Scatter[1]

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> 'La pluie a dispersé les spectateurs qui courent dans tous les sens.' [The rain has scattered the spectators who go running in all directions.] (Jacques Derrida, *Glas*)

1. Everything begins and ends in plurality or dispersion.

1.1. I prefer to call it 'scatter', and immediately scatter 'scatter' here, with help from the *OED*:

1.1.1. As noun:

1. a. The action or an act of scattering; wide or irregular distribution; dispersion. Now chiefly with reference to shot.

b. *transf.* in Linguistics.

> **1935 in *Trans. Philol. Soc.* 45 The frequency of reference to sex had necessarily extended what I term the formal scatter of the word, and we now have *sexed, sexless, sexy, sexiness*, even *sexology*. 1963 J. LYONS *Structural Semantics* vii. 178 One point that seemed to be of relevance in the inquiry was the defective formal 'scatter' of the lexeme *εἰδέναι*.**

2. A quantity loosely distributed or interspersed; a scattering, sprinkling; also *spec.* in *Archæol.*

3. *Statistics.* The degree to which repeated measurements or observations of a quantity differ; that which is measured by the variance.

4. a. The scattering of light or other radiation.

b. *spec.* with reference to radio waves, freq. denoting the use of scattering within the atmosphere to extend the range of radio communication. Freq. *attrib.*

1.1.2. As verb:

1. *trans.* To dissipate, squander (goods or possessions). *Obs.* or *arch.*

2. a. To separate and drive in various directions (a body of men or animals, a collection of things); to disperse, dissipate (a quantity of matter); to dispel (clouds, mists).

b. *intr.* for *refl.* To separate and disperse; to go dispersedly or stragglingly. Also of a hawk: To go to a distance.

c. *refl.* Now *rare* or *Obs.*

d. *trans.* To separate, drive apart (one or more individuals *from* the main body). *Obs.*

e. *fig.* To dissipate, distract (the mind, etc.).

3. a. *trans.* To throw about in disorder in various places.

b. To throw down (a thing) negligently; to drop. *Obs. rare*[1].

4. a. To distribute to various positions; to place here and there at irregular intervals. Chiefly in *pa. pple.*

b. *intr.* in pres. pple. used with a vb. of rest (= 'scattered'). *Obs.*

c. *trans. Baseball.* Of a pitcher: to yield (hits) only at intervals and so restrict scoring.

5. a. To throw or send forth so that the particles are distributed or spread about; to sow or throw (seed, money, etc.) broadcast; to sprinkle, strew; to diffuse (fragrance).

b. *transf.* and *fig.* Also, to spread (reports, a prophecy).

c. *intr.* for *refl.*

d. Of a gun, a cartridge: To distribute (the shot). Chiefly *absol.*

e. *Physics.* Of a surface, semi-opaque substance: To throw back (light) brokenly in all directions. More widely, to deflect, diffuse, or reflect (radiation, particles, or the like) in a more or less random fashion. Also *absol.*

f. *intr. Physics.* Of radiation, particles, etc.: to undergo scattering.

6. *trans.* To sprinkle or strew *with* something.

1.1.3. Scatter scatters scat.

1.1.3.1. Scat:

1.1.3.1.1. Noun:

1. Treasure, money; in ME. only in phr. *scat and s(c)rud.* [...]

4. a. A blow or buffet.

b. 'Anything burst or broken open; the sound of a rent; the sharp sound of a bullet' (E.D.D.). Cf. *SCAT v.*[3] and *adv.*

c. A brief spell of weather; a short turn of work.

d. A sudden or passing shower of rain.

5. (US slang) Whisky

6. a. A style of improvised singing in which meaningless but expressive syllables, usu. representing the sound of a musical instrument, are used instead of words. Freq. *attrib.* passing into *adj.* (see also b below).

b. *Comb.*, as scat-singing *n.*, singing in this style; also as *adj.*; hence scat-singer and (as a back-formation) scat-sing *v. trans.* and *intr.*

7. [ad. σκατ-, σκώρ Gr. dung.]

1. Dung; (*pl.*) droppings.

2. *slang.* Heroin. Cf. *SHIT n.*[1] 1.

1.1.3.1.2. Verb:

1. *trans.* To oppress by exactions.

2. *intr.* In phrase *to scat and lot* (later *to scat or contribute*) = 'to scot and lot', i.e. to contribute equally to the defraying of some charge or cost.

3. *trans.* To break in pieces, shatter.

4. a. *intr.* To perform scat-singing; to sing or improvise with meaningless syllables.

b. *trans.* To sing or improvise (a song) by replacing the words by meaningless syllables.

5. Hence scatting *vbl. n.*

1.1.3.1.3. Adverb:

***to go scat*: to fall down; to break in pieces; to become bankrupt.**

1.1.3.1.4. Int.
Begone! Hence used as verb (*intr.*). Also in phr. *quicker than scat.*

1.2. ['Begins and ends': no beginning, no end.]
1.2.3. (Metaphysical logic of *arkhe* and *telos*.)
1.3. Take it also as a prescription: 'scatter!', 'scat!'. In all senses, *dans tous les sens*.
1.3.3. A prescription is not always quite an order (there's a distinction to come between command and counsel [see 16.4.6.14.1 below]).
1.3.3.1. Scatter! Absolutely or transitively:
1.3.3.1.1. Scatter seed.
1.3.3.1.1.1. The eminently teleological figure of the seed is already in tension with the randomness of its scatter.
1.3.3.1.1.1.1. [...]
1.3.3.1.2. Scatter ashes.
1.3.3.1.2.1. *Demi-deuil.* Half, not half. (No end)
1.3.3.1.2.1.1. See my 'Not Half No End' in *Deconstruction is not what you think* (ebook, 2005), pp. 117–23.
1.3.3.1.2.1.2. [...]

2. Philosophy tries to gather, organize and unify scatter.
2.1. Philosophy as such is dedicated to clearing and cleaning up the scat and the scatter, in general.
2.1.1. Concept is gathered and grasped scatter.
2.1.1.1. The philosopher against the scatterbrain.
2.1.1.1.1. [...]
2.1.1.2. Speculative dialectics is the most powerful attempt to deal with scatter.
2.1.1.2.1. Read here the whole of Book Two Section One Chapter 2 of Hegel's *Science of Logic*.
2.1.1.2.1.1. Or, if you must, the shorter version in the *Encyclopedia Logic*. §§115ff.
2.1.1.3. But it founders on the deconstructive demonstration that difference can (and so must) be thought short of, this side of, its dialectical sublation.

2.1.1.3.1. Read Derrida's *Positions*, p. 60 and n6

2.1.1.3.1.1. I tried to distinguish *différance* (...) from Hegelian difference. At precisely the point where Hegel, in the *Greater Logic*, determines difference as contradiction* only in order to resolve, interiorize, sublate it, according to the syllogistic process of the speculative dialectic, into the self-presence of an onto-theological or onto-teleological synthesis.

2.1.1.3.1.1.1. [Derrida's note]: Difference as such is already *implicitly* contradiction ... (*Der Unterschied überhaupt ist schon der Widerspruch an sich.*') In no longer allowing itself to be simply subsumed under the generality of *logical* contradiction, *différance,* (*process* of differentiation) allows one to take differentiating account of heterogeneous modes of conflictuality or, if you like, contradictions. If I have more often spoken of conflicts of forces than of contradiction, this is first of all through critical suspicion of the Hegelian concept of contradiction (*Widerspruch*) which, moreover, as its name suggests, is designed to be resolved within dialectical *discourse*, in the immanence of a concept capable of its own exteriority, and capable of having its outside-itself close to itself.

2.1.1.3.1.1.1.1. (See my *Interrupting Derrida* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 12 and 45)

2.1.1.3.2. And see too his longer but perhaps more elusive commentary on this same question in *Glas* (189b ff.), in the context of sexual difference.

2.1.1.3.2.1. Sexual difference is *overcome* when the brother leaves, and the other (sister and wife) remains. There is no longer any sexual difference *as natural difference*. 'The sexes overcome their natural difference'. Once overcome, sexual difference will have been merely a natural diversity. The opposition between difference and qualitative diversity is a hinge of the *Greater Logic*. Diversity is a moment of difference, an indifferent difference, an external difference, without opposition. While the two moments of difference (identity and difference, since identity differs, as identity) relate only to themselves and not to the other, while identity is not opposed to difference nor difference to identity, there is diversity. Diversity is, then, a moment of both difference and of identity, it being understood, quite explicitly, that difference is the whole *and* its own moment. Which is true too, then, of sexual difference: it is identity, identity is difference, itself the whole and its own moment.

In overcoming natural difference *as diversity* of the sexes, one moves to difference *as opposition*. In *Sittlichkeit*, sexual difference finally becomes a true opposition: which it was, moreover, *called*, destined to be.

1.1.3.1.4.1.1. Read here also Derrida's '*Geschlecht:* Différence sexuelle, différence ontologique'. (See too 2.1.1.7.2.1.5.1 below)

2.1.1.4. Scatter *remains* (as scattered remains). Scatter is (what) remains.

2.1.1.5. **Scatter is never absolute.**

2.1.1.5.1. (Scatter is only scatter if not absolutely scattered. Always somewhat gathered against the scatter.)

2.1.1.6. *Différance* is scatter (dissemination).

2.1.1.6.1. *Différance* holds difference short of Hegelian Absolute Difference.

2.1.1.6.1.1. This restraint, pause or even *pudeur* opens the space of *reading*.

2.1.1.6.1.1.1. See my 'L'invincible honte', in B. Chaouat, ed., *Lire, écrire la honte* (Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2007).

2.1.1.7. Scatter is Babel.

2.1.1.7.1. **And they said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower, whose top *may reach* unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth. And the LORD came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men builded. And the LORD said, Behold, the people *is* one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do. Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another' speech. So the LORD scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth: and they left off to build the city. Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because the LORD did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did the LORD scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth. (Genesis 11: 4–9)**

2.1.1.7.2. Translate, please.

2.1.1.7.2.1. 'Scatter' can 'translate' at least this scatter:
- 2.1.1.7.2.1.1. disperse, spread, strew;
- 2.1.1.7.2.1.2. disperser, éparpiller, semer;
- 2.1.1.7.2.1.3. Διασπορά; □πισκεδ□ννυμι; □πι σκορπ□ζω; σαβ□ζω;
- 2.1.1.7.2.1.4. divido, disperso, dissipo, disjecto, circumspergo;
- 2.1.1.7.2.1.5. zerstreuen;
  - 2.1.1.7.2.1.5.1. **['At a particular moment, we might even perceive that the thought of *Geschlecht* and the thought of translation are essentially the same. Here the lexical swarm [*essaim*] gathers (or scatters [*essaime*]) the series "dissocation", "distraction", "dissemination", "division", "dispersion". The *dis-* would then be supposed to translate, though it does not do so without transfer and displacement, the *zer-* of *Zerstreuung*, *Zerstreutheit*, *Zerstörung*, *Zersplitterung*, *Zerspaltung*. But an internal and supplementary frontier again splits this lexicon: *dis-* and *zer-* sometimes have a negative sense but sometimes too a neutral or non-negative sense (I'd hesitate to say positive or affirmative here).' Jacques Derrida, *Psyché* (Paris: Galilée, 1987), p. 405.]**
    - 2.1.1.7.2.1.5.1.1. (Like a fractal object, say a Julia set: zoom in here to the finest resolution you like, and scatter is still scattering, never settling.)

2.1.1.7.2.1.6. spargere, disperdere;
2.1.1.7.2.1.7. esparcir, estrellar . . .
2.1.1.7.2.1.8. Just beginning to spread out. A little further:
2.1.1.7.2.1.8.1. 及物动词;
2.1.1.7.2.1.8.2. まき散らす;
2.1.1.7.2.1.8.3. 흩뜨리다.
2.1.1.7.2.1.9. And further still: *ghomHa'*
2.1.1.7.2.1.9.1. [. . .]
2.1.1.7.3. There's 'trace' (scattered) in 'scatter'. Scar. Star. Start. State.

2.1.2. **Scatter is the politics of philosophy.**

2.1.2.1. 'Politics is based on one fact: human plurality' (First sentence of Hannah Arendt, *Was ist Politik?*) More interestingly: 'Man is a-political. Politics is born in *the space between* humans, therefore in something fundamentally *external to* humans. There is therefore no truly political substance. Politics is born in the intermediate space and is constituted as a relation. This is what Hobbes understood.' (Quoting on the basis of the French edition: Hannah Arendt, *Qu'est-ce que la politique?*, ed. Ursula Ludz, tr. S. Courtine-Denamy.)

2.1.2.1.1. And so, we're tempted to say against Arendt, politics is already not quite human.
2.1.2.1.2. 'Space between', 'intermediate space': read Epicurus on the *intermundia.*
2.1.2.1.2.1. There is an *intermundus* (which is not a *mundus,* not globalizable or *mondialisable*) between every apparent element of a scatter.
2.1.2.1.2.1.1. Including of course this scatter here.
2.1.2.1.2.1.1.1. [. . .]
2.1.2.1.2.2. Read together ancient materialism and modern String Theory.
2.1.2.1.2.2.1. [Follow especially the motif of *rhuthmos* . . .]

2.1.2.1.2.2.2. There are no atoms, so no 'atomysticism' in String Theory.
2.1.2.1.2.2.2.1 Rather, differential vibration or rhythm.
2.1.2.1.2.2.3. See my 'La démocritie à venir', in M-L Mallet, ed., *La démocratie à venir* (Paris: Galilée, 2004), pp. 599–613.

3. Philosophy would like to subordinate politics to metaphysics.

3.1. And have the king be a philosopher (and the philosopher a king).
3.1.1. All too famously: Read Plato's *Republic* 473 c-d
3.1.1.1. And also: 499b, 540d, *Laws* 711d, 712a, 713e (etc.)
3.1.1.1.1. (See also 6.4.6.6.1.1.1.1.1 below)
3.1.1.1.2. [. . .]
3.2. But Aristotle (not unusually) allows for at least a hesitation:
3.2.1. Compare *Metaphysics*, 982b with *Nichomachean Ethics*, 1094a and *Politics* 1282b.
3.2.1.1. (And *Politics* 1324–5, on the active and contemplative life.)
3.2.1.2. See too my 'Demo' (1999), in M. McQuillan, ed., *The Politics of Deconstruction: Jacques Derrida and the Other of Philosophy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp. 17–42.
3.2.1.3. Try to show how Aristotle's whole view of politics is less rapidly assimilable to Plato and the model of 'ipseity' than Derrida (in *Rogues*) seems to think.
3.2.1.3.1. See my forthcoming paper 'For Better and Worse' (read to the 'Who? Or What? – Jacques Derrida' conference, University of Florida, Gainesville, October 2006).
3.2.1.3.1.1. But show too that even where politics can appear to be primary, this is only on the basis of a teleological argument that will always tend to redeem it as metaphysical.
3.2.1.3.1.1.1. (This trouble around teleology is the real (vanishing) point of all this scatter here. No end of trouble.)

3.3. Deconstruction is one quite good name for the necessary failure of this attempt to subordinate politics to metaphysics.

3.3.1. This does not of course mean that it is enough to attempt in return to subordinate metaphysics to politics.

3.3.1.1. [...]

4. In political philosophy, sovereignty is the concept designed to operate the unification of scatter.

4.1. And thereby achieve the metaphysicalization of the political, and the self-supporting sovereignization of metaphysics.

4.2. Sovereignty would be the (philosophical) *end* of politics.

4.2.1. [Take on here Agamben's rather sovereign view of sovereignty, exception and 'bare life', with some help from Derrida's seminar on *La bête et le souverain* (forthcoming).]

4.2.2. The end of politics: its telelogical realization or its putting to death.

4.2.2.1. Read Jacques Rancière:

4.2.2.1.1. **The art of politics is the art that consists in suppressing the political. It is an operation of self-subtraction. Perhaps the 'end of politics' is then merely its accomplishment, the always youthful accomplishment of its old-hat-ness. And perhaps it is this duplicity of the *tekhnè politikè* that philosophy has never ceased theorizing, beyond the opposition of the 'ancients' and the 'moderns'. It is this ever young end that it has always brought close to the thought of foundation.** (*Aux bords du politique* (Gallimard, 2004), p. 34)

4.2.2.1.2. See too my essay 'Foundations', in A. Weiner and S. Morgan Wortham, eds., *Encountering Derrida,* (London: Continuum Books, 2007), pp. 10–20

4.2.2.1.2.1. [...]

4.2.3. 'The end of politics is the end of politics'.

4.2.3.1. See for example my *Frontiers: Kant, Hegel, Frege, Wittgenstein* (ebook from bennington.zsoft.co.uk, 2003), pp. 85, 96, 144. [Texts from 1990]

4.2.3.1.1. This complication is in fact true of teleological structures in general: ***the end is the end.***

4.2.3.1.1.1. See Chapter 5 of my *Frontières kantiennes* (Paris: Galilée, 2000); partial translation 'The End is Here', *Tekhnema,* 6 (2001), 34–50, and 'Almost the End', in *Interrupting Derrida*, op. cit.

4.2.3.1.2. This is how philosophy teaches how to live, how to die, and how to kill.

4.2.3.1.2.1. See my paper 'Jacques Derrida ... a life' (forthcoming).

4.2.3.1.2.2. (There's no end to this: because the end (of the end) is still always (the end of) the end.)

4.2.3.1.2.2.1. [...]

4.2.3.1.2.2.1.1. (You will have seen by now that that's why there's all this scatter.)

4.2.3.1.2.2.1.1.1. **It could end here (or anywhere else) but there is no end.**

4.2.4. **But sovereignty is constitutively *failing*.**

4.2.4.1. There is no sovereign.

4.2.4.2. No sovereign is sovereign.

4.2.4.2.1. [Pursue that incredible oxymoron 'sovereign subject'.]

4.2.4.2.1.1. See my paper 'Superanus', in *Theory and Event* 8:1 (2005), unpaginated e-journal.

4.2.4.3. An achieved sovereignty would be an impossibly isolated instant of pure self-presence, and therefore death. (See Rousseau and/or Bataille [the sovereign abject].)

4.2.4.3.1. See my paper 'La souveraineté défaillante', in F. Bernardo, ed., *Derrida à Coimbra/Derrida em Coimbra* (Viseu: Palimage Editores, 2005), 131–43 (tr. as The Fall of Sovereignty', *Epoché*, 10:2 (2006), 395–406).

4.2.5. That failing opens up political space as the space of, or for, politics, and more especially 'democracy'.

4.2.5.1. [...]

5. The scat(ter) of sovereignty leaves matter.

5.1. Scatter rhymes with (and entails) matter (this really is a kind of 'materialism').

5.1.1. [Smatter.]

5.1.2. Democritean or Leucippean rather than Epicurean materialism.

5.1.2.1. Read Karl Marx's doctoral thesis on the differences between Democritus and Epicurus . . .

5.1.2.1.1. **Two philosophers teach exactly the same science, in exactly the same way, but – how inconsistent! – they stand diametrically opposed in all that concerns truth, certainty, application of this science, and all that refers to the relationship between thought and reality in general.**

5.1.2.1.1.1. . . . and prefer Democritus anyway.

5.1.2.1.1.1.1. ['Base', not 'dialectical' materialism . . .]

5.1.3. 'Matter' in the tradition is *essentially* scatter.

5.1.3.1. Or rather, scatter is why matter has no essence, is 'essentially' nothing.

5.1.3.1.1. [Read here Kant, *Theory of the Heavens*]

5.1.3.1.2. [Read here Hegel's Introduction to the *Philosophy of History* and Derrida's commentary in *Glas*, 29a–30a]

5.1.3.2. Democracy is to sovereignty as matter is to spirit.

5.1.3.2.1. (But matter is not *opposed* to spirit.)

5.1.3.2.1.1. Matter is not opposed, has no opposite.

5.1.3.2.1.1.1. That's scatter.

5.1.3.2.2. [Show how this does not at all commit us to what Badiou calls 'democratic materialism' (*Logiques des mondes* (Paris: Seuil, 2006)), nor of course to his own version of 'dialectical materialism').]

5.1.3.2.2.1. Though we might have more in common with his thinking of a politics of the event (already in *Peut-on penser la politique?* (1985)).

6. Democracy lines up with deconstruction . . .

6.1. . . . in the failing of would-be sovereign metaphysics, and *thereby* lines up too with 'literature'.

6.1.1. 'Democracy is the *autos* of deconstructive auto-delimitation.' (*Politiques de l'amitié*, p. 129)

6.1.1.1. [. . .]

6.1.1.1.1. **'. . . from France there comes a power/ Into this scattered kingdom' (*King Lear*, Act III, Scene 1)**

6.1.2. 'The institution of literature in the West, in its relatively modern form, is linked to an authorization to say everything, and doubtless too to the coming about of the modern idea of democracy.' (*Acts of Literature*, p. 37)

6.1.3. Writing in general is always associated with democracy (*La dissemination*, p. 166).

6.2. Democracy is not one regime-name 'among others'.

6.2.1. *Politiques de l'amitié,* p. 12 (among many others).

6.2.2. All regime-names, including 'democracy', attempt to master and organize the primal scatter of originary 'democracy'.

6.3. Political philosophers have had some intuition of primal proto-democratic scatter and the problems it causes for them:

6.3.1. Rancière again:

6.3.1.1. **Democracy is the specific situation in where it is the absence of title that entitles the exercise of *arkhè*. . . But this situation *of* exception is identical with the very condition of a specificity of politics in general. . . Democracy is thus in no way a political regime. . . Democracy is the very institution of politics. . . The whole of politics. . . is played out in the interpretation of democratic "anarchy" *(Aux bords du politique* (Gallimard, 2004), pp. 231, 248)**

6.3.1.1.1. But don't assume as quickly as Rancière does that you know what democracy is (and then use that 'knowledge' to adopt a position of moralistic critique).

6.3.1.1.1.1. Deconstruction is not critique.

6.3.1.1.1.1.1. See my 'Almost the End' (art. cit.)

6.3.2. But there are plenty of traces of this through the tradition.

6.3.2.1. Plato and Aristotle again.

6.3.2.1.1. [...]

6.3.2.2. In Rousseau, for example, the sovereignty of the body politic, itself produced from out of a primal '*dispersion*', is both secured and ruined by its giving itself a government, which it can do only by passing through a moment of radical democracy.

6.3.2.3. Or, in Spinoza, a kind of democracy flows directly from the 'natural' play of power and desire.

6.3.2.3.1. Read the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Ch. XVI:

6.3.2.3.1.1. In this manner a society can be formed without any violation of natural right. [...] A body politic of this kind is called a Democracy. [...] I believe it to be of all forms of government the most natural.

6.3.2.3.2. I detail these arguments from Rousseau and Spinoza more especially in 'Sovereign Stupidity and Auto-Immunity', forthcoming in Cheah and Guerlac, eds, *Jacques Derrida and the Time of the Political* (Duke University Press, forthcoming).

6.3.2.3.2.1. [Take on here the Negri/Hardt appropriation of Spinoza in *Empire* and *Multitude*.]

6.3.2.3.2.2. And propose a deconstructive 'retrieval' of the concept of nature.

6.3.2.3.2.2.1. [If only to help avoid the prevalent 'ethical' pieties ...]

6.4. Let's look more closely at this configuration in Hobbes himself.

6.4.1. The primacy of proto-democratic scatter is stated less clearly in *Leviathan* than in the earlier *Elements of Law:*

6.4.1.1. Having spoken in general concerning instituted policy in the former chapter, I come in this to speak of the sorts thereof in special, how every one of them is instituted. The first in order of time of these three sorts is democracy, and it must be so of necessity, because an aristocracy and a monarchy, require nomination of persons agreed upon; which agreement in a great multitude of men must consist in the consent of the major part; and where the votes of the major part involve the votes of the rest, there is actually a democracy.

In the making of a democracy, there passeth no covenant, between the sovereign and any subject. For while the democracy is a making, there is no sovereign with whom to contract. For it cannot be imagined, that the multitude should contract with itself, or with any one man, or number of men, parcel of itself, to make itself sovereign; nor that a multitude, considered as one aggregate, can give itself anything which before it had not. Seeing then that sovereignty democratical is not conferred by the covenant of any multitude (which supposeth union and sovereignty already made), it resteth, that the same be conferred by the particular covenants of every several man; that is to say, every man with every man, for and in consideration of the benefit of his own peace and defence, covenanteth to stand to and obey, whatsoever the major part of their whole number, or the major part of such a number of them, as shall be pleased to assemble at a certain time and place, shall determine and command. And this is that which giveth being to a democracy; wherein the sovereign assembly was called of the Greeks by the name of *Demus* (*id est*, the people), from whence cometh democracy. So that where, to the supreme and independent court, every man may

come that will and give his vote, there the sovereign is called the people. (*Human Nature and De Corpore Politico*, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 118–9.)

6.4.2. This primacy of democracy is short-lived in Hobbes: the *Elements of Law* continues to describe democracy famously and strikingly as really only 'an aristocracy of orators'.

6.4.2.1. In all democracies, though the right of sovereignty be in the assembly, which is virtually the whole body; yet the use thereof is always in one, or a few particular men. For in such great assemblies as those must be, whereinto every man may enter at his pleasure, there is no means any ways to deliberate and give counsel what to do, but by long and set orations; whereby to every man there is more or less hope given, to incline and sway the assembly to their own ends. In a multitude of speakers therefore, where always, either one is eminent alone, or a few being equal amongst themselves, are eminent above the rest, that one or few must of necessity sway the whole; *insomuch, that a democracy, in effect, is no more than an aristocracy of orators, interrupted sometimes with the temporary monarchy of one orator.* (my emphasis)

6.4.3. But this democratic moment cannot fail to continue to haunt the discussion of the other forms (aristocracy and monarchy), just because they can only come into being (even if they supposedly to so inevitably) through this primal, if fading, moment of democracy.

6.4.3.1. (I want to say that this founding moment of democracy is *fabulous*. **Democracy is fabulous**.)

6.4.4. Whence, perhaps, Hobbes's persistent distrust of 'orators', who are especially associated with democracy. This distrust is complex, because it looks on the basis of what we have seen so far as though oratory is the undoing of democracy, its becoming aristocratic or

monarchical, and that Hobbes might therefore have had some sympathy with it. But in fact it looks as though just this inability of democracy to be or remain itself (an inability essentially to do with the structures of language Hobbes associates with oratory) is his main argument against it. Democracy disperses.

6.4.5. So, for example, in *Leviathan* itself, Hobbes entertains possible objections to the superiority of monarchy among the three forms of 'commonwealth by institution' (for Hobbes insists that there only the three basic forms of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy: Aristotle's 'deviant' forms for Hobbes being merely names to use if you don't like the form in question):

6.4.5.1. Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none; for either One, or More, or All, must have the Soveraign Power (which I have shown to be indivisible) entire.

There be other names of Government in the Histories and books of Policy; as *Tyranny* and *Oligarch:* But they are not the names of other Formes of Government, but of the same Formes misliked. For they that are discontented under *Monarchy* call it *Tyranny*; and they that are displeased with *Aristocracy* call it *Oligarchy*: so also, they which find themselves grieved under a *Democracy* call it *Anarchy*, (which signifies want of Government;) and yet I think no man believes that want of Government is any new kind of Government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe that the Government is of one kind when they like it, and another when they mislike it or are oppressed by the Governours. (*Leviathan*, Ch. XIX: see too the *De Cive*, Ch. VI)

6.4.5.1.1. For a discussion of the logic of deviancy in Aristotle's treatment of the different forms of regime, see my 'Demo' (art. cit.)

6.4.6. Hobbes entertains six points of comparison between the three forms, typically starting in each case with a possible

objection to monarchy, which he then purports to refute, although the reasoning is often tortuous and less than compelling:

6.4.6.1. First, one might think that the danger of private interest clashing with public would be greater in the case of monarchy;

6.4.6.1.1. **And to compare Monarchy with the other two, we may observe: First, that whosoever beareth the Person of the people, or is one of that Assembly that bears it, beareth also his own naturall Person. And though he be careful in his politique Person to procure the common interest; yet he is more, or no lesse carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason. From whence it follows that where the publique and private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength, and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissension, to maintain a war against their enemies: whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the publique prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a Civill warre.**

6.4.6.1.1.1. 'Civill warre' is of course precisely what Hobbes's whole political theory is designed

to avoid, and is in many ways simply another name for 'state of nature'.

6.4.6.2. Second, a monarch has the advantage of being able to receive *secret* advice from whomever he chooses, whenever he chooses:

6.4.6.2.1. **But when a Soveraigne Assembly has need of Counsell, none are admitted but such as have a Right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of Wealth than of Knowledge, and are to give their advice in long discourses which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but not governe them in it. For the *Understanding* is by the flame of the Passions never enlightened, but dazled: Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an Assemblie can receive Counsell with secrecie, because of their owne Multitude.**

6.4.6.2.1.1. This motif of secrecy is a hidden (secret?) key to all the problems we are discussing here.

6.4.6.3. Third:

6.4.6.3.1. **Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch are subject to no other Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies, besides that of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number. For the absence of a few that would have the Resolution, once taken, continue firm (which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments), or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes today all that was concluded yesterday.**

6.4.6.3.1.1. (But it is an analytic component of sovereignty to undo today what was concluded yesterday: as much in Bodin

as in Schmitt. See my 'Souveraineté défaillante', art. cit.)

6.4.6.4. Fourth:

6.4.6.4.1. **Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy, or interest . . .**

6.4.6.4.1.1. 'The ego's position is like that of a constitutional monarch, without whose sanction no law can be passed but who hesitates long before imposing his veto on any measure put forward by Parliament [. . .] we see this same ego as a poor creature owing service to three masters and consequently menaced by three dangers [. . .] as a frontier-creature, the ego [. . .] behaves like the physician during an analytic treatement . . . also a submissive slave . . . too often yields to the temptation to become sycophantic opportunistic and lying, like a politician who sees the truth but wants to keep his place in popular favour.' (Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, Ch V)

6.4.6.4.2. **. . . but an Assembly may; and that to such a height as may produce a Civill warre.**

6.4.6.5. And now, the one we are interested in here:

6.4.6.5.1. **Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confess is a great an inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen where the Soveraigne Power is in an Assembly: For their power is the same; and they are as subject to evill Counsell, *and to be seduced by Orators* [my emphasis], as a Monarch by Flatterers; and becoming one an others Flatterers, serve one another's Covetousnesse and Ambition by turns. And**

> **whereas the Favorites of Monarchs, are few, and they have none els to advance but their owne Kindred; the Favorites of an assembly are many, and the Kindred much more numerous, than of any Monarch. Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which cannot as well succour his friends as hurt his enemies: But Orators, that is to say, Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires lesse Eloquence (such is mans Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution more resembles Justice. (*Leviathan*, Ch. 19)**

6.4.6.6. Orators are playing the language-game (if we can put it like this) of what Hobbes calls 'Counsell', of which he gives a subtle and complex analysis. But the root of the distrust of orators and their seductions is, not surprisingly perhaps, a distrust of rhetoric, which is itself, as always, a distrust of language itself. (Hobbes here sets a tone that will be definitive for English language philosophy for centuries to come.) This distrust of language goes hand in hand in Hobbes with the distrust of authorities (especially Aristotle and the 'deceived, or deceiving, Schoolmen.' (*Leviathan*, last words of Chapter III, just before the Chapter on Speech)).

6.4.6.6.1. See especially *Leviathan,* Chapter XLVI, 'Of *Darknesse* from *vain Philosophy*, and *fabulous Traditions*':

6.4.6.6.1.1. **That which is now called a University is a joining together, and an incorporation under one government, of many public schools in one and the same town or city, in which the principal schools were ordained for the three professions; that is to say, of the Roman religion, of the Roman law, and of the art**

of medicine. And for the study of philosophy it hath no otherwise place than as a handmaid to the Roman religion: and since the authority of Aristotle is only current there, that study is not properly philosophy (the nature whereof dependeth not on authors), but Aristotelity.

6.4.6.6.1.1.1. [Untangle here the relation of authority and sovereignty.]

6.4.6.6.1.1.1.1. Maybe in relation to Hobbes's own authority: see for example the end of Chapter 31 of *Leviathan* (end of Part 2):

6.4.6.6.1.1.1.1.1. And now, considering how different this Doctrine is from the Practise of the greatest part of the world, especially of these Western parts that have received their Morall learning from *Rome* and *Athens*; and how much depth of Morall Philosophy is required in them that have the Administration of the Soveraign Power, I am at the point of believing this my labour, as uselesse as the Commonwealth of *Plato*; For he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of State, and change of Governments by Civil Warre, ever to be taken away till Soveraigns be Philosophers. But when I consider again, that the

> **Science of Naturall Justice is the onely Science necessary for Soveraigns, and their principall Ministers; and that they need not be charged with the Sciences Mathematicall, (as by *Plato* they are,) further than by good Lawes to encourage men to the study of them; and that neither *Plato*, nor any other Philosopher hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently, or probably proved all the Theoremes of Morall doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey; I recover some hope, that one time or other this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign, who will consider it himselfe, (for it is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any interested or envious Interpreter; and by the exercise of entire Soveraignty, in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation into the Utility of Practice.**

6.4.6.7. This is how the sequence goes, beginning in Chapter 4 of *Leviathan*, 'Of *Speech*': print is an important invention, but not *such* an important invention compared to writing. And writing is not itself so important, as compared to speech:

6.4.6.7.1. **But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of SPEECH, consisting of *Names* or *Appellations*, and their Connexion; whereby men register their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves.**

6.4.6.8. The *general* use of speech is to 'transferre our Mentall Discourse, into Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words'. This is useful a) for personal use to help remember our own thoughts, and b) to signify those thoughts to others. And speech also has four 'speciall' uses, to which there correspond four possible abuses.

6.4.6.8.1. The four special uses:

6.4.6.8.1.1. **First, to register, what by cogitation, wee find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect: which in summe, is acquiring of Arts. Secondly, to shew to others that knowledge which we have attained; which is, to Counsell, and teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills, and purposes, that we may have the mutuall help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight our selves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.**

6.4.6.8.2. And their 'foure correspondent Abuses':

6.4.6.8.2.1. **First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conceptions that which they never conceived, and so**

deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech to grieve him with the tongue, unless it be one whom wee are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

6.4.6.8.2.1.1. 'It is but an abuse of Speech to grieve him with the tongue': i.e. a misuse of speech to use it to 'grieve' another – but also, in spite of Hobbes's manifest intention, an abuse of speech to use the expression 'grieve him with the tongue'.

6.4.6.9. All use of language involves connecting names. Two names joined together to form an affirmation ('A man is a living creature') enter into the realm of truth and falsehood ('For *True* and *False* are attributes of Speech, not Things. And where Speech is not, there is neither *Truth* nor *Falsehood*'). Truth is an issue with words, but words *as such* are the instruments of error and falsehood, so that

6.4.6.9.1. **Seeing then that *truth* consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise *truth*, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he struggles, the more belimed.**

6.4.6.9.1.1. Does Hegel get this image from Hobbes? Cf. 'Introduction' to *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 'If the Absolute were only to be brought on the whole nearer to us by this agency, without any change being wrought in it, like a bird caught by a limestick, it would certainly scorn a trick of that sort, if it were not in its very nature, and did it not wish to be, beside us from the start.', and picked up rather discreetly by Derrida in the Genet column of *Glas* (Galilée, 1975), p. 148b: 'Le métalangage est la vie du langage: il bat toujours de l'aile comme un oiseau pris dans une glu subtile' [Metalanguage is the life of language: it always flaps about like a bird caught in a subtle lime.'].

6.4.6.9.1.1.1. The fluttering of the bird: Scatter, squatter . . . 4. *intr.* To fly or run, to struggle along, to make one's way, among water or wet with much splashing or flapping. Const. *away*, *out of*, *through*, etc. 1785 BURNS *Address to Deil* viii, Awa ye squatter'd, like a drake, On whistling wings. 1790 A. WILSON *Poems & Lit. Prose* (1876) II. 103 Three years thro' muirs an' bogs I've squattert. 1825 SCOTT *Let.* in *Lockhart* (1839) VII. 354, I climbed Bennarty like a wild goat,..and squattered through your drains like a wild duck. 1853 C. BRONTË *Villette* xxv, A little callow gosling squattering out of bounds without leave. 1863 KINGSLEY *Water-Bab.* ii, Where the wild ducks squatter up from among the white water lilies. 1886 RUSKIN *Præterita*

I. v. 143 He pitched the boy..into the canal,..but I believe the lad squattered to the bank without help. b. To flutter, flap, or struggle among water or soft mud. 1808 JAMIESON, *To Squatter*, to flutter in water, as a wild duck, &c. 1833 M. SCOTT *Tom Cringle* i, A six-pound shot drove our boat into staves, and all hands were the next moment squattering in the water. 1897 M. KINGSLEY *W. Africa* 259 We..were all soon squattering about on our own account in the elephant bath.

6.4.6.9.1.1.1.1. 'Glu' (birdlime), also an important exhibit of the 'gl-' effect of *Glas* itself, (Hgl himself) communicating too with the 'glu de l'étang lait de ma mort noyée' that JD quotes here (and elsewhere) from a youthful poem.

6.4.6.10. Whence the need to begin with precise definitions and not to trust to those 'of former Authors', lest, bird again:

6.4.6.10.1. **From whence it happens, that they which trust to books, do as they that cast up many little summes into a greater, without considering whether those little summes were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the errour visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to clear themselves; but spend time in fluttering over their bookes; as birds that entering by the chimney, and finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glasse window, for want to wit to consider which way they came in. So that in the right Definition of Names,**

lyes the first use of Speech; which is the Acquisition of Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions, lyes the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senselesse Tenets; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true Science are above it.

6.4.6.11. In fact, according to what Derrida would no doubt describe as an 'auto-immune' structure, words simultaneously open the possibility of wisdom and, *thereby*, the possibility of foolishness. The passage proceeds:

6.4.6.11.1. **For between true Science, and erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Naturall sense and imagination, are not subject to absurdity. Nature it selfe cannot erre: and as men abound in copiousnesse of language; so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without Letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them, but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an *Aristotle*, a *Cicero*, or a *Thomas*, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.**

6.4.6.11.1.1. See too the *Elements*, V, 13:

6.4.6.11.1.1.1. **As the invention of names hath been necessary for the drawing of men out of ignorance, by calling to their remembrance the necessary coherence of one conception to another; so also hath it on the**

other side precipitated men into error: insomuch, that whereas by the benefit of words and ratiocination they exceed brute beasts in knowledge; by the incommodities that accompany the same they exceed them also in errors. For true and false are things not incident to beasts, because they adhere to propositions and to language; nor have they ratiocination, whereby to multiply one untruth by another: as men have.

6.4.6.12. Within this general structure of potential abuse, the specific abuse by metaphor corresponds to the use that includes what Hobbes calls 'Counsell'. And it is here that the root of the problem with the orators will lie. Metaphor is to be suspected everywhere, of course (in the *Elements of Law* he says that 'all metaphors are (by profession) equivocal' (V, 7)),

6.4.6.12.1. Although Hobbes does allow metaphor a place, so that in the immediately following chapter ('Of Reason, and Science'), listing the causes of 'absurd' conclusions, and counting as the sixth cause 'the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other rhetoricall figures, in stead of words proper', Hobbes nonetheless concedes that it is 'lawfull to say, (for example) in common speech, *the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither, The Proverb sayes this or that* (whereas wayes cannot go, nor Proverbs speak;)...' And indeed Hobbes concludes his chapter with a quite striking metaphorical spread of his own:

6.4.6.12.1.1. **To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and**

> **purged from ambiguity; *Reason* is the *pace*; Encrease of *Science*, the *way*; and the Benefit of man-kind, the *end*. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words, are like *ignes fatui*; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt.**

6.4.6.13. ... but it is especially to be criticized in counsel. If democracy is really an 'aristocracy of orators', and if orators are fundamentally suspect in the counsel they give, this will be in a complex way because of their use of metaphor.

6.4.6.14. You will remember that the second of the four special uses of speech listed by Hobbes was 'to shew to others that knowledge which we have attained; which is, to Counsell, and teach one another.' The detailed analysis of 'Counsell' occupies the whole of Chapter 25 of *Leviathan*. This chapter begins with a proto-pragmatic analysis of what it is very tempting to call different 'speech-acts'. As we would expect from what we just saw in Chapter 4, the general root of the problem is to be found in 'the ordinary and inconstant use of words', and the confusion of command (which in the following chapter will be shown to be the form of law in general) and counsel is the *best example* of just this possible abuse or confusion. Counsel looks and sounds rather similar to command, but must be distinguished from it: here's the opening of that chapter:

> 6.4.6.14.1. **How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the confusion of Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative manner of speaking in them both, and**

> **in many other occasions besides. For the words *Doe this*, are the words not onely of him that Commandeth; but also of him that giveth Counsell; and of him that Exhorteth; and yet there are but few, that see not, that these are very different things; or that cannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the Speech is directed, and upon what occasion. (p. 176)**

6.4.6.15. The essential differences between Command and Counsel are, first, that Command seeks the speaker's benefit, Counsel the addressee's; which means that one cannot be obliged to follow Counsel (which otherwise would have become command) nor claim a right to counsel another. Further:

> 6.4.6.15.1. **He that giveth counsel to his Soveraign, (whether a Monarch, or an Assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the Proposition in debate. For is the sense of the Assembly can be taken notice of, before the Debate be ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further Counsell; For the Sense of the Assembly, is the Resolution of the Debate, and End of all Deliberation. And generally he that demandeth Counsell, is Author of it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the Soveraign cannot, no man else can. (177)**

6.4.6.16. Counsel, however, rapidly (we might be tempted to say imperceptibly, *before you know it*) becomes what Hobbes calls *counsel vehemently pressed*, in the forms of exhortation and 'dehortation'. These forms supplement counsel proper with a dimension of desire or passion, and in so doing

divert it from 'the rigour of true reasoning' in the interests of producing action. This supplement shows up precisely in the form of Oratory:

6.4.6.16.1. **And therefore they have in their speeches, a regard to the common Passions, and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of Similitudes, Metaphors, Examples, and other tooles of Oratory, to perswade their Hearers of the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following their advise.**

6.4.6.17. This intrusion of oratory into Counsel *is already its ruin*, because it implies that the interest of the addressee, which is the definition of Counsel, is already being subordinated to the interest of the speaker (even his desire to have his counsel followed). As soon, then, as Counsel becomes rhetorical, i.e. 'vehemently pressed' (and so, one might think, true counsel in the sense that counsel is more than mere truth-speaking and has after all an 'imperative' mood (i.e. as soon as it *is* counsel), it is already suspect, and indeed in giving such Counsel I am already acting 'contrary to the duty of a Counsellour; who (by the definition of Counsel) ought to regard, not his own benefit, but his whom he adviseth'.

6.4.6.18. This properly catastrophic perversion of Counsel is, perhaps not surprisingly, more to be feared in the very situation that Hobbes has elsewhere explicitly associated with democracy, namely where one speaker is attempting to persuade a larger number: for he who I am attempting to exhort or 'dehort' may, if he is one person, interrupt me and dispute with me, but this is not possible when the audience is a 'multitude'. And the use of exhortation or dehortation in counsel is in fact already a corruption of its nature as counsel, *even if the counsel itself is good counsel.* The ex- or

de-hortatory supplement, inevitably called for when I counsel a multitude, corrupts *even the best* counsel. Strangely enough, this catastrophe or corruption, that is part of the very structure of counsel, itself only affects counsel *as such*. In other words, exhortation and dehortation, though they *are* forms of counsel, are acceptable when they are *not* used to counsel, but *really* (though secretly, deceptively, or perhaps tropically) associated with the opposite of counsel, i.e. *command* or the power of command. If I have the authority to command, *then*, just because my commands may order something unpleasant or unwelcome, I can and perhaps even should present my command *in the form of* exhortatory or dehortatory counsel, without it thereby being exposed to corruption:

6.4.6.18.1. **Thirdly, that they that Exhort and Dehort, where they are required to give Counsell, are corrupt Counsellours and, as it were, bribed by their own interest. For though the counsel they give be never so good, yet he that gives it is no more a good Counsellour than he that giveth a Just Sentence for a reward is a Just Judge. But where a man may lawfully Command, as a Father in his Family, or a Leader in an Army, his Exhortations and Dehortations, are not only lawfulle, but also necessary, and laudable; But then they are no more Counsells, but Commands; which when they are for Execution of soure labour, sometimes necessity, and always humanity, requireth to be sweetned in the delivery by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of Counsell rather than in harsher language of Command.**

6.4.6.18.2. Remember that in Chapter 4, counsel was one feature of the second 'special use' of

language, namely 'to shew to others that knowledge which we have attained; which is, to Counsell, and Teach one another'. But if we now take Counsel as it is presented in Chapter 25, then, in the context of Hobbes's general analogy between the 'commonwealth' and the 'artificial individual', as so famously laid out in his Introduction, it occupies, politically speaking, a slightly different place.

6.4.6.18.2.1. This is in fact already clear in the Introduction itself, as part of the initial description of the 'Leviathan':

6.4.6.18.2.1.1. **NATURE (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the world) is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say that all *Automata* (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For what is the *Heart*, but a *Spring*; and the *Nerves*, but so many *Strings*; and the *Joynts*, but so many *Wheeles*, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer? *Art* goes yet further, imitating that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, *Man*. For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine, CIVITAS), which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than**

> **the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the *Soveraignty* is an Artificiall *Soul*, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the *Magistrates* and other *Officers* of Judicature and Execution, artificiall *Joynts*; *Reward* and *Punishment* (by which fastned to the seate of the Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty) are the *Nerves*, that do the same in the Body Naturall; the *Wealth* and *Riches* of all the particular members are the *Strength; Salus Populi* (the *peoples safety*) its *Businesse*; *Counsellors*, by whom all things needfull for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the *Memory*; *Equity* and *Lawes*, an artificiall *Reason* and *Will*; *Concord, Health; Sedition, Sicknesse*; and *Civil war, Death*. Lastly, the *Pacts* and *Covenants*, by which the parts of this Body Politique were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that *Fiat*, or the *Let us make man*, pronounced by God in the Creation.**

6.4.6.18.3. At the level of speech proper, as it were, Counsel was part of second 'special' use: at the analogical level (though we might have some doubts here as to the actual direction or level of the analogy), Counsel as embodied in Counsellors lines up with memory, which is, at the 'proper' level, not even so much the first 'special' use, but the first of the two 'commodities' involved in speech *in general* (as

the transference of mental discourse in verbal), namely, 'the Registring the Consequences of our Thoughts... So that the first use of names, is to serve for *Markes,* or *Notes* of remembrance.' (IV, p. 25)

6.4.6.19. This 'promotion' of the role of counsel, at the level of the political analogy, is confirmed in Chapter 25 itself, and a specific difference is also explicitly brought out by Hobbes. Counsellors indeed function as the *analogon* of memory, as the Introduction suggested: but whereas memory at the level of the individual is primarily memory of experience (which *in itself,* as it were, is disinterested or dispassionate), the analogous use of counsellors in the Body Politic introduces a troublesome supplementary (and indeed abyssal) relay in the structure being described:

6.4.6.19.1. **For Experience, being but Memory of the consequences of like actions formerly observed, and Counsell but the Speech whereby that experience is made known to another; the Vertues. And Defects of Counsell, are the same with the Vertues, and defects Intellectuall: And to the Person of a Common-wealth, to a naturall man, there is one dissimilitude joined, of great importance; which is, that a natural man receiveth his experience, from the naturall objects of sense, which work upon him without passion, or interest of their own; whereas they that give Counsell to the Representative person of a Common-wealth, may have, and have often their particular ends, and passions, that render their Counsells alwayes suspected, and many times unfaithfull. (p. 179)**

6.4.6.20. This complication of the analogy, with its corollary that counsel is 'always suspected', dictates a further

set of consequences. The first of these is simply that the counsellor's 'Ends and Interest' not be incompatible with the 'Ends and Interest' of the one counselled. The second consequence, which is to do with consequences and the telling of consequences, brings us back to oratory, metaphor, and authority:

6.4.6.20.1. **Secondly, Because the office of a Counsellour, when an action comes into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such manner, as he that is Counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he ought to propound his advise, in such forme of speech, as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firme ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore *rash, and unevident Inferences*; (such as are fetched onely from Examples, or authority of Books, and are not arguments of what is good, or evill, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion;) *obscure, confused, and ambiguous Expressions, also all metaphoricall Speeches, tending to the stirring up of Passion,* (because such reasoning, and such expressions, are useful lonely to deceive, or to lead him we Counsell towards other ends than his own) *are repugnant to the Office of a Counsellour.* (179–80; Hobbes's emphasis)**

6.4.6.21. And this again soon leads to the problem of multiplicity. Here the problem will not be that of a single counsellor trying to counsel the multitude (as in democracy), but with the multiplicity of counsellors themselves. This complex and passably oratorical reflection on the multiple dangers of a multiplicity of counsellors leads back to a quite lurid reflection on the fate of democracy itself:

6.4.6.21.1. **Fifthly, Supposing the number of Counsellors equall, a man is better Counselled by hearing them apart, then in an Assembly; and that for many causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man; but in an Assembly many of them deliver their advise with / or *No*, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the eloquence of another, or for feare of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole Assembly, by contradiction; or for feare of appearing duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded the contrary opinion. Secondly, in an Assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some interests are contrary to that of the Publique; and these their Interests make passionate, and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence drawes others into the same advice. For the Passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in Assembly are like many brands, that enflame one another (especially when they blow one another with Orations) to the setting of the Common-wealth on fire, under pretence of Counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine (when there is need) the truth (or probability) of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advise he gives, by frequent interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an Assembly, where (in every difficult question) a man is rather astonied, and dazled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an Assembly of many, called together for advice, wherein there be not some that have the ambition to be thought**

eloquent, and also learned in the Politiques; and give not their advice with care of the businesse propounded, but of the applause of their motly orations, made of the divers colored threds, or shreds of authors;

6.4.6.21.1.1. *Poikilon* or motley is already the mark of democracy in Plato:

6.4.6.21.1.1.1. Socrates in The Republic:

6.4.6.21.1.1.1.1. **Possibly, said I, this is the most beautiful of polities; as a garment of many colours [*poikilon*], embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with every type of character, would appear the most beautiful. And perhaps many would judge it to be the most beautiful, like boys and women when they see bright-coloured things. (557c)**

6.4.6.21.1.1.1.1.1. See Derrida's commentaries, already in 'La Pharmacie de Platon' (in *La dissemination,* pp. 166–7), and especially in *Voyous*, pp. 48–9. *Poikilon* appears at other crucial moments in Plato, for example in the critique of *mimesis* in Book X of the *Republic*).

6.4.6.21.1.1.1.1.2. 'Astonied and dazled'.

6.4.6.21.1.1.1.1.3. *Poikilos* is the Greek word unanimously chosen by the Seventy to render the many-coloured nature of Joseph's famous coat, in Genesis 37.

6.4.6.21.2. **which is an Impertinence, at least, that takes away the time of serious Consultation, and in the secret way of Counselling apart, is easily avoided. Fourthly, in Deliberations that ought to be kept secret, (where of there be many occasions in publique Businesse,) the Counsells of many, and especially in Assemblies, are dangerous; And therefore great assemblies are necessitated to commit such affairs to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed in them, and in whose fidelity they have most confidence.**

6.4.6.21.3. **To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of Counsell from a great Assembly of Counsellours, that wisheth for, or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his Children, disposing of his Lands, governing his Household, or managing his private Estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? A man that doth his businesse by the help of many prudent Counsellours, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does it best; as he that useth able Seconds at Tennis play, placed in their proper stations. He does next best that useth his own Judgement only; as he that has no Second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his business in a framed Counsell, which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly (out of envy, or interest) retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and is like one that is carried to the ball, though by good Players, yet in a Wheele-barroughe, or other frame, heavy of itself, and retarded**

also by the inconcurrent judgements, and endeavours of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one or more amongst them, that desire to have him lose. And though it be true, that many eys see more than one; yet it is not to be understood of many Counsellours, but then only, when the finall Resolution is in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to misse their mark, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never ayme but with one; And therefore no great Popular Common-wealth was ever kept up; but either by a forraign Enemy that united them; or by the reputation of some one eminent Man amongst them; or by the secret Counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of equall factions; and not by the open Consultations of the Assembly. And as for very little Common-wealths, be they Popular, or Monarchicall, there is no humane wisdome can uphold them, longer than the Jealousy lasteth of their potent Neighbours. (181–2; my emphasis)

6.4.6.22. [Frontiers again . . .

6.4.6.22.1. See my paper 'Inter', in McQuillan, MacDonald, Purves and Thomson, eds., *Post-Theory: New Directions in Criticism* (Edinburgh University Press, 1999), pp. 103–19]

7. **This configuration around democracy is exemplary of deconstruction in general.**

7.1. [Begin again with scatter.]

7.1.1. Early ME. (12th c., Midland); of obscure origin; formed with iterative suffix (see - *ER*[5]). This and *Shatter v.* (which appears much later) are commonly regarded as respectively northern and southern representatives of an OE. **sc(e)aterian*, which is referred to a supposed Teut. root **skat-* cogn. w. Gr. σκεδ-αυυύυαι to scatter. The etymological identity of the two vbs. seems, however, doubtful, although they have some affinity of sense. It is true that in ME. *scatter* occurs only in northern and midland texts, with one exception (quot. 1330, sense 3); and that in this sole southern instance the MS. spells it with *sch*, which should normally stand for ( ). But initial (sk) from OE. *sc* in a native word would be no less abnormal in northern and midland than in southern English. The alleged cognates in Du. and LG. are questionable. Two instances are cited of MDu. *schaderen*, with the senses 'to squander (money)', 'to shed (blood)'; but this does not agree in form. The sense 'to scatter' assigned to early mod.Du. *schetteren*, rests on the authority of Kilian, whose citation of the Eng. word renders his testimony suspicious. The Du. and MLG. *schateren* to resound, to laugh uproariously (MLG. once, to be shattered by an explosion) would seem to be onomatopoeic; at least their sense cannot easily be derived from that assigned to the alleged Teut. root. Cf. *Scat v.*[2] and *Squatter v.*]

7.1.2. [...]

8. **And this makes of it a radically 'political' thinking.**

8.1. I want to say: a thinking of *the politics of politics.*

8.1.1. 'Politics (of politics (of politics (...)))'

8.1.1.1. [Scattered]

Notes

[1] This relatively gathered scatter is part of a 'book' in progress, also tentatively entitled *Scatter*. As the text argues and enacts, scatter also gathers, and it gathers here a number of references to published or forthcoming essays which will subsequently be attached in some way to the final version.

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