

## THE PEPYS SHOW: GHOST-WRITING AND DOCUMENTARY DESIRE IN *THE DIARY*

BY HARRY BERGER, JR.

While I am writing without knowing that I will keep these nine *cahiers* and take them with me to Stockholm, where they will be found among my papers after my death and sent to Clerselier in France. . . . [A]nd though I do not know the story of these events, it is no less true that I write to be read after my death, and that is why I do not publish. . . . While I am writing I think I see myself being seen by many others, who are reading over my shoulder the words traced by a dead man's hand immobilised for eternity, the eternity of truth, in the instance of inscribing it: *dum scribo*.<sup>1</sup>

"Your food stamps will be stopped effective March, 1992, because we received notice that you passed away. May God bless you. You may reapply if there is a change in your circumstances."

*From a letter to a dead person from the Greenville County (S. C.) Department of Social Services*<sup>2</sup>

The subject of Samuel Pepys's *Diary* was no inner-worldly ascetic, no Calvinist. He doesn't fit the Weberian pattern. He was a fiscal conservative in the sense that he kept most of his wealth in gold and his gold under his bed. But although reluctant to invest in land, and slow to speculate in securities, his financial health came increasingly to depend on his ability to navigate in the precarious waters of paper instruments and promises. The *Diary's* monthly statements of his accounts were among these instruments—the few signatures of rough notes bound into the first volume of the diary show that it began as a combination journal and account record, with memoranda that listed many items in order to document expenses. The memoranda were transferred to separate account books, but it remains tempting to construe the diary figuratively as a record of experiential expenditures and acquisitions—a record in which Pepys "tells" the day's happenings in a form that makes them as discrete and precious as his gold coins and shorthand symbols.

Pepys writes that during a time of danger in 1667 he removed his gold from his house and buried most of it for safekeeping in the yard of his father's house in the village of Brompton. The entry for 10–11

October of that year contains a comic account of his furious search to recover the poorly hidden coins, wash the dirt off them, and carry them apprehensively back home. Equating the gold coins with diary entries produces a parable of Pepys's ambivalent relation to the diary: like his money it is removed from his person for safekeeping, buried in foul papers, refurbished in fair copy, and returned to its hiding place at home; there it remains like a time capsule, containing his self-portrait safely disembodied and reincorporated in another medium, a paper investment in the future, but an uncertain investment owing to the coyness that solicits discovery only by conspicuously resisting it.

Since the nine-year growth of Pepys's *Diary* to its six substantial volumes paralleled the growth of his fortunes, he may well have been justified in the diligence with which he gave not simply a daily picture of his life and times but an *account* of them, in the sense of an *accounting*. And whether or not the parallelism was superstitiously or fetishistically interpreted by the writer as a causal relation, the weight of a diaristic enterprise animated (if only in part) by expressly moral, social, and economic motives falls on the accounting activity as a form of self-protection and validation. From this standpoint, the mimetic motive may itself be conceived as instrumental or secondary to another, variously expressed in the following passages:

Custom and memory now played second fiddle to the written word: reality meant "established on paper."<sup>3</sup>

"Graphic" means "like writing"; it also means "like truth."<sup>4</sup>

The self-conscious emergence of the page in its own right implies a radical, perhaps irrevocable, alienation of language from its supposedly primordial character as speech. . . . The moment in which the page is foregrounded is one in which it ceases to be the invisible servant of a higher order of language and meaning, and assumes its own existence in a world in which it is no longer to be denied.<sup>5</sup>

The secret book is not only a finding list or key to the organization of family knowledge, but its very pages mediate the terms of relations in such a way as to circumscribe the "reality" of facts and feelings within the limits of the page.<sup>6</sup>

It is important to stress . . . that the sense of reality that the diary can foster is of two kinds. The artless spontaneity of the internal, nonretrospective record is one. The other is the document itself, which as a *document*, claims to be real.<sup>7</sup>

Etymologically affiliated to *doxa* and *docere*, and thus to the doctrine that makes—through instruction and admonition—for docility, by the

middle of the fifteenth century “document” was being used to signify a means of showing, proving, furnishing evidence. The slow but sure gravitation of those functions to the graphic medium was metonymically confirmed some decades after Pepys’s death by the first recorded instance of “document” as “something written.” By then, what Foucault calls “the disciplinary regime” had begun “to capture and fix” individuals in “a network of writing,” a “mass of documents,” through which education, morality, conduct, law, property, commercial practice, scientific inquiry, bureaucratic administration, and political power were mediated and authenticated.<sup>8</sup> Documentary desire is the desire for graphic justification by paper and on paper, the desire for appellation (naming as appeal or accusation), interpellation, identification, and resistance—or counter-identification—by paper and on paper. When the literacy promoted by the Reformation, with its new emphasis on such graphic forms of spiritual accountancy as the confessional diary, passed into the society of the Restoration, when in the 1660s London swarmed with booksellers and stallkeepers, the practice of self-documentation was diffused into a more general culture of documentation of which state censorship—the Licensing Acts (1662–95)—was a symptom.

Samuel Pepys was a creature of documentary culture and desire. In the first year of the Restoration and the *Diary* he moved into a new home in the Naval Office Building, which housed his career as a diarist, a naval administrator, a government official, a member (and later president) of the Royal Society, a writer and collector of books and official documents. It was documentary desire that made him both the “greatest of diarists” and “the greatest of civil servants”; “he was able to return from the distractions of the park or the bargaining of the yards to the work of preparing a parliamentary report, or the devising of new official forms; with equal facility he could lose his heart to a woman and find his soul in a ledger”—a comment that blandly, condescendingly, overlooks the documentary desire and facility responsible for the evidence on which the comment is based.<sup>9</sup> To acknowledge the force of Pepys’s desire to transfer—transform—his life to the reality and justification of a document is to interrogate and complicate the standard view of the diary’s verisimilitude, a view that gives commentators permission to write as if they are looking through the diary’s window at the person behind the book. Even the most cursory glance at the relation between media shifts and the structural conditions of communication will be enough to place the standard view in question.

The effect of the proliferation of discursive media and genres in early

modern culture conforms with the observation of J. G. A. Pocock that “the more complex, even the more contradictory, the language context in which . . . [an author] is situated, the richer and more ambivalent become the speech acts he is capable of performing, and the greater becomes the likelihood that these acts will perform upon the context itself and induce modification and change within it.”<sup>10</sup> The kind of self-representation implicated in staging oneself in writing is a function of the more complex and contradictory performances of textualized speech acts. No matter who else writers perform before, they perform in the first instance before themselves. The *I that writes* is always an *I that reads* what it writes and monitors the act of writing. It continuously “reads” what it is about to write, and as it reads what it is writing and has written it may anticipate, may try to preempt or defuse or encourage, the reading it imagines others will give it. Authorship thus divides into these opposed but inseparable functions—into the communicative complementarity of sender and receiver—and the product of their negotiation is the *I that gets written*, but also, of course, the *I that gets read*.

The difference between writing and conversation is that in the former the abstraction of the process from the body and its reincorporation in the graphic medium more expressly dissociates the product and the interpreter from the agent and monitor. Under the conditions of primary orality, the *I that gets spoken*—whether in monologic or dialogic speech events—is the product of collaborative construction simultaneously going on between the listening *I* and the listening other, the interlocutor or audience.<sup>11</sup> Under the conditions of print literacy the *I that gets written and read* may well, as Ricoeur insists, be more fully alienated from the writer’s control and appropriated by the reading other, but it may also—because of its disseminability—have more power (in Pocock’s words) to “perform upon” its context. According to the conventional wisdom, when—as a result of this increase in power—the context comes to include censorship, which in turn motivates the development of conventions of coded discourse, these complications intensify the demand for self-censorship as a preemptive strategy of the *I that writes and reads*. Thus changes in the technical order are no less important than changes in the order of symbolic interaction in modifying the structure of self-representation.

In *The Tremulous Private Body* Francis Barker attributes the origins of the modern “bourgeois subject” to two features of the context I just described. The first is “a shift in representative and central discourse from the performed writing of the early seventeenth-century stage to the more evidently ‘written’ writing of the later period: a transition from

collaboration (of composition and performance) to individual production, and from visibility to script.”<sup>12</sup> The second is “the profound implication” of “the subject of writing (or of reading)” in “the machinery of censorship.” This was “a constitutive experience for the seventeenth century” because what Annabel Patterson calls “the hermeneutics of censorship” generated a theory and practice of “functional ambiguity” that intensified the potential self-division implicit in all writing insofar as it can’t avoid representing the writing subject.<sup>13</sup> As Barker states: “While censorship is a state function, an exterior apparatus of control, in so far as the domain it polices is the production, circulation and exchange of discourses, it is one that reaches into the subject itself.”<sup>14</sup>

Taking Pepys’s *Diary* and Descartes’s *Discourse* as important sites and epitomes of the “founding moment” of “bourgeois subjectivity,” Barker extrapolates from them the following structure: “a public *persona* surrounds an intermediate self (of which neither are ‘really’ the subject’s own . . . ); and within these there shelters a disembodied ‘inner self’: . . . the I that writes the text.”<sup>15</sup> He shows how the text of Descartes’s *Discourse* “constitutes the bourgeois individual as a split narration isolated within a censored discourse where it is crucial both that it is narrated and that is censored.”<sup>16</sup> But it is his (by now) notorious reading of a passage in Pepys’s *Diary* on which I want to focus.<sup>17</sup> The passage contains, among other items, Pepys’s reference to “reading a little of *L’escholle des filles*, which is a mighty lewd book, but yet not amiss for a sober man once to read over to inform himself in the villainy of the world.”<sup>18</sup> According to Barker, “the *Diary* tries to say that the part of Pepys that consumes the pleasures of the French text is not *really* Pepys”; the authorial subject

becomes self-censoring. The I that writes deletes *from its text* the body of the unacceptable, or allots it to a marginal or parenthetical status. . . . The constitution of the subject in this form is the principal support of the new order. Its splitting, in which modern discourse is founded, engenders . . . intense self-“consciousness” . . . [and] an awareness of self that goes along with the elision from that consciousness of other elements in the psychic ensemble. . . . The profound and corporeal guilt with which the subject is invested as the febrile undertone of that self-consciousness, which turns out to know so little of itself, is decisive in securing the deep inner control, which has been called interpellation, that is so vital to the bourgeois illusion of freedom. . . . While it would be difficult to deny that external controls are at work in bourgeois society . . . this must not occlude for us the more profound strategy of domination which is achieved not by *post hoc* intervention from without, but by the pre-constitution of the subject in its subjection.<sup>19</sup>

Here, in a fashion illustrative of current trends in cultural interpretation and critique, theses of Althusser, Foucault, and Elias converge. The first two are explicitly present in Barker's text; the resemblance to the Elias thesis is merely my observation—what Elias analyzes as part of the civilizing process Barker treats as a cultural catastrophe—but I mention it to bring Elias's emphasis on self-censorship into closer contact with the specific form of reflexive self-representation associated with writing. "Elias," write Stallybrass and White, "connects manners to the internal construction of the subject," but in Barker's story it is writing more than manners that produces what they call the "*self-regulating* bourgeois identity."<sup>20</sup>

The choice of Pepys as an exemplary instance of "the newly interiorated subject" enables Barker to dramatize—or allegorize—his thesis that the English Revolution established "a new set of connections between subject and discourse, subject and polity," and also between "body and soul, language and meaning," and that a new "ensemble of . . . power relations" installed the subject (Pepys) "as a private citizen in a domestic space, over against a public world."<sup>21</sup> In "what has been hitherto called the discourse of the clerk" Barker is struck not by "the relative lack of opacity of the self-deception (to and for whom is Pepys writing this secret text?)" but by "the indirect . . . manner of its self-exposure in another discourse within and around the clerk," a discourse "concerning desire, disease, the mess of the body and its passions."<sup>22</sup> Thus to fasten on the plain style, its clarity, its "epistemological naivety," and its informational value, as commentators have done, is to participate in the repression of guilty sexuality that marks the *Diary*; it is to be complicit with Pepys in treating the plain style as a mask, and in providing the discourse of the clerk with an alibi that substantiates its innocence, namely "the a-libi-dinous justification of reading 'for information sake'"; it is to reproduce not only the repressive and factitious proprieties but also the self-division that characterizes "the typical structure of all bourgeois discourse."<sup>23</sup>

What I find most valuable in this account is its analysis of the convergence of the effects of the structure of writing on self-representation with the effects of changing "power relations" on self-censorship and surplus meaning. But as it stands I don't think *The Tremulous Private Body* succeeds in making good on either its historical or its interpretive claims. One reason for this is that although Barker insists on the novelty of this founding moment of bourgeois subjectivity, his references to preceding versions of subjectivity are too cursory to provide the contrast that would validate his claim. Another reason, more

germane to my topic in this essay, is that his approach is dominated by two parsimonious strategies, snippetotomy and metonymy: since large historical claims are defended by readings of small excerpts from a few major exhibits, both the excerpts and their textual habitats are made to stand for the wholes of which they are parts.<sup>24</sup>

This is notably evident in his account of the *Diary*, which produces what seems to be a characterization of the whole from a reading of a single entry. Barker concludes that the *Diary* is the work of a man who “says sing when he means fuck, who fears sex and calls it smallpox, who enjoys sex and calls it reading,” and whose guilt is aroused by a “representation of a representation. . . . Behind it all, not even an adulterous act, but an act of reading.”<sup>25</sup> The problem with this conclusion is that it doesn’t even apply to the entry it is based on.<sup>26</sup> Barker cites the entry from an abridgment relying on earlier editions that deleted the more “explicit” erotic passages, most (but by no means all) of which were coded in garbled French and polyglot. Such a passage appears in parentheses near the end of the entry for 9 February 1668 in volume nine of the magisterial edition prepared for the University of California Press by Robert Latham and William Matthews. I cite it after the version Barker used:

We sang until almost night, and drank a mighty good store of wine, and then they parted, and I to my chamber, where I did read through *L'escholle des filles*, a lewd book, but what do no wrong once to read for information sake. And after I had done it I burned it, that it might not be among my books to my shame, and so at night to supper and to bed.<sup>27</sup>

We sang till almost night, and drank my good store of wine: and then they parted and I to my chamber, where I did read through *L'Escholle des Filles*; a lewd book, but what doth me no wrong to read for information sake (but it did hazer my prick para stand all the while, and una vez to decharger); and after I had done it, I burned it, that it might not be among my books to my shame; and so at night to supper and then to bed.<sup>28</sup>

Apart from the deletion, the other differences are caused by faulty transcription of Pepys’s shorthand. The change from “drank a mighty good store of wine” to “drank my good store of wine” shifts the sense of the passage from Barker’s emphasis on the heavy drinking that makes Pepys “blurtingly confess” his indulgence to an emphasis on the good quality of his wine and hospitality.<sup>29</sup> The scene of writing implied by “blurtingly confess”—he sets down the entry when still under the weather, perhaps after supper and while in bed—is countered by

everything Latham and Matthews have deduced about Pepys's method of composition from their analysis of the manuscript and his references to it in the *Diary*.<sup>30</sup> Above all, the double adversative ("but what doth me no wrong," "but it did hazer") has the preemptive effect of making Pepys anticipate Barker's view of him in what amounts to a proleptic parody of it: first, the bourgeois rationalization that a prudent man can profit from even this filthy trash so long as he mines it disinterestedly to increase his store of worldly knowledge; second, the parenthetical eruption of polyglot prurience that hilariously punctures the display of prudence. Together, the two clauses stage a mini-comedy of The Bourgeois Gentleman and Hypocrite.

Such an effect of self-parody gets lost when the historian of institutions appropriates the passage only "for information sake": "to read for information's sake' . . . was a somewhat lame excuse, for the reading gave Pepys an erection and led him to ejaculate once."<sup>31</sup> From his concise summary of the diary's portrait of its author's sexual behavior, Stone concludes that Pepys, who "*recorded* what he regarded as his failings as an aid to his reformation, . . . *was* a man at war with himself, and as such was an epitome of his time and class."<sup>32</sup> He also insists that the diary "is a unique piece of evidence, which could only have been kept by a very unusual man."<sup>33</sup> These two assertions may be brought into closer and more productive contact with each other by changing the two italicized terms to "represented" and "represented himself as" respectively. This is not to question the validity of Stone's assertions; my purpose is only to redirect attention from what the diary purports or pretends to record to what it does, that is, what its rhetorical and textual effects suggest not about Pepys's pornographic fantasies or sexual adventures but about his representation of his relation to those fantasies or adventures. If anything makes Pepys "a very unusual man," it is the occasionally wry tone, verging on self-parody, with which the diarist parades himself as an epitome of the "*homme moyen sensuel*" caught between his "powerful appetites and his nagging, puritanical, bourgeois conscience."<sup>34</sup>

Since Pepys is perfectly capable of saying what he means about sex, and happy to write about it, there must be another way to interpret his several uncoded—or barely coded—references to masturbation and all the passages (uncoded before 1664, coded thereafter) detailing his extramarital pursuits.<sup>35</sup> The psychoanalyst responsible for the entry on Pepys's health in the companion volume of the California edition ventures the following opinion:



For the most part he was not deeply guilty about his sexual adventures. He did think them improper and he recorded them usually in his private language, *as if to disguise or conceal* the meaning of such entries. He could not, however, have seriously considered that this would have been an effective shield from prying eyes. Anyone who could go to the trouble of deciphering his shorthand could readily get the sense of the simple mixture of foreign words he employed. It would seem more probable that he was in this way attempting to separate those thoughts from himself, to make them less immediately part of his own consciousness and yet at the same time more titillating. Perhaps the remnant of the Puritan in him had to be deceived.<sup>36</sup>

The final sentence states a view similar to Barker's and also a slightly more complex view of one of the motives Matthews ascribes to the diarist: "Despite his fondness for pleasures of the flesh he was a man divided, given to acting as recorder and punitive magistrate over his own inclinations."<sup>37</sup> It would be tempting to settle for this level of interpretation but something both in Pepys's language and in the above passage argues against it. The psychoanalyst's tentative conclusion—that Pepys may have been trying to deceive himself—ignores a strong implication in his own claim that Pepys couldn't have seriously thought his secrets would be concealed by the shorthand and *lingua franca*. To entertain this possibility is to wonder whether the Puritan or bourgeois self-struggle picked out by our three commentators isn't something the diary places in quotation marks: perhaps the interior drama of reflexive self-representation is part of what it represents to the prying eyes of others. But should this be true it would not be enough to hypothesize that Pepys was trying to make "those thoughts . . . more titillating" to himself alone, for the italicized passage suggests that the very conspicuousness of the *lingua franca* passages flags what they pretend (not too energetically) to conceal.<sup>38</sup> They have the same effect as stage whispers, and so it would be more consistent to assume that if Pepys betrays guilt he also studiously flaunts his virility and manly prowess in language that showcases his "naughtiness," as when he boasts of "the first time I did make trial of my strength of fancy . . . without my hand, and had it *complete avec la fille que* I did see *au-jour-dhuy* in Westminster hall" (*D*, 6:331).<sup>39</sup>

Pepys's male commentators tend to make the point—dismissively, or consolingly, or censoriously—that the objects of his conquest were only "servants, shopgirls, barmaids, prostitutes"; in this they realize and reinforce the promise of homosocial bonding the diary holds out to

“prying eyes”; they join Pepys in the locker room.<sup>40</sup> It is worth noting, however, that if he does betray guilt—and he does—it is not over promiscuous sexuality but over marital infidelity. That may indeed be a Puritan or bourgeois scruple—or just a scruple—but the chief effect of the diarist’s rhetorical display of randiness is that it projects the pose of one who aspires not to Roundhead virtues but to Cavalier vices. The rake who peeps through the diary, however, is no more than a pint-sized Don Giovanni. It would only give the screw of this interpretation another turn to posit that the diary means thus to demean its subject’s libertine pretensions. But who can speculate on, much less try to specify, the motives behind a diary that seems to want to give everything away?

Since commentators do speculate and continue to specify motives, one suspects that the diary’s display of giving everything away may be a tease. Matthews lists five motives and Ollard four.<sup>41</sup> The psychoanalyst adds another when he proposes a connection between Pepys’s anxiety over his health—his life-threatening encounter with kidney stones, his poor eyesight, his apparent sterility—and “the urgency of his sexual desires,” which might well have served to reassure him about his potency while providing “a great source of pleasure.”<sup>42</sup> But it doesn’t seem useful to muse over the psychology of the absent referent of the *Diary*, especially during the time he is not writing but doing all the other things about which he will or may (or may not) write. Better to restrict oneself to inquiring whether the I that gets written is represented in the *Diary* as depicting his escapades in a manner, and in contexts, that display or betray anxiety about potency. But as soon as we ask this question we encounter an obvious stumbling block that threatens either to render it trivial or to force the reader into a reductive distortion of the *Diary*. For although references to the escapades are scattered with some frequency throughout the *Diary*, by far the greatest proportion of the material it contains is about other matters.<sup>43</sup> And all of it is, in an important sense which I shall discuss in a moment, about writing. The value of Barker’s approach is that it keeps his psychoanalytic speculations focused on the text:

The decisive pattern of this subjectivity, in . . . its representation . . . , is the pattern of obliquity, evasion, displacement and condensation . . . at work in the incorporeal speech of a private writer.

As the privatized subject writes, its text is constrained to say more than it knows itself to say, an excess of signification . . . incited, paradoxically, by the censorship which is the governing principle of its discourse.<sup>44</sup>

The weakness of the approach is that it depends on snippetotomy, on dismemberment of the writer's incorporeal speech, in order to reduce the *Diary* to a psychodrama of guilty sexuality—the tremulous private body in question—and self-censorship. It would be hard to find many passages in which “the I that writes deletes *from its own text* the body of the unacceptable”—the unacceptability of the body in its guilty sexuality—and it would at any rate be more consistent with Barker's emphasis on the forms of linguistic mediation to redirect attention to the whole diary as a practice of writing and self-representation.<sup>45</sup>

Reduced to its most general characteristics the practice of early modern diary-writing is marked by a tension between two divergent emphases, one teleological and the other formal. The *telos* of the diary is *accountancy*—the socioeconomic account-keeping of Italian merchants, the spiritual account-keeping of the Puritan saints—and its recording function entails mastery of a set of mimetic procedures Ian Watt has called “formal realism” and associated with the rise of the novel, procedures for guaranteeing (the effect of) “accurate transcription of actuality.”<sup>46</sup> These emphases are divergent because, although both involve acts of recollection, and although the conventions of formal realism validate the truth-claims of accountancy, the sense given “re-” by mimetic recollection differs from that given by the re-collective activity of account keeping. The former connotes repetition, the aim of accurate transcription, whereas the latter connotes a more constitutive process of revision centered in the discipline and self-representation of writing. It is in the strain between these two emphases that I shall try to locate the new model of subjectivity Barker attributes to Pepys's diary.

In the standard view of the genre, writing that announces itself as diary asks to be read as a mimetic transcription of what “is here, there, given, waiting to be written down.”<sup>47</sup> According to one of the California edition's principal editors, a good diary

will move . . . at the pace of natural life, set by the rhythm of waking and sleeping. Its diurnal form will mean that its treatment of some events will be spasmodic and episodic, but this is the way in which many events—even processes—happen. Its sole principle of arrangement will be chronology. All that the diarist observes he will hold suspended in the same stream of time which carries him and everything else along with it. . . . The diarist, although he will comment on events and may well relate some events to others, will not attempt (if he is a good diarist) to isolate them or rearrange them: he will merely mark their passing in the stream. . . .

So much for the ideal. Pepys comes as close as anyone to it.<sup>48</sup>

Latham is by no means insensitive to extra-mimetic motives such as those implied by the orderly appearance of Pepys's shorthand: "By sieving the untidy events through his memory and marshaling them in the diary's straight and neatly written lines he could impose on them some semblance of control."<sup>49</sup> But his emphasis is on its mimetic functions as both a "mirror" of the author's personal life and "a private window" on public affairs: "because Pepys relates events *in the form of daily observations*, he registers their flow at something not very different from the rate at which they occurred. He almost persuades us that we are sharing his life."<sup>50</sup> The logic behind this reasoning is that the accuracy and transparency of the record is guaranteed by the proximity of the scene of writing to the scene of its referents. Thus the impression of daily recording is an important factor in establishing the diaristic effect of the real, as is also the effect of spontaneity and immediacy for which Latham and many other commentators praise the diary. But like the wording of the italicized phrase above, the terms "impression" and "effect" gesture toward the possibility that the appearance of daily recording may be a strategic (if conventional) fiction of the genre. And on this point the two principal editors of the California *Diary* differ in the relative attention each pays to that possibility.

In a brilliant set of deductions from the manuscript evidence, Matthews, who transcribed the diary from Pepys's shorthand, details "five possible stages in the composition of the diary" and concludes that even if they all weren't always traversed, the "appearance of most of the manuscript, the regularity and even spacing of the symbols and lines, the straightness of the lines, the even color of the ink over large sections, the neat disposition of the daily entries on the pages, all suggest that this is in fact largely a fair copy." Matthews shows that the entries for each day were not always—or, to put it more strongly, not necessarily—inscribed on that day. Pepys himself notes many times that he transferred a series of daily entries from his "loose papers" to the "Journal" at a later date. From the several signatures of these rough notes bound into the diary, and from evidence of corrections and additions in the fair copy, Matthews concludes that the production of the final draft "entailed selection, occasional expansion and condensation, and a measure of polishing."<sup>51</sup> His analysis thus focuses both on the fictiveness of the impression of daily recording and on the artfulness by which Pepys produces the impression and the air of spontaneity: "his great diary is no simple product of nature, thrown together at the end of each succeeding day. In part, at least, it is a product fashioned with some care, both in its matter and its style."<sup>52</sup> So, for example, "what is seemingly the most

spontaneous and living series of entries in the diary, the long account of the Great Fire, was, as Pepys himself states, entered into the diary-book three months and more after the events. . . . , Pepys seems to have treated the rewriting” of his rough notes into the final draft “as an opportunity for imaginative re-entry into the recent past . . . and also for making all those changes that contribute to immediacy in the literary sense.”<sup>53</sup> And even the fair copy gives evidence—“in the hundreds of instances where longhand has been superimposed on shorthand” and notes added in blank areas of the page—“that Pepys sometimes read over entries he had recently made in the diary-book and revised them.”<sup>54</sup> In transcribing foul papers into fair he becomes the first reader and interpreter of the diary.

This analysis drives a wedge—and destabilizes the relation—between the diary as a record of daily events and the diary as a record of the daily recording of events. It directs us to a structural anomaly we could otherwise easily overlook, an anomaly well illustrated by the long concluding clause of the entry for Christmas Day, 1666. After supper, Pepys writes, he went

to my chamber to enter this day’s journal only, and then to bed—my head a little thoughtful how [to] behave myself in the business of the victualling, which I think will be prudence to offer my service in doing something in passing the pursers’ accounts—thereby to serve the King—get honour to myself, and confirm me in my place in the victualling, which at present hath not work enough to deserve my wages. (*D*, 7:421)

Did he “enter this day’s journal” before going to bed but include as part of it what he knew was about to happen as if it had happened?<sup>55</sup> Was he already reflecting on his new job as navy food contractor while setting the entry down, or is this also proleptic? If the infinitive in the first clause is purposive and “to bed” is read in parallel with “to enter” rather than with the prepositional “to my chamber,” the syntax connotes an intended but not yet performed pair of actions.<sup>56</sup> If the infinitive is descriptive (“to enter” = “where I entered”) the journal entry has already been completed and he has already gone to bed; reading “to bed” prepositionally—“to my chamber . . . and then to bed”—accentuates this effect. In either case, the *mise-en-abîme* relation of the entry we read to the stated moment of its production renders them temporally discontinuous, and leads us to wonder when he wrote the entry in which he wrote that he wrote the entry. Again, in the entry for 5 August 1662, Pepys concludes with “to the office again all the afternoon, till it was so dark that I could not see hardly what it is that I now set down when I

write this word; and so went to my chamber and to bed, being sleepy” (*D*, 3:156).<sup>57</sup> Confronted by this telltale garble of verb tenses, the editors comment that the phrase in the floating present tense “must relate to a prior form of the diary” since the shorthand “is as neat here as in the preceding and following entries.”<sup>58</sup> The “now” of “when I write this word” precedes the “now” in which he writes that he writes this word. In the entry for 23 June 1663, we read that “I returned home and to my office, setting down this day’s passages; and having a letter that all is well in the country, I went home to supper; then a Latin Chapter of Will and to bed” (*D*, 4:193). Matthews deduces that in such entries only some of “this day’s passages” were set down on “this” day, and the remainder was added later but he goes on to note that in the text as we have it “uniformity of ink and penmanship . . . characterizes the added material and the material which precedes it.”<sup>59</sup>

The effect of this uniformity, which is of course reproduced in printed versions of the diary, is to reinforce the conventional mimetic promise and premise of the diary genre, the promise of accuracy supported by the premise if not of daily recording then of recording that closely follows on the time of the events recorded. Pepys frequently notes that his recording was irregular. Thus at the end of the entry for 16 March 1666, he writes that he went “to make good my Journall for two or three days, and begun it, till I came to the other side, where I have scratched so much, for, for want of sleep, I begun to write idle and from the purpose—so forced to break off, and to bed.” And at the beginning of the next entry: “Up, and to finish my Journall, which I had not sense enough the last night to make an end of” (*D*, 7:74). The indefiniteness of “for two or three days” (didn’t he remember? wasn’t he sure how many days he would get through?) compounds the indefiniteness of the temporal relation between the acts of writing he describes and the writing that describes them. This creates the effect of a strangely floating, disembodied, unlocatable now of inscription: when is he now writing “Up, and to finish my Journall”? Later that day? Just after the moment in which, he writes, he went “to bed, drinking butter-ale”? But the entry continues with another item of the day’s news concerning one of Pepys’s favorite targets, Sir William Penn, and concludes with a reflection: “But I need no new arguments to teach me that he is a false rogue to me, and all the world besides” (*D*, 7:75). When was or is this sentiment written in relation to the time recorded in the entry? The next day? Some other day? While reading and revising his notes for the entry?

Such examples could be multiplied—to use one of Pepys’s favorite words, they could be “mightily” multiplied—and what they confront the

reader with is a temporal conundrum, for the actual act of writing can never be congruent with any of the acts of writing specified in the diary. This is strikingly obvious in the anomalous “I could not see hardly what it is that I now set down when I write this word; and so . . . to bed,” or in “so home and set down my three last days’ Journalls, and so to bed” (*D*, 7:61): on *this* day, he wrote *those* entries, but not *this* one. And again:

I sat up till the bell-man came by with his bell, just under my window as I was writing of this very line. (*D*, 1:19)

Home, where my wife not yet come home. So I went up to put my papers in order. And then was much troubled my wife was not come, it being ten a-clock just now striking as I write this last line. (*D*, 2:14)

Then back home again, and to my chamber to set down in my *Diary* all my late journey, which I do with great pleasure; and while I am now writing, comes one with a ticket to invite me to Captain Robt. Blakes buriall. (*D*, 2:73)

The past progressive in the first passage clearly implies a later scene in which “this very line” is being read or rewritten; the “while . . . writing” of the third passage has the feel of a historical present that makes vivid a moment of interrupted pleasure; the time warp produced by the wandering tenses of the second passage—the rush from the preterit through the present participle to the immediate now of writing—works as a hyperbole conveying the writer’s impatience. In all these cases, the emphasis on the presence of the scene of writing, the *dum scribo*, ironically displaces it to the past and precipitates out a later scene in which he writes that he was or “is” writing. A generalized continuum of writing emerges, a ghostly sequence of serial but temporally unspecifiable acts of recording that dissociates itself from the putative sequence of the acts of writing the diary refers to.

I shall refer to this continuum as the *register of ghostwriting* and distinguish it from the *dated continuum* that includes the sequence of days, the sequence of entries, and the occasions of writing they imply or refer to. This distinction brings out the structural tension occluded by the standard mimetic view of the diary, as a glance at the structural relations of mediation will show. The formula for the standard view is: *the I that writes (the agent) represents the I that gets written (the product) as the I that gets written about (the referent)*; the writing agent represents itself in the midst of its daily life. This bypasses the basic feature of the revised view, the formula for which is: *the I that writes represents the I that gets written as the I that writes*; the writing agent represents itself representing itself in the midst of its daily life. The

complete formula for the revised view is: *the I that writes represents its product, the I that gets written, as both referent and agent, both the I that gets written about and the I that writes*. It represents the referent, I that gets written about, in the dated continuum and the agent, I that writes, in the continuum of ghostwriting. This divides the temporality of the referent's life from that of the agent. The score of references to the act and context of writing, and the very much larger number of references to his method of composition, represent Pepys in his monitorial function as a double agent who sees himself writing, reads what he has written, and copies or rewrites it. These references are generated from within the unlocatable register of ghostwriting alienated from the dated continuum. The two can't be self-identical. The use of first-person present-tense expressions to designate a now, a present scene of writing, can only yield a self-representation distanced and displaced by another now, the tacit present in which the deictic expressions are being used, and this in turn—since the site of the tacit present is the written page—represents and is displaced by another now, the implied but unrepresented series of nows that produced the page. Writing and seeing oneself write make explicit the structure of hearing oneself speak elucidated by Derrida in his critique of Husserl's logocentrism: "hearing oneself speak is not the inwardness of an inside that is closed in upon itself; it is the irreducible openness in the inside; it is the eye and the world within speech," or, in Lacan's formulation, it is the inside-out structure of the gaze.<sup>60</sup>

The evidence adduced by Matthews to show that the rough notes presumably made during the day they document were read, rewritten, and often revised by the writer suggests a time lag between the sequence of rough notes and the sequence of fair-copy entries. Taking the lag into account reinforces our sense of the gap between the dated continuum and the register of ghostwriting. The register intervenes between the continuum and the reader. Once the register is identified and dissociated from the continuum, the reader's attention is drawn to meanings produced strictly within the former's syntactical and rhetorical field. Thus, after noting that a potential suitor for his sister's hand raised his dowry demand, Pepys continues "this I do not like; but however, I cannot much blame the man, if he thinks he can get more of another than of me. So home, and hard to my business at the office, where much business; and so home to supper and to bed" (*D*, 7:81). The opening reflection brings the now of ghostwriting into the foreground and puts a strange spin on the effect of the connector idiom: "So home" becomes syntactically ambiguous; it can indicate both parataxis and consequence.



To activate the latter function (“as a result”) is to make the whole of the concluding sentence swerve from a simple narrative statement in the dated continuum to a gesture of resignation and dismissal: “So home . . .” equals “that’s that, so let’s turn to other matters.” As an affective response to the opening reflection, the gesture emerges in the register of ghostwriting.

To take another example, consider Christopher Hill’s epigrammatic assessment of a diary passage illustrating how Pepys’s “complicated equivocations enabled him to deny accepting bribes—‘not looking into it till the money was out, that I might say I saw no money in the paper, if ever I should be questioned about it’ (3.4.63). . . . This is indeed the homage that vice pays to virtue—or the post-restoration civil servant to the standards set during the interregnum.”<sup>61</sup> But the equivocation Hill’s epigram characterizes differs from Pepys’s description of it in the diary. To the extent that the latter displays a touch of self-satisfaction one may as easily speak of the entry as an act expressing the homage virtue pays to vice, an act depicting his skill in maneuvering between “residual Puritanisms” that make the diarist disapprove of “the morals of the post-restoration world” and his “determination to prosper in” that world.<sup>62</sup> Hill reels off a list of the “comical evasions and self-deceptions” that enabled Pepys to circumvent his vows intended “to keep play-going and drinking under control.”<sup>63</sup> But in all the passages he cites, the diarist appears to be re-citing, performing once again, the rationalizations or equivocations of a weak-willed lover of playgoing and drink. Do these performances betray guilty conscience? Do they assuage it? Do they express enjoyment in representing the actions that caused guilt? Or enjoyment in the comical transparency of his subterfuges? However wide the range of interpretive options may be, they are all responses to the act of self-representation portrayed in the register of ghostwriting; that is, they are responses not to the referent, the I that gets written about in the dated continuum, but to the agent, the I that represents itself in the continuum of ghostwriting. Hill’s assertion that Pepys “is not concerned to create an image of himself” and “is not writing for a public but for himself” is later qualified by the statement that “the care with which he preserved” the diary “suggests that Pepys had envisaged the possibility of others ultimately reading it.”<sup>64</sup> But to anyone who agrees with David Miller that all writing *qua* writing is “*addressed*, forestructured by the expectation of reading,” that possibility lies at the foundation of the diaristic enterprise in which the writer in the first instance addresses himself or herself as monitor.<sup>65</sup> As a writer of secrets, it isn’t only one’s secrets that one sets down for one’s own readerly delectation, it is the writing, the graphic self-representation of one setting

down secrets, and this reflexive performance is always potentially a rehearsal in which the monitor stands in for, anticipates the reading of, subsequent interpreters.

It is in the register of ghostwriting that such effects as those produced by the following juxtaposition are situated:

Thence, meeting Dr. Allen the physician, he and I and another walked in the park, a most pleasant warm day, and to the Queen's chapel—where I do not so dislike the music. Here I saw on a post an invitation to all good Catholics to pray for the soul of such a one, departed this life.

The Queen, I hear, doth not yet hear of the death of her mother, she being in a course of physick, that they dare not tell it her. (*D*, 7:87)

The juxtaposition of the two unrelated items seems motivated not only by the theme and thought of death but also by sheer association at the level of the signifier: “Queen” follows from “Queen’s chapel” and “physick” from “physician.” “I hear” situates the interjection in the unspecified now of ghostwriting; the sequence of items represents the train of thought occurring in that register, and the repetitions in the second item seem to be prompted not by what the writer remembers but by what he reads—either his rough notes or else the revised version that just danced from his pen.<sup>66</sup>

These considerations suggest that Pepys’s formula of closure, “and so to bed,” has a rhetorical function within the register of ghostwriting: when it concludes an entry it reinforces the mimetic fiction that “this day’s passages” of writing are correlated with or integrated into the daily passages of life Pepys writes about. William Matthews’s claim that entries terminated by the formula “were made late at night, just before Pepys turned in,” indicates that in these cases the register of ghostwriting is integrated into the dated continuum. But Matthews goes on to note, first, that this practice isn’t consistent, since Pepys himself writes that “many entries were made during mornings and afternoons” (entries that could be concluded with a recollective rather than proleptic reference to turning in); and second, that many entries containing this formula “go on, with no break in style, to describe matters that occurred after the diarist was abed or asleep,” hence the formula concludes an earlier draft that is subsequently augmented.<sup>67</sup> These instances suggest that there is no way of verifying whether any particular entry was in fact written at night, and that the fiction of the integration of the register into the dated continuum is often paper-thin. In a telling phrase Matthews remarks on Pepys’s “practice of ending a day neatly at the

bottom of a page”: even as the metonymic substitution of “day” for “entry” reflects the force of the fiction, it subverts it by implying that the real point of conclusion lies not in the end of the day but in the end of the page.<sup>68</sup> Thus “and so to bed” may be construed as marking the end of an episode of writing, whenever that occurred; it marks, that is, a moment in the register of ghostwriting. Its occurrence in the middle of an entry suggests that it is literally a *trope*, a turn that opens up the two previous closures of going to bed and concluding a first draft of the entry. Here, where the trope marks a boundary to be transgressed by revision, it signals the prelude to a new start that will bring to completion a process only initiated by the closing of the day. Left to itself, the day would fall away, would lack the reality of inscription. To announce its demise is the first step of a process leading to resurrection in the life of the page.

This division between the mimetic and revisionary contexts, the dated continuum and the register of ghostwriting, becomes deeper when we take into account the most obvious peculiarity of the diary, its being written in shorthand. Barker, who mentions but barely engages this fact, attributes it to the desire for secrecy: “A text . . . hidden in a difficult early seventeenth-century shorthand, written in secret and kept locked away during Pepys’s lifetime.”<sup>69</sup> This supports his thesis about guilty secrecy, and it accords with the consensus view of most Pepys scholars, including Latham, who states that the shorthand was “meant to protect the diary from prying eyes.”<sup>70</sup> It is true that Pepys was secretive about the diary, and I shall consider this in due time. But it’s also true—and oddly enough my authority here is Latham, who is not consistent on this issue—that the shorthand Pepys used, the method invented by Thomas Shelton, was “simple, almost naive,” when compared “with the well-known shorthands of our own day. . . . That, in fact, may have been one ground of its popularity, for it could have taken no one very long to learn it.”<sup>71</sup> Since three editions had been published at Cambridge by the time Pepys matriculated, it isn’t a system one would choose primarily for secrecy. The two titles under which it was published, *Short Writing* and *Tachygraphy*, make it clear that what it promised was not secrecy but economy and speed.

The paradoxical status of shorthand has been incisively described by Jonathan Goldberg, who observes that its sixteenth-century inventors dreamt “of a writing swift as speech—so swift that it could not be phonetic” and “would immediately represent the mind by bypassing the representation of ideas in sounds.”<sup>72</sup> Murray Cohen comments on the ideographic project of manual writers who believed “that ideas can be

visually represented” and, convinced that “short-hand . . . is an example of the transformation of propositions into pictures,” concentrated “on the layout of their systems on the printed page.”<sup>73</sup> In separating itself from the phonetic link to speech conventional to alphabetic writing, shorthand also separates itself from the reflexive transcription of the writer’s speech rhythms. Its relation to its referent is more like that of algebra than like that of plane geometry; it is digital rather than analogical. James Nielson has suggested, however, that the “mixed constructions” of tachygraphy may not fully evade “the rhythms of speech,” and perhaps resemble the syncopated structure of what Vygotsky describes as “inner speech.”<sup>74</sup> To whatever degree shorthand abstracts the symbol system from voice, it may be imagined to open up a space between the sociable and voluble subject of the diary as a dated continuum and its author or other in the register of ghostwriting.

The organization and rhetoric of Pepys’s entries bear out this hypothesis. The condensed syntax of his prose, its paratactic parade of discrete items, its elision of verbs and auxiliaries, its reliance on participial clauses to foreshorten complex episodic references, and its energetically terse use of deictic locators for rapid scene-setting, all bear the mark of shorthand composition. The prose is not logographic except when Pepys “deals with important public affairs,” and there the voicing is oratorical in a strictly literary sense—“the extended sentences and rotund utterance of the public man” who “sometimes speaks like a whale.”<sup>75</sup> Those more polished passages imitate the style of chronicle writing. But in the great majority of other entries there is little support for the opinion of one scholar that Pepys’s diary reads as “an echo of his speaking voice.”<sup>76</sup> The rhythm and “music” of the following passages are those not of the voice but of the hand subjected to the topological demands of the notational system:

Up, and to the office all the morning. At noon, my wife being gone to her father’s, I dined with Sir W. Batten, he inviting me. (*D*, 7:80)

Up, and going out of my dressing-room when ready to go downstairs, I spied little Mrs. Tooker, my pretty little girl, which it seems did come yesterday to our house to stay a little while with us, but I did not know of it till now. (*D*, 7:80)<sup>77</sup>

Up; and having many businesses at the office today, I spent all the morning there, drawing up a letter to Mr. Coventry about preserving of Masts, being collections of my own. (*D*, 5:54)

And here met with Mr. Hawly and with him to Wills and drank. And then by coach with Mr. Langly, our old friend, into the city. Set him down by the way; and I home and there stayed all day within—

having found Mr. Moore, who stayed with me till late at night, talking and reading some good books. Then he went away, and I to bed. (*D*, 2:40)

To see the kaleidoscopic jig of discrete figures made by the pen dancing across the pages of Pepys's manuscripts—a cross between algebraic and musical notation in appearance—is to apprehend the source of a volubility that doesn't always lend itself to the reading voice. Neither alphabetic nor cursive, separated from the logographic flow of speakable language, it has a pulse, a rhythm, that (for all its colloquial directness) resists imaginary audition, as presumably it resisted the reflexive transcription of the writer's vocality.<sup>78</sup> Its manual choreography transmits its spirit to the staccato attack, the busy inventorial saccade, the sprightly but awkward impatience of a syntax sometimes jerked awry by a weakness for the ablative disjunctions that cram a lot of news into a little space. This prose in turn transmits *its* spirit—vibrant, restless, awkward—to the life it represents.

It is understandable that biographers look through the *Diary* as a window on Pepys's life:

No two entries are alike, for no two of Pepys's days were alike. Between the opening "up betimes" and the familiar closing "and so to bed," his average day was crammed with activities so diverse, momentous, and pleasurable that the ordinary person would need a week or two to sort them out and live through them.<sup>79</sup>

It doesn't detract from the busyness of his average day to remember that this impression is produced by the way the writer crams into the average entry a run of time-and-motion clauses powered by prepositions or prepositional phrases that register the changes of time and scene (*up, to, so, thence, after, all the morning*). Events are telescoped to fit into sentences, and the sentences are often distended to cram in more events along with observations on them. At the same time, the sentences themselves are often telescoped by the omission of verbs and the first-person pronoun. These two tendencies combine to produce an effect at times of breathlessness, the effort to squeeze as much as possible into the confined sentential space of the diary page—since Pepys's shorthand is for the most part unpunctuated, this effect is both reflected and attenuated in the occasionally strained periods constructed by the editors. Furthermore, the pace is enlivened and the sense of the day's fullness enhanced by the simultaneous accentuation and truncation of deictic markers, a practice that transmits the tempo of stenography to the round of daily pursuits:

To Westminster. My Lord being gone before my coming to Chappell, I and Mr. Sheply told out my money. . . . After that to Chappell. . . . After sermon, a dull Anthem; and so to my Lord's (he dining abroad) and dined with Mr. Sheply. So to St. Margaretts. . . . From church to Mrs. Crisp's (having sent Will Ewre home to tell my wife that I would not come home tonight because of my Lord's going out erly tomorrow morning); where I sat late. . . . I drank till the daughter began to be very loving to me and kind, and I fear is not so good as she should be.

To my Lord's and to bed with Mr. Sheply. (*D*, 1:237)

I did many things this morning at home before I went out—as looking over the Joyners, who are flooring my dining-roome—and doing business with Sir Wms. both at the office. And so to White-hall and so to the bull head where we had the remaynes of our pasty, where I did give my verdict against Mr. Moore upon last Saturdays wager. Where Dr. Fuller coming in doth confirme me in my verdict.

From thence to my Lord's and dispatcht Mr. Cooke away with the things to my Lord. From thence to Axeyard to my house; where standing at the door, Mrs. Diana comes by, whom I took into my house upstairs and there did dally with her a great while, and find that in Latin "*nulla puella negat.*"

So home by water; and there sat up late, putting my papers in order and my money also, and teaching my wife her Musique lesson, in which I take great pleasure. So to bed. (*D*, 1:239)<sup>80</sup>

Several features of the second entry are characteristic of the way Pepys's prose ventilates and interprets what it describes: changes of rhetorical pace, the repetitive but differential use of shifters, and the juxtaposition of the nuanced sentential forms that not only shape the day's diverse activities but also establish their relative importance to the writer. Thus the first sentence displays both impatience to get through the inventory of matutinal chores and—in the exemplary interpolation—the obligation to record them so he can move with easy conscience to more pleasurable items. The repetition of "and so" registers relief and speeds him to the first of these items; the repetition of "where" clauses emphasizes his delight by anaphoristically extending the period in which he savors the good things that happen when men of distinction gather for outstanding food and talk.<sup>81</sup> The repetition of "From thence" dispatches another piece of business and sends him quickly to his house to dally in the "where" and the "whom" and the "there . . . a great while" of his impromptu frolic with the obliging daughter of Mrs. Crisp ("not so good as she should be"), which he terminates with the sort of knowledgeable reflection one expects from a worldly man, a university man. "So home by water" marks this accomplishment and leads to a countervailing list of legitimate satisfactions.<sup>82</sup>

The difference between flirtation and family music reinforces the parallel and contrast between the versatile Pepys's two spheres of pleasure and mastery. The happy coda, "So to bed," repeats the satisfaction of "So home by water," and as a trope of closure it locates satisfaction more in the act of perusing and concluding the diary than in the retirement that ends (or ended) the day.

A day in the life of Samuel Pepys emerges from life in the "day"—the rhetorical life in the entry—of his diary as from a simulacrum. It derives some of its raw vitality from its stenographic provenance, and much of its form from the organized balance and distribution of clauses itemizing duties and pleasures. Thus, as I have been trying to suggest, our picture of the life recorded in the dated continuum is generated and controlled by rhetorical forces within the register of ghostwriting. The suggestion can be carried further by imagining that the life Pepys lived was raw material for the diary—not merely that it *was* raw material but that it was lived *as* raw material. That is, I can imagine that a man who resolved to keep a diary and then spent nine years representing himself to himself in shorthand went about his day knowing that everything he did was grist for that mill. If he became habituated to the project so that it was part of his daily agenda, wouldn't that have some influence over the selection and conduct of the daily pursuits he planned to write about?

"Pepys," writes Latham, "went through London spreading a close-meshed net for his daily haul of news."<sup>83</sup> Though a butterfly net might more appropriately characterize many of his catches, the sense I draw from Latham's metaphor is that from "up betimes" to "and so to bed" the daily round is organized as a fishing expedition for the diary, and that the move from one catch to another may to some extent have been guided, pre-inscribed, by diaristic desire. This isn't Latham's sense, since, as an advocate of the diary's mimetic function, he asserts that the process of recording enabled Pepys "to relish every experience more than once—not only at the moment of its happening but also in its recollection."<sup>84</sup> "Recollection" both muffles and betrays its reliance on the activity it follows and depends on. Perhaps the diarist is already a collector when he takes his net out into the field of daily pursuits; perhaps the life recorded in the diary is a life lived for the diary, a life lived in expectation of writing about it, a life monitored to ensure the provision of collectable and writable experiences in the ongoing project of self-collection through self-representation. Such a project might be imagined to place the subject as referent in the position of performing for the benefit of the subject as writing agent, who in turn performs for the benefit of the subject as monitor. In this more radical view it is not

merely our *picture* of the life recorded in the dated continuum that is generated and controlled from within the register of ghostwriting; it is *the life* itself.

It's easy to subordinate the desire and *jouissance* of diary-writing to the mimetic function, but Pepys's diary-writing is better viewed as an act of collecting, an act of self-collecting through self-representation, the master work of a master collector: "All of Pepys's many collections . . . represent his response to both Baconian research and the new historiography. Collection of basic materials was the new watchword in both fields."<sup>85</sup> Documentation presupposes collection, and the desire of collecting is an essential component, a prerequisite, of documentary desire. Collection has the same function in Bacon's inductive science as *inventio* has in classical rhetoric. But collection can be informed by motives and strategies different from those on which Bacon was to found the great instauration. In his stimulating account of the politics of collection, Steven Mullaney explores the paradoxes of a cultural practice that assembles, "rehearses," and fully exhibits what is to be purged, ordered, or repressed. Mutually exclusive aims "were often announced by one and the same collector; purification could only come after all that would ultimately be banished . . . was first worked through, in full. . . . [T]he exhibition of what is to be effaced, repressed, or subjected to new and more rigorous mechanisms of control can be a surprisingly full one."<sup>86</sup> Mullaney's focus is on the rehearsal of alien cultures and of alien, marginal, and unfamiliar features in the collector's own culture. But what about extending the idea to the practice of self-collection, or of self-exhibition or self-effacement or self-rehearsal?

Mullaney considers the context for such a turn to reflexive self-representation during an account of the popular stage in England as "a theater of (self-)apprehension" in which, as in "conduct books . . . and from the pulpit, the individual was being exhorted to . . . interiorize a judgmental social perspective"—the debt to Norbert Elias is explicitly acknowledged—and thus to engage in "a form of self-scrutiny that would eventually produce something like the modern subject."<sup>87</sup> This attributes to the popular stage the function the Puritans themselves attributed to diary-keeping. "The devout Puritan," observes William Haller, "turned his back on stage plays and romances, but only to look in his own heart and write what happened there."<sup>88</sup> This implies, of course, an equivalence in the contrasting practices, an orthopsychic tendency to theatricalize and romanticize the sinful inner self produced by such spiritual accountancy:



Nor only mercies and signall works of gracious providence, but judgements, great changes, overturnings, and the sins of the age are to be registred in this Christian Journall, as this Author well mixes the ingredients of this Diary. . . .

There is a book of three leaves thou shouldest read dayly to make up this Diary; the black leaf of thy own and others sins with shame and sorrow; the white leaf of Gods goodnesse, mercies with joy and thankfulness; the red leaf of Gods judgments felt, feared, threatned, with fear and trembling.<sup>89</sup>

The diary, here a metaphor of documentary desire, takes its lurid place beside the other products of an age of growing reliance on documentation: “The state . . . has its ‘diurnals’ of affairs, tradesmen keep their books of precedents and physicians theirs of experiments, wary heads of households their records of daily disbursements and travelers theirs of things seen and endured.”<sup>90</sup>

Haller, who emphasizes the importance to Puritans of collecting and documenting “the most trivial circumstances of the most commonplace existence,” and who notes the influence of this practice on Pepys, throws an interesting light on the *Diary*’s trope of closure (“and so to bed”) when he describes the many references in Puritan literature to “saints” who withdrew each night to continue the daily record so that, having balanced their spiritual books, they “could go to bed with a good conscience.”<sup>91</sup> This suggests not only that Pepys’s use of the device may have served the same purpose but also that it may have functioned intertextually as an allusion to the practice—as if activating the convention, citationally reproducing it, was a way to inscribe himself in that saving tradition and appropriate its efficacy. What I find interesting about the suggestion is that in the *Diary* the incidences of the device are so often explicitly marked as fictional and merely conventional, which prompts the further suggestion that, however mechanical the recurrence of the device may seem (or precisely *because* it seems mechanical), it registers an ambivalence of motive: a residual and perhaps superstitious reliance on the efficacy of a practice that Pepys consistently violates. As I noted above, the closure formula often marks the conclusion of an earlier draft that is subsequently augmented and revised. Therefore, rather than marking the conclusion and attendant good conscience of nocturnal recording, it marks the boundary to be transgressed in converting foul papers into fair copy. Good conscience is thus displaced from spiritual accountancy to documentary self-transcendence; the focus is not on the integration of writing into the saint’s daily routine of confessional self-scrutiny but on the liberation of the daily

round from its embodied state through the stages of revision to the reality of stenographic hard copy.

For all its differences from its Puritan precursors and contemporaries, Pepys's diary is no more a mere act of recollection than they are. It shares with them a formative activity of re-collection, and perhaps it also shares with or derives from Puritan journals a peculiar attitude toward the collecting of data that comes into view as soon as one considers what the resolution to keep a diary might mean to the selection and conduct of daily pursuits the diarist plans to write about. The saint who keeps "a daily record of the state of his soul" may well spend his day doing things that stage and perhaps romanticize the soterial drama—bad things as well as good—so that he may carry his haul back to his nocturnal closet and "book" himself.<sup>92</sup> He enters the day prepared to search out "whatsoever thoughts and actions the old Adam within had most desire to keep hidden, the very worst abominations of the heart" as well as "the good things that . . . showed the saint that, bad as he was, God had not forsaken him." In this way, he will rehearse, perform, and exhibit to himself during the day those behaviors that best yield up the spiritual meanings to be re-collected when he withdraws to his "private chamber" at night to "draw [them] forth into the light of conscience"<sup>93</sup>

That the motive informing Pepys's diaristic enterprise significantly differs from the motives of the saints whose journals he must have read during the Protectorate (if not after), and that the *Diary* itself is a magnificent anomaly, only serves to highlight their common ground in the culture of documentary desire. The mimetic force of the *Diary* is seductive; it leads people to look through the words at the pictures they conjure up and to treat the diary as an *ex post facto* record of Pepys's life and times. It seems important therefore to keep in focus the "picture" of a man writing, a man who spent nine years representing himself to himself and who went about his day knowing that everything he did was grist for that mill. I find it difficult to believe that this project didn't have some influence over what he did—what he chose to do—during the day. Isn't it likely, for example, that on a particular day he may have gone to one coffee house or play rather than another because there he expected to find more to write about—not that he would go *in order to* write about it, rather he would go because he knew he *would* write about it, perhaps reflect on it and savor it, which is to say that he knew he would represent himself reflecting and savoring? If this is part of the awareness he carries with him into all the day's happenings, wouldn't it have the effect of internally distancing the agent and monitor of writing from its subject and referent, who would always to some extent be in the

position of performing for the benefit of the diarist—who, in turn, performs for his own benefit as the diary's monitor and first reader? And, as the following passage by Richard Ollard suggests, even Pepys's "furtive" pursuits might have been performances in the sense that they recall theatrical models:

An irresistible air of bedroom farce clings to him, partly deriving from the candor of the *Diary*, partly from the bawdiness of Restoration comedy. . . . As Mr. Tattle scampers across the stage, baulked of the seduction of Miss Prue by an unwelcome intrusion, we are reminded of the furtive and futile lecheries so vivaciously recorded by Pepys and for the moment identify the great civil servant with a character described by his creator as a half-witted Beau.<sup>94</sup>

Pepys, who represents himself as a devout and exacting hedonist of the theater, doesn't tell us what he thought about bawdiness on the public stage; his comments are reserved for the private theater in which his performances are undertaken for the commentator's eyes only.

My fantasy, then, is that the lives Pepys and the Puritan saints live when they aren't writing are lives to some extent organized by the pursuit of the writable, the recordable, lives that give themselves to be seen, to be scrutinized and written and read about, by their subjects. It is as if Pepys and the saints, every evening before going to bed, write or imagine the scenario to be enacted the next day. The supplementarity conventionally ascribed to writing exerts its deconstructive power and, indeed, transfers itself to—writes and writes on—the writable life. To entertain this view is to suspect that the relation between autobiography and its referent described in the following passage may be the same as the relation between the diary and *its* referent:

But are we so certain that autobiography depends on reference, as a photograph depends on its subject or a (realistic) picture on its model? We assume that life *produces* the autobiography as an act produces its consequences, but can we not suggest, with equal justice, that the autobiographical project may itself produce and determine the life and that whatever the writer *does* is in fact governed by the technical demands of self-portraiture and thus determined, in all its aspects, by the resources of his medium? And since the mimesis here assumed to be operative is one mode of figuration among others, does the referent determine the figure, or is it the other way round: is the illusion of reference not a correlation of the structure of the figure, that is to say no longer clearly and simply a referent at all but something more akin to a fiction which then, however, in its own turn, acquires a degree of referential productivity?<sup>95</sup>

The structure of the figure of mimesis De Man alludes to may be expressed by the formula, mimesis is always mimesis-of, so that anything represented *as* mimesis is by definition correlated to the original it seems to imitate, whether or not there actually is an original. As an effect of the trope, the illusion of reference acquires referential productivity when placed in the field of reading, the field in which the reference implicit in the figure is actualized, interpreted, and characterized.

The ironic force of De Man's formulation increases when we consider that "the technical demands" are never the only demands affecting self-representation; there are also social, political, and psychological demands—for idealization, exemplarity, and documentary self-transcendence in the heaven of the future perfect:

While I am writing I think I see myself being seen by many others, who are reading over my shoulder the words traced by a dead man's hand immobilised for eternity, the eternity of truth, in the instant of inscribing it: *dum scribo*.

We received notice that you passed away. May God bless you. You may reapply if there is a change in your circumstances.<sup>96</sup>

I have elsewhere discussed the narcissistic desire that may make autobiography a form of autothanatography, a kind of *ars moriendi* the aim of which is to write one's own epitaph; to shape the death mask that will control the future by representing the deceased as he or she wishes to be remembered; to undo or encrypt what resists identification, what frustrates the project of disappearing into (or behind) the death mask, vanishing into the gaze, that is the ultimate armor/mirror of alienating identity.<sup>97</sup> "If I believe this story, then I will have been other than I was, or thought (suspected, feared) I was": the hope of the subjects of psychoanalysis is also that of the subjects of autobiography, whose desire to control the future perfect may lead them—as De Man implies—to try to live the stories they envisage so that they may believe what they set down in the writing that seeks confirmation, seeks referential productivity, in the assent of future readerships.<sup>98</sup>

It is to the idea of the acquisition of referential productivity that one looks for help in dealing with the most puzzling aspect of Pepys's *Diary*, and with the key question Francis Barker posed but dismissed in a parenthetical phrase: "to and for whom is Pepys writing this secret text?"<sup>99</sup> So far as we know, Pepys was secretive about the diary during his life. Only twice does he mention having told someone else about it (*D*, 1:107 and 9:475), and in the final entry he writes that since his failing eyesight prevents him from continuing the diary and forces him "to have it kept by

my people in longhand” he “must therefore be contented to set down no more than is fit for them and all the world to know; or if there be anything (which cannot be much, now my amours to Deb[orah Willet] are past, and my eyes hindering me in almost all other pleasures), I must endeavour to keep a margin in my book open, to add here and there a note in shorthand with my own hand” (*D*, 9:564–65). This suggests that his extramarital “amours” are the only cause for secrecy, and that “all other pleasures” must fall in a similar category, which makes it understandable why Pepys’s editor should conclude that he writes “for himself alone” in a secret diary “not designed for publication” and in shorthand “meant to protect the diary from prying eyes.”<sup>100</sup> It is worth pointing out, however, that in the final entry Pepys’s concern was mainly about his wife and the members of his household, not about posterity nor the public at large nor those whom he might expect would ultimately gain access to the volumes; given the sexism and homosociality of the courtly, bureaucratic, university, and scientific circles he moved in, it’s conceivable that he might expect them to appreciate both the delicacy of his domestic scruple and the strength of his manly desires. But would he expect them to gain access to the volumes?

On this issue, Matthews is more flexible and illuminating than his co-editor. Though he acknowledges that the diary was probably “meant only for Pepys’s own eyes” during his lifetime, he finds some things that suggest Pepys “may have intended it to be read by future scholars of historical taste. He carefully guarded it, catalogued it in detail and set it in the library that he bequeathed to Magdalene specifically for the benefit of scholars.”<sup>101</sup> More interesting is a subsequent comment that grounds the suggestion in the very structure of diaristic writing: the diary “often reads as though it had been written by an *alter ego*, by another man in the same skin, one who watched understandingly but rather detachedly the behavior and motives of his fellow-lodger. The diary form lends itself to this kind of duality, since the diarist is at once performer, recorder and audience.”<sup>102</sup> As Matthews shows, the principles of selectivity and style that inform Pepys’s production of the diary are pretty much the same as those that later inform his redaction of the King’s story in *Charles II’s Escape from Worcester*.<sup>103</sup> He is no less an *alter* in the first case than in the second. The I that writes assesses both performances from the standpoint of a monitor concerned for the writability of the original, and the chief difference is that as diarist he not only edits his rough notes but also, as I suggested, selectively lives a writable life.

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## NOTES

I'm very grateful to Professors James Nielson, Molly Whalen, and Beth Pittenger for their careful reading of drafts of this essay and for many incisive suggestions that greatly facilitated the task of rewriting.

<sup>1</sup> Jean-Luc Nancy, "Dum Scribo," tr. Ian McLeod, *Oxford Literary Review* 3, no. 2 (1978): 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Newsweek* 23 (March 1992): 21. Thanks to Beth Pittenger for directing my attention to this moving missive.

<sup>3</sup> Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (1934; rpt. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1963), 137.

<sup>4</sup> Anne Hollander, "The Unacknowledged Brothel of Art," *Grand Street* 6 (1987): 118; quoted by Jonathan Goldberg in *Writing Matter: From the Hands of the English Renaissance* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1990), 203.

<sup>5</sup> Jonathan V. Crewe, *Unredeemed Rhetoric: Thomas Nashe and the Scandal of Authorship* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1982), 70.

<sup>6</sup> Stephanie H. Jed, *Chaste Thinking: The Rape of Lucretia and the Birth of Humanism* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1989), 83.

<sup>7</sup> H. Porter Abbott, *Diary Fiction: Writing as Action* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1984), 19.

<sup>8</sup> Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 189.

<sup>9</sup> David Ogg, *England in the Reign of Charles II*, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (1956; rpt. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963), 2:737–38.

<sup>10</sup> J. G. A. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), 5.

<sup>11</sup> Walter J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the World* (London: Methuen, 1982), 6, 11, 31–75.

<sup>12</sup> Francis Barker, *The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on Subjection* (London: Methuen, 1984), 50.

<sup>13</sup> For "profound implication" see Barker, 50–51; for "hermeneutics" see Annabel Patterson, *Censorship and Interpretation: The Conditions of Writing and Reading in Early Modern England* (Madison: Wisconsin Univ. Press, 1984), 20. Whatever the merits of their common insistence on the causal efficacy of state censorship in the seventeenth century, Patterson and Barker deploy the premise in different ways that illustrate the shapes given to historicist and deconstructive interpretation in the 1980s. Patterson precipitates the "reality" of her authors out of a dense texture of historical documentation. Her "real authors" exist outside of their texts; their fears and their strategies of self-censorship are reactions to the known or suspected dangers of state censorship. The "reality" of Barker's authors runs in the other direction; it is to be sought, beyond the decoding of hidden or subversive messages, in the agency of textual operations: "As the privatized subject writes, its text is constrained to say more than it knows itself to say, an excess of signification . . . incited, paradoxically, by the censorship which is the governing principle of its discourse" (67). In this emphasis on textual reality, Barker's practice implicitly subscribes to the principle enunciated by Norman Bryson: "the effect of the real" is the product of "hermeneutic effort"; because exegesis "must extract meaning . . . under conditions of difficulty and uncertainty," because "it must go out of its way to uncover its object," the meanings "are experienced as *found*, not made," and "the effect of the real is enhanced" (*Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze* [New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1983], 64).

<sup>14</sup> Barker, 52.

<sup>15</sup> Barker, 10, 58. Barker's identification of the "disembodied 'inner self'" with the "I that writes the text" is open to question—is indeed placed in question by subsequent moves in his analysis, as when he writes of the elision of psychic elements from the writer's consciousness (59) and of the "excess of signification" that results from self-censorship (67), an excess obviously identical with the elided elements.

<sup>16</sup> Barker, 57.

<sup>17</sup> The reasons for its notoriety, which appear below, are spelled out in James Nielson's fascinating "Reading between the Lines: Manuscript Personality and Gabriel Harvey's Drafts" (*Studies in English Literature* 33 [1993]: 47–49).

<sup>18</sup> Pepys, in Barker, 3.

<sup>19</sup> Barker, 58–60.

<sup>20</sup> Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1986), 90, 88; see 90–91 for a mention of Pepys.

<sup>21</sup> Barker, 52, 10–11.

<sup>22</sup> Barker, 6–7.

<sup>23</sup> Barker, 5, 6.

<sup>24</sup> Barker's claims rest on a sparse data base, a small sample of texts and images that are, despite his commitment to suspicious reading, selectively and at times tendentiously interpreted. *The Tremulous Private Body* wavers tonally between a cautionary tale and a jeremiad, the story of "our subjection," of "what was done to us in the seventeenth century" when we became bourgeois subjects, a fate it may not be too late to "undo" (68, 115).

<sup>25</sup> Barker, 9.

<sup>26</sup> Not to mention all the other entries in which Pepys describes singing and clearly means singing. If there is a connection between singing and fucking it needn't be so crude a one as simple displacement. Analysis of the connection would have to detour through the other representations of his body, his health, his appetite for food, and his anxiety about money. And such an analysis would have to respect thematic juxtapositions within single entries as well as a statistical account of juxtapositions—for example, how often does Pepys juxtapose references to sex and to song?

<sup>27</sup> Barker, 3. According to the bibliographical information Barker gives in his preface (vii) the passage is quoted from *John Evelyn and Samuel Pepys: Selections from the Diaries* (ed. James Gibson [London: Chatto and Windus, 1957], 216–17) but since I was unable to find this title in any database, I assume the volume he used was *Selections from the Diaries of John Evelyn and Samuel Pepys* (ed. James Gibson [London: Chatto and Windus, 1957]). Furthermore, he fails to cite the original source from which Gibson drew his excerpts, and the Gibson volume was unavailable to me. The passage differs, however, by only one word and one omission from the version in Pepys's shorthand manuscript as transcribed in 1875 by Mynors Bright and published with additions by Henry B. Wheatley (ed. Henry B. Wheatley, *The Diary of Samuel Pepys*, 18 vols. [New York: George E. Croscup, 1893], 14:290–91). The indefinite article in "a mighty good store" (Barker's quotation) is missing from Wheatley. More significantly, Baker omits the ellipses points supplied by Wheatley to mark the excision of the parenthetical phrase included by Latham and Matthews in their version: see immediately below and note 28. Unlike Barker, Wheatley takes pains in his preface to apologize for refusing to make public "a few passages which cannot possibly be printed" (reproduced in the two-volume Modern Library reprint, *The Diary of Samuel Pepys*, ed. Wheatley (New York: Random House, 1946), v).

<sup>28</sup> *The Diary of Samuel Pepys, Volume Nine, 1668–1669*, ed. Robert Latham and William Matthews, 11 vols. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1976), 59. This edition of the diary is hereafter cited parenthetically by volume and page and abbreviated *D*. Only Volumes Ten and Eleven, the Companion (commentary) and Index, appeared too late—1983—for Barker to consult. A cursory glance through Latham and Matthew’s magnificent introduction in Volume One (xvii–clii; published in 1970), with special attention to the two sections on the material text and previous editions (xli–xcvi), would have set Barker straight (separate sections of this introduction are hereafter attributed to either Latham or Matthews). In effect, he has equated Pepys with a Victorian expurgation of his text and then constructed him as a proto-Victorian, thus producing a fiction of bourgeois continuity.

<sup>29</sup> Barker, 7.

<sup>30</sup> See Matthews, in *D*, 1:xlili–xlv, xcvi–cxiii.

<sup>31</sup> Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage: In England 1500–1800*, abridged ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 334.

<sup>32</sup> Stone, 350, italics mine.

<sup>33</sup> Stone, 348.

<sup>34</sup> Stone, 349–50.

<sup>35</sup> For a likely source of Barker’s comments on the circumlocution about sex see Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality*, tr. Robert Hurley, 2 vols. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 1:20: “Under the authority of a language that had been carefully expurgated so that it was no longer directly named, sex was taken charge of, tracked down as it were, by a discourse that aimed to allow it no obscurity, no respite.”

<sup>36</sup> Martin Howard Stein, “Health,” in *D*, 10:179–80, my italics.

<sup>37</sup> Matthews, in *D*, 1:cvii.

<sup>38</sup> Pepys’s macaronics “would hardly have deceived [his wife] Elizabeth had she *per impossibile* mastered his shorthand and broken the lock under which he kept those dangerous volumes. The only gaze from which he was disguising them was his own” (Richard Ollard, *Pepys: A Biography* [1974; rpt. New York: Atheneum, 1984], 96). Of course this assumes that he tried to deceive himself by writing in a cipher he fully understood, which is absurd.

<sup>39</sup> “The forbidding of certain words, the decency of expressions, all the censorings of vocabulary, might well have been secondary devices” that morally and technically facilitate “the task of passing everything having to do with sex through the endless mill of speech” (Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, 2:21): this may suggest the kind of norm against which—and in terms of which—Pepys displays indecency of expression; for it is this as much as the details of sexual behavior it denotes and pretends to obscure that the *lingua franca* passages foreground.

<sup>40</sup> Ollard, 98.

<sup>41</sup> Matthews, in *D*, 1:cvi–cix; Ollard, 19.

<sup>42</sup> Stein, in *D*, 10:179.

<sup>43</sup> Though it is important to qualify this statement by noting, with Lawrence Stone, that affairs of business and pleasure were closely interrelated—that Pepys was not exceptional in using his official power “to obtain consent from women for his sexual advances,” and that both parties could realize practical benefits from strategic submission to sexual pleasure (346, 348).

<sup>44</sup> Barker, 58, 67.

<sup>45</sup> Barker, 59.

<sup>46</sup> Ian Watt, *The Rise of the Novel* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1957), 32.



<sup>47</sup> Barker, 5.

<sup>48</sup> Latham, in *D*, 1:cxvi.

<sup>49</sup> *The Illustrated Pepys: Extracts from the Diary*, ed. and Introduction by Robert Latham (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1978), 9.

<sup>50</sup> Latham, in *D*, 1:cxiv–cxv; Latham, *Illustrated*, 7, italics mine.

<sup>51</sup> Matthews, in *D*, 1:cii, xcvi, cii.

<sup>52</sup> Matthews, in *D*, 1:ciii.

<sup>53</sup> Matthews, in *D*, 1:cv–cvi.

<sup>54</sup> Matthews, in *D*, 1:cii.

<sup>55</sup> Why “this day’s journal *only*”? Were there other days still to be entered?

<sup>56</sup> And he thinks about victualling while preparing to write the entry.

<sup>57</sup> See also the entries for 26 October in the same volume and 10 May 1667 (*D*, 8:208): “a sad spectacle, . . . which makes my hand now shake to write of it.” Of the latter, the editor notes that the “handwriting is however steady at this point.”

<sup>58</sup> Matthews, editor’s note, *D*, 3:156.

<sup>59</sup> Matthews, in *D*, 1:xcviii.

<sup>60</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs*, tr. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973), 86.

<sup>61</sup> Christopher Hill, *The Collected Essays of Christopher Hill, Volume One: Writing and Revolution in 17th Century England* (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1985), 267.

<sup>62</sup> Hill, 264–65.

<sup>63</sup> Hill, 265–66.

<sup>64</sup> Hill, 259, 271.

<sup>65</sup> David Lee Miller, “The Writing Thing,” *Diacritics* 20 (1990): 23.

<sup>66</sup> I note in passing that if the diary had been written only for the writer’s eyes there would be no need to add “the physician” to “Dr. Allen.” Pepys has reason to keep his diary secret, not only because he seems intent on documenting his infidelities but also because he uses it to tell himself truths he would not be likely to tell others, such as the truth of his low opinion of Sir William Penn. But there are many signs that he wants the secret to be discovered—eventually if not immediately—so that the inner Pepys, the real Pepys, may preserve *his* truth in the medium that replaces his mortal body; the glorified body of shorthand encrypting his mind so that it may be translated, resurrected, revealed.

<sup>67</sup> Matthews, in *D*, 1:xcvii.

<sup>68</sup> Matthews, in *D*, 1:ciii.

<sup>69</sup> Barker, 6.

<sup>70</sup> Latham, *Illustrated*, 8.

<sup>71</sup> Latham, in *D*, 1:li.

<sup>72</sup> Goldberg, 203–4.

<sup>73</sup> Murray Cohen, *Sensible Words: Linguistic Practice in England, 1640–1785* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1977), 14.

<sup>74</sup> Personal communication. On inner speech, see L. S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language*, tr. Eugenia Hanfmann and Gertrude Vakar (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1965), throughout, but especially 44–51 and 135–53.

<sup>75</sup> Matthews, in *D*, 1:ciii–civ.

<sup>76</sup> Richard Lockett, “Language,” in *D*, 10:221. Though Lockett acknowledges the stenographic pressures and resultant ellipses “imposed by the actual keeping of a diary,” he goes on to document what he considers evidence of “the ring of the spoken word”

(10:221). But his examples of “the excellencies and intimacies of table talk” (10:222) seem theatrical and literary to me, and his subsequent account of the influence of Latin constructions further suggests the attempt to “sound” literary. See Cohen.

<sup>77</sup> “Till now” is another floating present: is it the now of writing or the now of the past moment of espial?

<sup>78</sup> Different kinds of entry correlate with different stylistic registers. As Matthews shows, when the diary “deals with important affairs,” the prose is more orotund (*D*, 1:civ). It aspires to the kind of scriptural authority conveyed by weighty prose that *looks* literary and polished. Compared to the more stenographic entries, these passages foreground the signs of rewriting and revision; they conjure up a scene of imaginary audition; theirs is the rhetoricity of writing that only pretends to be speaking.

<sup>79</sup> Ivan E. Taylor, *Samuel Pepys*, updated ed. (Boston: Twayne, 1989), 4.

<sup>80</sup> These two passages are among those Matthews describes as “written in rapid, even impetuous language, simple and limited in its sentence patterns, . . . innocent of ornament or rhetoric, . . . close to ordinary speech,” but “more economical, denser with facts and more elliptical than most men’s speaking” (in *D*, 1:civ). I have tried to suggest why I think it more elliptical and in that respect not close to ordinary spoken speech.

<sup>81</sup> The phrase “remaynes of our pasty” alludes to a similar meeting three days earlier, in the entry for which Pepys writes that he dined on “the best venison pasty that ever I eat of in my life” and anticipated eating the rest of it at the next meeting (*D*, 1:236).

<sup>82</sup> In this entry the apparent confusion between “my house” and “home” is caused by Pepys’s referring to his former house in Axe Yard. He now lives in the Navy Office in Seething Lane.

<sup>83</sup> Latham, in *D*, 1:cxxvii.

<sup>84</sup> Latham, in *D*, 1:cxxviii.

<sup>85</sup> *Charles II’s Escape from Worcester: A Collection of Narratives Assembled by Samuel Pepys*, ed. William Matthews (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1966), 12. On Pepys’s activity as a collector of chap-books—a hobby that engaged him mainly during the 1680s, after the period of the *Diary*—see Margaret Spufford, *Small Books and Pleasant Histories: Popular Fiction and its Readership in Seventeenth-Century England* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), 129–55 and throughout.

<sup>86</sup> Steven Mullaney, *The Place of the Stage: License, Play, and Power in Renaissance England* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1988), 74.

<sup>87</sup> Mullaney, 132.

<sup>88</sup> William Haller, *The Rise of Puritanism* (1938; rpt. New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 96.

<sup>89</sup> John Fuller, publisher’s preface to Samuel Beadle, *The Journal or Diary of a Thankful Christian* (1656), sig. b4, r. and v. Quoted from Paul Delaney, *British Autobiography in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1969), 64.

<sup>90</sup> Haller, 96; a paraphrase of Beadle.

<sup>91</sup> Haller, 97–100.

<sup>92</sup> Haller, 97.

<sup>93</sup> Haller, 99–100.

<sup>94</sup> Ollard, 18–19.

<sup>95</sup> Paul De Man, “Autobiography as De-Facement” (1979), in *The Rhetoric of Romanticism* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1984), 69.

<sup>96</sup> See the epigraphs above.

<sup>97</sup> See my *Imaginary Audition: Shakespeare on Stage and Page* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1989), 119–21.

<sup>98</sup> There is a nice illustration of this concern in Pepys's remarkable account of the great fire. He writes that "all over the Thames, with one's face in the wind you were almost burned with a shower of Firedrops—*this is very true*—so as houses were burned by these drops and flakes of fire" (*D*, 7:271, my italics): he is, as it were, soliciting referential productivity from a potentially incredulous reader.

<sup>99</sup> Barker, 6.

<sup>100</sup> Latham, *Illustrated*, 7–8.

<sup>101</sup> Matthews, in *D*, 1:civ.

<sup>102</sup> Matthews, in *D*, 1:cix.

<sup>103</sup> See Matthews, *Escape*, 9–12, 36–37.