THE BONDS OF LOVE

PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF DOMINATION

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object of desire. Yet even then, the underlying wish for recognition of one's own desire remains.

Of course, this transformation from direct recognition into identification—a defensive process, the basis for self-alienation—is an unavoidable development. And it has its beneficial side when it occurs at the appropriate time in early childhood. Indeed, it is precisely because women have been deprived of early identificatory love, the erotic force behind separation, that they are so often unable to forge the crucial link between desire and freedom. The value of early identificatory love thus cannot be denied. But it reveals its negative side clearly when it takes the form of an opposition between mother and father, emphasizing freedom from a powerful mother, under the aegis of paternal power. Feminist theory aims to expand the idea of freedom to, offering a view of erotic union as a tension between separation from and attunement to an other. In the sustaining of this tension, I see an expansion of that space where subject meets subject. The phallus as emblem of desire has represented the meeting of subject and object in a complementarity that idealizes one side and devalues the other. The discovery of another dimension of desire can transform that opposition into the vital tension between subjects—into recognition between self and other self.

CHAPTE R FO UR

The Oedipal Riddle

THE ROUTE TO individuality that leads through identificatory love of the father is a difficult one for women to follow. The difficulty lies in the fact that the power of the liberator-father is used to defend against the engulfing mother. Thus however helpful a specific change in the father's relationship to the daughter may be in the short run, it cannot solve the deeper problem: the split between a father of liberation and a mother of dependency. For children of both sexes, this split means
that identification and closeness with the mother must be traded for independence; it means that being a subject of desire requires repudiation of the maternal role, of feminine identity itself.

Curiously enough, psychoanalysis has not found this split, with its devaluation of the maternal, to be a problem. As long as the father provided the boy with a way into the world and broke up the mother-son bond, no problem seemed to exist. After years of resistance, however, psychoanalysis seems finally ready to accept the idea that girls, too, need a pathway to the wider world, and that a girl's need to assert her subjectivity is not merely an envy-inspired rejection of her proper attitude. Nevertheless, man's occupation of this world remains a given; and few imagine that the mother may be capable of leading the way into it. By and large, the mainstream of psychoanalytic thought has been remarkably indifferent to feminist criticism of the split between a mother of attachment and a father of separation.

In questioning the terms of the sexual polarity, then, we cannot, as in the case of woman's desire, adapt a problem (penis envy) already identified by Freud. Rather, we have to illuminate a problem which psychoanalysis scarcely acknowledges. To do so, we will have to challenge the most fundamental postulates of psychoanalystic thinking as they appear in the centerpiece of Freud's theory, the Oedipus complex. For Freud, the Oedipus complex is the nodal point of development, the point at which the child comes to terms with both generational difference and sexual difference. It is the point when the child (the boy, more precisely)* accepts his ordained position in the fixed constellation of mother, father, and child.

This construction of difference, as we will see, harbors the crucial assumptions of domination. Analyzing the oedipal model in Freud's original formulations and in the work of later psychoanalysts, we find this common thread: the idea of the father as the protector, or even savior, from a mother who would pull us back to what Freud called the "limitless narcissism" of infancy. This privileging of the father's role (whether or not it is considered the inevitable result of his having the phallus) can be found in almost every version of the oedipal model. It also underlies the current popular diagnosis of our social malaise: a rampant narcissism that stems from the loss of authority or the absence of the father.

Paradoxically, the image of the liberating father undermines the acceptance of difference that the Oedipus complex is meant to embody. For the idea of the father as the protection against "limitless narcissism" at once authorizes his idealization and the mother's denigration. The father's ascendancy in the Oedipus complex spells the denial of the mother's subjectivity, and thus the breakdown of mutual recognition. At the heart of psychoanalytic theory lies an unacknowledged paradox: the creation of difference distorts, rather than fosters, the recognition of the other. Difference turns out to be governed by the code of domination.

The reader may well wonder that I have given so much credit to the father in precordial life only to diminish his importance in oedipal life. Having argued that little girls should have use of this very father, I now question his role as liberator. But this is not as contradictory as it seems. In the identification with the Rapprochement father we saw both a defensive and a positive aspect. What I will argue is that in the Oedipus complex, this defensive aspect becomes much more pronounced. The boy does not merely disidentify with the mother, he repudiates her and all feminine attributes. The incipient split between mother as source of goodness and father as principle of individuation is hardened into a polarity in which her goodness is redefined as a seductive threat to autonomy. Thus a paternal ideal of separation is formed which, under the current gender arrangement, comes to em-

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*Much of my argument pertains to the model of the boy's development and requires the pronoun "he." At times, however, the oedipal model applies to both sexes, and I will then refer to "the child."
body the repudiation of femininity. It enforces the split between male subject and female object, and with it, the dual unity of domination and submission.

But we must not forget that every idealization defends against something: the idealization of the father masks the child’s fear of his power. The myth of a good paternal authority that is rational and prevents regression purges the father of all terror and, as we will see, displaces it onto the mother, so that she bears the badness for both of them. The myth of the good father (and the dangerous mother) is not easily dispelled. That is why the critique of the oedipal model is so crucial. Perhaps the best way to understand domination is to analyze how it is legitimated in what is the most influential modern construction of psychic life.

UNDER FATHER’S PROTECTION

The infant’s helplessness and the longing for the father aroused by it seem to be incontrovertible. . . . I cannot think of any need in childhood as strong as the need for a father’s protection. Thus the part played by the oceanic feeling, which might seek something like the restoration of limitless narcissism, is ousted from a place in the foreground.

—Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents

According to recent cultural criticism, Narcissus has replaced Oedipus as the myth of our time. Narcissism is now seen to be at the root of everything from the ill-fated romance with violent revolution to the enthralled mass consumption of state-of-the-art products and the “lifestyles of the rich and famous.” The longing for self-aggrandizement and gratification, in this view, is no longer bound by authority and superego to the moral values of work and responsibility that once characterized the autonomous individual. Instead, people seek immedi-

are experiences of power, glamor, and excitement, or, at least, identification with those who appear to possess them.

This social critique, best articulated by Christopher Lasch in The Culture of Narcissism, argues that the unleashing of narcissism reflects the decline of Oedipal Man. The Oedipus complex, this critique continues, was the fundaments for the autonomous, rational individual, and today’s unstable families with their less authoritarian fathers no longer foster the Oedipus complex as Freud described it. The individual who could internalize the father’s authority into his own conscience and power is an endangered species. Whereas Oedipus represented responsibility and guilt, Narcissus represents self-involvement and denial of reality. At times, the popular versions of this critique presented a view of narcissism amounting to little more than a caricature of self-indulgence, whether in the counterculture of youth revolt or in the solipsism of therapy addicts.

The invocation of myths, of course, oversimplifies a more complex matter of psychic and cultural change. But it is nevertheless true that Narcissus rivals Oedipus as the dominant metaphor of contemporary psychoanalysis. Analysts no longer focus exclusively on the instinctual conflicts that develop through the triangular relationship of child and parents, the Oedipus complex. Now pathologies of the self, or narcissistic disorders, are at least of equal importance in psychoanalytic practice and discussion. But what does this change in the diagnosis of psychological distress mean?

Many psychoanalysts agree that the change reflects the greater visibility of preoedipal issues of early individuation and self formation. Some think it reflects broader changes in family, childrearing, character formation, and the nature of civilization itself. For example, Heinz Kohut, the founder of the psychoanalytic school called self psychology, argues that the new focus on narcissistic disorders corresponds to a spiritual transition from Guilty Man to Tragic Man, from the problem of thwarted gratification to the desperation about self-fulfillment. The great cause of discontent in civilization has reversed
since Freud’s time: we suffer not from too much guilt but from too little.

The cultural critique of narcissism is based on this idea of too little guilt. It interprets the Oedipus complex primarily as the source of the superego, favoring a rather old-fashioned reading of Freud’s theory. In Freud’s conception, the Oedipus complex crystallizes the male child’s triangular relationship with the parents. The boy loves his mother and wishes to possess her, hates his father and wishes to replace or murder him. Given the father’s superior power (the threat of castration), the boy renounces the incestuous wish toward the mother and internalizes the prohibition and the paternal authority itself. Those wishes that the little boy once proclaimed openly (“When I grow up I’ll marry you and be the daddy and we’ll have a baby”) now undergo repression; that is, their sexual and aggressive components are repressed, and what remains is civilized filial affection or competition.

Now the boy’s superego will perform the paternal function within his own psyche: internal guilt has replaced fear of the father. Structurally, this means a differentiation within the psyche, a new arrangement of the agencies of superego, ego, and id. The resolution of the complex includes the transition from fear of external authority to self-regulation, the replacement of authority and the desire for approval by conscience and self-control. The cultural critique emphasizes the importance of this process of internalization for the creation of the autonomous individual; and it interprets the current social malaise as the direct result of the weakening of authority and superego, the eclipse of the father. But in its lament for the lost prestige and normative power of Oedipal Man, it oversimplifies the psychoanalytic position. Thus Lasch presents a simple scheme in which the precordial fantasy of authority is archaic, primitive, “charged with sadistic rage,” while the oedipal one is realistic and “formed by later experience with love and respected models of social conduct.” Implicit in this scheme is the assumption that the narcissistic or infantile components of the psyche are the more destructive ones, that psychological development

is a progress away from badness. The comparison between Oedipal Man and the New Narcissist is permeated with nostalgia for old forms of authority and morality. The old authority may have engendered Guilty Man’s conflicts but it spared him Tragic Man’s disorganization of the self.

Lasch’s analysis is a variation on the older theme of the fatherless society, a theory which explained many phenomena, including the popularity of fascism in Germany, as responses to the absence of paternal authority. In Lasch’s version, the “emotional absence of the father” who can provide a “model of self-restraint” is so devastating because it results in a superego that remains fixated at an early phase, “harsh and punitive” but without moral values. Other contemporary critics have echoed his analysis, claiming that changes in psychological complaints are the result of shifts in family politics. Contemporary disorders result from the excessive distance of parents rather than overstimulation by them. Children no longer take their parents, especially their fathers, as their ideal, but distribute their identificatory love promiscuously in the peer group and among the superstars of commodity culture. Many explanations are offered for the weakening of parental authority in childrearing. Lasch particularly singles out the interference of the “experts”: the vast proliferation of psychoanalytically informed literature, mental health agencies, and social welfare intervention directed at the family.

Sociologically speaking, this viewpoint is one-sided. It simply dismisses all the opposing tendencies that enrich and intensify, as well as complicate, contemporary family life: fewer children per family, shorter working hours for parents, less labor in the home, a culture of family leisure, increased paternal involvement in the early phases of childrearing, and the trend toward understanding rather than merely disciplining children.

As a reading of psychoanalytic discourse, this viewpoint is equally limited. We should start by noting that psychoanalysts do not commonly express the sort of crass nostalgia for authority that we find in
the critique of the New Narcissist, even if they are in sympathy with it. It is true that psychoanalysts generally assume that a patient with an oedipal conflict has reached a higher level of development than a patient with a narcissistic or preoedipal one; but what they find positive about Oedipus and the superego, about the father and masculinity, is not primarily framed in terms of the internalization of authority.

Rather, psychoanalysis currently sees the oedipal conflict as the culmination of the preoedipal struggle to separate from the parents. Separation includes giving up the narcissistic fantasy of omnipotence—either as perfect oneness or self-sufficiency. Contemporary psychoanalytic discussions emphasize how the Oedipus complex organizes the great task of coming to terms with difference: when the oedipal child grasps the sexual meaning of the difference between himself and his parents, and between mothers and fathers, he has accepted an external reality that is truly outside his control. It is a given, which no fantasy can change. The sexual difference—between genders and between generations—comes to absorb all the childhood experiences of powerlessness and exclusion as well as independence. This interpretation, which understands oedipal development as a step forward into reality and independence, by no means devalues the positive aspect of the child’s narcissism in the early relationship with the mother.12

This emphasis on separation in the oedipal model becomes problematic, however, because it is linked to the paternal ideal. The idea that the father intervenes in the mother-child dyad to bring about a boy’s masculine identity and separation is, as I have suggested, hardly innocuous. This idea is actually the manifest form of the deeper (and less scientific) assumption that the father is the only possible liberator and way into the world.13 Repeatedly, this defense of the father’s role as the principle of individuation creeps into the theory even when the element of authority is de-emphasized. Whether the Oedipus complex is interpreted as a theory of separation or of the superego, it still contains the equation of paternity with individuation and civilization.

When Freud, for example, asserts the child’s great need for the father’s protection, telling us that it outst “the oceanic feeling,” what
could this feeling refer to but the bond to the mother?8 Freud then admits his discomfort with the ecstasy of oneness, with primordial states—in short, with the irrational; his preference is for the Apollonian world of dry land, and he quotes Schiller’s diver: “Let him rejoice who breathes up here in the roseate light.”15 Likewise, when Lasch links together the absence of the father, the dependence on the mother, and the “persistence of archaic fantasies,” he implies that without paternal intervention the image of the “primitive mother” necessarily overwhelms the child.16 In other theories, as we shall see, the contrast between a primitive/narcissistic mother and a civilized/oedipal father is explicitly stated.

There are several problems with this point of view. For one thing, the association of the father with oedipal maturity masks his earlier role in rapprochement as an ideal imbued with the fantasy of omnipotence. When paternal authority is presented as an alternative to narcissism, its role in preserving that fantasy is ignored. Furthermore, the sanitized view of oedipal authority denies the fear and submission that paternal power has historically inspired.

The roots of this denial lie in Freud’s curious interpretation of the story he chose to represent the great conflict of childhood. Oedipus, it will be remembered, fled his home in Corinth, hoping to evade the Delphic oracle that he will murder his father and commit incest with his mother. What Oedipus does not know is that his real father who had set him out to die as an infant in order to evade the same prophecy is the man he has slain in his flight. When Oedipus learns the truth, that he has murdered his father and married his mother, he puts out his eyes, and exiles himself from the human community. For Freud, the tragedy of Oedipus was the key to our unconscious desires and our inevitable sense of guilt.

*In The Future of an Illusion, which immediately preceded Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud actually states that the child first is protected by the mother, but that “the mother is soon replaced by the stronger father.”14
But as has often been observed, Freud's reading of the Oedipus myth "overlooked" the father's transgression: Laius's attempt to murder Oedipus in infancy, which sets in motion the awful course of events.\(^\text{17}\) If we put this transgression back into the story, a very different reading emerges. Laius now appears as a father seeking to avoid what is, in some sense, the fate of all fathers—to die and be superseded by their sons. The oedipal father is one who cannot give up omnipotence; the thought of his own mortality, surrendering his kingdom to his son, is too much for him to bear. Oedipus, too, now appears in a different light. In Freud's version, Oedipus appears possessed by the wish to kill his father, whereas in this reading we also note Oedipus's efforts to evade the prophecy. The oedipal son, then, is one who cannot bear his wish to unseat his father, because its fulfillment would deprive him of the authority who protects him, the ideal that gives him life.\(^\text{18}\)

This view of the father, although it nowhere appears in Freud's discussion of the Oedipus story, can be discovered in the frequent portrayal of father and son in his other writings. In *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud explicitly depicts the dangerous father in the figure of Kronos; "Kronos devoured his children just as the wild boar devours the sow's litter; while Zeus emasculated his father and made himself ruler in his place. The more unrestricted was the rule of the father in the ancient family, the more must the son, as his destined successor, have found himself in the position of the enemy."\(^\text{19}\)

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\(^{17}\) Later, in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, Freud acknowledges that his version of the myth contains a crucial slip, that it was actually Uranus who devoured his children and who was castrated by Kronos. Freud says that he was "erroneously carrying this atrocity a generation forward" (NB: he is referring to the atrocity of emasculating one's father, not of devouring one's children). These errors proceeded, he says, from his efforts to suppress thoughts about his own father, specifically, "an unfriendly criticism." And he links this mistake to another slip—in his account of Hannibal—in which he refers to the brother as the father, and makes the father into the grandfather. Freud states that this slip occurred because he had recently met his half-brother in England, his father's son by a previous marriage. This brother, whose first son was the same age as Freud, suggested to Freud that he more properly belonged to the "third generation," as if he were his own father's grandchild. All of this implies that Freud identifies his father with Uranus, his brother with Kronos, and himself with Zeus, who, by putting an end to his father's archaic violence, becomes upholder of the law.\(^{20}\)

The image of the dangerous father appears again in Freud's myth of the primal horde. At the beginning of history Freud imagines a primal horde ruled by a dreaded patriarch, whom the sons rise up against and murder. Freud cites the sons' murder of the primal father as the beginning of the Oedipus complex. Out of remorse, the sons create an ideal of goodness, in the hope of preventing the recurrence of the father's "extreme aggressiveness" and the murderers' insouciance they inspired in them. The good father and his law are thus created by the sons in the mental act of internalization.\(^\text{21}\) The terrible primal father is transformed into the superego, who upholds the law against patricide, and moderates the force of omnipotence or narcissism. So the good father—as a mental creation—is a protection against the danger of irrational authority and the hatred it inspires. The British psychoanalyst Ronald Fairbairn called this kind of mental creation the "moral defense." The individual takes badness upon himself in order to preserve the goodness of authority: "It is better to be a sinner in a world ruled by God than a saint in a world ruled by the devil."\(^\text{22}\)

Paternal authority, then, is a far more complex emotional web than its defenders admit: it is not merely rooted in the rational law that forbids incest and patricide, but also in the erotics of ideal love, the guilty identification with power that undermines the son's desire for freedom. The need to sustain the bond with the father makes it impossible for the sons to acknowledge the murderous side of authority; instead they create the "paternal law" in his name.

But the transformation of the father from a figure who inspires murderous revolt to a personification of rational law is not complete. Behind Laius still lurks the figure of the murderous, dreaded primal father. Freud's delineation of the father is ambiguous: although his
defense of paternal authority is quite obvious—the father is the progressive force—it is complicated by an awareness of danger. Freud’s partisanship for the moral father does not entirely obscure the darker signs of the primal father.

The double image of the father also surfaces in Freud’s discussion of ideal love. In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Freud shows how what I have called identificatory love can either be the basis of ordinary identification with the father or ofbondage. On the one hand, Freud associates the hypnotic leader who inspires masochnism with the “dreaded primal father,” the man who loves no one but himself, a leader who demands “passive-masochnistic” surrender, and satisfies his “thirst for obedience.” Mass submission could thus be understood as the group uniting in its narcissistic strivings by taking this leader as its ideal. On the other hand, Freud suggests that the emotional tie of identification is readily observable in the little boy’s ordinary love for his father:

A little boy will exhibit a special interest in his father; he would like to grow like him and be like him, and take his place everywhere. We may simply say that he takes his father as his ideal. This behavior has nothing to do with a passive or feminine attitude towards his father (and toward males in general); it is on the contrary typically masculine. It fits in very well with the Oedipus complex, for which it helps to prepare the way.

The dangers of identification arise in adult life, Freud suggests, when we cannot live up to our ideal and so make the loved one the “substitute for some unattained ego ideal of our own.” This love of the ideal can become so powerful, Freud points out, that it is stronger even than desire for sexual satisfaction. The “devotion” of the ego to the object becomes so compelling that the subject loses all conscience: “In the blindness of love remorselessness is carried to the pitch of crime. The whole situation can be completely summarized in a formula: *The object has been put in the place of the ego ideal.*”

The social critics who turned to Freud in their efforts to understand fascism had no difficulty recognizing this constellation in which the leader is put in the place of the ideal image of the self. Deployed by a hypnotic leader, the narcissistic currents of identification can sweep people into dangerous social movements. But what did this have to do with the father? Since the hypnotic leader was conspicuously lacking in the qualities of the classic “father figure,”—the solid monarch, the wise and just ruler—he could not be a simple expression of paternal authority. T. W. Adorno solved the problem by proposing that the primal father whom Freud describes as the hypnotic leader should be understood as the preoedipal father. The classic father figure whose authority appeals not to dread but to reason is the oedipal father. Now the analysis of mass participation in fascism reads this way: In the absence of the oedipal father, the narcissistic tie to a figure of dreaded power can prevail in the psyche. This analysis of “fatherless” individuals seeking a powerful figure of identification could then, with slight modifications, be added to explain the fascination with the “superstars” of a “narcissistic” culture.

The fatherless-society critics, then, see the oedipal authority as the rational figure who saves us from the dangerous preoedipal strivings associated with the archaic figure. But this hard and fast distinction between oedipal and preoedipal figures—one which Freud himself did not make—actually suggests that splitting is at work. All badness is attributed to the residue of the early phase, all goodness to that of the later phase. In fact, in each phase the father figure plays a role in the child’s inner conflict, and in each case the child may use the father defensively or constructively. Which aspect of the father predominates depends largely on the relationship the father offers the child. To explain what Freud called the “short step from love to hypnotism,” from ordinary identificatory love to bondage, we must look not merely to the distinction between oedipal and preoedipal, but to the fate of the child’s love for the father in each phase. The bias in the fatherless-society critique consists of the effort to find pathology in the child’s early love, rather than in the father’s re-
response to it. As I have argued in chapter 3, the idealization of the prooedipal father is closely associated with submission when it is thwarted, unrecognized. Yet if that early ideal love is gratified it can form the basis for autonomy. As Freud proposed, the child’s early identification is not opposed to but paves the way for the oedipal relationship to the father.

One could plausibly argue that the surrender to the fascist leader is not caused by the absence of paternal authority, but by the frustration of identificatory love: the unfulfilled longing for recognition from an early, idealized, but less authoritarian father. As we have seen, if the child does not receive this recognition, the father becomes a distant, unattainable ideal. This failure of identificatory love does not imply the absence of authority; it often comes about precisely when the father is authoritarian and punitive. It is the combination of narcissistic disappointment and fear of authority that produces the kind of admiration mingled with dread noted by observers of fascism in the mass love of the leader. The fascist leader satisfies the desire for ideal love, but this version of ideal love includes the oedipal components of hostility and authority. Again, it is not absence of a paternal authority—“fatherlessness”—but absence of paternal nurturance that engenders submission.

Thus both narcissistic and oedipal currents contribute to the fearful love of authority. The image of the “good father,” free of irrationality, is but one side of the father, an image that can only be produced by splitting. Indeed, in the most common version of the oedipal model, the existence of the archaic, dangerous father is completely obscured, and the split between good and bad father is instead reformulated as the opposition between a progressive, oedipal father and a regressive, archaic mother. This opposition is, for us, the most serious problem in psychoanalytic theory; yet by analyzing this problem, we may begin to unravel the “great riddle of sex.”

THE PRIMAL MOTHER

The notion that rational paternal authority constitutes the barrier to irrational maternal power hearkens back to long-standing oppositions within the Western tradition—between rationalism and romanticism, Apollo and Dionysus. It is significant that Chasseguet-Smirgel introduces her book on “the role of the mother and the father in the psyche,” Sexuality and Mind, with Thomas Mann’s classic statement of this opposition:

In the garden of the world, oriental myths recognize two trees, to which they give a universal significance, which is both fundamental and opposed. The first is the olive tree... It is the tree of life, sacred to the sun. The solar principle, virile, intellectual, lucid, is linked to its essence... The other is the fig tree. Its fruit is full of sweet, red seeds, and whosoever eats of them dies...

The world of the day, of the sun, is the world of the mind...

The opposition between the rational and the irrational is also intertwined with the sexual politics of psychoanalytic theory. The oedipal model takes for granted the necessity of the boy’s break with his early maternal identification. It ratifies that repudiation on the grounds that the maternal object is inextricably associated with the initial state of oneness, of primary narcissism. In this view, femininity and narcissism are twin sirens calling us back to undifferentiated infantile bliss. Com-
munion with others is understood as dangerous and seductive—as regression. The elevation of the paternal ideal of separation is a kind of Trojan horse within which is hidden the belief that we actually long to return to oceanic oneness with mother, that we would all sink back into “limitless narcissism” were it not for the paternal imposition of difference. The equation oneness = mother = narcissism is implicit in the oedipal model.

The contrast between paternal rescue and maternal danger emerges clearly in contemporary writing about the Oedipus complex. Chasseguet-Smirgel’s interpretation of the Oedipus complex offers a particularly striking version of the idea that the paternal law of separation is what protects us from regression. Her theory, which is highly regarded among psychoanalysts here and in France, is worth a detailed discussion because it clearly spells out assumptions about the role of the mother in the Oedipus complex that remain sub rosa in previous formulations.

The distinction between ego ideal and superego is essential to Chasseguet-Smirgel’s argument. In the evolution of psychoanalytic theory, the concept of the ego ideal preceded that of the superego. Freud originally developed the concept in his writing on narcissism. The ego ideal referred to an agency which was the locus of the child’s desire for omnipotence and aspirations to perfection. Originally Freud gave the ego ideal such functions as self-observation and conscience. But when he later elaborated the theory of the Oedipus complex, he gave those functions to the superego, and henceforth used the terms ego ideal and superego interchangeably. Later writers tried to disentangle the two agencies, recalling that Freud called the ego ideal “heir to our narcissism” and the superego “heir to the Oedipus complex.” Accordingly, the superego could be defined as the agent that modifies our narcissism and keeps the ego ideal from getting out of hand. In Chasseguet-Smirgel’s interpretation, for example, the ego ideal represents the narcissistic love of the perfect being, whose nearness produces heights of fear and exhilaration, annihilation and self-affirmation. The superego represents a later, more rational authority, which admonishes us only to be good—to obey the prohibition against incest and patricide—but not to be powerful and perfect.

Chasseguet-Smirgel reviews the Oedipus complex in light of this contrast between ego ideal and superego. For her, as for most contemporary theory, the oedipal conflict is a reformulation of the earlier pre-oedipal conflict between separation from and reunion with the mother. In her view, the oedipal wish to make the mother an exclusive loved one can be seen as a later expression of the early narcissistic longings, “the nostalgia for primary fusion, when the infant enjoyed fullness and perfection.” Thus, fulfillment of the incest wish would mean return to narcissistic oneness, loss of the independent self—psychic death.

In this reading, the superego upholds difference; it denies the wish for omnipotence and reunion that remains alive in the ego ideal. The superego, which says, “You may not yet...” offers only a long march, an evolutionary route to final satisfaction. By contrast, the ego ideal is the “inhibitor of narcissism” and “tends to restore illusion”; it is devoted still to shortcuts, to the magical achievement of power through identification with the ideal. It is therefore opposed by the superego, which as “the inhibitor of the Oedipus complex discourages this identification.”

The consequence of this definition is that these agencies are now aligned schematically with mother and father: the superego represents the paternal demand for separation, and the ego ideal represents the goal of maternal oneness. As Chasseguet-Smirgel puts it, “The superego cuts the child off from his mother; the ego ideal pushes the child toward fusion with her.” This alignment defines narcissism exclusively in terms of maternal oneness, as if the identification with the ideal father of rapprochement played no part in the development of early narcissism. Likewise, it defines the longing for the mother as only narcissis-
tic, denying the erotic, oedipal content of the child’s desire for her. The oedipal super ego in Chasseguet-Smirgel’s reading does more, however, than represent the paternal law of separation; it also leads the child into reality—the reality of gender and generational difference. It is true that the oedipal injunction, “You must be like me,” seems to be simply a continuation of that grandiose identification with the rapprochement father that already “saved” the child from immersion in the mother. As Chasseguet-Smirgel points out, it is incorrect to say that the oedipal father liberates the child from the dyad, for the preoedipal father has already done so. But what the oedipal prohibition adds is that the parents cannot be split apart, that something powerful unites them from which the child is excluded. When the oedipal father says, “You may not be like me,” thus denying the boy identification with him, he represents a reality principle, a limit. Of course, this limit is actually the result of the child’s own recognition that he is too small to be what the father is to the mother. But the child prefers to hear this as prohibition (“You may not be like me”) rather than as impotence (“You cannot be like me”). This denial of identification takes on a familiar, symbolic form. The phallus, once the token of sameness, now also becomes the sign of difference.

The father and his phallus come to symbolize the child’s whole sense of difference between himself and adults, as well as between men and women. In order to inherit that phallus, to sustain identification with his father, the child must accept his separation from his mother. According to the oedipal model, it is precisely this recognition of difference and separateness that makes a person able to enjoy the possibilities of erotic union later in life. As Otto Kernberg points out, once the oedipal separation is consolidated in the psyche, passion can be ignited by crossing the boundaries of the separate selves, and the narcissistic element can be safely enjoyed.

I agree with the interpretation of the Oedipus complex as a confrontation with difference and limits. What is essential is the child’s realization that he or she cannot be the mother’s lover. In my view, the pressure points of development, like rapprochement or the Oedipus complex, reveal the child’s striving to separate, to destroy, to let go of earlier connections and replace them with new ones. The child, as much as he desires the mother, fears incest as a kind of re-engulfment. The child fears being overwhelmed, overstimulated by the more potent parental object with adult desires. The limit set by the incest taboo is experienced as a protection, because the child wants to be his own person even as he resents having to be it. The idea of paternal intervention, in the most profound sense, is a projection of the child’s own desire. He attributes this power to the father because he wants him to have it. Moreover, by accepting that the parents have gone off together without him, the child may go off without the parents. If father and mother fulfill one another’s desire, the child is relieved of that overwhelming responsibility. By allowing their full sexuality, the child can fully identify with them as sexual subjects.

What I object to in Chasseguet-Smirgel’s interpretation of the Oedipus complex is that this confrontation with reality is made contingent on the father’s embodiment of difference and the reality principle. The mother here seems to play no active role in bringing the child to reality. In this polarized scheme, the mother exercises the magnetic pull of regression and the father guards against it; he alone is associated with the progression toward adulthood, separation, and self-control. The problems start, I suggest, when we take the symbolic figures of father and mother and confuse them with actual forces of growth or regression. There is no denying that unconscious fantasy is permeated with such symbolic equations. But even if the father does symbolize growth and separation—as he does in our culture—this does not mean that in actual fact the father is the one who impels the child to develop.

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8In my view, this should be understood to mean that it is the process of differentiation that stimulates the creation of a symbolic representation, not the symbol that creates difference. Any mother, or any combination of parenting figures (with or without an actual father) who are basically committed to their child’s development as a separate person, can foster differentiation. That is why children without fathers still exhibit the symbolic representation.
Chasseguet-Smirgel's idea that the paternal superego presides over growth and development collapses the distinction between symbolic representation and concrete reality. The idea that the ego ideal derives from the experience of maternal union is likewise a mixing up of metaphor and reality. Real mothers in our culture, for better and worse, devote most of their energy to fostering independence. It is usually they who inculcate the social and moral values that make up the content of the young child's superego. And it is usually they who set a limit to the erotic bond with the child, and thus to the child's aspiration for omnipotent control and dread of engulfment.

Rather than opposing paternal superego to maternal ego ideal, we can distinguish between a maternal and a paternal ideal, and a paternal and a maternal superego. As recent feminist critiques have demonstrated, the dominant identification of little girls with their mothers impairs neither their social maturity nor their superego. Certainly the ideal that the female superego strives for is often different; thus Gilligan argues that it is defined more as concern for others than as separateness. The sense of responsibility promoted by the female superego (not the sense of separateness) curbs aggression and desire. This suggests quite a different relationship between separation and morality than superego theory has maintained. It shows that the paternal principle of separation is not necessarily the royal road to selfhood and morality. The capacity for concern and responsibility allows the girl a sense of initiative and competence in personal relationships—though it may contain an inclination toward self-sacrifice. Girls learn to appreciate difference within the context of caring for others, identifying with the mother's ability to perceive the different and distinct needs of others.

Curiously, Chasseguet-Smirgel's own account of the concrete reality of mothering contradicts her neat division between a regressive, maternal ego ideal and a progressive, paternal superego. She, in fact, acknowledges that the mother helps her child project the ego ideal forward concretely through encouragement and recognition. Each time the child has to give up some illusion of perfection, a new sense of mastery must replace it and be recognized. When the parent provides this "narcissistic confirmation," the child's agency (for example, being able to dress oneself) is invested with value. Under these circumstances, the child's narcissism is a vehicle for development, not a pull toward regression. In the end, Chasseguet-Smirgel allows that the ego ideal itself develops, each phase assimilating new images into the idea of perfection. Thus our narcissism pushes us forward; it is not merely a siren luring us toward regression.

But if narcissism impels us forward as well as backward, and if such development actually depends on the concrete activity of the mother and father, then why does the theory make the oedipal father represent all the progress and all the sense of reality that both parents foster? Why does the mother appear only as a feared, archaic figure whom the oedipal father must defeat?

According to Chasseguet-Smirgel this is how the mother appears in the unconscious. But as we have seen, that is not all there is in the unconscious. There is also the oedipal mother, and, for that matter, the archaic father. Indeed, we are left wondering why the child's fantasy would pit a highly developed, mature, oedipal father against an earlier, preoedipal mother.

In Chasseguet-Smirgel's theory, the two phases of development are collapsed, and the Oedipus complex is reduced to a confrontation with

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*It must be that idealization plays a role here. The oedipal father is in part a screen for the narcissistic ideal of rapprochement. And to this idealization is added his oedipal power to reunite with mother without being engulfed by her. The father and his phallus thus become the magnet for the (preoedipal and oedipal) strivings of narcissism: reunion and omnipotence. But it is also the father's very lack of concreteness, compared to the mother, which makes him this magnet. The symbolic dominance of father and phallus is intensified when he is outside the family. The father's inaccessibility, as we have seen in the case of the daughter, transforms identificatory love of the ideal father into penis envy. The missing father, who was not there to confirm his daughter's identificatory love, became the missing phallus. The father's distance and the mother's closeness conspire to produce the disproportionate idealization of the symbolic father."
narcissism. Chasseguet-Smirgel fails to distinguish the differentiated eroticism the oedipal child feels toward the mother from the narcissism of oneness. And she fails to find the archaic father as well. For if the incest wish can shatter this more differentiated image of the oedipal mother and evoke the archaic one, would it not also shatter the oedipal father and evoke his archaic, punitive, primal aspect? As we have seen, this primal father is curiously missing from most versions of oedipal theory. How do we account for this constellation in which the father is progressive and developed while the mother is primitive and archaic? We might see it as the result of a defense: fear and dread are split off from paternal power and welded onto maternal power. Insofar as the child perceives the father as powerful and threatening, he dares not know him, and has to displace the danger—onto the mother.

This same displacement can be observed in Chasseguet-Smirgel’s remarks on the dangers of striving after a maternal ideal. She argues that this striving is the inspiration for destructive group formations, such as Nazism.

which was directed more toward the Mother Goddess (Blut und Boden) than God the Father. In such groups one witnesses the complete erasure of the father and the paternal universe, as well as all of the elements pertaining to the Oedipus complex. In Nazism, the return to nature, to the old German mythology, is an expression of this wish for fusion with the omnipotent mother.45

The notion that return to the omnipotent mother was the predominant motive in Nazism is an exemplary demonstration of the theoretical attempt to attribute all irrationalism to the maternal side and deny the destructive potential of the phallic ideal. Chasseguet-Smirgel’s alignment of the ego ideal with the mother in general, and her example of Nazism in particular, are whitewashes of the vital part played by narcissistic identification with the father in the mass psychology of fascism—a part anticipated full well by Freud. This view justifies the father’s domination of the mother on the grounds that, in the unconscious, she still reigns omnipotent.6

In Chasseguet-Smirgel’s view, the roles played by mother and father are part of an inevitable unconscious structure, a condition that we must make the best of. She advocates a more equitable outcome to the “struggle between maternal and paternal law” in which we remember that “we are all children of Men and Women.” She also envisions a balance of superego and ego ideal, salvaging our narcissism as a source of creativity and the aspiration to perfection.47 The idea of psychic balance in which both ego ideal and superego have their say, where narcissistic and oedipal currents each play their role, seems to offer an ideal outcome of the Oedipus complex.

On closer examination, however, this vision of separate but equal roles is not equal at all. Citing the Eumenides of Aeschylus, Chasseguet-Smirgel compares the psychological evolution of the individual to the overthrow of matriarchy by patriarchy, the “subordination of the chthonic, subterranean forces by celestial Olympian law.”48 The most we can do to redress the balance, she says, is to remember the precordial mother, to acknowledge that beneath the appearance of male domination lies the reality of early maternal omnipotence—an

*A case in point is Chasseguet-Smirgel’s illustration of her thesis that the absence of the father intensifies the destructive urges toward the archaic mother, that the child who “omits the identification with the father” and his phallus has no impediment to the destructive reentry into the maternal body. Her example is a perverse male patient whose fantasies of invading women’s bellies reflect the “absence of a stable introjection of [the father’s] penis” which would bar the way. This patient has a dream in which he puts a stone through a fish’s smooth belly, which turns into a vagina, which is next to a museum exhibit about the Jews. She later mentions that shortly before entering analysis, the patient discovered that his father had been a fascist, in the Rumanian equivalent of the SS. This fact suggests to me that the patient does not live in a “fatherless universe,” but that he lives rather with a dangerous father with whom he has identified. This father image, as the dream connection to Jews shows, is the source of the fantasy of attacking the mother’s body. Here Chasseguet-Smirgel is describing not the absence of a father, but the presence of a bad father.46
idea prefigured by Freud’s remark that the early attachment to the mother is like discovering “the Minoan-Mycenaean civilization behind the civilization of Greece.”

But why must one civilization bury the other? Why must the struggle between maternal law and paternal law end in unilateral defeat rather than a tie? Why must a patriarchal father supersede and depose the mother? If the struggle between paternal and maternal power ends in paternal victory, the outcome belies the victor's claim that the loser, the mother, is too dangerous and powerful to coexist with. Rather, it would seem that the evocation of woman’s danger is an age-old myth which legitimates her subordination.

As our discussion of the rational father and irrational mother shows, the debate over Oedipus and Narcissus has an implicit sexual politics. This aspect of the debate has been more explicit outside the confines of psychoanalysis. When Lasch published The Culture of Narcissism a number of feminists criticized its nostalgia for paternal authority and the old gender hierarchical family. One feminist critic, Stephanie Engel, proposed that the denunciation of narcissism reflected a fear of “feminization.” She argued that narcissistic ties of identification were denigrated by virtue of their association with femininity, that is, with the early maternal experience. She supported her argument by reference to Chasseguet-Smirgel’s work, and suggested a solution to the tension between superego and ego ideal in which neither agency would be devalued.

Engel made an eloquent case for a less one-sided view of narcissism, arguing that “the call back to the memory of original narcissistic bliss pushes us toward a dream of the future.” She proposed that ideally one can find a balance between narcissistic aspirations and limitations:

Neither agency of morality should overpower the other—this challenge to the moral hegemony of the superego would not destroy its power but would instead usher in a dual reign. We can remain aware of the danger of a politics founded on a fantasy of infantile omnipotence or grandiosity, while remembering that the total extinction of the ego ideal by the superego, which would curtail creative fantasy, is neither possible nor desirable.

A dual reign would acknowledge the ego ideal, with its fantasies and longings, as an indispensable avant-garde, and accord it the same respect as solid citizenry. It would be a rehabilitation of narcissism.

It appears that Lasch was profoundly influenced by Engel’s critique. In his next book, The Minimal Self, he dropped his panegyric to the superego and adopted Chasseguet-Smirgel’s theory, including her understanding of the early conflict between separation and dependency. Lasch also accepted Engel’s case for a more balanced view of narcissism, but he balked at the gender implications of her argument. He rejected her charge that the psychoanalytic model of a “radically autonomous and individuated man” devalues both femininity and primary narcissistic connectedness to the world. Having cited approvingly Engel’s vision of the dual reign of superego and ego ideal, Lasch wants to know why feminists must ruin a good argument by bringing up the matter of male domination:

The case for narcissism has never been stated more persuasively. The case collapses, however, as soon as the qualities associated respectively with the ego ideal and the superego are assigned a gender so that feminine “mutuality” and “relatedness” can be played off against the “radically autonomous” masculine sense of self. That kind of argument dissolves the contradiction held in tension by the psychoanalytic theory of narcissism, namely, that all of us, men and women alike, experience the pain of separation and simultaneously long for a restoration of that union. Narcissism . . . expresses itself in later life both in the desire for ecstatic union with others, as in romantic love, and in the desire for absolute independence from others, by means of which we seek to revive the original illusion of omnipotence and to deny our
dependence on external sources of nourishment and gratification. The technological project of achieving independence from nature embodies the solipsistic side of narcissism, just as the desire for a mystical union with nature embodies its symbiotic and self-obliterating side. Since both spring from the same source—the need to deny the fact of dependence—it can only cause confusion to call the dream of technological omnipotence a masculine obsession, while exalting the hope of a more loving relation with nature as a characteristically feminine preoccupation.55 (emphasis added)

Here it might appear that Lasch raises the same question I have raised. Why, indeed, should the ego ideal or the superego be assigned a gender? Yet Lasch himself makes such distinctions between mother and father, in spite of all his protests. First, like Chasseguet-Smirgel, he makes use of a gender scheme in which the father’s phallic and prohibition play a decisive role in establishing the rule of difference. This leads him to the assertion that “the emotional absence of the father” is so devastating because it means “the removal of an important obstacle to the child’s illusion of omnipotence.”54 And second, he adopts her theory, which privileges absolute independence over ecstatic union, by making the superego of separation a protection from the ideal of oneness.55

As we have seen in our discussion of early differentiation, separation from the mother is based on paternal identification. By the same logic, the attempt to master dependency through feelings of oneness preserves the identification with the mother. Each aspect of narcissism is thus associated with gender: independence with masculinity, oneness with femininity. Neither state of mind represents real relationships or the truth about gender—each is merely an ideal. But whether one idealizes the mother or the father, separation or connection, does make a great difference.

Either extreme, pure symbiosis or pure self-sufficiency, represents a loss of balance. Both are defensive denials of dependency and difference. But they are not equally powerful ideals. Lasch would like to downplay the inequality of power between the maternal and paternal ideals by arguing that both ideals serve the same psychic function. He would like to think that one can only criticize technological domination as a masculine strategy by turning the tables and celebrating an idealized oneness with the mother nature.56 He is wrong to think that his feminist critics fall into that trap; it is possible to criticize the consequences of the masculine strategy without embracing its opposite and believing in fantasies of maternal utopia (although such reversal is undeniably present in some feminist thought). Certainly, Engel’s argument for a balance between separation and relatedness in the conception of the individual avoids that pitfall.

The controversy about Oedipus and Narcissus, superego and ego ideal, is really a debate about sexual difference and domination. In the oedipal model, the father, in whatever form—whether as the limiting superego, the phallic barrier, or the paternal prohibition—always represents difference and enjoys a privileged position above the mother. Her power is identified with early, primitive gratifications that must be renounced, while the father’s power is associated with development and growth. His authoritative is supposed to protect us from irrationality and submission; she lures us into transgression. But the devaluation of femininity in this model undermines precisely what the Oedipus complex is purported to achieve: difference, erotic tension, and the balance of intrapsychic forces. The oedipal model illustrates how a one-sided version of individuation undoes the very difference that it purports to consolidate.

THE REPUDIATION OF FEMININITY

We often have the impression that with the wish for a penis and the masculine protest we have penetrated through all the psychological strata and have reached bedrock, and that thus our activi-
ties are at an end. This is probably true, since, for the psychical field, the biological field does in fact play the part of the underlying bedrock. The repudiation of femininity can be nothing else than a biological fact, a part of the great riddle of sex.\textsuperscript{57} (emphasis added)

In this passage from "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," Freud sums up the deepest issues in psychoanalysis for men and women. It is interesting to observe how differently male and female "bedrock" have fared. When it came to penis envy, women offered no dearth of opposition, even if it took many years for psychoanalytic orthodoxy to reconsider the issue. But when it came to the other side of the great riddle, the repudiation of femininity, there was hardly an objection raised. Men did not dispute their fear of castration, or attribute their repudiation of femininity to social conditions. Nor did the two sides of the riddle share an equal place in the taxonomy of neurosis. While women's wish to be like men was deemed illness, men's fear of being like women was deemed universal, a simple, immutable fact. We might hope that the boy's "triumphant contempt"\textsuperscript{58} for women would dissipate as he grew up—but such contempt was hardly considered pathological.

The repudiation of femininity does not offer us the same convenient avenue for theoretical revision as did the concept of penis envy. While current theories of gender identity dispute Freud's view that the penis wish is the core of femininity, they seem to confirm that the rejection of femininity is central to masculinity. Not a biological fact, perhaps, but an equally unavoidable psychological one. The boy's disidentification with his mother is considered a necessary step in the formation of masculine identity. With luck, the boy's disavowal of his own femininity would occur in a way that does not overly disparage his mother and exalt his father. Yet, in the oedipal model this polarity of a regressive mother and a liberating father seems inescapable.

Accepting the repudiation of femininity as "bedrock," psychoanalysis has normalized it, glossing over its grave consequences not only for theory, but also for the fate of relationship between men and women. But the damage this repudiation inflicts on the male psyche is indeed comparable to woman's "lack"—even though this damage is disguised as mastery and invulnerability.

In the psychoanalytic picture of development, gender polarity and the privileging of the father become far more intense in the oedipal phase. In the pre-oedipal period, as we saw in the discussion of approachment, gender difference is still somewhat vague. The boy's ego ideal may still include identification with the mother; he still dresses up in her clothes and, like Freud's famous patient "Little Hans," still "believes" he might have a baby even though he knows he can't. But the oedipal resolution banishes this ambiguity in favor of an exclusively masculine ideal of being the powerful father capable of leaving mother as well as of desiring and uniting with her. In oedipal reality sexual difference becomes a line that can no longer be breached.

After Oedipus, both routes back to mother—identification and object love—are blocked. The boy must renounce not only incestuous love, but also identificatory love of the mother. In this respect the contrary commands of the oedipal father—"You must be like me" and "You may not be like me"—unite in a common cause, to repudiate identity with the mother.\textsuperscript{19} The oedipal injunctions say, in effect: "You may not be like the mother, and you must wait to love her as I do." Both agencies, paternal ego ideal and superego, push the boy away from dependence, vulnerability, and intimacy with mother. And the mother, the original source of goodness, is now located outside the self, externalized as love object. She may still have ideal properties, but she is not part of the boy's own ego ideal. The good mother is no longer inside; she is something lost—Eden, innocence, gratification, the bounteous breast—that must be regained through love on the outside.

What really changes, then, in the oedipal phase is the nature of the boy's tie to the mother. I have already made the point that the oedipal identification with the father is actually an extension of a powerful
erotic connection, identificatory love. In this sense, the term narcissism does not mean self-love or a lack of erotic connection to the other, but a love of someone like oneself, a homoerotic love.\(^6\) In the oedipal phase a new kind of love emerges, which Freud, perhaps unfortunately, called object love. But it is not an entirely unhappy phrase, for it does connote that the other is perceived as existing objectively, outside, rather than as part of the self. In the Oedipus complex the important change is the transformation of the original preoedipal object of identification into an oedipal object of "outside love." This outside love, according to the theory, would threaten to dissolve back into "inside love" if the incest barrier did not prohibit it. A major function of the incest barrier thus seems to be making sure the love object and the "like" object are not the same. It is not just a literal forbidding of sexual union, but also a prohibition on identification with the mother.\(^6\)

In my view—and, in a way, in Freud's view too—the boy's repudiation of femininity is the central thread of the Oedipus complex, no less important than the renunciation of the mother as love object. To be feminine like her would be a throwback to the preoedipal dyad, a dangerous regression. The whole experience of the mother-infant dyad is retrospectively identified with femininity, and vice versa. Having learned that he cannot have babies like mother, nor play her part, the boy can only return as an infant, with the dependency and vulnerability of an infant. Now her nurturance threatens to re-engulf him with its reminder of helplessness and dependency; it must be countered by his assertion of difference and superiority. To the extent that identification is blocked, the boy has no choice but to overcome his infancy by repudiation of dependency. This is why the oedipal ideal of individuality excludes all dependency from the definition of autonomy.

Generally the road back to the mother is closed off through devaluation and denigration; as observed before, the oedipal phase is marked by the boy's contempt for women. Indeed, the boy's scorn, like penis envy, is a readily observable phenomenon, and it often becomes more pronounced once the oedipal stance is consolidated. Consider the great distance between boys and girls during the period of latency: the pejorative charge of "sissy"; the oedipal boy's insistence that all babies are "she."

With the exception of dissidents like Karen Horney, most psychoanalytic writers have denied the extent to which envy and feelings of loss underlie the denigration or idealization of women.\(^6\) Male envy of women's fecundity and ability to produce food is certainly not unknown, but little is made of it. Similarly, the anxiety about the penis being cut off is rarely recognized as a metaphor for the annihilation that comes from being "cut off" from the source of goodness. As Dinnerstein has noted, once the mother is no longer identified with, once she is projected outside the self, then, to a large extent, the boy loses the sense of having this vital source of goodness inside.\(^6\) He feels excluded from the feminine world of nurturance. At times he feels the exclusion more, as when he idealizes the lost paradise of infancy; at other times he feels contempt for that world, because it evokes helplessness and dependency. But even when mother is envied, idealized, sentimentalized, and longed for, she is forever outside the masculine self. The repudiation of the mother, to whom the boy is denied access by the father—and by the outside world, the larger culture that demands that he behave like a little man—engenders a fear of loss, whether the mother is idealized or held in contempt.

As the discussion of intersubjective space in chapter 3 suggested, the identification with the holding mother supplies something vital to the self: in the case of the boy, losing the continuity between himself and mother will subvert his confidence in his "inside." The loss of that in-between space cuts him off from the space within. The boy thinks: "Mother has the good things inside, and now that she is forever separate from me and I may not incorporate her, I can only engage in heroic acts to regain and conquer her in her incarnations in the outside world." The boy who has lost access to inner space becomes enthralled with conquering outer space.

But in losing the intersubjective space and turning to conquest of
the external object, the boy will pay a price in his sense of sexual subjectivity. His adult encounter with woman as an acutely desirable object may rob him of his own desire—he is thrown back into feeling that desire is the property of the object. A common convention in comedy is the man helpless before the power of the desirable object (The Blue Angel); he is overpowered by her attractiveness, knocked off his feet. In this constellation, the male’s sexual subjectivity becomes a defensive strategy, an attempt to counter the acute attractive power radiating from the object. His experience parallels woman’s loss of sexual agency. The intense stimulation from outside robs him of the inner space to feel desire emerging from within—a kind of reverse violation. In this sense, intersubjective space and the sense of an inside is no less important for men’s sexual subjectivity than for women’s.

In the oedipal experience of losing the inner continuity with women and encountering instead the idealized, acutely desirable object outside, the image of woman as the dangerous, regressive siren is born. The counterpart of this image is the wholly idealized, masterful subject who can withstand or conquer her.

The upshot of the repudiation of femininity, then, is a stance toward women—of fear, of mastery, of distance—which by no means recognizes her as a different but like subject. Once the unbridgeable sexual difference is established, its dissolution is threatening to male identity, to the precious identification with the father. Holding on to the internalized father, especially by holding on to the ideal phallus, is now the means of protection against being overwhelmed by the mother. But this exclusive identification with the father, achieved at the expense of disavowing all femininity, works against the differentiation that is supposed to be the main oedipal achievement.

We can see this in the fact that the oedipal model equates sexual renunciation of mother with recognition of her independent subjectivity. In giving up the hope of possessing her, in realizing that she belongs to the father, the child presumably comes to terms with the limits of his relationship with her. But true recognition of another person means more than simply not possessing her. In the parents’ heterosexual love, the mother belongs to and acknowledges the father, but the father does not necessarily acknowledge her in return. The psychoanalytic literature consistently complains of the mother who denies the child the necessary confrontation with the father’s role by pretending that he is unimportant to her, that she loves only the child. Yet seldom do psychoanalysts raise a comparable complaint about the father who denigrates the mother. Realizing that mother belongs to father, or responds to his desire, is not the same as recognizing her as a subject of desire, as a person with a will of her own.

This is the major internal contradiction in the oedipal model. The oedipal resolution is supposed to consolidate the differentiation between self and other—but without recognizing the mother. What the Oedipus complex brings to the boy’s erotic life is the quality of outside love for the mother, with all the intensity that separation produces. This erotic potential is further heightened by the incest prohibition, the barrier to transgression, stimulated by the awareness of difference, boundaries, and separation. Yet all of this does not add up to recognition of her as an independently existing subject, outside one’s control. It could mean, after all, that she is in the control of someone else whom one takes as one’s ideal. The point of the oedipal triangle should be the acknowledgment that “I must share mother, she is outside my control, she is involved in another relationship besides the one with me.” Yet—and here we come to the unhappy side of the phrase “object love”—at the same time that the boy acknowledges this outside relationship, he may devalue her and bond with father in feeling superior to her. She is at best a desired object one may not possess.

The problem with the oedipal model should come as no surprise when we consider that men have generally not recognized women as equal independent subjects, but rather perceived them as sexual objects (or maternal helpmates). If the disavowal of identity with the mother is linked to the denial of her equal subjectivity, how can the mother survive as a viable other with whom mutual recognition is possible? Psychoanalysis has been careful to evade this contradiction by defining differentiation not as a tension or balance, not in terms of mutual
recognition, but solely as the achievement of separation: as long as the boy gets away from the mother, he has successfully become an individual.

Perhaps the starkest denial by psychoanalysis of the mother's subjectivity is Freud's insistence that children do not know about the existence of the female sexual organs. According to Chasseguet-Smirgel, the real flaw in Freud's thinking was this idea of "sexual phallic monism," the assertion that there is only one genital organ of significance to both boys and girls, the penis. No matter what competing evidence he stumbled over, Freud insisted that children do not know about the existence of the vagina until puberty, and that, until then, they perceive women as castrated men.

The theory of the castrated woman is itself an example of this denial. What is denied, Chasseguet-Smirgel says, is the image of woman and mother as she is known to the unconscious: the frightening and powerful figure created out of the child's helpless dependency. "The theory of sexual phallic monism (and its derivatives) seems to me to eradicate the narcissistic wound which is common to all humanity, and springs from the child's helplessness, a helplessness which makes him completely dependent upon his mother." When the oedipal child denies the existence of a vagina in favor of the phallic mother it is because "the idea of being penetrated by a penis is less invasive than that of a deep and greedy womb." The idea of phallic monism is clearly at odds with the acceptance of difference that the Oedipus complex is supposed to embody. It denies the difference between the sexes, or rather it reduces difference to absence, to lack. Difference then means plus-or-minus the penis. There is no range of qualitative divergence; only presence or absence, rich or poor, the haves and the have-nots. There is no such thing as woman: woman is merely that which is not man. Like the oedipal

symbolization of the mother as either a lost paradise or a dangerous siren, the denial of her sexual organs makes her always either more or less than human.

Thus within the oedipal model, difference is constructed as polarity; it maintains the overvaluation of one side, the denigration of the other. Although Chasseguet-Smirgel recognizes that the real issue is that mother's vagina is too big, she accepts as inevitable the outcome that denies women's sexuality. She argues that children of both sexes, in the wish to escape the primal mother, "project her power on to the father and his penis, and so more or less decathet [sic] specifically maternal qualities and organs." Consequently the boy's "passing devaluation of the mother and women is 'normal.'" Implicit in this account is that devaluation of the other is a normal aspect of heterosexuality that can be modified in later life. Similarly, the transfer of erotic idealization to the father's penis by both sexes is presented as a normal feature of heterosexuality. Accepting the penis is psychoanalytic shorthand for separating from and recognizing the father. In these terms, only heterosexual relationships acknowledge the father's penis and therefore show respect for difference. Accepting the vagina is not psychoanalytic shorthand for the father's recognition of the mother's equal subjectivity, or for the boy's learning to accept difference.

Chasseguet-Smirgel glosses over the contradictory finale of the Oedipus complex, its false resolution. She remains hopeful that the boy whose relationship with the mother has been "sufficiently good" (once again, it is up to the individual mother) will not reactively denigrate femininity, or at any rate will not "prolong" this reaction into adulthood. At best, then, we can say that the resolution of Oedipus awaits adolescence or adulthood. Once the possibility of real, concrete

genitals, prohibits "any different sexuality." The other, woman, is circumscribed "as man's complementary other, his appropriate opposite sex." Instead of real difference there is only a mirror image.

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63In her remarks on Luce Irigaray's critique of Freud, "The Blind Spot in an Old Dream of Symmetry," Jane Gallop emphasizes this point. The blind spot, the denial of women's
sexuality interaction emerges, once the boy has renewed access to women, the symbolic level on which they are depreciated can be counteracted. But the symbolic depreciation of women and their sexuality permeates adult culture, just as it did Freud's own theory, which retained the oedipal boy's phallocentric perception of women. All the evidence of woman's objectification testifies that the oedipal riddle—the repudiation of femininity—continues to bar the way between men and women.

Thus the Oedipus complex does not finally resolve the problem of difference, of recognizing an other. The mother is devalued, her power and desire are transferred to the idealized father, and her nurturance is inaccessible. The same phallus that stands for difference and reality also stands for power and repudiation of women. By assuming the power to represent her sexuality as well as his, it denies women's independent sexuality. Thus, masculinity is defined in opposition to woman, and gender is organized as polarity with one side idealized, the other devalued.

Although the oedipal construction of difference seems to be dominant in our cultural representation of gender, it is not the only possible one. The oedipal phase is, after all, only one point at which gender difference is integrated in the psyche. Once we recognize the consequences of the repudiation of femininity, we may speculate that the boy's stance toward femininity has something in common with the girl's toward masculinity, that it, too, is a reaction to blocked identification. As we have seen in the case of the girl, a successful identity love of the father may "solve" the problem of penis envy. Perhaps repudiation is not all that different from envy, in which it is partially rooted.

Irene Fast's distinction between repudiation and renunciation of femininity suggests another route to the integration of difference. Repudiation, Fast suggests, is an unsuccessful mode of differentiation; "ideally" boys ought to renounce, not repudiate, femininity, after a period of identification with it. She points out that girls, too, must overcome the primary identification with the mother and replace it with more generalized gender identifications that do not equate all femininity with the mother. If the girl tries to differentiate exclusively by repudiating the mother in favor of the father rather than by also developing generalized gender identifications, she never really separates from the mother: "Repudiation leaves the primitive identifications and the fusion with the mother intact." We could then speculate that for boys, repudiation also forecloses the development of a more mature maternal identification; it perpetuates the power of the merging, omnipotent mother in the unconscious. Without this mature identification, the boy does not develop a differentiated mother image. Thus a longer period of "bisexuality," of allowing both feminine and masculine identifications to coexist, would aid boys in becoming more differentiated from mother and obviate the need for such defenses as repudiation, distance, and control.

Perhaps, then, the way out of the oedipal repudiation of femininity must be sought in the period that comes before it. Between the boy's early disidentification with the mother and his oedipal separation from her is a neglected phase of playful, secondary identification with femininity. Insofar as the culture forecloses this possibility by demanding a premature entry into the oedipal world, gender identity is formed by repudiation rather than by recognition of the other. But the changing social relations of gender have given us a glimpse of another world, of a space in which each sex can play the other and so accept difference by making it familiar. As we give greater value to the preoedipal world, to a more flexible acceptance of difference, we can see that difference is only truly established when it exists in tension with likeness, when we are able to recognize the other in ourselves.

THE POLARITY PRINCIPLE

In the oedipal model, the distinction between the two parents—the holding, nurturing mother and the liberating, exciting father—is ex-
pressed as an irreconcilable difference. Even though the rapprochement conflict already opposed the father to the mother, it did not wholly abrogate the maternal identification. But in the oedipal construction of difference, this coexistence is no longer possible. Separation takes precedence over connection, and constructing boundaries becomes more important than insuring attachment. The two central elements of recognition—being like and being distinct—are split apart. Instead of recognizing the other who is different, the boy either identifies or disidentifies. Recognition is thus reduced to a one-dimensional identification with likeness; and as distinct from early childhood, where any likeness will do, this likeness is sexually defined.

The denial of identification with the mother also tends to cut the boy off from the intersubjective communication that was part of the primary bond between mother and infant. Emotional attunement, sharing states of mind, empathically assuming the other's position, and imaginatively perceiving the other's needs and feelings—these are now associated with cast-off femininity. Emotional attunement is now experienced as dangerously close to losing oneself in the other; affective imitation is now used negatively to tease and provoke. Thus the intersubjective dimension is increasingly reduced, and the need for mutual recognition must be satisfied with mere identification of likeness (which the industry of mass culture is only too happy to promote in the gender stereotyping of children's playthings). Recognition works more through ideal identifications and less through concrete interaction. What comes to fruition in this psychic phase, then, is a one-sided form of differentiation in which each sex can play only one part. Concrete identifications with the other parent are not lost, but they are excluded from the symbolically organized gender identity.74

Although I have dealt with the oedipal model exclusively in its masculine form, it is easy to see how the model constructs femininity as a simple mirror image of masculinity. The ideal type of femininity (which, as we observed earlier, is constituted as whatever is opposite to masculinity) absorbs all that is cast off by the boy as he flees from mother. The main difference is simply that for girls, masculine traits are not a threat to identity, as feminine traits are for boys, but an unattainable ideal. But for both sexes the important oedipal limit is the same: identify only with the same-sex parent. Even if the mirror relationship does not fit seamlessly in real life, the oedipal model defines gender as just such a complementarity. Each gender is able to represent only one aspect of the polarized self-other relationship.

To the extent that this scheme actually does prevail, no one can truly appreciate difference, for identification with the other parent is blocked. Identification no longer functions as a bridge to the experience of an other; now it can only confirm likeness. Real recognition of the other entails being able to perceive commonality through difference; and true differentiation sustains the balance between separateness and connection in a dynamic tension. But once identification with the other is denied, love becomes only the love of an object, of The Other. Since the mother is deprived of subjectivity, identification with her involves a loss of self. When the oedipal standpoint takes over completely, men no longer confront women as other subjects who can recognize them. Only in other men can they meet their match. Women can gain this power of recognition only by remaining desirable yet unattainable, untouched and unconquered, and ultimately dangerous. Loss of mutual recognition is the most common consequence of gender polarity.

The other important consequence of this polarity is the one-sided ideal of autonomous individuality, the masculine ideal. The identification with the father functions as a denial of dependency. The father's phallus stands for the wholeness and separateness that the child's real helplessness and dependency belie. Denying dependency on the mother by identifying with the phallic ideal amounts to sustaining the rapprochement fantasy of omnipotence, only modified by projecting it into the future ("You must wait to be like me"). The devaluation of the need for the other becomes a touchstone of adult masculinity.

Thus, I believe, the deep source of discontent in our culture is not repression or, in the new fashion, narcissism, but gender polarity. Many of the persistent symptoms of this discontent—contempt for the
needy and dependent, emphasis on individual self-reliance, rejection of social forms of providing nurturance—are not visibly connected to gender. Yet in spite of the fact that these attitudes are almost as common among women as they are among men, they are nevertheless the result of gender polarity. They underlie the mentality of opposition which pits freedom against nurturance: either we differentiate or remain dependent; either we stand alone or are weak; either we relinquish autonomy or renounce the need for love. No doubt many individuals are flexible enough to forge less extreme solutions, but the polarities tug mightily whenever dependency is an issue.

In spite of the many arguments that individuality is waning, the ideal of a self-sufficient individual continues to dominate our discourse. The power of this ideal is the chief manifestation of male hegemony, far more pervasive than overtly authoritarian forms of male domination. Indeed, this one-sided ideal of individuality has not been diminished by the undermining of paternal authority and superego. It may even have been strengthened: the lack of manifest authority intensifies the pressure to perform independently, to live up to the ideal without leaning on a concrete person who embodies it. The idealization of masculine values and the disparagement of feminine values persist unabated even though individual men and women are freer to cross over than before. The very idea that this form of individuality is not universal and neutral, but masculine, is highly controversial, as we saw in Lasch’s outraged denial of the relevance of gender to narcissism. It challenges the repudiation of femininity, and the equation of masculinity with humanity—and so it challenges men’s right to make the world in their own image.

Despite the appearance of gender neutrality and the freedom to be whatever we like, gender polarity persists. And it creates a painful division within the self and between self and other; it constantly frustrates our efforts to recognize ourselves in the world and in each other. My analysis of the oedipal model points beyond the obvious way that sexual difference has been linked to domination—the old authority of the father over children and wife—to its updated, subtler form. It points to a version of male domination that works through the cultural ideal, the ideal of individuality and rationality that survives even the waning of paternal authority and the rise of more equitable family structures.

What sustains this ideal is the confusion between total loss of self and dependency. As we have seen, in recent versions of the oedipal model the revolt against maternal power is actually portrayed as a reaction against the experience of helplessness. According to the theory, we begin in an original state of primal oneness in which helplessness is not yet realized. The journey of differentiation takes us away from this perfect oneness with the beloved source of goodness, into revulsion and fear of fusion with her. But what if the idea of such a state is a symbolic condensation, a retroactive fantasy that “oversimplifies” a rather complicated intersubjective relationship? As I have shown, that relationship was neither oneness nor perfect—it was always marked by alterations between helplessness and comfort, by the contrast between attunement and disjunction, by an emerging awareness of separation and individual differences.

The vision of perfect oneness, whether of union or of self-sufficiency, is an ideal—a symbolic expression of our longing—that we project onto the past. This ideal becomes enlarged in reaction to the experience of helplessness—in the face of circumstance, powerlessness, death—but also by the distance from mother’s help that repudiation of her enforces. What makes helplessness more difficult to bear is the feeling that one does not have the source of goodness inside, that one can neither soothe oneself nor find a way to communicate one’s needs to someone who can help. It seems to me that the confidence that this other will help, like the confidence created by early attunement, is what mitigates feelings of helplessness. Such confidence is enhanced by a cultural life in which nurturance, responsiveness, and physical closeness are valued and generalized, so that the child can find them everywhere and adopt them himself. It is vitiated when those values are associated exclusively with infancy and must be given up in exchange for autonomy.
disputing the readily observable wishes—of infants and adults—to withdraw from the world into a state of rest or to experience the sensuous gratification and attunement of erotic union. But we do not have to see them as dangerous forces of regression that threaten to cancel all strivings toward differentiation.

When we do see them that way, the mother inevitably appears as a figure who would permit endless merging, blurring all differences and keeping the child in a swamp of narcissistic bliss. This image of the archaic mother from whom the father protects us appears to psychoanalysis as a basic construction of the human psyche. As Stoller has argued, the dreaded image of the mother arises as a male response to the need to separate from the primary identification with her. The threat which the original sense of bodily continuity poses to male identity remains as the unassailable explanation for male fear and dread of woman. But this explanation does not account for the persistence of this threat once masculine identity is consolidated. How else may we explain the persistence of this dreadful apparition of maternal power?

Here we may recall our discussion of the difference between renunciation and repudiation. The persistence of the maternal threat can be explained, at least in part, by the prohibition on maternal identification which deprives the boy of the opportunity to develop a more differentiated image of the mother. The repudiation of the mother gives her the aura of lost perfection, but it also makes her the object of destructive envy: "Mother does not need me, so I don't need her; she is the source of perfect oneness, but this oneness can turn against me; Mother can retaliate for my envy by 'smothering' me with love." The blocking of identification reduces the mother to the complementary other who easily turns into the enemy, the opposite in the retaliatory power struggle between the sexes. This view of the mother meshes with the defensive stance assumed in reaction to the paradox of recognition, when the power of the one we have depended on may begin to appear threatening to the vulnerable self. When this defensive stance is institutionalized in a coherent symbolic system of gender—as in the
Oedipus complex—it cancels access to direct experience of the other. The symbolic system locks into place the sense of the mother’s dangerous but alluring power and the need for paternal defense against it. The more violent the repudiation of the source of nurturance, the more dangerous and tempting it begins to appear. The demonic view of maternal love is analogous to the revulsion that repression confers upon a forbidden wish.

Quite possibly, the dangerous apparition of women only takes final form in the symbolic unconscious once domination is institutionalized. I suggested in chapter 2 that the dilemma of omnipotence may be a consequence of the loss of tension that results from reducing the other to object. Similarly, the lack of opportunity to encounter woman’s subjectivity makes it impossible to break the magic spell of the omnipotent mother. The effort to destroy or reduce the other is an inevitable part of the childhood struggle for recognition, as well as a way of protecting independence. But it is another matter when—as in the domination of women by men—the other’s independent subjectivity really is destroyed, and with it the possibility of mutual recognition. It may be impossible to say where this cycle of real domination and the fantasy of maternal omnipotence begins, but this does not mean that we can never break that cycle and restore the balance of destruction and recognition. The answer awaits the social abolition of gender domination. And this means not just equality for women, but also a dissolution of gender polarity, a reconstruction of the vital tension between recognition and assertion, dependency and freedom.

THE NEW OEDIPUS

Freud’s opposition between rational paternal authority and the maternal underworld still resonates today. And I believe that the father’s authority will persist as long as we accept the ideal of rationality as the antithesis of “limitless narcissism.” The persistence of this dualism alerts us to an unchanging image of the father in the deep strata of the psyche where sexual difference takes hold. This dualism operates just as powerfully, it should be noted, for social critics like Brown and Marcuse, who defend the desire for union with the bounteous mother against the rational reality principle of the father. Their positions accept the characterization of the maternal world as found in the discourse of gender domination: they affirm the “limitless narcissism” of the babe at the breast who does not recognize the mother’s, or anyone else’s, equal subjectivity. A deeper critique is necessary, one which rejects the terms of sexual polarity, of subject and object, and so rejects any revolt that merely reverses these terms. The point is to get out of the antithesis between mother and father, this revolving door between the regressive maternal warmth and the icy paternal outside.

One step in the dissolution of this dualism is to reinterpret the Oedipus complex in such a way that it is no longer the summation of development. Rather than emphasizing the overcoming of preoedipal identifications, a new perspective on the Oedipus complex might see it as only a step in mental life, one that leaves room for earlier and later levels of integration. Significantly, Hans Loewald, a prominent exponent of the object relations tendency in American psychoanalysis, proposed in “The Waning of the Oedipus Complex” that psychoanalysis should question the exclusion of “the whole realm of identification and empathy from normality.” The focus on preoedipal life has created “a growing awareness of the force and validity of another striving, that for unity, symbiosis, fusion, merging, identification...”

The validation of this striving helps to redress the repudiation of the maternal that informed the earlier rationalism of psychoanalysis. It opens a place in the reality principle for bodily continuity with another; it includes the intersubjective experience of recognition and all the emotional elements that go into appreciating, caring for, touching, and responding to another, many of which are developed in infancy. I suspect that this change in psychoanalysis is an indirect result of women’s increased status and freedom, which have proven that the
maternal bond is not founded on a denial of reality. It may also reflect an incipient critique of pure autonomy, based on the observation that the denial of the need for nurturance takes a tremendous toll on those who live by it, as well as on those who cannot or will not live up to it.

While Loewald’s interpretation of the Oedipus complex is an attempt to soften the antithesis between rationality and affectivity, it is also a new approach to parental authority. He no longer sees patricide as forbidden, but as figuratively necessary. "The assumption of responsibility for one’s own life and its conduct is in psychic reality tantamount to the murder of the parents... Not only parental authority is destroyed by wresting authority from the parents and taking it over, but the parents... are being destroyed as libidinal objects as well." This, of course, presumes that the parents survive the destruction without retaliating, something only the “generous father” can do. But Oedipus, and countless sons before and after him, did not have a generous father. Theirs was the father of Kafka’s story “The Judgment,” who leaps from his sickbed to condemn his son to death for the crime of taking over the family business and planning to marry. Along with the social decline in paternal authority, the plot has gradually changed: from murdering the father to leaving home. Believing against the father now appears to our conscious minds as a stage in life rather than a transgression punishable by death. Likewise, women’s emancipation has contributed to the transformation of reunion: from an image of death or primordial oneness to a moment of connection. As women achieve greater equality and mothers become equally important representatives of the outside, the desire for mother no longer evokes complete loss of self. The mother’s ability to balance separation and connection can also become a model for the child, and the child can leave this mother without fear of destroying her. Thus both separation and connection become disentangled from the archaic fears.

In this sense, we can conceptualize a post-oedipal phase of separation in which the metaphoric death of the parents as loved ones who are responsible for us is accompanied by the joy of successful survival and the grief of loss. This joy and grief could be, at least partially, disentangled from the polarized, archaic images of reunion and separation, murder and guilt (the lasting imprint of the oedipal phase on the symbolic unconscious) and be felt as conscious ambivalence. This would make it possible for sons and daughters, as Loewald says, to take responsibility for their own desires—by responding to them, not relinquishing them.

This formulation revises the old oedipal notion of responsibility in which the sons assumed the guilt for the father’s transgression and made his oppressive power into law. This act of internalization substituted identification with the aggressor for separation from authority, and so perpetuated the guilt-ridden desire to become the authority oneself. Identification with the aggressor, embodying the wish to merge with and be like the all-powerful other, is an effort to escape the necessity of destroying the father, and insures the same refusal to be superseded by one’s own offspring. The desire to be one with such an authority is equally dangerous, whether it is expressed through overt submission, conformity, or domination.

Internalization of authority proceeds by turning the frustrated wish for power inward: we may not be able to affect the world, but we can at least control ourselves; we may not be able to truly achieve independence from all other creatures, but we can distance ourselves from them so that we appear completely autonomous. That this acceptance of powerlessness in the guise of autonomy may deny our respon-
sibility to care for others is rationalized by the notion that we can, after all, do nothing to help them. This compact with the reality principle was expressed most eloquently by Descartes:

My third maxim was to try to conquer myself rather than fortune, and to change my desires rather than the order of the world, and generally to accustom myself to believing that there is nothing entirely in our power except our thoughts. . . . And this alone seemed to me to be sufficient to prevent me from desiring anything in the future that I could not obtain.92

Freud brought about a dramatic break in the Cartesian worldview by showing that controlling our thoughts is not sufficient to change our desires. He revealed that even in withdrawing from the world the ego remains subject to the pressures of the unconscious which confront it as "external" reality. But Freud's great discovery was still only another stage of the journey inward, away from the impact of the outside world. Freud's reading of Oedipus exclusively as a story of unconscious desire and not of real transgression shows how difficult it is to know—and face—external reality, how difficult it is to confront not only one's own aggression and desire, but that of the father as well. The New Oedipus, the rereading of the story as a confrontation with knowledge of self and other, holds out the prospect of understanding not only the hidden inner world, but also the mystifying outer world of power and powerlessness. It presumes the possibility of a post-oedipal separation in which individuals are able to turn back and look at their parents, and to assess critically their legacy rather than simply identifying with their authority.

The breakdown of paternal authority and the resulting search for a different route to individuation are the context for the controversy over Oedipus and Narcissus with which we began this chapter. But this does not mean that the decline of authority has "caused" the demise of a once successful form of individuality; rather, it has revealed the contradiction once hidden within that individuality: the inability to confront the independent reality of the other. Men's loss of absolute control over women and children has exposed the vulnerable core of male individuality, the failure of recognition which previously wore the cloak of power, responsibility, and family honor. It is this inability to recognize the other which the psychoanalytic focus on narcissism has finally brought to the surface.

The oedipal model rationalized and concealed this failure by assuming that differentiation cannot occur within the mother-child dyad, that the father must intervene to impose independence. The three pillars of oedipal theory—the primacy of the wish for oneness, the mother's embodiment of this regressive force, and the necessity of paternal intervention—all combine to create the paradox that the only liberation is paternal domination. Oedipal theory thus denies the necessity of mutual recognition between man and woman. Construing the struggle for recognition in terms of the father-son rivalry, the theory reduces woman to a contested point on the triangle; never an other whose different and equal subjectivity need be confronted. By going beyond Oedipus we can envisage a direct struggle for recognition between man and woman, free of the shadow of the father that falls between them. By rejecting the false premise of paternal authority as the only road to freedom, we may recover the promise on which oedipal theory has defaulted: coming to terms with difference.
69. Thus the correct labeling and open discussion of the female genitals in childhood, however important, is not the key to changing the unconscious perception of women. Nor do I agree with positions like the one put forth by Luce Irigaray in “This Sex Which Is Not One,” which valorizes the female genitals as a starting point for a different desire, although I am in sympathy with other aspects of her critique of Freud. A great deal of feminist art is also dependent on such reversal, which certainly has a redemptive moment, and is in any case scarcely avoidable in the historical process of change. Nonetheless, it is theoretically necessary to criticize this position, especially insofar as it becomes dominant and static.

70. Julia Kristeva has made some attempts to base the early role of space (“Women’s Time”), as well as a possible pecedival relationship to language (“About Chinese Women”), on “maternal rhythms,” corresponding to “an intense echolalia.” Although not further elaborated, her thinking has the advantage of simultaneously acknowledging the problematic aspects both of idealizing motherhood or rejecting the symbolic.

71. See Winnicott, “The Location of Cultural Experience”: “From the beginning the baby has maximally intense experiences in the potential space between the subjective object and the object objectively perceived . . .” (p. 118).

72. Quoted in Winnicott’s “The Location of Cultural Experience.” According to Marion Milner, in “D. W. Winnicott and the Two-way Journey,” Winnicott said the aphorism was “to aid speculation upon the question, if play is neither inside, nor outside, where is it?” (p. 39).

73. Erik H. Erikson, “Womanhood and the Inner Space.”


75. Donna Bassin, “Woman’s Images of Inner Space.” Bassin demonstrates how the theme of self-discovery runs through women’s poetry. The view of psychoanalysis as a space in which to explore one’s own inner life and share it with an other contrasts with Freud’s archaeological metaphor in which the analyst is the phallic explorer uncovering the patient’s relics and delivering the mutative interpretation. It suggests how psychoanalysis may, at times, step out of the
discourse of knowledge as power. For the feminist critique of knowledge as power in psychoanalysis, see the essays in Bernheimer and Kahane (eds.), In Dora’s Case, and Jane Gallop, Reading Lacan.

76. Carol Gilligan and Eve Stern, “The Riddle of Femininity and the Psychology of Love.”


78. Ghent, “Masochism, Submission, and Surrender.”

CHAPTER 4: THE OEDIPAL RIDDLE


2. Much of the groundwork for Lasch’s position had already evolved in his earlier book, Haven in a Heartless World. Lasch’s work gave intellectual respectability to what might more properly be called the “popular” critiques of narcissism (e.g., Tom Wolfe, “The ‘Me’ Decade and the Third Great Awakening”) and public exposure to the psychoanalytic critiques (e.g., Simon Sobo, “Narcissism as a Function of Culture”). His arguments also differed, by his own account, from serious sociological critiques of this period in that he saw not individualism but “lack of privacy” as the problem. Here Lasch polarizes the issues: one either criticizes the invasion of public life by inappropriate forms of intimacy, as does Richard Sennett in The Fall of Public Man, or one correctly recognizes that “personal life has almost ceased to exist.” Thus he dismisses Sennett’s defense of bourgeois civility as a valid basis for public political life, while he himself clamors for the same bourgeois values in private life.

3. The interest in narcissistic pathology, in problems of regulating self-esteem and establishing a cohesive self or self-representation, began to take shape in the sixties (see Anne Reich, “Pathological Forms of Self-Esteem Regulation,” and Edith Jacobson, The Self and the Object World) and was flourishing by the time of Kohut’s publication of The Analysis of the Self in 1971.

4. Kohut’s The Restoration of the Self, Kernberg’s Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism, and more recently Modell’s Psychoanalysis in a New Context.

6. Freud elaborates this in The Ego and the Id.


8. In formulating his position, Lasch drew heavily on the more sophisticated arguments of the Frankfurt School which had been presented anew in the seventies by Russell Jacoby (see Social Amnesia). The main outlines of the thesis relating declining parental authority to loss of oedipal autonomy had been formulated by Horkheimer in his 1949 "Authority and the Family Today," and amplified by Marcuse in "The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man."


11. Joel Kovel suggests how the same intellectual tradition can lead to a different analysis of the family. He recognizes that capitalist development, particularly expanding commodity consumption, has not vitiated but stimulated the growth of personal life, so that the individual is frustrated in the home and confronts a depersonalized public world, which "is nowhere enriched... to the level of demand created by the development of the personal sphere" (Kovel, The Age of Desire, p. 117). See also M. Barrett and M. McIntosh, The Anti-Social Family.

12. The oedipal model is an internalization theory, in the sense that I discussed earlier, stressing identification with parental functions and ideals. Some psychoanalysts, like Otto Kernberg (see Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism), do give the superego an important role. But the formation of the superego is not the only aspect of internalization, and the force that controls insatiable desire and infantile wishes is a less popular concept than the ego that oversees differentiation between self and other. Lasch himself later criticized (see The Minimal Self) the overemphasis on the superego (while not specifically disavowing his position in The Culture of Narcissism) as he came to see that the issue takes a back seat to that of separation.

13. Juliet Mitchell, in Psychoanalysis and Feminism, states that the father is the necessary intermediary "if any relationship is to move out of a vicious circle," and his phallus "breaks up... the dyadic trap" (p. 397). The idea that the child remains trapped in the maternal dyad, a closed circle of the imaginary, unless the symbolic father (who can be presented mediatly by the mother) intervenes, means that mutual recognition is not possible within the dyad.

14. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 24: "The mother, who satisfies the child's hunger, becomes its first love-object and certainly also its first protection against all the undefined dangers which threaten it in the external world—its first protection against anxiety, we may say. In this function the mother is soon replaced by the stronger father, who retains that position for the rest of childhood."

15. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 73.

16. In The Culture of Narcissism, Lasch states: "The most convincing explanations of the psychic origins of this borderline syndrome draw on the theoretical tradition established by Melanie Klein. In her psychoanalytic investigations of children, Klein discovered that early feelings of overpowering rage, directed especially against the mother and secondarily against the internalized image of the mother as a ravenous monster, make it impossible for the child to synthesize 'good' and 'bad' parental images" (p. 83). Klein's theory has been used by Michael Rustin ("A Socialist Consideration of Kleinian Analysis") to make the opposite argument—namely, that good object relations generally enable the child to integrate destructive emotions. Lasch often moves in one breath from a reference to the image of the archaic mother to real "narcissistic" mothers: "Behind this image of the phallic father stands an even earlier attachment to the primitive mother, equally untempered by experiences that might reduce early fantasies to human scale. Narcissistic women seek to replace the absent father, whom the mother has castrated, and thus to reunite themselves with the mother of earliest infancy" (p. 299). Both the archaic mother image and the narcissistic ideal of an all-powerful father arise because of what the castrating mother does when the father is gone.

17. See George Devereux, in "Why Oedipus Killed Laius: A Note on the Complementary Oedipus Complex in Greek Drama," and Marie Balmary, Psychoanalyzing Psychoanalysis.
18. The firstborn son, unseated by the next sibling, also identifies with the father. Freud's own guilt at his murderous wishes toward his younger brother, which seemed to have been fulfilled when that brother died in infancy, may have led to his identification with Laius's infanticide, as his mix-up of fathers and brothers in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (see note below) suggests.


21. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, pp. 131–32: "This remorse was the result of the primordial ambivalence of feeling towards the father. His sons hated him, but they loved him, too. After their hatred had been satisfied by their act of aggression, their love came to the fore in their remorse for the deed. It set up the super-ego by identification with father; it gave that agency the father's power, as though as a punishment for the deed of aggression they had carried out against him, and it created the restrictions which were intended to prevent a repetition of the deed."


23. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 122–28. The idea of a dreaded primal father is rather undeveloped in psychoanalytic theory; it plays its largest role under a different name, the fear of homosexuality, which is a reaction to the unconscious fantasy of being the father's passive victim. This fantasy is not a function of the early preoedipal phase of identification but of an early oedipal phase involving the "negative Oedipus complex" with an anal-phallic father.

24. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 105. Freud states that it is only later, in the Oedipus complex, that the boy "notices that his father stands in his way with his mother. His identification with his father then takes on hostile coloring." As I shall point out, it is only with this hostile coloring that all the feelings ascribed to the son regarding the preoedipal father properly begin—the murderousness, the rivalry, the rebellion against authority.

25. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 112 and 113. What distinguishes ordinary identification from submission, Freud says, is whether we identify with the other in our ego or take the other as our ideal. But "with many people this differentiation within the ego does not go further than with children" (p. 110). For children the identification with the parent as ego and as ego ideal are not so different, and that is why childhood ideal love, if affirmed, can serve to build the ego, whereas in adulthood it generally only exacerbates the distance between ego and ideal.

26. T. W. Adorno, "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda." This analysis was applied to American mass culture in Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.

27. The Frankfurt theorists' own study of authoritarianism, *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al.), did not confirm the "fatherless" thesis about disappointment in a weak father: the liberal subjects were more critical of their parents; the authoritarian ones were uncritically idealizing of their parents.

28. Epigraph to Chassegue-Smirgel's *Sexuality and Mind* from Thomas Mann's 1930 story, "The Trees in the Garden."

29. For example, Hans Loewald writes in "Ego and Reality": "Against this threat of the maternal engulfment, the paternal position is no other threat or danger, but a powerful force" (p. 14).

30. Chassegue-Smirgel, "Freud and Female Sexuality."

31. Freud, "On Narcissism" and *The Ego and the Id*. See also Chassegue-Smirgel, *The Ego Ideal*.

32. Chassegue-Smirgel, *The Ego Ideal*.


34. Ibid., pp. 358–59; and Chassegue-Smirgel, *The Ego Ideal*, p. 76. In her later formulation in the book, Chassegue-Smirgel stresses the "progressive" function of the ego ideal as a compromise between primary narcissism and object rela-
tions, since the child's projection of his narcissism on to the parental ideal draws him closer to reality and encourages his development.


37. Honey and Broughton, "Feminine Sexuality: An Interview with Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel." Chasseguet-Smirgel makes this point about Lacan when suggesting how problematic is the use of Lacan by feminists.

38. Chasseguet-Smirgel, The Ego Ideal. She points out that the threat of castration is simply a reflection of the concrete recognition that, for both boys and girls, "compared with father I am too small, too impotent, I do not have what is required to satisfy mother"—a point also made by Horney in "The Dread of Woman." This idea of the narcissistic injury was originally developed by her colleague, Bela Grunberger, in Narcissism. Yet another way to look at this is that since the father's phallus is the object of the mother's desire, it represents the fact that the mother needs something outside of herself; thus she is not perfect, not omnipotent, and not the realization of the narcissistic ideal of self-completion.


40. The contradiction between external reality and unconscious fantasy cannot be ignored, or simply dissolved by saying that psychoanalysis deals only with fantasy. Rather we must try to account for the contradiction, to explain the inability to represent the mother in a more differentiated way.

41. Gilligan, In a Different Voice. See also Doris Bernstein, "The Female Super-ego: A Different Perspective," and J. Alpert and J. Spencer, "Morality, Gender and Analysis."

42. Chasseguet-Smirgel, The Ego Ideal, p. 31.

43. Ibid., p. 30: "In fact it falls principally to the mother—at least in the early stages of life—to encourage her child to project his ego ideal onto successively more evolved models." The idea that our narcissism develops, and what conditions foster that development, was highlighted in Kohut’s work (see The Restoration of the Self). By emphasizing the parent not only as ideal object, onto whom we project our narcissism, but also as mirroring object, who confirms our own sense of agency and self-esteem, Kohut contributed decisively to the idea of an evolving narcissism.

44. Chodorow (The Reproduction of Mothering) points out that the abstractness of paternal "positional" identification is also a source of idealization.

45. Chasseguet-Smirgel, "Some Thoughts on the Ego Ideal," p. 362. She reiterates this point in each of her later works, The Ego Ideal and Sexuality and Mind.

46. Chasseguet-Smirgel, Sexuality and Mind, pp. 87–89. Her assumption that this kind of perversion is the key to understanding fascism strikes me as problematic. By contrast, Klaus Theweleit, in his exhaustive study of early fascist militants, Male Fantasies, argues that the fascist has no experience of primary gratification or narcissistic fusion with the mother, nor does he seek such reunion by circumventing the father.

47. Chasseguet-Smirgel, "Freud and Female Sexuality" (p. 286) and "Some Thoughts on the Ego Ideal" (p. 371).


50. Stephanie Engel, "Femininity as Tragedy."

51. Ibid., p. 101.


53. Ibid., pp. 245–46.
54. Ibid., p. 192. In this regard Lasch did not alter his original position as presented in The Culture of Narcissism. For example, see pp. 299–301.

55. Chasseguet-Smirgel, “Perversion and the Universal Law.”

56. Lasch, The Minimal Self, p. 246. In a reply to his critics, “The Freudian Left and the Cultural Revolution,” Lasch claims that I propose as an alternative to patriarchal values as “women’s kinship and friendship networks, sisterhood, mutual recognition and nurturant activity,” values that could only be “institutionalized in a totalitarian setting . . .” (p. 30). In fact, I did not claim women’s solidarity and networks as an alternative but as the real basis of nineteenth-century family and socialization—what the fatherless-society critics regard as a “lost utopia” and mistakenly attribute to paternal authority; see my “Authority and the Family Revisited.”


58. Freud, “Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes.”

59. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 34.

60. See Freud’s discussion of homosexual libido, the ego ideal, and love of someone like the self, in “On Narcissism.”

61. Hans Loewald (“The Waning of the Oedipal Complex”) has also argued that the point of the oedipal prohibitions is to establish a “barrier between identification and object cathexis.” The important thing, in regard to a mother who can draw one back, is to make sure that one loves her only in one way, inside or outside, as it were.

62. Horney, “The Flight from Womanhood.” See also Dinnerstein’s discussion of this point in The Mermaid and the Minotaur.

63. Dinnerstein, in The Mermaid and the Minotaur (p. 43), speaks of “the mother-raised boy’s sense that the original, most primitive source of life will always lie outside himself.”

64. Chasseguet-Smirgel, “Freud and Female Sexuality.”


68. Gallop, The Daughter’s Seduction, p. 38. This is a reading of Irigaray’s essay from Speculum of the Other Woman. The blind spot is the vagina, obscured by the phallus; it is the blindness of Oedipus, who remains embedded in the phallic phase.


70. Chasseguet-Smirgel (“Freud and Female Sexuality,” p. 282) cites an argument of Joyce McDougall to the effect that the sight of castration would require the child to recognize “the role of the father’s penis and to accept the primal scene,” again referring us back to the primary importance of the father’s phallus rather than accepting the vagina for its own sake.

71. Chasseguet-Smirgel, “Freud and Female Sexuality.” I suggest that the best position regarding the Oedipus complex (as now theorized, it is the male complex) in the phallic phase is to consider it only one step toward accepting “reality,” for it only recognizes the rights of the father. A critical psychoanalytic view would find the phallic phase’s insistence on the exclusive rights of the male sex as a makeshift and defensive resolution to the dilemma of difference, which ought to be superseded in a later phase. It is evident that the failure of psychoanalysis thus far to delineate another equally important phase—the true “genital phase,” which Freud located in adolescence but never elaborated—implies a powerful statement about the limits of theory (and probably of development itself) under male supremacy.


73. Ibid., p. 106.
74. The loss of capacities associated with these identifications is more severe in those whose identity is more rigidly defined by gender. See Ricki Levenson, "Boundaries, Autonomy and Aggression."

75. The consequence of repressing this sense of bodily continuity may be, as Bataille implies, that the desire for it becomes tied to erotized images of death and murder. One might be justified in arguing that in male fantasy, love of death takes the place of primal continuity with others. On this, see Theweleit (Male Fantasies), who emphasizes the role played by denial of the body.

76. N. O. Brown, Life Against Death, p. 51. The upshot of this position is that all striving is Faustian restlessness and all sociability is repressive. In essence, this position represents a refusal to accept ambivalence, as accepting disillusionment along with hope. Brown, like Marcuse in Eros and Civilization, juxtaposes a repressive reality principle to the connection to the world achieved through primary narcissism. And so man's ultimate desire is, like the final salvation of Faust by "Dat ewig weibliche," (the eternal feminine), the image of the virgin mother.


78. Ibid., p. 757

79. This phrase from Braunschweig and Fain's Eros et Anteros is cited and discussed by Kernberg in Internal World and External Reality, p. 286.


81. Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex."

82. Descartes, Discourse on Method, p. 47.

CHAPTER 5: GENDER AND DOMINATION

1. See Sandra Harding and Meryl Hintikka, Discovering Reality, and Seyla Benhabib and Drusilla Cornell, eds., Feminism as Critique.


4. Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 85–87. This problem was further elaborated by other social theorists, such as Karl Mannheim in Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction.

5. For example, Max Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," p. 226. Lukacs's discussion of the penetration of culture and society by the commodity form is in his History and Class Consciousness.

6. Marx, in Capital I, shows how the commodity form, based on the exchange of equivalent value, serves to obscure the relation of domination—the fetishism of commodities.

7. Foucault's idea of discourse or "discursive practice" is developed in The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language. A discourse is not ideology, nor a result of some deeper structure; it is, itself, a system of power.


12. Ibid.
