied by other blacks but not yet eclipsed, were both still active in their paradoxical ways in 1913. Both men, one born free and a veteran of the

war who eventually denounced America, and the other born a slave who rose to be the most prominent voice of reconciliation, would die in 1915, celebrated as visionaries of how to remember and forget. In 1913, a thirteen-year-old girl named Margaret Mitchell was growing up in Atlanta, Georgia, surrounded by an abiding Lost Cause tradition she would eventually represent more popularly than any writer ever. And in Oxford, Mississippi, a sixteen-year-old boy named William Faulkner was about to drop out of high school as he drank in an environment and a burden of memory he would later represent more probingly than any American writer.18 Their time would come two decades later, during the Great Depression, when an astonishing American appetite reemerged for the nostalgia and the Lost Cause of the Old South. Millions would flock to buy the story of Scarlett O'Hara's struggle in Gone with the Wind (1935) to cope with the crushed but ennobled South in the aftermath of the war; not nearly as many would embrace so eagerly Thomas Sutpen's fierce ambitions and the legacies his family coped with on the real and psychological landscapes of Mississippi in Absalom! Absalom! (1935).

In 1913, Harriet Tubman, the grand old half-forgotten warrior of the Underground Railroad, herself a veteran of service with Union troops in the war, died at ninety-three in Auburn, New York, where local Civil War veterans led her funeral march. In 1890, after many years of rejected requests, she had received a federal pension, but only as a widow after her husband, Nelson Davis, a Civil War soldier, had died. Also in 1913, in early summer, amidst all the attention to Blue-Gray fraternalism and the planning of emancipation exhibitions, W. E. B. Du Bois, a New England child of the Reconstruction years, took a seven-thousand-mile journey all over the western United States as spokesman of the NAACP. He delivered twenty public lectures to an estimated 18,000 people in eighteen cities from Fort Worth, Texas, to Kansas City, Missouri, to Seattle, Washington. He spoke in huge auditoriums and at small dinners in his honor. Everywhere, Du Bois saw and admired the forward-looking, hopeful attitudes of black communities in the American West. Among the 500,000 blacks in those eighteen cities, he found "energy and alertness . . . new ambition and determination . . . to fight segregation." He felt the "tragedy" that overlay Fort Worth and Atlanta, cities that had recently experienced race riots or lynchings. But in Los Angeles he observed a "gospel of fight and self-assertion," and in Tacoma he was greeted officially by the mayor and spoke to a large interracial audience. Contrasts of old and new met Du Bois at every turn: here a Jim Crow railroad, there a group of young
black professionals brimming with confidence. Perhaps it was this trip that gave Du Bois the ultimate confidence to lead and mount the extraordinary emancipation exhibition and the Star of Ethiopia pageant later that fall in New York.

That spirit of confidence would be crucial to blacks because also in 1913, D. W. Griffith and Thomas Dixon began their collaboration to bring to the motion picture screen The Clansman, Dixon's fiercely racist epic about the victimized South and the heroism of the Ku Klux Klan. The alienation of the emancipationist vision, and of the basic substance of black memory, from mainstream popular remembrance of the Civil War era received no greater long-term stimulus than when Birth of a Nation premiered across the country in the spring of 1915. Dixon, the North Carolina-born author of the extraordinarily successful white supremacist novels Leopard's Spots (1903) and The Clansman (1905), which was adapted to the stage with sensational success in 1906, possessed a boundless desire to "teach the north," he said, "the young north, what it has never known—the awful suffering of the white man during the dreadful reconstruction period. I believe that God . . . anointed the white men of the south . . . to demonstrate to the world that the white man must and shall be supreme." Griffith, who grew up in Louisville, Kentucky, came of age in the heyday of the Lost Cause. A lover of the Southern martial tradition and Victorian melodramas, and eager to portray a lost rural innocence in the new urban age, he was in New York by 1908, acting and making short films. As the fiftieth anniversary of the war approached in 1909-11, Griffith made several Civil War melodramas. In these films, stock scenes and characters abound: rebel soldiers going off to war with black fieldhands cheering; genteel but sturdy Southern white women, Confederate and Union soldiers (sometimes brothers) shaking hands while wrapped in the folds of their flags, and ubiquitously, loyal slaves saving or dying for their masters.

When Dixon and Griffith connected in New York, the filmmaker was leading a group of pioneers making scores of short movies that fed the growing American appetite for the visual image. During the semicentennial, American theaters were saturated with Civil War films lasting fifteen to twenty-five minutes, with some 98 produced in 1913 alone. These films virtually all followed ritual plots full of nostalgia, reconciliation, brave if defeated Confederates surrounded by their virtuous women, and countless uncles and mammies protecting plantations and arranging marriages of the Blue and Gray. The films' subtitles repeatedly portrayed the slaves as "happy, contented, and well cared for. . . joyful as a bunch of school children," as

though the obsequious characters on screen did not adequately convey the message. Black characters in these films themselves carry the historical lesson that slavery was not the cause of the war, and its destruction was the lingering misfortune of the nation and the black race. Not only do black mammys and butlers die saving their white folks from marauding Yankees, but in some films, whole families and slave quarters defend plantations, and thereby the South, from its destruction. In one film, The Old Oak's Secret, Old Mose even hides his master's will in a tree because he cannot face its manumission clause. With these characters, Griffith and others established a stereotype for blacks that would stand for decades as essentially the only image allowed in the movies.

In Birth of a Nation, Griffith and Dixon gave their well-plied audiences the message not only that blacks did not want their freedom, but also that emancipation had been America's greatest and most dangerous disaster. With its stunning battle scenes and suspenseful chases, Birth of a Nation made cinematic history. It was the racial dramas that Griffith foisted on to the semicentennial that left the deepest imprint. The lasting significance of this epic film is that by using powerful imagery, buttressed by enormous advertising and political endorsement, it etched a story of Reconstruction that has lasted long in America's historical consciousness. The war was noble on both sides, the film says, but Reconstruction in the South was directed by deformed radicals and sex-crazed blacks, especially those mulattoes given unwarranted political power. The very lifeblood of civilization, of familial survival, was at stake for the exploited South; hence, white Southern men had to take law and history into their own hands. The South not only wins in the end in Birth of a Nation; it also transforms emancipation, the potential second founding of the American nation, into a reign of racial terror and the necessity of a third creation by the heroic, hooded riders of the Ku Klux Klan. When Gus, a renegade black soldier who has symbolically raped and murdered a white girl, is thrown upon the ground by Klansmen who have castrated and murdered him, the "nation" achieves a rebirth quite unlike the one Lincoln and Douglass had in mind in 1865.

The NAACP and other black organizations, as well as some white dissenters (Southern and Northern) protested and condemned Birth of a Nation in 1915. It opened first in Los Angeles with the title, Clansman, but after Dixon himself saw the final cut in New York, he urged the new title on Griffith. Dixon and Griffith were both master promoters, and they managed screenings at the White House and in Congress. In many cities, NAACP chapters,
often armed with thousands of pamphlets and enacting their first direct-action protests, sought to get the film banned or at least portions of its content censored. Furor and anger from black communities stalked the movie in city after city, but it did not stop Dixon, Griffith, and their company from staging Birth of a Nation in New York with hooded white cavalry outside the theater as a promotion. In Boston, black protesters led by William Monroe Trotter, the militant editor of the Guardian and fierce critic of Booker Washington, achieved some success in getting the most offensive scenes banned by censorship boards. After violence and brawls at theaters, Massachusetts governor David Ignatius Walsh banned the film in Boston for reasons of public safety. Through his network of loyalists, Booker Washington supported Griffith's right to show the film. Among blacks generally, the issue of censorship became a knotty one; some were never comfortable with banning art, and others launched efforts to make their own counter films. But protest over Birth of a Nation reinvigorated direct-action resistance and inaugurated a new era of dissent in the realm of popular culture. At one point in the Boston protests, Trotter led a group of blacks who had been thrown out of the state capitol to the front steps of the golden-domed building. As he spoke in condemnation of Griffith's vision of the Civil War, the Shaw Memorial, with its proud black soldiers marching to freedom, stood immediately beneath them on Boston Common. In the end, no amount of partial bannings could stop millions from seeing Birth of a Nation. It would always be out there as a set of images that emancipationist memory of the Civil War would have to counter.

And so it was that in 1913–15 Civil War memory was both settled and unsettled; it rested in a core master narrative that led inexorably to reunion of the sections while whites and blacks divided and struggled mightily even to know one another across separate societies and an anguished history. Reconciliation joined arms with white supremacy in Civil War memory at the semicentennial in an unsteady triumph. Just how enduring that triumph would be was a matter of degree, time, and place. Beleaguered but hardly invisible, emancipationist memory lived on to fight another day. The "peace among the whites" that Douglass had so feared in 1875 had left the country with a kind of Southern victory in the long struggle over Civil War memory. But because of the enduring significance of race in American society, and because it would take another political revolution and the largest mass movement for human rights in our history to crush the nation's racial apartheid system that had been forged out of the reunion, the first fifty years of remembering the Civil War was but a prelude to future reckonings. All memory is prelude.
Notes

Abbreviations

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAS</td>
<td>American Antiquarian Society</td>
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<td>AC</td>
<td>Atlantic Constitution</td>
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<td>Atlantic Monthly</td>
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<td>AME Review</td>
<td>African Methodist Episcopal Church Review</td>
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<td>CC, NYPL</td>
<td>Century Collection, Civil War Letters, New York Public Library</td>
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<td>CG</td>
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<td>CR</td>
<td>Christian Recorder</td>
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<td>CV</td>
<td>Confederate Veteran</td>
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<td>GLC, ML</td>
<td>Gilder Lehrman Collection, John Pierpont Morgan Library, New York</td>
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<td>Hampton Institute Clipping File</td>
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<td>MHS</td>
<td>Massachusetts Historical Society</td>
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<td>MOC</td>
<td>Museum of the Confederacy, Richmond, Virginia</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOLLUS</td>
<td>Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States</td>
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Prologue


40. NYH, May 29, 1877. The NYT, May 31, 1877, opened its coverage of Decoration Day activities with the statement that across the country, North and South, "the spirit of reconciliation and peace seemed universal."

41. NYT, May 29–30, 1877.

42. Ibid., May 31, 1877.


45. NYH, May 31, 1877.


5. *Nation*, June 28, 1868; Benjamin Tanner to Thomas O. Summers, editor of *Christian Advocate* (Nashville, Tenn.), September 24, 1868, in *CR*, October 3, 1868. In a public letter of July 30, 1868, Blair offered a manifesto of Democratic opposition: "There is but one way to restore the Government and the Constitution; and that is for the president-elect to declare these acts [Reconstruction Acts] null and void, compel the army to undo its usurpation of the South, disperse the carpet-bag State Governments, allow the White people to reorganize their own governments, and elect Senators and Representatives." See *NYT*, September 2, 1868.


7. *NYT*, September 19, 1868; *Cincinnati Commercial*, September 1, 1868.


10. *Southern Watchman* (Athens, Ga.), February 19, April 22, April 15, 1868; *Daily News and Herald* (Savannah, Ga.), July 19, 1868. White attitudes toward blacks, Reconstruction issues, and the election were often expressed in racist jokes and parodies, crafted as though they were meant for the minstrel stage. See a dialect story about a white judge communicating with the foreman of a "darky jury," *Southern Watchman*, February 19, 1868. The black jury cannot reach a verdict because, though "we searched every nook, corner, crevice, and everywhere dar was in dat room," they just could not find any verdicts. See also a story alleged to have been written by a Northern journalist during the war, "A Sable Philosopher," by Gray Jacks, *Southern Watchman*, February 12, 1868. It is an interview with a black soldier incapable of courage. Asked about standing his ground in battle, the black soldier says "'No, sa, I runs... dat isn't my line, sa—cookin's my profeshan... self preserbahshum am the first law wid me!" A typical joke that went around whites during the election is in the *Louisville Daily Courier*, October 4–5, 1868: "At a late dinner party in North Carolina there sat down to table three ex-Governors, an ex-Juice of the Supreme Court, two ex-members of Congress, and some other men of honorable distinction in their State, and the only person in the room who could vote, or hold office, was the negro who waited on the table."


13. The Rosecrans and Lee letters are both dated August 26, 1868, and are reprinted in *NYTr*, September 5, 1868. On the White Sulphur Springs meeting, see Emory M. Thomas, *Robert E. Lee: A Biography* (New York: Norton, 1995), 390–391. By 1868 Lee was president of Washington College in Lexington, Virginia. He was still under at least the threat of indictment for treason until a general amnesty was issued by President Andrew Johnson on Christmas Day, 1868, and a formal abandonment of any treason proceedings was announced on February 15, 1869. Lee died in Lexington on October 12, 1870. See Thomas, *Robert E. Lee*, 390, 416–417.


15. *Columbus Sun* (Georgia), reprinted in *NYTr*, September 17, 1868; *NYTr*, September 6, 8, 1868; *Cincinnati Commercial*, September 7, 1868.


17. Wendell Phillips, "We Ask of Congress," speech delivered in Boston, December


19. _Louisville Courier-Journal, A Decade of History, January 4, 1870_; “A Radical Exclamation Point,” March 12, 1870. The _Cleveland Herald_ responses are reprinted in these articles.


29. Myrta Lockett Avary, _Dixie after the War: An Exposition of Social Conditions Existing in the South, during the Twelve Years Succeeding the Fall of Richmond_ (1906; rpr. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1970), 203–204, 206, 384. It was reviewed widely and divergently. A measure of popular imagination about Reconstruction to which the publisher appealed is in the promotional announcement, which stated: “No book hitherto published so fully and graphically portrays Southern life after the war, or so vividly presents race problems. The grotesque absurdities, the corruption, the tragedy, the pathos, and the humor of military dictatorship and reconstruction are intimately pictured.” At the turn of the century Avary's book could be interpreted many ways (and it had negative reviews), but not the least it was seen by many as a literary gesture of reconciliation. In the _Atlanta Constitution_, a Southerner, William Riley Boyd, defended Avary against a critical review by “Yankee.” “Yankee” lacked appreciation for Avary’s “spirit of friendliness,” claimed Boyd, and he saw in the book a means of reuniting white Northerners and Southerners: “for after all we are both human if not always humane, but we are all of one blood, and it is well to learn the great lesson of how to forgive and to forget.” These documents are in Myrta Lockett Avary Papers, Atlanta Historical Society, Atlanta, Ga., box, folder 10.

30. Avary, _Dixie after the War_, 380–381, 384, 373–378. Popular and apologetic literature on the Klan had appeared before and after Dixon and Avary in various forms. See James Melville Beard, _K.K.K. Sketches: Humorous and Didactic_ (Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen and Haffelfinger, 1877); Eyre Damer, _When the Ku Klux Rode_ (New York: Neale, 1912); and William Thomas Richardson, _Historic Pulaski: Birthplace of the Ku Klux Klan, Scene of Execution of Sam Davis_ (1913), no publication information, copy in Widener Library, Harvard University.


35. Report of Evidence Taken before the Military Committee in Relation to Outrages Committed by the Ku Klux Klan in Middle and West Tennessee, extra session, Thirty-fifth General Assembly of the State of Tennessee (Nashville, 1868), 7–9, 13, 18–20, 23–26, 28–29. The July 4, 1868, rampage was reported to involve four hundred to five hundred Klansmen.


37. Trelease, *White Terror*, 389–395. Democrats did all they could to discredit the hearings and pointed especially to the provision that witnesses were paid two dollars per diem and a mileage allowance for coming to towns to testify. Scores of black witnesses were repeatedly accused of testifying merely for money. Witnesses were also offered immunity from prosecution for anything they said in the hearings, which protected many a white Southerner who lied or shaded the truth. Some blacks were attacked as a result of their testimony, whereas no white Southerner was prosecuted solely based on his testimony.


42. *KKK Hearings*, South Carolina, 520–526. On sleeplessness and fear, see Jane Surratt’s testimony, *KKK Hearings*, 525. On families being whipped together, see testimony of Caleb Jenkins, *KKK Hearings*, South Carolina, 697–698.


45. Ibid., 98–99. For one of those lists of victims for a single county, Spartanburg, see *KKK Hearings*, South Carolina, 919–922. The list contains the names of 227 people murdered, beaten, or who had their homes burned.


47. Ibid., 448–449. For Forrest’s testimony before the Congressional committee, see *KKK Hearings, Miscellaneous Testimony*, 3–24. Also see Trelease, *White Terror*, 19–20, 49–50. Forrest never openly admitted that he was the first Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, but he was widely believed to be one of its primary founders. He admitted in his testimony that during the Klan’s rapid spread across the South in 1867–68, he received fifty to one hundred letters per day regarding resistance to the Reconstruction regimes, and that he employed a personal secretary to keep up with the correspondence. Forrest also gave newspaper interviews in which he discussed the Klan’s character, purpose, and size. To a *Cincinnati Commercial* reporter he verified that “there is such an organization, not only in Tennessee, but all over the South, and its numbers have not been exaggerated.” Forrest put the number at 40,000 in Tennessee and 550,000 across the South. Such figures can never be verified and are probably exaggerated, as are the Klan’s claims to rigid organization. But Forrest’s interviews were widely reprinted. See *Cincinnati Commercial*, September 17, 1868; *NYT*, September 4, 1868.


63. *NYT*, May 30-June 1, 1874, May 31, 1875.


67. *NYT*, May 28, 1875; Nash was actually William B. Nash (1822-88). Born a slave in Virginia, he was brought to South Carolina as a youth and worked as a servant in a Columbia hotel. Nash held many offices in Reconstruction South Carolina and served as state senator, 1868-77. He was a distinguished and influential member of the senate, as well as a brick manufacturer and a coal-yard operator. He admitted to accepting one bribe from a railroad company in exchange for his vote. When he resigned from the senate in 1877, Nash made restitution to the state for funds he had illegally procured. See Eric Foner, *Freedom's Lawmakers: A Directory of Black Officeholders during Reconstruction*, rev. ed. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 159.

68. Frederick Douglass, "The Color Question," speech delivered July 5, 1875, in Hillsdale, near Washington, D.C., Frederick Douglass Papers, LC, reel 15.

69. Langston quoted in *CR*, August 5, 1875; Douglass, "Color Question."


73. Foner, *Reconstruction*, 568-569. Federal marshal J. H. Pearce, quoted in Rable,
But There Was No Peace, 182, and on the election of 1876 and the role of violence and intimidation generally, see 169–185.

74. Chicago Tribune, November 11, 1876; NYT, February 22, 1877; AC, November 8, 1876, January 5, 25, 1877.


76. Ibid., 201–234; Foner, Reconstruction, 578–582; Gillette, Retreat from Reconstruction, 332–333; Nation, April 5, 1877.


5. Soldiers’ Memory


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69. Crisis 5 (January 1913), 118–129.
72. James Weldon Johnson, "Fifty Years," in Fifty Years and Other Poems (Boston: Cornhill Co., 1917), 1–5; NYT, January 1, 1913.

Epilogue

1. NYT, March 26, April 9, 26, 1911, April 4, 11, 1915. On April 4, 1915, the Times ran a massive commemorative feature, "The Blue and the Gray: The Golden Anniversary of Peace within This Union," with many articles on wartime heroes and battles, all presented in a mode of national unity. The entire 24-page section, featuring a good deal of poetry, was written and compiled by Charles Willis Thompson.
4. Ibid., 196–197.
5. Fiftieth Anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg, 31, 36–37. This report contained many photographs, with one compelling scene after another of the spirit of reconciliation as well as the generational transmission of memory. In a few of these pictures one sees black laborers and camp workers constructing the tents, serving as bakers, or passing out blankets or mess kits. Nowhere is there a photograph of a black veteran in uniform.
6. Ibid., 6, 39–41, 49–51, 53, 57–58; Philadelphia Inquirer, July 6, 1913.
12. San Francisco Examiner, July 4, 1913; Charleston News and Courier, July 1, 1913; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, July 2, 1913.
14. See Williamson, Crucible of Race, 364–395; Booker T. Washington, NYT, August 18, 1913. An especially interesting counterattack on the Wilson administration's segregation policies in 1913 was Oswald Garrison Villard’s "Segregation in Baltimore and Washington," an address delivered to the Baltimore branch of the NAACP, October 20, 1913, copy in HU. The central figure in the NAACP’s often successful resistance to Wilson administration segregation schemes was Archibald Grimké, the branch director for Washington, D.C. See Bruce, Archibald Grimké, 184–200.
15. AC, July 2, 1913.
21. Cripps, Slow Fade to Black, 28–32.