at Lemnos, where I brought you the price of a hundred oxen \( \text{ἐκατώματον} \) \( \text{δὲ τοι \ έλ\phi\nu} \) (II. 21. 79). About a little slave who is offered for sale: \( \text{ὅ \ d' \ ἐμι \ μακά} \) \( \text{διών} \ \text{α} \) \( \text{λρω} \) (Od. 4: 453). Melantheus threatens to sell Eumaeus far from Ithaca 'so that he will bring me a good living' \( \text{ ἵνα} \ \text{μο\nu \ βι\tau\ν} \ \text{πολύν} \ \text{άλ\pra} \) \( \text{λρω} \) (Od. 17. 250), and the suitors invite Telemachus to sell his guests at the market in Sicily 'where they will bring you a good price' \( \text{ἀ\θεν \ k\α \ τοι \ \pi\tau\ι} \ \text{αλ\pra} \) \( \text{λρω} \) (Od. 20. 383). There is no variation in the meaning of the verb and the full force of it is found in the epithet that describes maidens: \( \text{παρθένι} \ \text{δικα\τωμα} \) \( \text{τε} \) 'bring in oxen' for their father who gives them in marriage.

"Value" is characterized, in its ancient expression, as a "value of exchange" in the most material sense. It is the value of exchange that a human body possesses which is delivered up for a certain price. This "value" assumes its meaning for whoever disposes of a human body, whether it is a daughter to marry or a prisoner to sell. There we catch a glimpse, in at least one part of the Indo-European domain, of the very concrete origin of a notion connected to certain institutions in a society based on slavery.

From L'Annee sociologique, 3rd series, 2 (1948-1949): 7-20

**TWENTY-SEVEN**

The Notion of "Rhythm" in its Linguistic Expression

It might be the task of a psychology of movements and gestures to make a parallel study of the terms that denote them and the psychological phenomena that they express, the meaning inherent in the terms, and the often very different mental associations that they awaken. The notion of "rhythm" is one of the ideas that affect a large portion of human activities. Perhaps it even serves to distinguish types of human behaviour, individual and collective, inasmuch as we are aware of durations and the repetitions that govern them, and also when, beyond the human sphere, we project a rhythm into things and events. This vast unification of man and nature under time, with its intervals and repetitions, has had as a condition the use of the word itself, the generalization, in the vocabulary of modern Western thought, of the term rhythm, which comes to us through Latin from Greek.

In Greek itself, in which \( \text{γυθις} \) does indeed designate rhythm, where does the notion come from and what does it properly mean? An identical answer is given by all the dictionaries: \( \text{γυθις} \) is an abstract noun from \( \text{γυ\nu} \) 'to flow,' the sense of the word, according to Boisacq, having been borrowed from the regular movements of the waves of the sea. This is what was taught more than a century ago, at the beginnings of comparative grammar, and it is what is still being repeated. And what, really, could be more simple and satisfying? Man has learned the principles of things from nature, and the movement of the waves has given rise in his mind to the idea of rhythm, and that primordial discovery is inscribed in the term itself.

There is no morphological difficulty in connecting \( \text{γυθις} \) to \( \text{γυ\nu} \) by means of a derivation which we shall have to consider in detail. But the semantic connection that has been established between "rhythm" and "to flow" by the intermediary of the "regular movement of the waves" turns out to be impossible as soon as it is examined. It suffices to observe that \( \text{γυ\nu} \) and all its nominal derivatives (\( \text{γυ\nu} \), \( \text{γυ\νι} \), \( \text{γυ\νις} \), \( \text{γυ\νας} \) \( \text{γυ\νας} \)) are exclusively indicative of the notion of 'to flow,' but that the sea does not 'flow.' \( \text{Tε\nu} \) is never said of the sea, and moreover, \( \text{γυθις} \) is never used for the movement of the waves.
The terms which depict this movement are entirely different: ἀποσται, ἁχαία, πλημμελός, ὀμόδεινος. Conversely, what flows, ὑδάτι, is the river or the stream, and a current of water does not have "rhythm." It ὑδατί means "flux, flowing," it is hard to see how it could have taken on the value proper to the word "rhythm." There is a contradiction of meaning between ὑδατί and ὑδατικός, and we cannot extricate ourselves from the difficulty by imagining—and this is a pure invention—that ὑδατικός could have described the movement of the waves. What is more, ὑδατικός in its most ancient uses never refers to flowing water, and it does not even mean "rhythm." This whole interpretation rests on the wrong premises.

It is clearly necessary, in order to reconstruct a history which was less simple but which is also more instructive, to begin by establishing the authentic meaning of the word ὑδατικός and by describing its use at its origins, which go very far back. It is absent from the Homeric poems. It is especially to be found in the Ionian authors and in lyric and tragic poetry, then in Attic prose, especially in the philosophers.¹

It is in the vocabulary of the ancient Ionian philosophy that we may apprehend the specific value of ὑδατικός, and most particularly among the creators of atomism, Leucippus and Democritus. These philosophers made ὑδατικός (ὀρθοτικός)² into a technical term, one of the key words of their teaching, and Aristotle, thanks to whom several citations from Democritus have come down to us, transmitted its exact meaning to us. According to him, the fundamental relationships among bodies are established by their mutual differences, and these differences come down to three: ὅσμος, διαθήκη, γραφή, which Aristotle interprets thus: διαθήκη γίνεται τῷ ὑδατικῷ καὶ διαθετή καὶ τροπή τοιτέκνον ὃ ὅσμος ἀρχή ἀκτίν ἢ ἢ διαθήκη τάξεις, ἢ δὲ τροπὴ ἑπεξ. "Things are differentiated by ὁσμός, by διαθήκη, and by τροπή, the ὁσμός is the σχῆμα ("form"), the διαθήκη ("contact") is the τάξις ("order"), and the τροπή ("turn") is the ἑπεξ ("position") (Metaph. 985b 4). It is clear from this important passage that ὁσμός means σχῆμα ("form"), which is confirmed by Aristotle when he follows in the passage, in an example borrowed from Leucippus. He illustrates these three notions by applying them respectively to the "form," "order," and "position" of the letters of the alphabet:³ A differs from N by the σχῆμα (or ὁσμός), AN differs from NA by the τάξις, and I differs from H by the ἑπεξ.

Let us hold on to the idea suggested by this passage that ὁσμός is the equivalent of σχῆμα. Between A and N, the actual difference is one of "form" or "configuration": two of the strokes are identical—Λ—and only the third is different, being interior in A and exterior in N. And it is indeed in the sense of "form" that Democritus always uses ὁσμός.⁴ He wrote a treatise Περὶ τῶν διαθετῶν ὁσμῶν, which means ‘on the variety of form (of

atoms).’ His doctrine taught that water and air, ὀσμός διαθέτει, differ from each other in the form that their constituent atoms take. Another citation from Democritus shows that he also applied ὁσμός to the form of institutions: ὁσμὴ καθεστῶτας ὁσμὴ μὲν ὁσμὺὶ διαθέτει τὸν ὁσμὸν τῆς ἑπεξ. There is no way, in the present form (of the constitution) to prevent rulers from committing injustice. The verbs ὁσμός, μεταφορμήσε, μεταπλαστίζω ‘to form’ or ‘to transform’ proceed from this same meaning, in the physical or moral sense: ἀνωθόμος φασινοῦνται τοῖς τῆς τῆς κάρρου, οἱ δὲ τῶν τοιότων διαίμορος τοῖς τῆς τῆς σφηνές ‘fools are formed by the acquisitions of change; but men who know [what] these acquisitions [are worth], by those of wisdom’; ἡ διδαχὴ μεταφορθήκεν τὸν ἀνθρώπον ‘instruction transforms man’; ἀνάγκη . . . τὰ σχήματα μεταφορθήκεσθαι ‘it is indeed necessary that the σχήματα change in form (in order to pass from angular to round),’ Democritus also uses the adjective ἐπωροσμένος, whose meaning can now be corrected; it is not “courant, qui se répand” (Bailly) or “adventitious” (Liddell-Scott), but ‘possessing a form’: ἐκεῖ ὄντοι οἱ μεταπλαστὶς, ἀλλ’ ἐπωροσμένος ἐκάστῳ οἱ διαθῆκε ‘we have no genuine knowledge of anything, but everyone gives a form to his belief’ (= lacking knowledge of anything, everyone makes up his own opinion about everything).

Accordingly, there is no variation, no ambiguity in the meaning that Democritus assigns to ὁσμός, and this is always ‘form,’ understood as the distinctive form, the characteristic arrangement of the parts in a whole. This point being established, there is no difficulty in confirming it by the total number of ancient examples. Let us first consider the word in Ionian prose. It is found once in Herodotus (5, 59), along with the verb μεταφορμήσε, in a passage which is particularly interesting because it deals with the "form" of the letters of the alphabet: ("The Greeks borrowed the letters of their writing from the Phoenicians";) μετά δὲ χρόνον πορφυροκόρον ἐξαίρετος μέν τῇς φωτεινὰς καὶ τὸν ὀσμὸν τῶν φωνῶν τά γράμματα, μεταφορμήσασθε σφυρίζοντο ἔργα τοὺς Ἑλλήνας borrowed letters from the Phoenicians through instruction, and used them after having transformed (μεταφορμήσε) them a little.’ It is not chance that Herodotus used ὁσμός for the ‘form’ of letters at almost the same period that Leucippus, as we have just seen, was defining this word by using the very same example. This is proof of an even more ancient tradition that applied ὁσμός to the configuration of the signs of writing. The word remained in use among the authors of the Corpus Hippocraticum, and with the same sense. One of them prescribes, for the treatment of clubfoot, the use of a small leaden boot, ‘in the form of the ancient sandals of Chios’ (οἶνος αἱ
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in speaking of the images which mirrors reflect (Tim. 46a); this same verb μεταφηματίζειν has the moral sense of 'to reform (the character)' in Xenophon (Econ. 11. 2. 3). And Aristotle himself invented διαφημίζεται 'not reduced to a form, amorphous' (Metaph. 10. 104b, 27).

We must limit ourselves here to this almost exhaustive list of examples. The citations suffice amply to establish: (1) that θημων never meant 'rhythm' from the earliest use down to the Attic period; (2) that it was never applied to the regular movement of the waves; (3) that its constant meaning is 'distinctive form, proportioned figure, arrangement, disposition' in conditions of use which are otherwise extremely varied. Similarly the derivatives or compounds, nominal or verbal, of διωμων never refer to anything but the notion of "form." Such was the exclusive meaning of διωμω in all types of writings down to the period at which we halted our citations.

Having established this meaning, we can and must determine it precisely. There are other expressions in Greek for 'form': σχήμα, μορφή, εἶδος, etc., among which θημων should be distinguished in some way, better than our translation can indicate. The very structure of the word διωμω should be investigated. We can now profitably return to etymology. The primary sense, the one which we have just deduced, seems unquestionably to take us far away from "to flow," by which others have explained it. And nevertheless, we shall not lightly abandon a comparison which is morphologically satisfying; the relation of διωμων to σχήμα does not in itself give rise to any objection. It is not this derivation itself that we have criticized, but the wrong sense of διωμων that was deduced from it. Now we can take up the analysis again, basing it on the corrected meaning. The formation in -θομωδεσις deserves attention for the special sense it confers upon "abstract" words. It indicates, not the accomplishment of the notion, but the particular modality of its accomplishment as it is presented to the eyes. For example ἄρχητος is the act of dancing, ἄρχητος, the particular dance seen as it takes place; χρήσις is the act of consulting an oracle, χρήσις, the particular response obtained from the god; θέσις is the act of placing, θήσις the particular disposition; στάτης is the state of being in some position (Fr. τε τέτινει), στάτης the position assumed, whence the balancing of a scale, a stance, etc. This function of the suffix emphasizes the originality of διωμων. But it is especially the meaning of the radical which must be considered. When Greek authors render διωμω by σχήμα, and when we ourselves translate it by 'form,' in both cases it is only an approximation. There is a difference between σχήμα and διωμων; σχήμα in contrast to ἄρχητος 'ε (me) tiens' (cf. the relation of Lat. habitus to habeo) is defined as a fixed 'form,' realized and viewed in some way as an object. On the other hand, διωμων, according to the contexts in which it is given, designates the form in the instant that it is assumed by what is moving,

Among the tragedians, διωμων and the verbs derived from it invariably maintain the same sense as in all the texts cited: τετράγωνος διωμων 'in a triangular form,' in a fragment of Aeschylus (fr. 78 N); πλέον διωμων 'a pitless fate has made my present form (= condition)' (Prom. 243); πᾶσον μεταφηματίζεις 'Xerxes, in his madness,' wanted to transform a strain (Pers. 747); μορφημων δόμοι 'a dwelling arranged for one person' (Suppl. 965). The use of διωμων in Sophocles is very instructive (Antig. 318): to the guard whom Creon has commanded to be quiet because his voice makes him suffer and who asks him, "Is it in your ears or in your soul that my voice makes you suffer?" Creon replies, τέ διωμων της ημων λύκην ὅποιον 'why do you picture the location of my grief? Here is the exact sense of διωμω "to give a form," and the scholiast correctly renders διωμων by αχρηματίζειν, διαφημίζειν 'to picture, to localize.' Euripides speaks of the διωμων of a garment, of its distinctive 'form' (διωμων πέπλων, Pers. 130); of the 'modality' of a murder (πρόν�α καὶ διωμων φόνον, El. 772); of the 'distinctive mark' of mourning (διωμων κακών, Suppl. 94); he uses εὔφημως 'in a suitable fashion,' for the arrangement of a bed (Cyel. 593) and διωμων for a 'disproportionate' passion (Hipp. 539).

This meaning of διωμων persists in the Attic prose of the fifth century. Xenophon (Mem. 3. 10. 10) makes διωμων 'propagation' the quality of a fine cuirass, which he qualifies by εὔφημως 'of a beautiful form.' In Plato one finds, among others, the διωμων 'the balanced state' between opulence and poverty (Laws 728e), and expressions like διωμων τα παιδία 'to form a young favorite' (Phaedr. 253b), μεταφηματίζεται 'reproduce the form,'
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σάρτος, γέγονεν 'Harmony is a consonance, and consonance an accord. . . . It is in the same way that rhythm results from the rapid and the slow, at first contrasted, then in accord.' Finally, in the Laws (665a), he teaches that young people are inconstant and turbulent, but that a certain order (τάξις), a privilege exclusively human, appears in their movements: τή δ' ἡ τῶν καθαρῶν τάτη φύσις ἐν οἷς τῇ δ' ἡ τῶν φωνῶν, τῶν τ' ἀλυσία καὶ βαρύδος συνθέωμεν, ομορροίνα προσαχούσαντο, χωρῆσαι δέ το τοιούτου καθένα. 'This order in the movement has been given the name rhythm, while the order in the voice in which high and low combine is called harmony, and the union of the two is called the choral art.'

It can be seen how this definition developed from the traditional meaning and also how that meaning was modified by it. Plato still uses ὀθύμος in the sense of 'distinctive form, disposition, proportion.' His innovation was in applying it to the form of movement which the human body makes in dancing, and the arrangement of figures into which this movement is resolved. The decisive circumstance is there, in the notion of a corporal ὀθύμος associated with μέτρον and bound by the law of numbers; that 'form' is from then on determined by a 'measure' and numerically regulated. Here is the new sense of ὀθύμος: in Plato, 'arrangement' (the original sense of the word) is constituted by an ordered sequence of slow and rapid movements, just as 'harmony' results from the alternation of high and low. And it is the order in movement, the entire process of the harmonious arrangement of bodily attitudes combined with meter, which has since been called ὀθύμος.

We may then speak of the 'rhythm' of a dance, of a step, of a song, of a speech, of new, of everything which presupposes a continuous activity broken by meter into alternating intervals. The notion of rhythm is established. Starting from ὀθύμος, a spatial configuration defined by the distinctive arrangement and proportion of the elements, we arrive at 'rhythm,' a configuration of movements organized in time: πᾶς ὀθύμος ἀρχηγοῦντες μετάτιθεν κατάφερε 'all rhythm is tempered by a definite movement' (Arist. Probl. 882b. 2).

The history sketched here will assist in the appreciation of the complexity of the linguistic conditions from which the notion of 'rhythm' was disengaged. We are far indeed from the simplistic picture that a superficial etymology used to suggest, and it was not in contemplating the play of waves on the shore that the primitive Hellenes discovered 'rhythm'; it is, on the contrary, we who are making metaphors today when we speak of the rhythm of the waves. It required a long consideration of the structure of things, then a theory of measure applied to the figures of dance and to the modulations of song, in order for the principle of cadenced movement to be recognized and given a name. Nothing is less 'natural' than this slow working out, by
the efforts of philosophers, of a notion which seems to us so necessarily inherent in the articulated forms of movement that we have difficulty in believing that people were not aware of it from the very beginning.

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**Civilization: A Contribution to the History of the Word**

The whole history of modern thought and the principal intellectual achievements in the western world are connected with the creation and handling of a few dozen essential words which are all the common possession of the western European languages. We are just beginning to perceive how desirable it would be to describe with precision the genesis of this vocabulary of modern culture. Such a description could only be the sum of many detailed investigations of each of these words in each language. These works are still rare, and those who undertake them feel keenly the scarcity of the most necessary lexical documentation, especially in French.

In a well-known study, Lucien Febvre gave a brilliant sketch of the history of one of the most important terms of our modern lexicon, the word *civilisation*, and the development of the very productive notions attached to it between the end of the eighteenth and the middle of the nineteenth century. He also deplored the difficulties encountered in dating exactly the appearance of the word in French. Precisely because *civilisation* is one of those words which show a new vision of the world, it is important to describe as specifically as possible the conditions under which it was created. The present article, which has as its particular purpose the broadening of the problem and the enrichment of the documentation, will be limited to that early phase of the first uses of the word.

Febvre did not encounter any reliable example of *civilisation* before 1766. A little after the publication of his study, new specific details and earlier examples were contributed on the one hand by Ferdinand Brunot, in a succinct note in his *Histoire de la langue française*, and on the other by Joachim Moras, who devoted a detailed treatise to the notion of civilization in France.

To this we can now add still other data encountered in our own reading. It now appears quite likely that the earliest examples of the word are to be found in the writings of the Marquis de Mirabeau. Today it is hard to imagine the fame and influence of the author of *L'Ami des hommes*, not only in the circle of the physiocrats, but in the entire intellectual world and for many
7. This meaning of θείας, once fixed, helps to settle a philological problem. We read in Herodotus 6. 89 that the Corinthians, by way of friendship, ceded to the Athenians some ships with the "symbolic" price of five drachmas, "because their law forbade a completely free gift" θείος (var. θεός) γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὁμίῳ νοέσθαι θείῳ. The sense of a 'free gift,' which is that of δώρον, not of θείας, should cause the adoption of the reading δώρον of ABCP, in opposition to the editors (Kallenberg, Hude, Legrand) who admit δώρον, following DIRSY.


**CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN**

1. Most of the references used here are to be found in Lidell-Scott-Jones, *et al.,* θεός. But the different acceptations of θεός in it are arranged almost at random, starting with the meaning of 'rhythm,' and without one's being able to discern the principle of the classification.

2. Between θεός and θεός the difference is only dialectal; θεός is the prevailing form in Ionic. There are many other examples of the coexistence of θεός and -μοsea; cf. Doric θεός, Homer θεός; βούρες and βούρες etc.

3. These observations are valid for the form of the letters in the archaic alphabets, which we cannot reproduce here. An I is, in effect, a vertical Η.


6. Another example of θεός in Aeschylus, *Orest*. 977, in a very emended text, was unusable.


**CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT**


2. F. Brunot, *Histoire de la langue française* (1930) 6, 1st part: 106. He gives as the first example of the word a passage from Turgot which L. Fevre ("Civilisation," pp. 4–5) eliminated as probably belonging to Dupont de Nemours.


5. Thus was demonstrated by G. Weulersse, *Les Manuscripts économiques de François Quesnay et du marquis de Mirabeau aux Archives nationales* (Paris, 1912), pp. 19–20, which shows "that the work was composed entirely, and undoubtedly even printed, in 1756, but it did not appear until 1757." But it was not difficult to go back to Mirabeau. This passage is cited in the second edition of the *Dictionnaire de Trévoux*. The reference now appears in the new edition of O. Bloch and W. von Warburg, *Dictionnaire étyologique de la langue française* (Paris, 1930), but with a wrong date (1755, instead of 1775) and an error in the title of the work (*L'Ami de l'homme* instead of *L'Ami des hommes*).